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Document 1067 28th July 1986 
AGENDA 
of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session 
Paris, 1st-4th December 1986 
I. Political questions 
1. Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of 
the Council 
2. Developments in the Soviet Union and 
East-West relations 
11. Defence questions 
1. Threat assessment 
2. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first 
annual report of the Council 
3. European security and the Mediter-
ranean 
Ill. Technical and scientific questions 
European helicopters for the 1990s 
IV. Budgetary and administrative questions 
1. Accounts of the administrative expen-
diture of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1985 - the auditor's report and 
motion to approve the final accounts 
2. Revised draft budget of the adminis-
trative expenditure of the Assembly for 
the financial year 1986 
3. Draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1987 
V. Parliamentary and public relations 
1. Outline of a new booklet on Western 
European Union 
2. Parliamentary and public relations 
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Report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Close on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration 
Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration 
Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration 
Report tabled by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges on 
behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations 
Report tabled by Mr. Terlezki on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions 
Document 1068 28th November 1986 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session 
Paris, 1st-4th December 1986 
MONDAY, 1st DECEMBER 
Meetings of political groups 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
3.45 p.m. 
4.30 p.m. 
1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary 
session (Document 1 068). 
5. Action by the Presidential Committee (Document 1 083): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the !Assembly. 
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
7. Address by Mr. Mollemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the F:ederal Republic of 
Germany. I 
8. Threat assessment (Document 1076): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
9. Address by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO. 
10. Threat assessment: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY, 2nd DECEMBER 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the 
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Document 1069): 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
2. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1 the financial year 
1986 (Document 1071 ): 
1 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
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3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
(Document 1 072): 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
10.30 a.m. 
4. Presentation of the first part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council by Mr. Poos, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council (Document 
1074). 
5. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-first annual report (Document 1 078): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council: 
Resumed debate. 
3.30 p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France. 
3. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Document 1075): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
4. Political activities of the Council - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council; 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council: 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
5. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 
1986; 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987: 
Votes on the draft budgets. 
6. Accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 - the auditor's report and motion to 
approve the final accounts: 
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts. 
WEDNESDAY, 3rd DECEMBER 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
10 a.m. 
1. European helicopters for the 1990s (Document 1 077): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
2. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg. 
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3. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurem~nt of the United 
Kingdom. 
4. European helicopters for the 1990s: 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. European helicopters for the 1990s: 
Resumed debate. 
3.30 p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy. 
3. European helicopters for the 1990s: 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
4. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union (Document 1081): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges on behalf of ~he Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
5. Parliamentary and public relations (Document 1080): 
I 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Terlezki on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
6. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations (Document 1079): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Close on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
THURSDAY, 4th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
European security and the Mediterranean (Document 1073): 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Comnllittee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION 
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Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1985 
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Letter from the President of the Assembly 
to the Auditor submitting the accounts 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 
23rd June 1986 
Sir, 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a deficit 
ofF 136 098, whereas the summary of income and 
expenditure shows an excess of expenditure of 
F 151 463. The difference between these two figu-
res, F 15 365, represents the deficit of receipts over 
those estimated made up as follows: 
In accordance with Article 13 of the Finan-
cial Regulations of the WEU Assembly, I have the 
honour to submit to you the accounts for the finan-
cial year 1985 in accordance with the statements 
attached hereto which refer to: 
1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure -
financial position as at 31st December 
1985 (Appendix I) ; 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11) ; 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill); 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
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Bank interest 
Sundry receipts 
F 
265 145 
64 695 
Sale of publications 33 541 
Levy on the salaries 
of Grade A staff 64 284 
Contributions 71tfo 397 970 
Receipts for 1985 
estimated in the 
budget 
F 
825 635 
841 000 
- 15 365 
3. Excess expenditure under Heads 11 and V 
of the operating budget and under Head I of the 
pensions budget amounting to F 277 610 has been 
met by transfer~ from other heads of the budget. 
4. All contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
December 1985. 
5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund 
are incorporated with those of the other organs 
of WEU and the entire fund is administered by 
the Secretary-General in consultation with the 
Clerk of the Assembly. 
On 31st December 1985 these amounts total-
led F 3 222 858 as shown at Appendix IV. On that 
date there remained two loans to two staff mem-
bers amounting to F 453 144. 
The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up within 
WEU and from outside bankers on the investment 
of the funds. On 31st December 1985 the fund was 
held by Montagu Investment Management Limi-
ted in London. 
I have the honour to be, 
Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
J.-M. CARO 
President of the Assembly 
Sir Gordon DowNEY, K.C.B. 
National Audit Office 
Audit House 
Victoria Embankment 
LONDON EC4Y ODS 
Letter from the external Auditor to the President 
of the Assembly submitting the accounts 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 
14th August 1986 
Dear Monsieur Caro, 
I have the honour to submit the accounts of 
the Assembly of Western European Union for the fi-
nancial year 1985, together with my opinion thereon. 
As required by Article 15 of the Financial 
Regulations, I also enclose my report which takes 
into account the comments made in your letter of 
11th July 1986. 
Monsieur Jean-Marie CARO 
President of the Assembly 
Western European Union 
Yours sincerely, 
Gordon DOWNEY 
43, avenue du President Wilson 
75775 PARIS Cedex 16 
15 
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Report of the external Auditor to the 
Assembly of Western Europfan Union on the 
accounts for the financial year 1985 
I 
1. I have audited the accoUJilts of the Assembly 
of Western European Union for the financial year 
1985 in accordance with Artide 14 of the Finan-
cial Regulations of the Assembly. My examination 
included an appraisal of the Assembly's financial 
procedures and was supported !Jy such tests of the 
records and transactions as appeared to me to be 
necessary. 
Budgetary out-~rn 
2. The budget provided for expenditure of 
F 16 311 900 of which F 841 <*> was expected to 
be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the 
balance by contributions. Actual expenditure in the 
year amounted to F 16 447 99$. Income amoun-
ted to F 16 296 535 comprising F 15 470 900 from 
contributions and F 825 635 from miscellaneous 
receipts. There was thus an exc~ss of expenditure 
over income of F 151 463 arising from a budge-
tary over-spend ofF 136 098 (as shown at Appen-
dix 11) and shortfall in miscellaneous receipts of 
F 15 365. 
3. The budgetary over-spend of F 136 098 
comprised over-spends on Part I Head 11 
(F 89 307), Head Ill (F 14. 735), Head V 
(F 77 520) and Part 11 Head I (F 110 783), total-
ling F 419 345 of which F 283 247 was met from 
savings on other heads. The Financial Regulations 
do not provide for budget transfers between heads 
of expenditure but I note that the Western Euro-
pean Council, who sets the Assembly's budget, was 
notified of the transfers in May 1986 in accordance 
with the usual procedure. 
4. The over-spend is attributable to the cost 
(F 151 463) of the Assembly's share of security 
improvement work at the Paris h~adquarters. This 
work was approved by the Council of the Wes-
tern European Union but there was no provision 
for its cost in the Assembly's bucjlget for 1985 and 
a supplementary budget was not sought. The 
Council was informed of this situation and agreed 
in March 1986 that the Assem~y's 1984 budget 
surplus ofF 168 190 could be retained to meet the 
cost of this work in order to avoid the need to call 
for additional budget contributiqms. I have there-
fore accepted without qualification of my certifi-
cate the position where, contrary to Article 5 of 
the Financial Regulations, the Assembly incurred 
expenditure in excess of the budgetary credits 
DOCUMENT 1069 
approved but I trust that should a similar situa-
tion arise in the future a supplementary budget will 
be submitted to the Council for approval. 
5. I also draw attention to the treatment of the 
cost (F 223 158) of a 1985 pay award for Grade 
A officials which was paid in March 1986. 
F 145 352 of this was charged to the 1985 budget 
and the balance, F 80 806 to the 1986 budget. The 
Council approved this accounting treatment in 
March 1986 on the basis that the Assembly will 
submit a supplementary budget for 1986 to regu-
larise the situation. This supplementary budget will 
also modify the salary estimates for 1986 to take 
account of the higher than expected pay award. 
6. I wish to record my appreciation for the co-
operation and assistance extended by the President 
and staff of the Assembly during my tenure of 
office as the external Auditor of the Assembly. 
Gordon DoWNEY 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
14th August 1986 
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Financial statements of the Assembly of 
Western European Union for the year ended 
31st December 1985 
Audit opinion 
I have examined the appended financial sta-
tements (Appendix I) of the Assembly of Western 
European Union, comprising the summary of 
income and expenditure and the statement of assets 
and liabilities for the year ended 31st December 
1985, in accordance with Article 14 of the Finan-
cial Regulations of the Assembly. As a result of 
the examination I am of the opinion that the finan-
cial statements present fairly the financial position 
of the Assembly as at 31st December 1985 and the 
results of its operations for the period then ended; 
and that the transactions were in accordance with 
the Financial Regulations and legislative authority. 
Gordon DoWNEY 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
14th August 1986 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1985 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) ............ . 
Miscellaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest ........................................... . 
Sundry receipts ......................................... . 
Sale of publications ..................................... . 
Levy on salaries of grade A officials 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (70J'o) ...................................... . 
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.) ... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation .................... . 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads 11, Ill, 
V and Part 11, I ...................................... . 
Total expenditure (see Appendix 11) ....................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ........................ . 
15 470 900 
2~5 145 
64 695 
33 541 
64 284 
397 970 
825 635 
16 296 535 
16 3]1 900 
136 098 
16 447 998 
F - 151 463 
Financial position as at 31st December 1985 
Assets 
Cash at bank ........................................... . 
Sundry advances ........................................ . 
Accounts receivable ..................................... . 
Liabilities 
Accounts payable 
Excess expenditure over income ........................... . 
Jean-Marie CARO 
President of the Assembly 
Certified correct : 
Georges MouLIAS 
Clerk of the Assembly 
17 
190 718 
538 735 
q8 210 
F 
1 009 126 
- 1~1 463 
F 
857 663 
857 663 
Dudiey SMITH 
Chairman of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration 
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AP 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDIT 
(in I 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1985 1 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 Basic salaries 6 330 000 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 555 000 
2.2. Household allowance 253 ()()() 
/ 
I 
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons 200 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 25 ()()() 
2.5. Education allowance 90 000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 ()()() 
2.7. Overtime 50()()() 
2.8. Home leave 20 000 
Sub-Head 3 Social charges 
3.1. Social security 845 ()()() 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 227 ()()() 
3.3. Provident fund 120 ()()() 
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of 
permanent officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidatures for vacant posts 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent officials and their families 
4.3. Removal expenses 
4.4. Installation allowance 
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination 8 ()()() 
Total of Head I 8 725 000 
1. Documents 1001 and A/WEU/BA (85) 7. 
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~11 
0 UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1985 
:s) 
Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
3 678 6 326 322 
7 774 562 774 
~- 2 542 250 458 
. 1 634 201 634 
3 192 28 192 
8 849 81 151 
4 506 6 506 
13 860 63 860 
5 519 14 481 
6 317 838 683 
12 633 214 367 
3 662 123 662 
658 658 
4 947 4 947 
695 7 305 
40 233 40 233 8 725 000 
19 
APPENDIX Il 
Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
6 307 484 18 838 
562 774 -
250 458 -
201 634 -
28 192 -
81 151 -
6 506 -
63 860 -
14 481 -
838 683 -
214 367 -
123 662 -
I 
I 
658 -
4 947 -
i 
7 305 -
8 706 162 18 838 
DOCUMENT 1069 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1985 
HEAD 11 -TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head 6 Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly 
6.1. Sittings service 868 ()()() 
6.2. Interpretation service 298 ()()() 
6.3. Translation service 634 ()()() 
6.4. Other services 50()()() 
~ 
Sub-Head 7 Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between 
sessions 350 ()()() 
~ 
Sub-Head 8 Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 60000 
Sub-Head 9 Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 4 ()()() 
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters 83 ()()() 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 2 800 
Total of Head 11 2 349 800 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 10 Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises 430 ()()() 
Sub-Head 11 Hire of committee rooms 15 ()()() 
Sub-Head 12 Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions 315 ()()() 
Sub-Head 13 Various services for the organisation of sessions 27 000 
Sub-Head 14 Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the 
Clerk 15 ()()() 
Sub-Head 15 Purchase or repair of office furniture 10 ()()() 
Sub-Head 16 Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment 75 ()()() 
Sub-Head 17 Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office 
equipment 272 ()()() 
Total of Head Ill 1 159 ()()() 
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APPENDIX 11 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
39 275 907 275 908 667 1- 1 3921 
3 440 294 560 294 560 -
17 334 616 666 616 666 -
15 646 34 354 34 354 -
~ 
' 350 ()()() 437 915 1- 87 915 I 
2 726 62 726 62 726 -
295 3 705 3 705 -
4 957 78 043 78 043 -
329 2471 2471 -
42 001 42 001 2 349 800 2 439 107 1- 89 3071 
430 ()()() 539 357 1- 109 357 I 
10 889 4 111 4 111 -
10 093 325 093 325 093 -
5 348 32 348 38 392 
.1- 6 0441 
2 222 17 222 17 222 -
10 ()()() 36 334 1- 26 3341 
3 003 71 997 71 997 -
3 771 268 229 268 229 -
17 663 17 663 1 159 ()()() 1 300 735 I - 141 735 I 
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PART I : OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1985 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents 480 000 
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office 
supplies 238 000 
Sub-Head 20 Printing and publication of documents 1 318 000 
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents 44800 ~ 
Sub-Head 22 Official cars 60 000 ' 
Sub-Head 23 Bank charges 500 
Total of Head IV 2 141 300 
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the 
President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs 139000 
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation 160 000 
Sub-Head 26 Committee study missions 3 300 
Sub-Head 27 Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk 310 000 
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor 70 000 
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information 275 000 
Sub-Head 30 Expenses for political groups 273 000 
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided 
for 3 000 
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes 20 000 
Total of Head V 1 253 300 
Total 15 628 400 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
480 000 469 188 10 812 
13 573 251 573 251 573 -
68 523 1 249 477 996 382 253 095 
~ 1 301 46 101 46 101 -
' 
53 649 113 649 113 649 -
500 - 2 502 
68 523 68 523 2 141 300 1 876 891 264 409 
32 828 106 172 106 172 -
27 433 187 433 187 433 -
2 181 1 119 1 119 -
29 701 339 701 417 221 1- 77 s2o I 
34 679 104 679 104 679 -
49 894 225 106 225 106 -
273 000 273 000 
600 2400 2 400 -
6 310 13 690 13690 -
91 813 91 813 1 253 300 1 330 820 1- 77 s2o I 
260 233 260 233 15 628 400 15 653 715 1- 2s 315 I 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET Total budget for 1985 
HEAD I - PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES 
Sub-Head 1 Pensions and leaving allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 402 000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 181 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 43 500 
A 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions r ' 
1.5. Leaving allowances · 
Sub-Head 2 Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 18 000 
2.2. Children's and dependants' allowances 22 000 
2.3. Education allowances 5 000 
Sub-Head 3 Supplementary insurance 12 000 
Total of Head I 683 500 
Total 16 311 900 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1985, and paid for up 
Jean-Marie CARO 
President of the Assembly 
24 
Geor1 
Clerk of, 
Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
402 000 
181 000 
64 43 436 
. 
23 17 977 
22 000 
5 000 
87 12 087 
87 87 683 500 
260 320 260 320 16 311 900 
March 1986, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
ULIAS 
embly 
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Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
418 287 - 16 287 
186 928 1- 5 9281 
43 436 -
I 
79 751 I - 79 751 I 
17 977 -
23 016 I - 1 o16 I 
12 495 I - 7 4951 
12 393 I - 3061 
794 283 1- 110 783 I 
16 447 998 , I - 136 o98 I 
Dudley , SMITH 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1985 
Contributions Budget surplus Budget Net Member states 600ths overpaid 1984 for 1985 contributions in 1984 (Revised) required 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 508 744 (-) 16 539 1 521 305 2 013 510 
France 120 (-) 350 967 (-) 33 638 3 094 180 2 709 575 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 350 967 (-) 33 638 3 094 180 2 709 575 
Italy 120 (-) 350 967 (-) 33 638 3 094 180 2 709 575 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 5 849 (-) 560 51 570 45 161 
Netherlands 59 (-) 172 560 (-) 16 539 1 521 305 1 332 206 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 350 967 (-) 33 638 3 094 180 2 709 575 
600 (-) 1 073 533 (-) 168 190 15 470 900 14 229 177 
Amounts prud by the Secretanat-General to the Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 302 710 
1984 budget surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 190 
1985 budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 470 900 
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APPENDIX IV 
PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1985 
in French francs 
F F 
Balance brought forward: 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st 1 anuary 1985 2 761 413 Management fee 15 394 
Contributions of staff members and of the 
Assembly of Western European Union 182 337 Withdrawals 8 300 
Repayments of loans by staff members 80 946 Loss on valuation at 31st December 1985 10 186 
Interest received during the year 
Jean-Marie CARO 
President of the Assembly 
232 042 Accounts of existing 
31st December 1985 
3 256 738 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
staff members as at 
3 222 858 
3 256 738 
Dudley SMITH 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1985. 
14th August 1986 
---
Gordon DowNEY 
Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom 
External Auditor 
0 
0 
~ 
t:r1 
z 
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Document 1069, Addendum 15th September 1986 
Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1985 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1985 1 
The Assembly, 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1985, together with 
the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial 
responsibility. 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee : Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Sinesio, Bohl (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beysen, Chartron, 
Declercq, Dhaille, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson, Haase, Linster (Alternate: Hengel), Morris, Oehler, Mrs. 
Pack, MM. Pollidoro, Rauti, Stokes (Alternate: Rees), van Tets, de Vries, Zierer. 
N.B. : The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Meeting between the Committee for Relations with the Council 
and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
MEMORANDUM 
by Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly, 
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 15th September 1986 
1. Almost two years after the Rome declara-
tion, much uncertainty or obscurity still sur-
rounds the nature, extent and scope the seven 
governments intend to accord to the reactivation 
\ of WEU. On the occasion of the meeting 
, between the Council and the Assembly in Venice 
and again at the first part of the thirty-second 
session of the Assembly, this uncertainty and 
obscurity caused some doubt to be voiced, par-
ticularly in the press, about whether the Seven 
were truly determined to give WEU new 
tasks. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 
the Secretary-General of WEU and the ministers 
who spoke during the session nevertheless reaf-
firmed this determination, and the Assembly's 
Presidential Committee for its part wishes to 
convey to the Council its opinion on the steps it 
believes the latter should take to carry it into 
effect. 
2. In any event, the Assembly wishes to be 
given a prior assurance that the aims of the 
reactivation of WEU remain unchanged in the 
Council's political programme. 
1. Promotion of a European political area 
3. The Rome declaration made it clear, on 
the one hand, that it was towards the political 
area that the Seven intended to direct the activi-
ties of WEU and, on the other hand, that WEU 
should not duplicate the work of other bodies, 
thus allowing a wider base to be given to the 
building of a European union. Inter alia, this 
implied that the WEU Council would not inter-
fere in matters handled by the Twelve. 
4. While admitting that it should be ensured 
that each institution keeps to its own area of 
responsibility, it must be noted that this fear of 
duplication is voiced almost only in regard to 
WEU although so far it has hardly impinged 
upon other European organisations. In many 
cases, therefore, it may be wondered whether this 
does not conceal a bias against the reactivation 
ofWEU, i.e. the existence ofEurope in the areas 
for which WEU is responsible. 
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5. In any event, the applicatton of these prin-
ciples shows that there is some qncertainty about 
which matters should be tackled by the Seven 
and which by the Twelve. As a result, no satis-
factory action has yet been taken on some ques-
tions because twelve-power p<i>litical consulta-
tions associate countries whose security policies 
are not homogenous enough a~d because their 
discussions are not followed uv by an interna-
tional secretariat. 
6. If it is accepted that the Twelve now form 
the area in which a European political union is to 
be set up, it must be noted that they are not able 
to ensure application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty which is the basis of Eqrope in security 
matters. Hence the European political area has 
to be organised, account being taken of these 
facts and maximum use being made of the possi-
bilities offered by WEU to give Europe a content 
which cannot now be defined in the framework 
of the Twelve. 
7. This means applying *e principle of 
avoiding duplication among the European insti-
tutions not by a division of work between the 
Seven and the Twelve but by reasonable co-ordi-
nation between them. Keeping the Twelve 
informed ofWEU's activities is ~ne way of doing 
this but it must not remain the ionly one and in 
order to produce more conviricing results for 
European political co-operation ~he WEU Coun-
cil must not hesitate to take up matters tackled in 
a wider framework, particularly when it is a mat-
ter of contributing to Europe's. security, as the 
Assembly proposed in response to the develop-
ment of international terrorism. The decision 
taken by the Public Administration Committee 
in May 1986 to follow up the Italian proposal to 
study " the organisation of government in the 
face of terrorism " in 1987 shows that there are 
areas in which WEU can play this role. 
8. The present recrudescence of international 
terrorism emphasises the permanent nature of 
this threat to our civilisation. It is for the Coun-
cil, under Article VIII of the mbdified Brussels 
Treaty, to ensure that the WEU member coun-
tries co-ordinate the measures of prevention and 
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repression they have to take to counter it. This 
situation can but add weight to the proposal 
addressed by the President of the Assembly to 
the Council on 17th April 1986, which the 
Assembly endorsed by adopting Recommenda-
tion 435, to " concert the action taken by mem-
ber countries so as to deter effectively any coun-
try from affording assistance or encouragement 
to organisations practising terrorism ". 
9. The development of meetings of political 
directors from the ministries for foreign affairs of 
the Seven at the close of meetings of the Twelve 
on political co-operation would be one means of 
moving in this direction. This should be prac-
tised in particular in the event of serious threats 
to international peace and in any case 
communiques should be issued about meetings 
held in the context of WEU. The participation 
of the Secretary-General of WEU in twelve-
power political consultations might also promote 
fruitful co-operation between the two bodies. 
10. In accordance with the wishes expressed 
by the Council, the Assembly for its part has 
started to develop its relations with the European 
Parliament and with the North Atlantic Assem-
bly, as well as with the parliaments of the Euro-
pean member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, 
with a view to improving the organisation of the 
European political area at parliamentary level. 
2. Promotion of a European policy on defence and 
armaments, the limitation of armaments 
and the military use of space 
11. This was the main aim which the seven 
governments assumed in the Rome declaration. 
Since then, the Council's activities have fallen 
well short of this goal. While welcoming the 
fact that the Council's thirty-first annual report 
refers to its conclusions on the American strate-
gic defence initiative, the Assembly has asked the 
Council to direct its work in a number of direc-
tions, with the assistance of its specialised 
agencies. These would include: 
- promoting European co-operation in 
research on and development and pro-
duction of defence equipment involving 
use of advanced technology (Recom-
mendations 416, 419, 423, 436 and 
437); 
- promoting a true European policy on 
the limitation of armaments; 
- developing research to master the space 
dimension with a view to starting a 
European programme for Europe to 
increase its capabilities in space matters 
where progress with the SDI might give 
the United States an overwhelming lead 
(Recommendations 413 and 414); 
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- following up the report on WEU and 
public awareness (Recommendation 
411); 
- stipulating the specific role of each of 
the bodies responsible for promoting 
European armaments co-operation on 
the basis of agreements between chiefs-
of-staff on tactical requirements, com-
mon logistical requirements and the 
technical details of interoperability 
based on an analysis of the threat 
adopted by the Seven (Recommenda-
tions 416 and 423); 
- in the countries concerned, co-ordinat-
ing the measures of deterrence, preven-
tion and repression which have had to 
be taken because of the development of 
terrorism (Recommendation 435). 
3. Co-operation with the United States 
12. The major role played by the United 
States in ensuring Western Europe's security 
makes it essential to determine Europe's require-
ments in order to hold a continuing dialogue 
between the United States and a European 
partner. This is being conducted mainly in 
NATO and in the context of bilateral relations 
which allows the United States to obtain too 
many economic advantages thanks to its military 
strength. However, if, in the Atlantic Alliance 
and in areas not covered by the alliance, Europe 
wishes to play a role which corresponds to its 
geographical situation, its economic resources, 
its ability to defend itself and its efforts for joint 
security, it must, in external policy and defence 
and disarmament matters provide itself with the 
wherewithal to define and defend its interests 
through collective action, as it has succeeded in 
doing in the Community's area of responsibil-
ity. 
13. WEU cannot claim to be a European pillar 
of the alliance if the Council does not assert itself 
as the United States' partner by voicing Europe's 
view both on matters tackled in the framework 
of NATO, including alliance strategy, arma-
ments, arms limitation and disarmament, and in 
regard to the threats to international peace aris-
ing outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. 
With this in mind, the Assembly has proposed 
several times that the Council meet prior to 
meetings of the North Atlantic Council. It has 
also stressed the importance it attaches to minis-
~ers of defence regularly attending Council meet-
mgs. 
14. The Council should develop its activities 
in regard to the American authorities to show 
them that WED's work is in the interests of the 
alliance as a whole and of the United States itself 
/ 
I 
by allowing Europe to express itself with a single 
voice capable of warning the United States Gov-
ernment about any measures which might divide 
the members of the Atlantic Alliance or 
jeopardise Europe's fundamental interests in all 
areas. 
4. The enlargement of WEU 
15. At the request of the Council, the Assem-
bly is developing its relations with the parlia-
ments of European countries members of the 
Atlantic Alliance, several of which send observ-
ers to its sessions. However, it is evident that 
for countries which have applied for member-
ship of WEU and those showing a real interest in 
its activities, this method of participation can 
but be a transitional measure. The Assembly 
expects the Council to say forthwith what action 
it intends to take on Portugal's application for 
membership and on the results of the Spanish 
referendum. Its decisions on these matters will 
give public opinion a better idea of its views on 
the role WEU is destined to play in setting up a 
European union associating WEU's security and 
defence responsibilities with the Communities' 
economic responsibilities (Recommendation 
432). 
16. The Council's favourable response to the 
enlargement of WEU, in accordance with the 
Assembly's expectations, will show whether the 
Council is still attached to the reactivation of 
WEU as provided for in the Rome declaration. 
5. The Secretariat-General and the agencies 
17. While there is no doubt that the 
Secretariat-General, as a consequence of the 
Rome declaration, has extended its field of 
action considerably, it is not so clear that the new 
agencies have so far had to play a role corre-
sponding to WEU's operational requirements as 
envisaged in the Rome declaration. The crea-
tion of such agencies implied that WEU effec-
tively exercised certain responsibilities and also 
that the Council left them a free enough hand to 
allow them to take meaningful action in the areas 
assigned to them. 
18. (a) For the reports to be really useful, the 
task of reporting at short notice on the various 
subjects assigned to them by the Council implies 
certain requirements which do not yet seem to be 
fully met. 
1. The Council must first develop definite 
tasks before asking the agencies for 
assistance. The reports submitted to it 
31 
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should be considered and effectively 
followed up in the context of its normal 
work. 
I 
2. The agencies must be required to follow 
continuously the matters they have to 
study so as to build up the necessary 
documentation and competence to be 
able to work to good avail. They must 
have the means necessbry for acquiring 
information in member countries and 
international organi~tions and for 
processing it. In paaticular, NATO 
and the IEPG should be instructed to 
give them all necessary support. 
3. The Council must inform the Assembly 
and public opinion of the content of 
these reports without delay, subject 
only to the restrictions ~mposed by clas-
sified defence information (Recom-
mendation 432). 
19. (b) The necessary continuity of the agencies' 
action means that, in addition to their task of 
keeping the Council informed, lthey must have 
permanent tasks in the context ofWEU's general 
vocation (Recommendation 432). 
1. Agency I for disarmap1ent questions 
should be instructed tQ assist the dele-
gations of all member countries in dis-
armament negotiations in which they 
take part, particularly in the United 
Nations and the CSCE. It should take 
part in preparing directives for the 
negotiations and should follow official 
and unofficial negotiation sessions in 
order to be able to play an effective 
role. This means the agency giving 
member countries every guarantee that 
the secrecy of inform._tion communi-
cated to it is respecte~ and that the 
basis of any co-operation between the 
agencies and the Ass~mbly must be 
clear enough to ensurd that the latter 
cannot be suspected of leaks. 
2. Agency II for defence qlestions should 
be instructed to co-prdinate work 
undertaken in the v~rious member 
countries to keep public opinion 
informed of defence problems with a 
view to making it better aware of their 
European dimension. The Assembly 
has often stressed the interest of this 
task which correspohds to views 
endorsed by the Seven in the Rome 
declaration. While ghring favourable 
answers to Assembly· recommenda-
tions, the Council has so far done noth-
ing to follow them up (Recommenda-
tions 429 and 432). 
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3. Agency Ill for the development of 
armaments co-operation differs from 
the others in that its research role is a 
secondary one. It is responsible for 
following the progress of European 
armaments co-operation. Where nec-
essary, it has to follow and analyse 
work conducted elsewhere on the com-
parison of equipment requirements and 
relevant specifications and on the pre-
sent situation. Finally, it has to study 
the armaments sector of industries in 
member countries. For this purpose, 
it should first continue the work under-
taken by the international secretariat of 
the SAC and ensure that governments 
follow up their conclusions, which has 
not so far been the case, some of these 
studies, particularly the one on legal 
obstacles to co-operation, involving leg-
islative decisions. -Just as, generally 
speaking, American legislation reserves 
the United States army's procurement 
for the country's own industries, princi-
ples should similarly be defined for 
European preference without any 
protectionist policy. Agency Ill 
should also be given the permanent 
task of studying all matters raised by 
the transfer between allies of 
armaments-related technology. 
Finally, the 1955 text setting up the 
SAC should be re-examined to ensure 
that that body's new terms of reference 
take account of the vocation of the 
IEPG and of the fact that WEU has a 
political vocation: preparation of the 
European union. 
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6. Council and Assembly 
20. The Assembly is gratified that the 
Luxembourg presidency has agreed to maintain a 
ministerial presence throughout the second part 
of the thirty-second session. It trusts this will 
allow the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to 
speak during each debate in order to present the 
Council's view. Above all, it trusts that this 
experience will be continued to allow a non-stop 
dialogue between Council and Assembly on the 
principal matters on the agenda of sessions. 
21. Conversely, the Assembly was not very 
satisfied with its exchanges with the Council in 
the first half of 1986, mainly because of the inad-
equate use the Council made of its thirty-first 
annual report to inform the Assembly of its 
activities. It can but repeat its requests for 
fuller, more frequent and more systematic infor-
mation and for the press to be kept regularly and 
fully informed of Council meetings. 
22. Finally, it has to recall that the reactiv-
ation of WEU and the new interest shown in the 
organisation by certain countries and many asso-
ciations have already led to a considerable 
increase in the work incumbent on the Office of 
the Clerk and in the Assembly's budgetary 
constraints. The prospects of WEU being 
enlarged will add to this. Consideration must 
be given to the requirements which these new 
burdens already represent and which will 
become even greater for the Assembly's staff, 
equipment, premises and budget, and a remedy 
must first of all be found to a trend which has led 
to the resources available to the Assembly dimin-
ishing just when its work is increasing. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. There are several reasons for having to revise the budget for the financial year 1986: some are due 
to political decisions of the Assembly or its organs, others stem from decisions of the Council concern-
ing in particular the financial regulation of expenditure through the application of the 215th report of 
the Co-ordinating Committee. 
A specific reference must therefore be made to the documents which reflect these decisions in 
order to justify the request for additional credits in the draft revised budget for 1986. 
2. During the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session, the Assembly recommended that the 
Council " give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new grade B3 posts which are 
given top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986" (cf. Recommendation 433, paragraph 4, 
Appendix I). 
Further to this recommendation, this draft revised budget repeats the proposal to create these two 
new posts, the need for which is still a top priority. It suffices to recall that one of these two posts is to 
strengthen the administrative and accounts service ofthe Office of the Clerk- which at the moment has 
only one grade B6 official- and the other will allow the secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations (whose responsibilities within this committee have been increased and above all 
he is now responsible for the research service) to be helped by an assistant specifically assigned to this 
sector of work. 
In view of the necessary administrative time-lag in procedure for approving this draft revised 
budget, the creation of these two new posts cannot take effect before December 1986. The financial 
repercussions have therefore been calculated on the basis of one month's salary and allowances, i.e. 
F 25 000 (Sub-Heads 1, 2 and 3 of Head I). 
3. At its meeting on 29th Aprill986, the Bureau ofthe Assembly decided inter alia to give Mr. Bur-
chard the task of head of the research service in addition to his present duties and to ask for his promo-
tion to grade A4. In a letter of 18th June 1986, the President of the Assembly informed the Secretary-
General, underlining that it was both a matter of recognising the increased responsibilities ofthis official 
and of fulfilling an undertaking towards the German Delegation. This promotion, which would take 
effect as from 1st July 1986, had a financial implication ofF 4 800. 
It should be specified that the other promotions considered by the Bureau will be examined in the 
near future by the Presidential Committee in the context of a full study of the restructuration of the 
Office of the Clerk. 
The new list of staff of the Office of the Clerk as at 1st September 1986 is given in the table at 
Appendix 11. 
4. In application of the measures approved by the Council (cf. documents CB (86) 3 of 17th Feb-
ruary 1986, Appendix Ill, and CB (86) 3, confirmation of 26th March 1986, Appendix IV), the following 
additional sums are requested: 
(a) In Head I of the operating budget 
F 80 800 (rounded down) to finance the part of the salary adjustments of A grades which 
could not be met from the 1985 budget and was attributed to the 1986 budget; 
F 200 000 for the amended salary estimates for 1986 which had been calculated at a level 
lower than the one subsequently agreed upon on the basis of the 215th report of the Co-ordi-
nating Committee; 
(b) In Head I of the pensions budget 
F 43 000 for the amended estimates of pensions for 1986 as a consequence of the application 
of the report of the abovementioned Co-ordinating Committee. 
However, this expenditure is partly offset by increased receipts from contributions to the pen-
sion scheme of permanent staff assessed at F 15 000. 
Appendices V and VI show the calculations made to assess these additional appropriations. 
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5. Conversely, no amounts are requested under the same head for salaries of interpreters and tempo-
rary sittings staff recruited for sessions at A level since it is possible to offset excess expenditure by bud-
getary savings. 
6. Finally an additional amount ofF 80 000 is requested under Sub-Head 7 of Head 11 - Interpre-
ters. This amount is essential for carrying out the programme of committee meetin~s outside Paris. 
It is underlined that the initial sum ofF 400 000 granted by the Council was [argely taken up by 
the organisation of the committee session in Venice and by various study journeys by committees to the 
United States, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, etc. Without this amount, the Presi-
dential Committee would be obliged to revise the programme of work of each committee and cancel 
journeys already authorised. 
Furthermore, it will not be possible to organise a second committee session in the autumn or 
other meetings outside Paris in 1986. 
7. In conclusion, the total supplementary credits requested amount to F 418 600, i.e. 2.49% of the 
net total initial budget for 1986. 
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Revised draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head I - Permanent staff 
Sua-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries .......................... . 
2 - Allowances ............................ . 
3 - Social charges ......................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
Draft budget 
for 1986 
(initial) 
6 690 000 
1 300 000 
1 250 000 
Draft budget 
for 1986 
(revised) 
6 897 800 
1 337 400 
1 315 400 
departure of permanent officials . . . . . . . . . . 180 000 180 000 
Difference 
207 800 
37 400 
65 400 
5 - Medical examination .................... t-----8_0_00_-+----8_00_0_-+-------1 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 428 000 9 738 600 
Head II- Temporary staff 
Sua-HEAD·: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
1 950 000 1 950 000 
work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 000 480 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 80 000 80 000 
310 600 
80000 
9 - Social charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 000 81 000 
~----------+-----------~----------~ 
Total.................................. 2 511000 2 591000 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
Sua-HEAD: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris pre-
mises ................................. . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for Assem-
bly sessions ........................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of ses-
sions ................................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of 
the Clerk .............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .... . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ............................ . 
17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
430 000 
15 000 
340 000 
45 000 
15 000 
25 500 
94 800 
430 000 
15 000 
340 000 
45 000 
15 000 
25 500 
94 800 
80000 
other office equipment .................. t---....;;.3-'-9-'-0--'-8_00_-+----'-3-'-90--'-80.::...0"---+-------l 
Total.................................. 1 356 100 1 356 100 
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Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
SuB-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents ............................ . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
Draft budget 
for 1986 
(initial) 
480 000 
Draft budget 
for 1986 
(revised) 
480 000 
and other office supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 000 250 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents . . . 1 150 000 1 150 000 
21 - Purchase of documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 000 50 000 
22 - Official cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 00 000 1 00 000 
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Difference 
23 - Bank charges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 500 
~--------~r---------~-----------4 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 030 500 2 030 500 
Head V - Other expenditure 
SuB-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .. 
25 - Expenses for representation ............. . 
26 - Committee study missions .............. . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk ........................... . 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor ..... . 
29 - Expenditure on information ............ . 
30 - Expenses for political groups ............ . 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
150 000 
170 000 
3 300 
350 000 
70000 
300 000 
300 000 
150 000 i 
170 000 
3 300 
350 000 
70000 
300 000 
300 000 
elsewhere provided for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 000 3 000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 000 20 000 
~--------~----------~-----------4 
Total.................................. 1 366 300 1 366 300 
OPERATING BuDGET . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 691 900 1 7 082 500 390 600 
RECEIPTS ..................................... f-----'4....:.0....:.0....:.0....:.00.:;__-l---~4....:.00.:..__:_00....:.0:..__+------------l 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 291 900 16 682 500 ' 390 600 
~--------~r---------~-----------4 
PENSIONS . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 928 000 971 000 43 000 
RECEIPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410 000 425 000 15 000 
f--------~~r---------~-----------1 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518 000 546 000 28 000 
~------~~r---------~-----------4 
NET GRAND TOTAL............................ 16 809 900 17 228 500 418 600 
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APPENDIX I 
RECOMMENDATION 433 1 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986 2 
The Assembly, 
APPENDIX I 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 
1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial 
organs ofWEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration; 
(b) each of these budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explana-
tory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a 
document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and trans-
mitted to the Council; 
(c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned docu-
ments and of the others produced during the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a 
regular basis; 
(d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extraor-
dinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the evo-
lution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero growth 
criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments; 
(e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the 
sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of 
the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in 
October 1984 to have the Assembly " play a growing role "; 
(f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial 
organs increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to 
provide a better guarantee of its autonomy and independence; 
(g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body 
should be given responsibility for this task; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget ofthe Paris agencies whereas the Assem-
bly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been rejected; 
(b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a 
telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services ofWEU as well as by parliamentarians; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has 
adopted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different 
documents; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration (Document 1054). 
38 
APPENDIX I DOCUMENT 1071 
(b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories 
of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier tq follow the evolu-
tion of these budgets; 
2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its budge-
tary decisions; 
3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure for apbroving Assembly 
budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and indepencftence; 
4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3 posls which are given 
top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986; 
5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an independent body for the 
administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with the other co-ordinated organisa-
tions; 
6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay down a general rule on 
the subject applicable to all WEU staff; 
7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it being understood that the 
telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and 
cost-sharing to be agreed among them; 1 
8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs of WEU to achieve future cost-
saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private imdustry to investi-
gate this matter and make recommendations. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Recapitulation of changes 
in the staff of the Office of the Clerk 
proposed in the 1986 budget (revised) 
Draft budget 
Grade Duties for 1986 
(revised) 
1 
0 
5 I 
3 
0 
3 
1 
5 
6 
1 
1 
1 
2 
29 
I. One of these 5 posts is now grade A4. 
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Draft budget 
for 1986 +or-
(initial) 
1 -
1 - 1 
4 + 1 
2 + 1 
1 - 1 
3 -
1 -
5 -
5 + 1 
- + 1 
1 -
1 -
2 -
27 +2 
APPENDIX Ill 
APPENDIX Ill 
Secretary-General's note 1 
Assembly budget - 1985 
(C-B (86) 2) 
DOCUMENT 1071 
l. The Secretary-General refers to document C-B (86) 2 dated 29th January 198~ in which delega-
tions were advised that the Assembly's budget for 1985 may not have sufficient funds to cover the cost 
of the Assembly's share of security work carried out at the Paris offices of WEU in 1985. It is recalled 
that the Council gave its approval for this work on 13th February 1985 (CR (85) 3, V, 3). The Assem-
bly's share of the cost amounted to F 151 463.45. 
2. Document C-B (86) 2 noted that a possible consequence of this situation could be that the Assem-
bly's accounts for the financial year 1985 would show a deficit instead of the customary surplus. It was 
also pointed out that so long as the deficit did not exceed the amount mentioned above, the need to call 
for additional budget contributions to cover the deficit could be avoided if delegations would agree that 
the Assembly's budget surplus from 1984 (F 168 189.58) could be retained. · 
3. Delegations are now asked to note that the Assembly is faced with further unforeseen expenditure, 
that will affect both the 1985 and 1986 budgets, arising from the 1985 annual review of emoluments and 
the recommendations for that review contained in the Co-ordinating Committee's 21 ~th report (C (86) 2 
and addendum). The increases proposed in the report are higher than were anticipated both for the 
Assembly and the other offices of WEU. This situation has been foreseen by the members of the 
Co-ordinating Committee and is mentioned in paragraph 4 on page (ii) of the addendum to the report: 
" The attention of national delegations was drawn to the fact that some organis,tions - due to the 
late submission of the second part of the proposals ... might not have been able to take into 
account completely the financial consequences of the present report in their budgetary estima-
tes. Certain rearrangements might therefore be necessary within such budgets. " 
4. The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly proposes to overcome this latest probl~m by charging the 
salary arrears payments for 1985 that cannot be met from the 1985 budget to the budget for 1986. It 
will submit in due course a supplementary budget for 1986 to regularise this situation. That budget 
will also have to modify the salary estimates for 1986 which were also calculated at a lower level than is 
proposed in the 215th report. 
5. In passing, the Secretary-General must inform delegations that the 215th re11>ort will mean an 
adjustment to the budgets of the ministerial organs. The increases proposed for A and L staff in Lon-
don are interim figures (see paragraph 2 of the addendum to the report) and it may be some time, there-
fore, before the full financial consequences can be calculated. 
6. Insofar as the Assembly is concerned, the Council's approval of the measures proposed in para-
graphs 2 and 4 above will be assumed if no written objections are received by 26th February 1986. 
1. Document C-B (86) 3, 17th February 1986. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Secretary-General's note 1 
Assembly budget- 1985 
(C-B (86) 2) 
APPENDIX IV 
The Secretary-General confirms that the Council has now approved the measures proposed by the 
Assembly in paragraphs 2 and 4 of document C-B (86) 3. 
1. Document C-B (86) 3 - Confirmation - 26th March 1986. 
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APPENDIX V 
Comparison between estimates for expenditure on grade A salaries 
calculated on the basis of scales as at 1st July 1985 
and sums granted for this purpose in the 1986 budget 
1986 Estimates Sub-Heads based on scales budget 
as at lst July 1985 1 
SuB-HEAD 1 - Basic salaries •••••••••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 280 000 4 470 500 
SuB-HEAD 2 - Allowances 
2.1. Expatriation allowance ............... 465 700 483 900 
2.2. Household allowance 0 ••• 0 0 •••••••••• 190 400 199 200 
2.3. Allowance for children, etc ............ 116 400 122 200 
2.4. Rent allowance ...................... - -
2.5. Education allowance ................. 90 000 91 500 
SuB-HEAD 3 - Social charges 
3.1. Social security ....................... 556 800 581 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance ............. 151 000 182 400 
3.3. Provident fund ...................... 125 400 131 000 
5 975 700 6261800 
DOCUMENT 1071 
Difference 
- 190 500 
! 
- 18 200 
- 8 800 
- 5 800 
1 500 
- 24 200 
- 31 400 
- 5 700 
- 286 100 
Foreseeable savings in the salaries of grade B and C staff under Head I ......... 1 86 100 
Additional sum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 200 000 
l. Adjusted on the basis of a 1.5% rate of increase to take account of foreseeable increases as from 1st July 1986. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Comparison between estimates for expenditure on grade A pensions calculated 
on the basis of scales as at 1st July 1985 
and sums granted for this purpose in the 1986 budget 
1986 Estimates Sub-Heads based on scales Difference budget 
as at 1st July 1985 1 
SuB-HEAD 1 - Pensions and leaving allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions ................. 508 300 532 000 -23 700 
1.2. Invalidity pensions •••• 0. 0 ••••• 0 0 •••• 190 000 198 000 - 8 000 
SuB-HEAD 2 - Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances ................ 19 600 20 500 - 900 
2.2. Children's and other dependants' 
allowances .......................... 11 700 12 300 - 600 
2.3. Education allowances ................ 4 500 10400 - 5 900 
SuB-HEAD 3 - Supplementary insurance ........ 12 200 16 100 - 3 900 
746 300 789 300 -43 000 
I. Adjusted on the basis of a 1.5% rate of increase to take account of foreseeable increases as from 1st July 1986. 
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Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Opinion of the Council 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Opinion of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee 
(Document C-B (86) 14) 
Opinion of the Council (Letter from the Secretary-General 
of WEU dated 27th November 1986) 
Table showing reductions approved by the Council 
Secretary-General's note 1 
WEU Assembly revised budget for 1986 
1. The WEU Assembly revised budget for 1986 was circulated under reference B ~86) 24 (Assembly 
Document 1071) and was considered by the Budget and Organisation Committee iat its meeting in 
London on 23rd and 24th October 1986 (BR (86) 2, Ill - to be circulated). 
2. The total of the approved 1986 budget was F 16 809 900. An additional sum ofF 418 600 was 
requested in the revised budget, bringing the total for the year to F 17 228 500. That total would 
represent an increase over 1985 of 11.36% (originally 8.65%) or, without pensions, 19.97% (originally 
7.39%). 
3. The additional amount ofF 418 600 was made up as follows: 
Head I - Permanent staff 
Creation of two new posts in grade B3 ......................................... . 
Cost in 1986 of a promotion to an existing vacant post (A3 to A4) ............... . 
To meet, in 1986, costs from salary increase awarded in 1985 for which therte were 
insufficient funds in the 1985 budget .......................................... . 
F 
25 000 
4 800 
80 800 
Extra .cost in. 1986 of salary increase awarded in 1985 for which the original es~imates 
were Insufficient ........................................................ 
1 
• • • • • • 200 000 
310 600 
Head II- Temporary staff 
Additional funds for the recruitment of interpreters to serve committee meeti1;1gs . . . 80 000 
Pensions 
F 43 000 required for higher pensions costs as a result of the salary adjustment men-
tioned above, less F 15 000 additional contribution income arising from the same 
390 600 
adjustment, making a net increase of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 000 
Total................................................................... 418 600 
4. In the committee's debate on this budget, several delegations observed that they would have diffi-
culties finding extra money to meet a call for supplementary contributions. They urged that savings be 
found elsewhere in the budget. It was acknowledged, however, that the salary adjustment procedure 
imposed unavoidable financial obligations on the co-ordinated organisations. This was especially true 
in 1985 when the increase for A and L staff had been higher than anticipated because Qf an adjustment 
1. Document C-B (86) 14, 31st October 1986. 
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to the purchasing power parity factor. Expenditure that was clearly within the control of the 
organisation was another matter and, in this area, the committee agreed that economies would have to 
be made. 
Head I 
The proposal to create two new B3 posts could not be agreed, and delegations also felt that the 
amount of F 4 800 should not feature in this budget. It was recommended, therefore, that a total of 
F 29 800 should be deleted from this head. 
Head II 
The committee took the view that meetings of various committees, etc., should be organised and 
financed within the limits of the credits approved in the main budget. A proposal supported by three 
delegations to reduce the increase sought by half was not approved as two other delegations could accept 
no increase under this head (F 80 000). 
At this point, therefore, the committee had effectively applied reductions ofF 109 800, reducing 
the total increase of the revised budget from F 418 600 to F 308 800. 
Additional economies were sought by members of the committee. The Assembly's represen-
tative offered a further reduction of F 50 000 that would reduce the total increase from F 308 800 to 
F 258 800, but this remained unacceptable and, after further discussion, the committee agreed (subject 
to a United Kingdom reserve) that the increase of the revised budget should not exceed F 250 000, a 
reduction of F 168 600. 
5. The committee's recommendations would amend the 1986 budget as follows: 
F 
Main budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 809 900 
Revised budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 000 
Total for 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 059 900 
The increase over 1985 would be 10.27% in total or 8.86% without pensions. 
6. It is noted that the increase proposed, namely F 250 000, is below the amount sought by the 
Assembly to compensate for the higher salary costs arising from the Co-ordinating Committee's 215th 
report (F 280 800 in Head I plus F 28 000 for pensions, making a total of F 308 800). 
7. Subject to the amendments proposed above, the Budget and Organisation Committee (but United 
Kingdom reserve) could recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the revised budget of 
the WEU Assembly for 1986. 
8. That opinion has to be conveyed to the Assembly before the opening of the second part of the 
thirty-second session on 1st December 1986. After the budget has been adopted during the session, it 
will be returned to the Council for final approval (see Annex). 
9. The Council's opinion will be sought at a forthcoming meeting in November. 
Dear Mr. Moulias, 
* 
* * 
London, 27th November 1986 
1. At its meeting on 26th November 1986, the Council discussed in depth the Assembly's budgets 
for 1986 and 1987 on the basis ofthe recommendations ofthe Budget and Organisation Committee set 
out in documents CB (86) 14 and CB (86) 15. 
2. In the case of the revised budget for 1986, and notwithstanding the recommended reductions, the 
Council decided to grant the Assembly a sum ofF 58 800 to allow it to fulfil its commitments in regard 
to the payment of salaries and pensions. 
The total budget would thus amount to F 17 118 700; the percentage increase compared with the 
1985 budget would therefore be 10.65% including pensions and 9.24% without them. 
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3. The Council will be able to express a favourable opinion on the revised bu(!iget for 1986, the 
abovementioned changes being made. 
4. The Council also examined the Assembly's budget for 1987 with special care. 
There was a consensus in favour of a limited increase in this budget and the Council decided, not-
withstanding the recommended reductions, to grant the following sums: 
- F 24 875 under Sub-Head 6 of Head 11; 
- F 40 000 under Sub-Head 7 of Head 11; 
- F 15 000 under Head IV. 
The total budget will thus amount to F 17 596 375 and the percentage increase compared with the 
revised budget for 1986, as amended, will therefore be 2. 79% including pensions and 0.49% without 
them. 
The Council will be able to express a favourable opinion on the budget for 1987, the 
abovementioned changes being made. 
5. The Council also examined the place of pensions in the organisation's budget. 
It intends to pursue its detailed study of this matter on the basis of the various budgetary implica-
tions involved and in the light of the position of the co-ordinated organisations in this connection. 
6. Moreover, it took note of the proposals relating to the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk 
which have just been submitted to it. 
It will, as soon as possible, study these in detail on the basis of the opinions of national experts 
who have already had the matter placed before them. 
Mr. Georges MouLIAS, 
Clerk of the Assembly of WEU 
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DOCUMENT 1071, ADDENDUM 
Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 
Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head I - Permanent staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries .......................... . 
2 - Allowances ............................ . 
3 - Social charges ......................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
Draft revised budget 
for 1986 
(initial) 
6 897 800 
1 337 400 
1 315 400 
Reductions 
in accordance 
with the Council's 
opinion 
20000 
5 500 
5 000 
Draft revised budge 
for 1986 
(reduced) 
6 877 800 
1 331 900 
1 310 400 
departure of permanent officials . . . . . . . . . . 180 000 - 180 000 
5 - Medical examination .................... r----8_0_0_0_+--------+---8.:......:..0..:..00.:......:..-i 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 738 600 30 500 9 708 100 
Head // - Temporary staff 
SUB-HEAD: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
1 950 000 1 950 000 
work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 000 80 000 400 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 80 000 - 80 000 
9 - Social charges .......................... r-----=8~1-=0-=0~0-+---------t-----=-8 =-1 ..:.00.:..0=---i 
Total .................................. 2591000 80000 2511000 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
SuB-HEAD: 
lO - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .............................. . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ..................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of ses-
sions ................................. . 
14 - Maintenance ofthe premises of the Office of 
the Clerk .............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .... . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ............................ . 
17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
430 000 
15 000 
340 000 
45 000 
15 000 
25 500 
94 800 
430 000 
15 000 
340 000 
45 000 
15 000 
25 500 
94 800 
other office equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 800 - 390 800 
~-----+------+-----~ 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 356 100 - 1 356 100 
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Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sua-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents ............................ . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
and other office supplies ............... . 
20 - Printing and publication of documents .. . 
21 - Purchase of documents ................. . 
22 - Official cars ........................... . 
23 - Bank charges .......................... . 
Total ................................. . 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Sua-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .. 
25 - Expenses for representation ............. . 
26 - Committee study missions .............. . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk ........................... . 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor ..... . 
29 - Expenditure on information ............ . 
30 - Expenses for political groups ............ . 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
elsewhere provided for ................. . 
Draft revised budget 
for 1986 
(initial) 
480 000 
250 000 
1150 000 
50000 
100 000 
500 
OOCUMENT 1071, ADDENDUM 
Reductions 
in accordance 
with the Council's 
opinion 
-
-
-
-
-
-
braft revised budge 
for 1986 
(reduced) 
480 000 
250 000 
1150 000 
50000 
100 000 
500 r---------~r---------~------~~_, 
2 030 500 - 2 030 500 
150 000 - 150 000 
170000 - 170 000 
3 300 - 3 300 
350 000 I 350 000 -
70000 - 70000 
300000 - I 300 000 
300000 - 300 000 
3 000 - 3 000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ................... r---__;;;.:......:...:....:...--lr---------~----=:.....:...:....:__, 20000 - 20000 
Total ................................. . 1 366 300 - 1 366 300 
OPERATING BUDGET •...•••••.••.•......••••.•.. 17 082 500 110500 16 972 000 
RECEIPTS .•..•••.••..•...•..•••••..•...•.••••• r----'----~r---------~---~;.....;...~_, 400 000 - 400000 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET ......••••......• 16 682 500 110 500 16 572 000 
r--------~r--------~-------~_, 
PENSIONS ..••••.•.....••••••.•..•.••••••...... 971 000 - 971 000 
RECEIPTS ••••••.......•••••••...•.•.•••••.•... r---....;;:;;.:......:...:....:...--lf----..:....:...=----~---=..:....:...:....:__, 425 000 700 424 300 
NET ToTAL PENSioNs BuDGET •..••.••......•.••• r---...:;._;..:......:...:....:...--lr-----..:....:...=----~---~=----:....:__, 546 000 700 546 700 
NET GRAND TOTAL •••••.......•.••••....•••••• 17 228 500 109 800 17 118 700 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. General and political considerations 
1. When presenting its budget for the financial year 1986, the Assembly underlined that in the con-
text of the reactivation of WEU it had set itself the aim of affording the Council its full support in the 
fundamental task of creating the political conditions for asserting a European personality in the various 
bodies contributing to Europe's security. To this end, it asked the Council for the means to pursue 
fruitful co-operation with it. However, the Council did not accept the Assembly's budget proposals 
and, by a unilateral decision of which the PreSidential Committee could but take note, it set the rate of 
increase at 8.6% for the 1986 budget compared with the 1985 budget, thus forcing the .j\ssembly to with-
draw from its budget, among other items, the proposals relating to the restructuration of the Office of 
the Clerk. 
i 
2. As the Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Assembly on 17th January 1986: 
" First and foremost, the Council wishes to call the Assembly's attention to th~ need, in view of 
the budgetary conditions prevailing in all the member states, to adhere to the zero growth princi-
ple. " 
On this specific point, the President of the Assembly told the Secretary-General that: 
" Application of the zero growth criterion will be possible only when the Assembly's means have 
been adapted to its tasks, as has been done for the ministerial organs, and, in particular, once a 
solution has been found to the recent reduction in the staff of the Assembly and to the shortcom-
ings which henceforth jeopardise the smooth conduct of its work. " 
3. The draft budget for 1987 merely takes account of this clearly-expressed position. It is also 
worth pointing out that the present unfavourable economic circumstances to which the Council referred 
in order to justify maintaining the zero growth criterion has improved considerably, in the meantime 
due to the sharp fall in the price of oil and lower inflation rates with the result that all the WEU coun-
tries at present have the benefit of a clear reversal of the economic situation. 
4. Circumstances therefore seem favourable for the Assembly's requirements, as set out in its draft 
budget, to be taken into consideration by the governments. In this connection, it should be stressed 
that the Assembly is not asking for dispensation from the need to apply a strict poUcy of economy -
which moreover it steadfastly respects in the management of its budget. What it wan~s is to be allowed, 
once and for all, to revise the structure of the Office of the Clerk to adapt it to the ta~ks it has to fulfil 
and to provide it with the means necessary fot developing its political activities in ac~ordance with the 
programmes proposed by the committees and approved by the Presidential Committ e. This is there-
fore an exceptional requirement of the same nature and scope as was necessary for restructuring the 
Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies a year ago already. Once this restructuration has been 
accomplished and appropriations adjusted on the basis of real requirements, bud~ets would again 
evolve normally and thus remain within the limits of the zero growth criterion applicable to all the 
WEU organs. 
5. However, the problem relating to the methods of applying this criteria still exists. The Assembly 
has often referred to the principal aspects, proposing that it be applied only to the operating budget and 
not to the pensions budget and that a specific rate of increase be fixed for each category of expenditure 
whereas at present a single rate of increase is applied to the total net budget (cf. in1er alia Assembly 
Recommendations 409 of 21st June 1984 and 426 of 4th December 1985). In this connection, it is 
important to point out - as shown in the table at Appendix V - that the growth rate of the Assembly's 
draft budget for 1987 compared with the previous budget (revised 1986 budget) varies between 4.90% 
and 6.85% depending on whether or not pensions are taken into account. In fact, the pensions budget 
alone shows an increase of 66.57% due to the payment of two new pensions to grade A officials. This 
rate will increase as and when members of the Office of the Clerk retire, as will be the case for two fur-
ther grade A officials in 1988. 
6. In spite of its exceptional nature, the Assembly's draft budget for 1987 therefore does not show a 
very high rate of increase. In studying its budget estimates, the Assembly has in fact endeavoured to be 
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as rigorous and as cost effective as possible. The following paragraphs describe the conclusions of this 
study. To allow a fuller analysis, they are set out under the following three headings: 
- restructuration of the Office of the Clerk; 
- operational expenditure; 
- modernisation of equipment. 
2. Restructuration of the Office of the Clerk 
7. In its report of 28th May 1986 (Document 1063), the Presidential Committee informed the 
Assembly that: 
" The Presidential Committee notes with regret that it has been impossible to strengthen the 
structure of the Office of the Clerk by the recruitment of officials in spite of the urgency of the 
matter and previous reductions in the Assembly secretariat. The problem of the structure of the 
Office of the Clerk should therefore be raised again and will be materialised in a draft supplemen-
tary budget for the financial year 1986 and in the draft budget for the financial year 1987. " 
8. In accordance with this guideline, the restructuration of the Office of the Clerk was started in 
1986. The relevant Assembly bodies reserve the right to complete the study on the restructuration of 
the Office of the Clerk in the coming months. All the proposals should be summed up here so as better 
to understand the nature of and reasons for the changes which are the subject of the two 
abovementioned budgets. 
9. As shown in the organogram at Appendix I, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has six 
services: 
- committee service; 
- administration and finance service; 
- press and external relations service; 
- translations and publications service; 
- research service; 
- sittings service. 
10. The position of the committee and administration services has already been the subject of many 
communications from the Assembly and its organs to the Council and the Secretariat-General. It 
should be recalled that in 1981, following the suppression of the hors grade post of Clerk Assistant, the 
Bureau decided, because of their responsibilities, to regrade to grade A6 the posts of officials assisting 
the Clerk, one for co-ordinating the work of all the committees (except the Budget Committee) and the 
other for administrative matters in the widest meaning of the term 1, including the secretariat of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
11. However, the Council accepted this regrading on a personal basis only. Consequently, one ofthe 
two grade A6 posts was lost in 1983 and the other might also be lost this year when both the officials 
concerned will have retired. The Presidential Committee has reserved the right to return to this point 
later. 
12. In the committee service, the Bureau also decided to give priority in the revised draft budget for 
1986 to: 
- regrading to A4 the grade A3 post held by the secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations in order to take account of the extension of that committee's duties to rela-
tions with the public and of the attribution to its holder of responsibility for the new research 
service set up in 1986; 
- creating a post of assistant for the secretariat of that committee and for the research service 
which now have to resort to the services of the Clerk's assistant who already has many other 
duties. 
I. The main responsibilities of this service may be summed up as follows: working out budget estimates, financial management, 
bookkeeping, staff management (including the recruitment of hundreds of temporary or free-lance staff for Assembly sessions and 
committee meetings), general services, security, protocol and organisation of Assembly sessions and other parliamentary meetings. 
52 
DOCUMENT 1072 
13. It should also be stressed that the duties of secretary and assistant to the Com~ittee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges continue to be carried out by the Clerk and his assistant since the Bureau did 
not consider it necessary at the present juncture to ask for the creation of two new1 posts. 
14. The organisation of the administration service should be completed in 1987 with the creation of a 
post of deputy to the head of service made necessary by the multiplicity and complexity of his 
tasks. At institutional level, this need was also recognised by the auditors who, during a recent audit, 
said: 
" As a part of our audit we carried out a review of internal controls, including segregation of 
duties between individuals. While I appreciate that a high level of control is not always practical 
or possible in a small organisation, it seems to me that certain improvements are none the less 
desirable. I would suggest that the office accountant should not at the same time be responsible 
for bank reconciliations, pay-roll preparation, bookkeeping and handling and recording 
receipts. Allocating these duties between two or more individuals would, I think, greatly 
enhance internal control. " 
The creation of a grade B3 post of bookkeeper, already the subject of earlier budget prpposals for which 
abundant reasons were given, was again requested in the revised 1986 budget in' accordance with 
Recommendation 433 adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986. 
15. The press and external relations service and the translation and publications serv)!:e will be studied 
subsequently on the basis of the respective competence and responsibility of the otpcials concerned. 
16. The sittings service is formed twice a year for Assembly sessions. It works und~r the authority of 
the Clerk and requires considerable organisation and co-ordination by the head of administration both 
for recruiting the several dozen persons in this service and for organising their offices in the Wilson wing 
and in the premises made available to the Assembly by the French Econ<J>mic and Social 
Council. Budget estimates for these services (under Heads 11 (temporary staff) and Ill (expenditure on 
premises and equipment)) are worked out in real terms, it being considered that each-part session lasts 
four days (from Monday to Thursday) and that sittings do not last more than eight hours a day. It 
should also be pointed out that this method, which allows very accurate estimates to be made, leaves no 
room for flexibility in the organisation of sessions and sittings; for instance, a night sitting or the prolon-
gation of a session until Friday would be impossible because of budgetary constraints. 
17. The financial implications of the possible restructuration of the Office of the Clerk as proposed in 
the revised draft budget for 1986 and the 1987 budget are as follows: 
Grade 1986 (revised) 1987 
A4 Secretary to the Committee for Parliamentary 
A2 
B3 
B3 
and Public Relations and head of the research 
service (regrading) 
Deputy to the head of the administration service 
- controller (new post) 
Bookkeeper (new post) 
Assistant to the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations and the research service 
(new post) 
3. Operational expenditure 
4 800 
13 000 
12 000 
29 800 
10 000 
276 000 
162 000 
148 000 
596 000 
18. In the new political context created by the Rome declaration, the Assembly has developed its rela-
tions with the Council and the other parliamentary assemblies and has intensified its 
activities. Consequently, the number of committee meetings and study visits has increased. The 
same is true for the President's contacts with the authorities of member countries and contacts estab-
lished by rapporteurs with political and scientific circles in various countries for the preparation of their 
reports. 
19. With particular regard to relations with the Council, the proposed timetable of meetings includes: 
- a meeting of the Committee for Relations with the Council prior to each ministerial meeting; 
- a meeting between the Council and the Committee on Defence Questions an<jl Armaments and 
the General Affairs Committee at the close of the spring ministerial meeting; 
- a meeting with the Presidential Committee on the occasion of each minist~rial meeting; 
' 
- a twice-yearly meeting between the Permanent Council and the Presidenti~l Committee. 
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20. In addition, during the first half of each year, grouped meetings are held of all committees, if pos-
sible to coincide with the meeting of the Council of Ministers and in the same place (such as the meeting 
held in Venice in April 1986). It would be desirable to hold a second grouped meeting if the budget 
allows. 
21. Intensification ofthe Assembly's activities has considerable financial repercussions, and in partic-
ular on those sub-heads which cover interpreters' salaries (Sub-Head 7), travelling expenses of the Presi-
dent of the Assembly, committee chairmen and rapporteurs (Sub-Head 24), official journeys of mem-
bers of the Office of the Clerk (Sub-Head 27) and representation expenses (Sub-Head 25). 
22. For the interpretation service (Sub-Head 7), it should be pointed out that already in 1985 actual 
expenditure easily exceeded the budget (F 437 915 compared with F 350 000), the surplus being met 
from savings under other heads of the budget, and estimated expenditure in 1986 amounts to F 480 000 
compared with a budget ofF 400 000. In the revised budget for 1986 an extra F 80 000 was therefore 
requested. Estimates for 1987 (F 496 000) therefore take account ofthe experience of the two previous 
financial years and will allow a comparable programme to be carried out. Furthermore, everything has 
been done to ensure that, thanks to a strict recruitment policy, the cost of interpretation is kept as low as 
possible while guaranteeing efficient service. It should also be specified that, for budgetary reasons, 
rapporteurs' requests to be accompanied by an interpreter when they visit a country whose language 
they do not speak fluently cannot be met. 
23. Travelling expenses of the President of the Assembly and of committee chairmen can be estimated 
only very approximately since even in the short term programmes may be changed considerably in the 
light of economic and political circumstances. For rapporteurs, the Presidential Committee authorises 
them to travel on the basis of a working programme submitted to it at each part-session by the commit-
tees as a whole. Estimates under Sub-Head 24 take account of this particular point and are the same as 
in 1986. 
24. Travelling expenses of officials of the Office of the Clerk are linked strictly with parliamentary 
activities outside Paris. Thus, because of the increase in such activities, the sum under Sub-Head 27 
was exceeded by about F 100 000 in 1985 and in 1986 it is expected to be difficult to remain within the 
limits of the budget ofF 350 000. Estimated travelling expenses for 1987 have therefore been based on 
experience in the last two years; it also takes account of the foreseeable trend of allowances and travel-
ling expenses. 
25. Representation expenses are also linked with Assembly activities. The more assiduous presence 
of members of governments of WEU countries at Assembly sessions, visits by the President of the 
Assembly to members of governments and representatives of parliamentary assemblies, committee 
meetings held in Paris and elsewhere and the traditional receptions given during sessions - to give but a 
few examples - involve commitments dictated by hospitality and courtesy. In spite of constant efforts 
to economise in this sector of expenditure, an increase, albeit modest, has to be requested in comparison 
with sums granted for this purpose in 1986. 
4. Modernisation of equipment 
26. The programme for modernising the equipment of the Office of the Clerk is given at Appendix 
IV. Apart from the renewal of current hire and maintenance contracts, the 1987 programme includes: 
- the purchase of an offset machine. This proposal was included in the 1986 budget but was 
withdrawn in the context of the reductions imposed by the Council; 
- the replacement of four typewriters as the second stage of a programme spread over several 
years and drawn up in 1986; 
- the replacement of the present scales used for calculating postal charges by a new, more accu-
rate electronic model; 
- the replacement of a few desks and other pieces of furniture which have become unusable 
because of their poor condition; 
- the purchase of cupboards and computer desks for staff operating word processors; 
- the hire of a telex. 
27. The telex has already been the subject of a specific proposal in recent years which was turned 
down by the Council. It has often been regretted that this convenient, very widespread means of com-
munication was not available. The matter was therefore placed before the Assembly again in Recom-
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mendation 433, adopted on 4th June 1986. This recommendation should be referrecl to in support of 
the proposal, which is renewed in this draft budget. 
28. In regard to the programme for modernising the equipment of the Office of the <i:lerk drawn up in 
1985, it may be noted that in the last two years it has been possible to apply it regularly thanks to sums 
granted by the governments and also to the very considerable savings made possible under other heads 
of expenditure through the introduction of word processors. 
29. However, the future development of this programme has come up against an obstacle which it 
seems impossible to overcome at present, i.e. the impossibility of finding more space in the premises 
now available to the Office of the Clerk. This has, for instance, prevented consideration being given to 
the purchase of a film setter for the direct printing of documents, although this would have considerable 
advantages from the point of view of the cost and speed of printing. 
30. The problem raised by the need to have larger premises for the requirements of the Assembly is 
not a new one. If it is raised here, it is to express the wish that the initiatives taken in this connection 
by the President of the Assembly and the Clerk will be pursued with perseverance. If other premises 
were made available to the Assembly, the programme for modernising equipment cquld but be facili-
tated and this would allow the sums the governments of member countries grant to th~ Assembly to be 
used rationally and ever more efficiently. 
5. Pensions 
31. The problem of pensions was already referred to at the beginning of this explalllatory memoran-
dum (cf. paragraph 5). It should be added that in 1986 the net total pensions budget was 3.08% of the 
net grand total budget; in 1987 this percentage will be 4.94% and it will rise progr~ssively in future 
years. The operating budget could absorb this increase only to the detriment of the Assembly's 
work. The Assembly has considered this problem and sent the Council many recommendations on the 
matter. A solution should be sought as a matter of urgency. As the Assembly suggested in Recom-
mendation 433 adopted on 4th June 1986, priority should be given to setting up an independent body to 
manage pensions. 
6. Summary of operating budget estimates 
32. A summary of operating budget estimates for 1987 (expenditure and receipts) is given at Appen-
dix VI. The implications of each head for total expenditure and the total net budget (expenditure less 
receipts) are shown. For the purposes of comparison, data relating to the revised budget for 1986 are 
given in the same table. 
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PART I Operating budget 
Section A: 
Head I: 
Head II: 
Head Ill: 
Head IV: 
Head V.· 
Section B: 
PART 11 Pensions budget 
Section A: 
Head I: 
Section B: 
Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts 
for the financial year 1987 
Details Expenditure 
Expenditure 
Permanent staff 10 042 000 
Temporary staff 2 751 000 
Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 1 396 300 
General administrative costs 2 133 500 
Other expenditure 1 488 000 
Receipts 
17 810 800 
NET TOTAL 
17 810 800 
Expenditure 
Pensions, allowances and socia 
charges 1 351 000 
Receipts 
1 351 000 
NET TOTAL 
1 351 000 
NET TOTAL BUDGET 
56 
Receipts 
310 000 
310 000 
17 500 800 
17 810 800 
441 500 
441 500 
909 500 
1 351 000 
18 410 300 
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Budget estimates 
PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I- Permanent staff 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1987 for 1986 in 1986 in 1985 
Sub-Head 1 - Basic salaries 7 270 000 6 897 800 6 897 800 6 307 484 
Sub-Head 2- Allowances: 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 595 000 
2.2. Household allowance 287 000 
2.3. Allowance for children and 
other dependent persons 290 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 30 000 
2.5. Education allowance 90000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 000 
2. 7. Overtime 50 000 
2.8. Home leave 20000 
1 364 000 1 337 400 1 337 400 1 209 056 
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges: 
3.1. Social security 976 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 289 000 
3.3. Provident fund 135 000 
1 400 000 1 315 400 1 315 400 1176712 
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and departure of permanent 
officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi-
dates for vacant posts p.m. 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of permanent 
officials and their families p.m. 
4.3. Removal expenses p.m. 
4.4. Installation allowance p.m. 
p.m. 180 000 180 000 5 605 
Sub-Head 5 - Medical examination 8000 8 000 8000 7 305 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 10 042 000 9 738 600 9 738 600 8 706 162 
Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to per-
manent staff in accordance with Chapter Ill of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Qerk of the WEU 
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st 
January 1985 2, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4.5%. Adjustments taken into 
account amount to F 428 000. 
2. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU 
Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with 
the committee's I 59th report, salaries are adjusted with effect from I st July of each year. Furthermore, sh<)uld the cost of living 
between 1st July and 31st December rise by more than 3% a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold, ini-
tially 2%, was raised to 3% in the 191st report.) 
57 
DOCUMENT 1072 
A list of staff of the Office of the Clerk, showing their grades and duties, is given at Appen-
dix 11. This appendix also shows proposed changes compared with the financial year 
1986. Justification for these changes is given in the explanatory memorandum. 
Sub-Head 3 
Estimated expenditure for " Social charges " is based on commitments stemming from: 
- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the 
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1) 3; 
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2) 4; 
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the 
Provident Fund, alllounting to 14% ofbasic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme 
(Sub-Head 3.3). 
Sub-Head 4 
No retirements are expected in 1987. The new grade A2 official would probably be recruited in 
Paris, thus avoiding travelling, removal and installation allowances. This sub-head is therefore shown 
pro mem. 
Sub-Head 5 
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff 
must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU Staff in Paris are carried 
out at the OECD medical centre. 
Head II - Temporary staff 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1987 for 1986 in 1986 in 1985 
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions ofthe 
Assembly 
6.1. Sittings service 1 023 000 
6.2. Interpretation service 350 000 
6.3. Translation service 700 000 
6.4. Other services 40000 
2113000 1 950 000 1 950 000 1 854 247 
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for 
Assembly work between sessions 496 000 480 000 480 000 437915 
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of 
the Clerk 50000 80000 80000 62 726 
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff 
other than interpreters 4000 
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters 85 000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 3 000 
92000 81000 81 000 84 219 
TOTAL OF HEAD 11 2 751 000 2 591 000 2 591 000 2 439 107 
3. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-
age pensions. 
4. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or perma-
nent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the 
beneficiaries he has nominated. 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 6 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to: 
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reim-
bursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and 
translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at 
Appendix Ill. 
Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1985 in the co-ordinated 
organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the 
same way as for permanent staff, the rate of increase being 4.5%. These adjustments amount to 
F 77 416. 
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the Interna-
tional Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the 
basis of the scale in force for Grade L4.8 staff, plus 6%. 
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post 
office technician, typewriter mechanic, etc.). 
Sub-Head 7 
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at 
meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, 
travelling time and travelling expenses). 
Estimates are based on a total of 150 working days (of which 100 in Paris and 50 
elsewhere). Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions 
(cf. Sub-Head 6). Their salary adjustment for 1987 amounts to F 17 265. 
Sub-Head 8 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the 
Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1987. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible tra-
velling expenses and insurance. The sum requested is F 30 000 less than the 1986 figure since it is 
expected that fewer staff will have to be recruited from outside due to the creation of two new grade B3 
posts proposed in the revised 1986 budget. 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges: 
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 
Staff recruited for the Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company 
against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% ofthe premium being paid by the Office ofthe Clerk 
and 40% by staff. 
Provident fund for interpreters 
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU 
has to pay into the conference interpreters' provident fund or, where appropriate, another provident 
fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters. 
Insurance for interpreters 
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, 
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from 
working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk 
(0. 7%) and the interpreters (0.4%). 
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Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1987 for 1986 in 1986 in 1985 
Sub-Head 10 - Share of joint expenditure on 
the Paris premises 450 000 430 000 430 000 539 357 
Sub-Head 11 - Hire of committee rooms 15 000 15 000 8 000 4 111 
Sub-Head 12 - Technical and other installa-
tions for Assembly sessions 345 000 340 000 330 000 325 093 
Sub-Head 13 - Various services for the organ-
isation of sessions 45 000 45 000 45 000 38 392 
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenance of the premises of 
the Office of the Clerk 18 000 15 000 15 000 17 222 
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture 28 000 25 500 33 000 36 334 
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and 
other office equipment 104 600 94 800 94 800 71 997 
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance of repro-
duction and other office equip-
ment 390 700 390 800 390 800 268 229 
TOTAL OF HEAD Ill 1 396 300 1 356 100 1 346 600 1 300 735 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 10 
Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises. They include the fixed annual sum ofF 30 000 which the Assembly has to pay until 1987 as 
its share of the cost of replacing the telephone switchboard. 
The director responsible for co-ordinating the Paris agencies manages the programme for such 
expenditure to which the Assembly contributes 30%, 70% being met by the agencies. 
Sub-Head 11 
For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous 
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in 
certain cases it is to be expected that the Assembly will have to pay for the hire of a room or the cost of 
installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-
head are to cover such expenditure if necessary. 
Sub-Head 12 
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous inter-
pretation equipment, telephone booths, metal-detecting equipment necessary for improving security 
measures, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions. 
Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services. 
Sub-Head 13 
Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during 
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social 
Council, etc.). 
Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services. 
Sub-Head 14 
An increase ofF 30 000 over the sum granted in 1985 and 1986 is requested for 1987 to allow 
minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk. 
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Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the three-year modernisation and maintenance pro-
gramme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget. Criteria governing the preparation of this 
programme are shown in the explanatory memorandum. 
Head IV - General administrative costs 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1987 for 1986 in 1986 in 1985 
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telex and 
transport of documents 495 000 480 000 480 000 469 188 
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed writ-
ing paper and other office sup-
plies 258 000 250 000 250 000 251 573 
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of 
documents 1 190 000 1 150 000 1 150 000 996 382 
Sub-Head 21 - Purchase of documents 60000 50000 50 000 46 101 
Sub-Head 22 - Official cars 130 000 100 000 119 500 113 649 
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges 500 500 500 (-) 2 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV 2 133 500 2 030 500 2 050 000 1876891 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 18 
The increase ofF 15 000 as compared with 1986 is calculated on the basis of an average inflation 
of 3%, this being the minimum foreseeable, and takes account of the fact that the increase in the 
Assembly's work will involve a considerable increase in the cost of the various means of 
communication. Moreover, expenditure relating to the use of a telex in 1987 will be charged to this 
sub-head. 
Sub-Head 19 
In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the purchase of a third offset 
machine, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1986 is slight and is mainly due to the variation 
of prices in this sector. 
Sub-Head 20 
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in costs (3%). 
Sub-Head 21 
The 20% increase takes account of a slight increase recorded in the INSEE index for books and 
newspapers for the most recent twelve-month period at the time this budget was drawlll up and require-
ments for setting up a new research service in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. 
Sub-Head 22 
Estimates under this sub-head show an increase of 30% over 1986. This is based on experience 
in recent years. The hire of a chauffeur-driven car when the President is present at the Assembly takes 
up most of this amount (approximately F 80 000). The remainder is used for foreseeable repairs to the 
official car, insurance, garage, petrol, etc. 
Sub-Head 23 
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged. 
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Head V - Other expenditure 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for budget expenditure expenditure 
1987 for 1986 in 1986 in 1985 
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence 
allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs 150 000 150 000 120 000 106 172 
Sub-Head 25 - Expenses for representation 200 000 170 000 190 000 187 433 
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions 5 000 3 300 3 300 1 119 
Sub-Head 27 - Official journeys ofmembers of 
the Office of the Clerk 380 000 350 000 350 000 417 221 
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the 
auditor 100 000 70000 70 000 104 679 
Sub-Head 29 - Expenditure on information 315 000 300 000 300 000 225 106 
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups 315 000 300 000 300 000 273 000 
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other expen-
diture not elsewhere provided 
for 3 000 3 000 3 000 2400 
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes 20000 20000 20000 13 690 
TOTAL OF HEAD V l 488 000 1 366 300 l 356 300 1 330 820 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 24 
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly is borne by gov-
ernments, as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee. 
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the 
Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen insofar as 
these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys by 
committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee. 
Estimates take account of the expected increase in the Assembly's work in 1987 (see explanatory 
memorandum) and of the foreseeable rise in per diem allowances and travelling expenses. 
Sub-Head 25 
The increase of 17.64% compared with the 1986 budget, based on experience, is due to the rise in 
the cost of meals in restaurants in the Paris area and to greater requirements due to the increased activi-
ties of the various Assembly organs. 
Sub-Head 26 
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure linked with committee study 
missions. 
On the basis of experience, the same amount has been requested as last year. 
Sub-Head 27 
The 9% increase in sums requested for 1987 compared with last year is justified by: 
- the increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st July 1986 
(218th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts); 
- the increased activities of the Assembly which require more frequent travel by members of the 
Office of the Clerk for organising and holding meetings and visits of the various Assembly com-
mittees. 
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Sub-Head 28 
It is to be expected that the type of studies to be carried out in the framework o:hhe reactivation 
of WEU will require greater recourse to experts in various areas. An increase in auditors' fees has also 
been noted in recent years. An increase of F 30 000 in estimates under this sub-head is therefore 
requested. 
Sub-Head 29 
An increase of 5% over sums granted in 1985 has been included to take account of the increase in 
representation and travelling expenses. 
Sub-Head 30 
The estimate under this sub-head is divided between the political groups. By decision of the 
Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the 
number of members listed. 
Sub-Head 31 
There is no change in the estimate for this sub-head as compared with 1986. 
Sub-Head 32 
The same amount is requested as in 1986. 
PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
for budget receipts receipts 
1987 for 1986 in 1986 in 1985 
Sales of publications 50000 110 000 40000 33 541 
Bank interest 250 000 250 000 250 000 265 145 
Social security reimbursements 10000 8 000 8 000 64 695 
Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials - 32 000 35 600 64 284 
TOTAL RECEIPTS 310 000 400 000 333 600 427 665 
Explanations 
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are calcu-
lated on the basis of experience. 
In accordance with the decisions of the Council, no levies are planned on the 'basic salaries of 
grade A officials. 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Pensions, allowances and social charges 
Estimates Revised 
Sub-Heads for budget 
1987 for 1986 
Sub-Head 1 -Pensions and leaving allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 998 000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 204 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 47 000 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' 
pensions -
1.5. Leaving allowances -
1 249 000 889 200 
Sub-Head 2 -Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 37 000 
2.2. Children's and other 
dependants' allowances 26000 
2.3. Education allowances 11 000 
74000 62 400 
Sub-Head 3- Supplementary insurance 28 000 19 400 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 1 351 000 971 000 
Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
In 1987, the Assembly will be paying six pensions, as follows: 
- four old-age pensions; 
- one invalidity pension; 
- one survivor's pension. 
Expected Actual 
expenditure expenditure 
in 1986 in 1985 
889 200 728 402 
62 400 53 488 
19 400 12 393 
971 000 794 283 
Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the pension scheme rules. 
Sub-Head 3 
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article l9bis of the collec-
tive convention in force. 
Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid 
by the Assembly. 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Revised Expected Actual 
for budget receipts receipts 
1987 for 1986 in 1986 in 1985 
Contributions by permanent officials 441 500 425 000 425 00~ 397 970 
441 500 425 000 425 000 397 970 
Explanations 
Estimated receipts have been calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid 
by permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pen-
sion scheme. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Grade 
H.C. 
AS 
A4 
A2 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B3 
B3 
B3 
C6 
C4 
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APPENDIX 11 
Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk 
proposed in the 1987 budget 
1987 Revised Duties budget b4dget for 1986 
Clerk 1 1 
Counsellors 5 I 5 
First secretaries 3 3 
Controller 1 0 
Translators 3 3 
Chief accountant 1 1 
Personal assistants 5 5 
Bilingual shorthand-typists 6 6 
Accountant 1 1 
Switchboard operator 1 : 1 
Head of reproduction department 1 1 
Assistants in reproduction department 2 2 
30 29 
+or-
-
-
-
+ 1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+ 1 
I. One of these five posts in now a grade A4. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions 
1. Sittings senice 
Duties Number 
Counsellors to the President of Assembly . . . . . . . . 1 a 
lb 
Heads of sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 a 
2b 
1 a 
Sergeant-at-arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 b 
Parliamentary secretaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 a 
2b 
Precis writers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 a 
3b 
Verbatim reporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 a 
14 b 
Assistants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 a 
Head ushers 
Ushers: 
2a 
1 a 
lb 
1 b 
23 b 
6b 
1 a 
1 a 
Daily 
No. of remu-
days neration 
F* 
16 1 344 
18 1 344 
8 875 
10 1 236 
8 1 236 
16 1101 
8 751 
10 1 101 
8 751 
10 1101 
8 1 101 
10 1101 
8 341 
16 341 
22 341 
18 625 
12 625 
10 625 
10 676 
10 
12 
322 
322 
Total 
F 
21 504 
24 192 
7 000 
24 720 
9 888 
17 616 
12 016 
22 020 
18 024 
33 030 
61 656 
154 140 
27 280 
10 912 
7 502 
11 250 
7 500 
143 750 
40 560 
3 220 
3 220 
Security control .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 4 a 8 292 9 344 
Sittings office .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. 1 a 12 322 3 864 
4 a 8 292 9 344 
4b 10 576 23040 
Messengers.................................. 3 a 10 292 8 760 
Cloakroom attendant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 a 8 292 2 336 
Offset-assemblers .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 13 a 10 292 37 960 
APPENDIX Ill 
Total 
F 
45 696 
41 608 
17 616 
34 036 
51 054 
215 796 
248 754 
6 440 
56 688 
mechanic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l---1:...a::....t_.....:8:__+-.....:3:;..;;9..:.2-+-~3..:.1~36::......-j--4..:.1...:0..:.9~6 
115 758 784 
Adjustment for 1987 (+ 4.5 %) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 34 145 
792 929 
Travelling expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 000 
* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1985. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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1 022 929 
Rounded up to 1 023 000 
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2. Interpretation service 
Duties Number No. of Total days F 
Interpreters ................................. 8a 8 315 644 6b 10 
14 315 644 
Adjustment for 1987 ....................................................... 14 203 
329 847 
Travelling expenses I I I I I I I I If I I I I I I I 10 I I I I I I I I I I I I 0 0 I I I I I I I o I I I I I o I I I I o I o o I I 20000 
349 847 
Rounded up to 350 000 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
N.B.: On lst July 1985, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 316.57. In addition, interpreters recruited out· 
side Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (half a day each way), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to 
that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses. 
3. Transllltion service 
Daily 
Duties Number remuneration Estimate 1 Total 
F F 
Revisers .................... 3a 915 68 625 
4b 1439 143 900 212 525 
Translators .................. 3a 370 54 750 
5b 1 254 156 750 211 500 
Assistants ................... 5a 341 59 675 
2a 392 27 440 
4b 625 87 500 
2b 676 47 320 221 935 
28 645 960 645 960 
Adjustment for 1987 ....................................................... 29 068 
675 028 
Travelling expenses t I I I I I I I I I I I It I I I I 0 I I I I It I I I I I 10 I I I I 0 I I I I 1111 I 0 I I I o I 1 o o I 25 000 
700 028 
Rounded up to 700 000 
I. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 35 days for assistants. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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Ref. 
No. 
2 
3 
3 bis 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
APPENDIX IV 
Three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment 
of the Office of the Clerk 
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices) 
Budgets 
Equipment 
A. Reproduction equipment 
1 RX 1045 photocopier 
Explanations 
Hire (blocked rate): F 1 713 per month 
Maintenance (indexed rate) F 2 100 per 
month 
1987 1988 1989 
F 45 756 (rounded up) 
Maintenance (indexed rate): F 1 650 per 
quarter. 
45 800 45 800 45 800 
1 RX 3107 photocopier 
2 Gestetner offset machines 
1 Gestetner offset machine 
3 Gestetner electrostatic 
stereotypers 
1 Gestetner 1 00 
binding machine 
1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 
assembling machine 
with stapling machine 
1 AM International 
addressograph 5000 
1 Fortematic 655 
paper-cutting machine 
1 Orpo-Planax 
binding machine 
1 Orpo-Thermomatic 
binding machine 
B. Typewriters and 
calculators 
(a) Office of the Clerk 
8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic 
typewriters 
1 Olivetti ET 221 electronic 
typewriter 
3 Olympia SGE 51 electric 
typewriters (l with English 
keyboard and 2 with French 
keyboards) 
1 type 311, purchased in 1984: mainte-
nance (indexed rate). 
1 type 329, purchased in 1985: mainte-
nance (indexed rate). 
1 type 329, purchase price 
maintenance (indexed rate). 
1 Gestetner PM/9, purchased in 1980 : 
maintenance (indexed rate). 
1 Gestetner DT 1, purchased in 1985 : 
maintenance (indexed rate). 
1 Gestetner 100 PM, purchased in 1986 : 
maintenance (indexed rate). 
Purchased in 1978, this machine is in good 
condition. The maintenance contract has 
to be confirmed (indexed rate). 
Purchased in 1977, this machine is servi-
ced when required, since the cost of a 
maintenance contract is exorbitant. The 
estimate is based on experience. 
On 1st July 1986, this machine became the 
property of the Assembly. The estimate 
concerns the maintenance contract which 
became effective on that date. 
This machine is serviced when requi-
red. A single annual service is enough to 
keep it in good working order. 
Purchased in 1964 in good working l These machines are order and no mainte-Purchased in 1974 nance contract seems necessary. 
Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these 
typewriters are in very good condition. 
Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in 
very good condition. 
These machines are part of the old stock 
now being replaced in accordance with the 
programme referred to in 18 bis below. In 
1986, one machine with English keyboard 
included in the 1986 budget had to be 
scrapped. 
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Ref. 
No. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
18 bis 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Equipment 
2 IBM electric typewriter 
with a French keyboard 
3 Olivetti calculating 
machines 
(b) For use during sessions 
4 Olympia SGE 51 electric 
typewriters (1 with an 
English keyboard and 3 
with French keyboards) 
4 RX 6015 typewriters 
3 Olivetti Editor electric 
typewriters (with Italian 
keyboards) 
21 Olympia mechanical 
typewriters (19 with 
English keyboards and 2 
with French keyboards) 
Electronic typewriters 
(c) Maintenance and repairs 
C. Miscellaneous equipment 
2 UHER 5000 dictaphones 
11 Grundig Stenorette 
dicta phones 
Explanations 
These machines are part of the old stock 
now being replaced in accordance with the 
programme referred to in 18bis below. 
These machines are in good working 
order. The most recent was purchased in 
1986. 
The typewriters, the same model as those 
under 13 above are assigned to national 
delegations. They will be replaced gra-
dually in accordance with the programme 
referred to in 18 bis below. 
These typewriters were purchased in accor-
dance with the modernisation programme 
given in the 1986 budget. The four IBM 
electric typewriters shown under item 17 of 
the 1986 programme have been scrapped. 
Purchased secondhand in 1980, these 
typewriters are assigned to the Italian Dela-
gation and the Italian summary reporters. 
They will be replaced in accordance with 
the programme referred to in 18 bis below. 
Replacement of 13 typewriters under 13, 
14, 16 and 18 above at a rate of 4 per year 
for 2 years and 5 in 1989. 
Purchased between 1966 and 1979, these 
typewriters are used only occasionally 
because they are old models and staff are 
no longer used to working on such machi-
nes. It is planned to keep the best of them 
in reserve in case of electricity cuts. 
To meet the requirements of the various 
services during Assembly sessions, and 
subject to the purchase of the 13 typewri-
ters mentioned in 18 bis above, the fol-
lowing hire programme is envisaged for 
each session: 
1987 1988 1989 
English keyboards . . . 12 10 7 
French keyboards . . . 11 9 7 
The rates indicated relate to electronic 
typewriters, the electric ones hired until 
now no longer being available. 
All typewriters and calculators are serviced 
twice a year, before each session, by a 
mechanic recruited for this purpose. How-
ever, a lump sum should be earmarked for 
possible repairs at other times. 
Purchased in 1971 and 1980, these dicta-
phones are in good condition. It is not 
planned to replace them in the period 
1987-89. 
Purchased between 1963 and 1983, the dic-
taphones are in good condition. It is not 
planned to replace them in the period 
1987-89. 
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Ref. Budgets 
No. Equipment Explanations 1987 1988 1989 
24 1 Grandjean stenotyping Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good 
machine working order. It is planned to keep it in 
use for the next four years. 
25 Overall estimate for possible repairs to 
equipment in this category. 4000 4000 4000 
25 bis Alcatel CT3 electronic scales These scales will replace the very old Tes-
tut-Dayton scales, which are inaccurate, 
and will allow postal charges to be calcula-
ted far more accurately. 13 600 
D. Word processors and 
computers 
26 8 Word processors/ These have been hired on a five-year lea-
Computers sing basis. 
7 Olivetti ETS 2010 Cost of hire. 210 000 210 000 210 000 
1 Olivetti M 24 Indexed maintenance contract. 43000 48 000 48 000 
27 Telex Hire 20000 20000 20000 
E. Office furniture 
28 Various offices Purchase of computer desks for staff using 
word processors. 18 000 9000 -
29 Various offices Replacement of various items of furniture 10 000 15 000 20000 
Breakdown by budget classification 
Budget classification Ref. No. Budgets 
Head Sub-Head in programme 1987 1988 1989 
Ill 1 5. Purchase or repair of office furniture 28 18 000 9000 -
29 10 000 15 000 20000 
28000 24000 20000 
Ill 16. Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment 3 bis 65 000 - -
18 bis 26000 26000 32 500 
25 bis 13 600 - -
104 600 26 000 32 500 
Ill 17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
other office equipment 1 45 800 45 800 45 800 
2 6600 6600 6 600 
3 10 500 10 500 10 500 
3 bis 4000 4000 4000 
4 5 200 5 200 5 200 
5 1 lOO 1 lOO 1 lOO 
6 4000 4000 4000 
7 3 500 3 500 3 500 
8 700 700 700 
20 25 300 20900 15 400 
21 7000 7000 7000 
25 4000 4000 4000 
26 253 000 258 000 258 000 
27 20000 20000 20000 
390 700 391 300 385 800 
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APPENDIX V 
Trend of the Assembly budget from 1986 to 1987 
1986 1986 %Q 1987 %-c-
revised a a+b 
a b c 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. Permanent staff 9 428 000 + 310 600 3.29 + 303 400 3.11 
Head 11. Temporary staff 2511000 + 80 000 3.18 + 160 000 6.17 
Head Ill. Expenditure premises 
and equipment 1 356 100 - - + 40 200 2.96 
Head IV. General administrative 
costs 2 030 500 - - + 103 000 5.07 
Head V. Other expenditure 1 366 300 - - + 121 700 8.90 
Total expenditure 16 691 900 + 390 600 2.34 + 728 300 4.26 
Receipts 400 000 - - -90 000 -22.50 
Net Total 16 291 900 + 390 600 2.39 + 818 300 4.90 
13. Pensions budget 
Pensions and leaving allowances 928 000 + 43 000 4.63 + 380 000 39.13 
Receipts 410 000 + 15 000 3.65 + 16 500 3.88 
Net Total 518 000 + 28 000 5.40 + 363 500 66.57 
GRAND NET TOTAL (A+ B) 16 809 900 + 418 600 2.49 + 1 181 800 6.85 
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APPENDIX VI 
Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budgets for 1986 (revised) 
and 1987 compared with the total of these budgets 
Revised budget for 1986 1987 
%of %of 
Amount Amount 
A B A B 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. - Permanent staff 9 738 600 57.00 58.37 10 042 000 56.38 57.38 
Head II. - Temporary staff 2 591 000 15.17 15.53 2 751 000 15.45 15.72 
Head Ill. - Premises and equipment 1 356 lOO 7.94 8.13 1 396 300 7.84 7.98 
Head IV. - General administrative 
costs 2 030 500 11.89 12.17 2 133 500 11.98 12.19 
Head V. - Other expenditure 1 366 300 8.00 8.19 1 488 000 8.35 8.50 
ToTAL A (expenditure) 17 082 500 100.00 102.39 17 810 800 100.00 101.77 
Receipts 400 000 -2.39 310 000 -1.77 
TOTAL B (net) 16 682 500 100.00 17 500 800 100.00 
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' 
Opinion of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee (Document C-B ( 16) lS) 
Opinion of the Council (Letter from the Secretary-General ofWEU dated 27th November 
1986) 
Table showing reductions approved by the Council 
Secretary-General's note 1 
WEU Assembly budget for 1987 
1. The WEU Assembly budget for 1987 was circulated under reference B (86) 25 (Assembly 
Document 1072) on 2nd October and was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its 
meeting on 23rd and 24th October 1986 (BR (82) 2, IV - to be circulated). 
2. The customary procedure for the approval of Assembly budgets requires the Council to convey its 
opinion on those budgets to the Assembly before the second part ofthe annual session at which they will 
be approved by the Assembly itself. Insofar as this budget is concerned, that opinion should be trans-
mitted to the Assembly for 1st December 1986. The full procedure is given in the annex to C-B (86) 14 
(Revised budget of the WEU Assembly for 1986). 
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee's conclusions and recommendations in respect of this 
budget are summarised below. 
General observations 
All delegations reaffirmed their commitment to " zero growth " as the guiding principle. There 
was some doubt, however, as to how this should be interpreted; should pensions be included or 
not? Should the national inflation rate of the host country, approximately 2% in the case of France, be 
applied to an international organisation or not? Should zero growth be applied to the original budget 
for 1986 or to the revised budget total for 1986 to establish a level for 1987? 
I 
It was noted that the 1987 budget total was increased by 6.8% (or 4.9o/o without Ptlnsions) over the 
revised budget submitted for 1986. One delegate pointed out, however, that his government would 
base its judgment of zero growth on a comparison with the orginal budget for 1986, which showed 
increases of 9.5% and 7.4o/o respectively. He would seek reductions totalling F 1 250 000. 
Head I- Permanent staff 
The estimates included provisions for three new posts: one A2 and the two Bps sought in the 
revised 1986 budget from December of that year. The cost was shown to be F 586 oop in 1987. One 
delegate felt that proposals of this nature should be postponed for another year when 1here would be a 
major re-examination of the staffing needs of WEU as a whole. The committee conqluded that these 
proposals should be withdrawn, with some delegations suggesting that better use sh<>uld be made of 
existing staff. · 
Head II- Temporary staff 
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions 
Several delegates sought economies under this sub-head. The need for two counsellors to the 
President of the Assembly was questioned as was the need to recruit assistants ftom abroad. A 
reduction ofF 24 875 was agreed, this representing lOo/o of the cost of the assistants. 
Sub-Head 7- Interpretation staff 
Noting that the 1986 revised credit of F 80 000 had been refused, delegation$ insisted that a 
similar reduction be made in 1987. 
I. Document C-B (86) 15, 31st October 1986. 
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Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 
The representative of the Assembly drew attention to the comment on page 16 of the budget in 
which it was stated that a saving ofF 30 000 had been made as a result of the appointment of two new 
B3 staff members. The fact that the committee had rejected those appointments would make it 
necessary to increase this item by F 30 000. The committee took note. 
The savings achieved to this point were insufficient for at least one delegate who suggested that 
the total for Head 11 be reduced by F 111 000, leaving it to the Assembly to decide on the sub-heads to 
be modified. The committee agreed, although one delegation was reluctant. 
Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment 
This item included credits for the purchase (and maintenance) of a new offset machine at 
F 69 000 and for the replacement of typewriters at F 26 000. Delegations sought to delete these credits 
to save F 95 000. 
Sub-Head 17- Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment 
Delegations insisted on the withdrawal of F 20 000 from this item for the hiring of a telex 
machine, noting that telex was expensive to operate and that the budget gave no indication of likely 
running costs. 
The abovementioned reductions totalled F 115 000, but, in the light of arguments advanced by 
the Assembly's representative, a compromise reduction of F 96 300 was agreed subject to a reserve 
figure. All delegations agreed that telex should not be installed. 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telex, etc. 
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of documents 
Sub-Head 21 -Purchase of documents 
Sub-Head 22 - Official cars 
One delegation insisted on reductions for all of these items (18 especially, as the telex had been 
deleted). Detailed discussion led to reductions totalling F 63 000 but some members of the committee 
could accept a lower figure (F 33 500). A compromise was agreed at F 45 000 from the total of Head 
IV. One delegation still sought a higher reduction. 
Head V - Other expenditure 
A proposal to reduce the total of this head by F 68 000 was amended to bring that figure to 
F 88 000 to satisfy, partly, one delegation's request for greater savings in Head IV. It was noted that the 
savings on both Heads IV and V would then total F 133 000. That total still did not meet the dis-
senting delegate's target and he reserved his position though all other members of the committee 
accepted a reduction ofF 88 000 for Head V coupled with the abovementioned reduction ofF 45 000 for 
Head IV. 
4. The total of the reductions agreed by a majority of delegations, as described above, is 
F 926 300. However, the refusal to agree to the new posts proposed under Head I means that pension 
income (staff members' 7% contributions to the scheme) will have to be reduced by F 32 500. The final 
total of the reductions is, therefore, F 926 300 less F 32 500 making a net total ofF 893 800. 
5. The committee's recommendations have amended the budget as follows: 
Operating Pensions 
budget budget 
F F 
Initial estimates (B (86) 25) ............ . 17 500 800 909 500 
Amendments proposed .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . (-) 926 300 ( +) 32 500 
Amended totals ....................... . 
Increase over 1986 original budget ..... . 
Increase over 1986 revised budget (C-B 
(86) 14) .............................. . 
16 574 500 
1.73% 
0.37% 
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942 000 
81.85% 
72.53% 
Total 
F 
18 410 300 
(-) 893 800 
17 516 500 
4.20% 
2.68% 
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6. Subject to the reductions proposed above, the Budget and Organisation Cbmmittee could 
recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the budget of the WEU Assembly for 1987 
subject to reserves on the part of Italy (which favoured a more generous approach) and the United 
Kingdom (which sought greater reductions). 
7. The Council's opinion will be sought at a forthcoming meeting in November 1986 . 
Dear Mr. Moulias, 
... 
... ... 
London, 27th November 1986 
1. At its meeting on 26th November 1986, the Council discussed in depth the As~embly's budgets 
for 1986 and 1987 on the basis ofthe recommendations ofthe Budget and Organisation Committee set 
out in documents CB (86) 14 and CB (86) 15. 
2. In the case ofthe revised budget for 1986, and notwithstanding the recommended reductions, the 
Council decided to grant the Assembly a sum ofF 58 800 to allow it to fulfil its commitments in regard 
to the payment of salaries and pensions. 
The total budget would thus amount to F 17 118 700; the percentage increase compared with the 
1985 budget would therefore be 10.65% including pensions and 9.24% without them.
1 
3. The Council will be able to express a favourable opinion on the revised budget for 1986, the 
abovementioned changes being made. 
4. The Council also examined the Assembly's budget for 1987 with special care. 
There was a consensus in favour of a limited increase in this budget and the Council decided, not-
withstanding the recommended reductions, to grant the following sums: 
- F 24 875 under Sub-Head 6 of Head 11; 
- F 40 000 under Sub-Head 7 of Head 11; 
- F 15 000 under Head IV. 
The total budget will thus amount to F 17 596 375 and the percentage increase compared with the 
revised budget for 1986, as amended, will therefore be 2. 79% including pensions and 0.49% without 
them. 
The Council will be able to express a favourable opinion on the budget for 1987, the 
abovementioned changes being made. 
5. The Council also examined the place of pensions in the organisation's budget. 
It intends to pursue its detailed study of this matter on the basis of the various bu~getary implica-
tions involved and in the light of the position of the co-ordinated organisations in t}lis connection. 
6. Moreover, it took note of the proposals relating to the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk 
which have just been submitted to it. 
It will, as soon as possible, study these in detail on the basis of the opinions of national experts 
who have already had the matter placed before them. 
Mr. Georges MouLIAS, 
Clerk of the Assembly of WEU 
77 
Yours sincerely, 
Alfr~d CAHEN 
Secretary-General of WEU 
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Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head I - Permanent staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries .......................... . 
2 - Allowances ............................ . 
3 - Social charges ......................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
departure of permanent officials ......... . 
Draft budget 
for 1987 
(initial) 
7 270 000 
1 364 000 
1 400 000 
Reductions 
in accordance 
with the Council's 
opinion 
440 000 
64000 
82 000 
Draft budget 
for 1987 
(reduced) 
6 830 000 
1 300 000 
1 318 000 
5 - Medical examination .................... r-----8_0_0..:..0_+---------+---8.;,__;_00-'-0'------t 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 042 000 586 000 9 456 000 
Head// - Temporary staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
2113000 1 125 21111875 
40000 work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496 000 456 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 50 000 - 50 000 
9 - Social charges .......................... l---....;9:....::2:.._0:....::0....:.0_1----=5__;0:....:0:....::0_-+ __ 8:....:7_0:....:0:....::0~ 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 751 000 46 125 2 704 875 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
SuB-HEAD: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .............................. . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ..................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of ses-
sions ................................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of 
the Clerk .............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .... . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ............................ . 
17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
450 000 
15 000 
345 000 
45 000 
18 000 
28 000 
104 600 
- 450 000 
- 15 000 
- 345 000 
- 45 000 
- 18 000 
- 28 000 
72 300 32 300 
other office equipment .................. r-------+--------t-----'--------1 390 700 24000 366 700 
Total ................................. . 1 396 300 96 300 1 300 000 
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Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head IV - General administrative costs 
SuB-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents ............................ . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
Draft budget 
for 1987 
(initial) 
495 000 
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Reductions 
in accordance 
with the Council's 
opinion 
15 000 
Draft budget 
for 1987 
(reduced) 
: 480 000 
and other office supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 000 - 258 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents . . . 1 190 000 - 1 190 000 
21 - Purchase of documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 000 - 60 000 
22 - Official cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 000 15 000 115 000 
23 - Bank charges ........................... t-----5_00_-+---------+-~---------'--50-'-'0'---1 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 133 500 30 000 2 103 500 
Head V - Other expenditure 
SuB-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .. 
25 - Expenses for representation ............. . 
26 - Committee study missions .............. . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk ........................... . 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor ..... . 
29 - Expenditure on information ............ . 
30 - Expenses for political groups ............ . 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
150 000 
200 000 
5 000 
380 000 
100 000 
315 000 
315 000 
20000 
30000 
30000 
4000 
4000 
130 000 
200 000 
5 000 
350 000 
70000 
311 000 
311000 
elsewhere provided for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 000 - 3 000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ................... t----20.:........:..0..:...00.::..__-+---------t----'2=-cO-'-'O.::..._O-'-'O'---I 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 488 000 88 000 1 400 000 
! 
OPERATING BUDGET............................ 17 810 800 846 425 16 964 375 
RECEIPTS ..................................... t-----3_1_0_0_00_-+---------t-------'--3_1 0..:.._0..:.._0-'-'0'----1 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET ................. t---1_7_50_0_80_0_+-_8_4_6_4_2_5_-+-_16_65_4_3_7_5---1 
PENSIONS..................................... 1 351 000 - 1 351 000 
RECEIPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 500 32 500 409 000 
r-----~-----~-----~ 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 909 500 32 500 942 000 
r-----~-----~-----~ 
NETGRANDTOTAL ............................ 18410300 813925 17596375 
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Draft Order 
on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 
2nd December 1986 
submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
The Assembly, 
Noting that the Council, in communicating its prior opinion, has explained that it was continuing 
to study in detail the problem of the place of pensions in the budget of the organisation and that it will 
study in detail the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as soon as possible, 
1. DECIDES, therefore, to adopt in the course of the present session its draft budget, as amended by 
the Council, on condition that within a maximum ofthree months a supplementary budget for 1987 be 
established taking into consideration the requirements of the Assembly as set out in the documents 
already submitted to the Council; 
2. Consequently INSTRUCTS the Presidential Committee to negotiate with the Council to this end. 
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European security and the Mediterranean 
REVISED REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
REVISED DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on European security and the Mediterranean 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The Mediterranean and European security 
(a) General 
(b) Threats to security 
Ill. Soviet Union and the Mediterranean 
(a) Possible strategic and political objective of the Soviet Union 
(b) Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean 
(c) Warsaw Pact forces in proximity to NATO countries 
(i) The Black Sea fleet 
(ii) Land forces 
(iii) Air forces 
(iv) General 
IV. The NATO countries in the Mediterranean 
(a) Defence policy and armed forces 
(i) Portugal 
(ii) Spain 
(iii) Gibraltar 
(iv) France 
(v) Italy 
(vi) Greece 
(vii) Turkey 
(viii) Greek-Turkish relations 
(ix) United States 
1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to I with 0 abstentions. 
14th October 1986 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); Mr. Cifarelli, Dr. Miller (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Amadei, Sir 
Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. Beregovoy, van den Bergh, Bourges, De Decker (Alternate: Declercq), Dejardin, 
Edwards, Ertl, Galley (Alternate: Baumel), Gerstl, Giust, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmnch, Matraja, Peochioli, Sarti, Scheer 
(Alternate: Gansel), Str Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Wtlkinson), Wirth (Alternate: Jeambrun), N ... (vacant 
seat). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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(b) Collective defence arrangements under NATO 
(i) NATO command structure 
(ii) Joint forces 
(i1i) Infrastructure 
V. The non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean 
(a) Yugoslavia 
(b) Albania 
(c) Cyprus 
(i) General 
(ii) Present situation 
(iii) Greek, Turkish and Cypriot military forces in Cyprus 
(iv) United Nations force in Cyprus 
(v) British sovereign base area 
(vi) The Cyprus problem 
(d) Syria 
(e) Lebanon 
(f) Israel 
(g) Egypt 
(h) Libya 
(i) Malta 
(j) Rest of the Maghreb 
VI. Summary and conclusions 
VII. Opinion of the minority 
APPENDICES 
I. Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
11. Comparative table of defence effort 1981-1985 
A. Financial effort 
B. Manpower effort - 1985 
Ill. United States military assistance - Department of Defence proposals for 
Financial Year 1986 
IV. Diagram showing NATO military command structure - elements in the Medi-
terranean and adjoining area 
V. Documents concerning the financing of the United Nations force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) 
VI. Source of armaments of Middle Eastern and North African Mediterranean 
countries 
A. Apparent source of selected major equipment currently in service 
B. Equipment reported to be on order or under delivery in 1985 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
3rd March-6th March 1986- Cyprus 
3rd March 
British Sovereign Base, Episkopi 
Mr. David Reynolds, Chief Officer; 
Brigadier Andrew Myrtle, Deputy Commander, British Forces; 
Air Vice-Marshal K.W. Hayr, Commander, British Forces. 
UNFICYP Headquarters, Nicosia 
, DOCUMENT l 07 3 
Major-General Giinther G. Greindl, Commander, United Nations Force in Cyprus; 
Major Roderick MacArthur, Military Public Information Officer. 
4th March 
H.E. Mr. W.J.A. Wilberforce, CMG, British High Commissioner; 
Mr. George Iacovou, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
President Rauf Denktash; 
Dr. V. Lyssarides, President of the House of Representatives. 
5th March 
Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus; 
Mr. Elias Eliades, Minister of Defence; 
Mr. George Anastadiades, Director-General of the Ministry of Defence; 
Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations; 
Mr. Gustave Feissel, Director of the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General; 
Mr. Glafcos Clerides, Member of the House of Representatives. 
6th March 
H.E. Mr. Richard Boem, United States Ambassador; 
Mr. Richard Hoover, United States Embassy; 
Mr. Thomas Carolan, United States Embassy; 
H.E. Dr. Thilo Rotger, German Ambassador. 
21st March 1986- Rome 
Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Carmelo Liotta, Head Middle East and North Africa Desk, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
Mr. Fernando Lay, WEU Affairs; 
Mr. Vittorio Olcese, Secretary of State for Defence. 
20th March 1986- Naples 
Information was gathered on behalf of the Rapporteur in interviews at Headquarters Allied For-
ces Southern Europe with: 
AdmiralS. Morean, United States Navy, CINCSOUTH; 
Lt. General Thomas F. Healy, United States Army, Chief-of-Staff; 
Mr. Donald A. Kruse, Special Assistant for International Affairs; 
Brigadier General Carlo Parodi Dandini, Italian Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Operations; 
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Brigadier General Dimitrios A vgouropoulos, Hellenic Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Personnel 
and Administration; 
Commodore Keith Estlin, Royal Navy, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Communications and Informa-
tion Systems; 
Admiral Andre Deloinde, French Navy, Head of French Military Mission, and Staff Officers. 
The committee as a whole met in Paris on 19th February 1986 when it discussed Mr. Kittelmann's 
draft outline report. 
The committee met again in Venice on 29th April 1986 when it discussed and adopted the present 
report. 
The Rapporteur expresses his thanks to all those persons who discussed the subject of the report 
with him or provided information for it. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Revised Draft Recommendation 
on Europt!fln security and the Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
(i) Convinced that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East 
region and the Mediterranean area has not changed; 
(ii) Believing however that the military threat from Warsaw Pact forces in the Mediterranean area has 
not increased since the committee's last report; 
(iii) Condemning the continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the perpetration of 
atrocities against the Afghan resistance forces and population; 
(iv) Concerned at the latent dangers arising from conflicts and crises particularly in the eastern and 
southern parts of the Mediterranean area which exert direct or indirect influence upon the interests and 
positions of allied countries; 
(v) Drawing particular attention to the political and military instability in the M'ddle East region 
caused by the unsolved Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab disunity, Libyan and Syrian invollvement in world 
terrorism and, last but not least, by Islamic belligerent fundamentalism in some countries of the region; 
(vi) Welcoming Spain's decision to remain a member of NATO; 
(vii) Believing that European security and security in the Mediterranean area depend also on appro-
priate diplomatic efforts to reach agreed and verifiable arms control measures, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Establish common adequate and convincing policies, which it should implement and publicise, 
when and where appropriate, and which should be defined and intended: 
1. To demonstrate more publicly the collective responsibility of the western alliances for defence in 
the Mediterranean area: 
(i) by supporting joint NATO forces and their exercises in the region and co-ordinating mari-
time surveillance under COMMARAIRMED; 
(ii) by recommending that peacetime actions of forces of NATO countries in the areas covered 
by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be oriented towards NATO policies; 
(iii) by making all efforts to secure and maintain the operational freedom of forces of NATO 
countries in the Mediterranean area, in full accordance with international law and the princi-
ple of the freedom of the seas; 
( iv) by emphasising the need for the continued presence of United States forces in the area thus 
helping to improve European defence capability in this particular part of the continent; 
2. To stress the absolute need to maintain proper military stability in the region, particularly by pro-
viding military aid for the modernisation of the equipment of the Portuguese, Greek and Turkish armed 
forces; 
3. To persuade Spain to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with ACE mobile force, the naval 
on-call force Mediterranean, Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, and by contributing a 
mobile force for reinforcement of allied contingents in the Mediterranean, as well as by reporting 
defence data to NATO as customary with all other NATO members; 
4. To pay proper attention and give due consideration to Turkey's key political and strategic posi-
tion on the Middle East land bridge and to its important defence assignments in NATO's south-eastern 
flank; 
5. To persuade Greece and Turkey to resume bilateral negotiations to solve their Aegean issues, 
inter alia with a view to permitting normal co-operation of Greek forces with NATO plans and to com-
pleting the NATO command structure in the area; 
6. To persuade all relevant parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially in the disturbing 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to find a lasting and peaceful solution, thereby removing the inspiration and 
causes of terrorism, and reducing one peripheral threat to the region; 
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7. To continue to support the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and Cyprus; 
8. To encourage the two communities in Cyprus to resume direct contacts to discuss all issues which 
will assist in finding an agreed solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United 
Nations Secretary-General; 
9. To recall Egypt's commitment to pursue th.~ search for a peace settlement between the Arab world 
and Israel and, by political support, economiC -assistance and due consideration for its security pro-
blems, to encourage that country to continue relevant efforts in that direction; 
10. To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situation of the peoples 
of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The committee has regularly reported on 
the security situation in the Mediterranean, the 
three most recent reports to be devoted exclu-
sively to the region being those by Mr. Bozzi in 
May 1981 1, Mr. Grant in May 1978 2, and Mr. 
Buck in May and June 1976 3• Most recently, 
however, Sir Dudley Smith's report of May 
1984 4 paid particular attention to the western 
Mediterranean and the position of Spain within 
NATO, drawing in particular on information 
gathered during the committee's visit to that 
country in October 1983, and the Rapporteur's 
subsequent visit to Gibraltar. 
1.2. On this occasion, therefore, the committee 
in the terms of reference asked the Rapporteur to 
deal with " the defence situation throughout the 
Mediterranean, in particular the eastern part". 
In this connection, the committee visited Greece 
and Turkey in October 1985 and the Rapporteur 
visited Cyprus and Rome in March this year. 
1.3. Nevertheless, the successful outcome of 
the referendum in Spain on continued member-
ship of NATO held on 12th March makes it 
appropriate to review the situation in that coun-
try also in the present report. 
1.4. As the General Affairs Committee is pre-
paring a report on terrorism and on security out-
side the area of the alliance S, this report does not 
deal in detail with security problems arising from 
conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf 
except to the extent that the levels of armaments 
and armed forces of the immediate neighbours of 
Turkey, or the risk of " ... armed attack ... on the 
forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties, 
when in or over ... the Mediterranean Sea ... " 6, 
make the security problem an " in-area " one for 
NATO. 
1.5. This report was originally adopted by the 
committee on 29th April 1986 by 16 votes to 0 
with 3 abstentions, but after debate on it in the 
Assembly on 4th June, it was referred back to the 
committee, the only explicit argument advanced 
1. European security and the Mediterranean, Document 
876. 
2. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776. 
3. Security in the Mediterranean, Documents 708 and 712. 
4. State of European security, Document 971. 
5. Security and terrorism - the implications for Europe of 
crises in other parts of the world, Rapporteur: Mr. van der 
Werff. 
6. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty- full text of Arti-
cles 5 and 6 at Appendix I. 
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·in favour of the reference bac~ being that the 
report omitted to refer to th~ important role 
played by several industrial couP.tries as a source 
of armaments supplied to Middle Eastern 
countries. The Rapporteur doubts whether that 
was in fact the real motive of all those supporting 
the reference back; there had in fact been a rather 
acrimonious exchange in the Assembly between 
the observers from Greece and Turkey, in which 
other speakers did not join. But as a gesture to 
consensus in the Assembly at the next session, 
the Rapporteur has now included at Appendix 
VI factual information from reliable sources con-
cerning the origin of certain major items of mili-
tary equipment held by the armed forces of the 
Middle Eastern and North African Mediterra-
nean countries. 
1.6. Three amendments to the draft recom-
mendation were tabled in the Assembly in June 
which were not discussed because of the refer-
ence back. The committee has incorporated 
one of these amendments in the ~raft recommen-
dation which now refers in paragraph (v) to both 
Libyan and Syrian involvement in world 
terrorism. The committee stre~ses that this is a 
report which deals with the security interests of 
NATO countries in the Mediterranean area, and 
not one which addresses the p11oblems either of 
world terrorism or of the various disputes and 
conflicts of the Middle East, except in passing to 
the extent that they impinge on allied security in 
the Mediterranean. These other problems have 
been dealt with in many other reports submitted 
to the Assembly in the past, mostly from the 
General Affairs Committee. As far as the prob-
lems of security in the Mediterranean are con-
cerned the committee continues to believe that 
the report as it stands, with the minor additions 
referred to above, remains a balanced report that 
is fair to the various interests concerned. It 
accordingly resubmits it to the Assembly without 
other change. 
II. The Mediterra"'ean 
and European security 
(a) General 
2.1. The welcome confirmation of continued 
Spanish membership of NATO consolidates, in 
theory at least, the stabilising in:tlluence of NATO 
in the Mediterranean basin, where all countries 
on the northern shore are members, with the sole 
exception of Yugoslavia and Albania. Despite 
the long-standing and still unresolved disputes 
between Greece and Turkey which seriously wea-
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ken the eastern flank, the countries of the 
alliance, through the frequent ministerial mee-
tings and lower level working groups of NATO, 
as well as of the European Community to which 
all except Turkey now belong, are much better 
placed to co-ordinate their policies to their 
mutual benefit than the countries on the eastern 
and southern shores of the Mediterranean des-
pite the fact, that with the exception of Israel, the 
latter are all members of the Arab League. 
2.2. Within both main groups there are wide 
variations in standards of living with GDP per 
capita in the NATO Mediterranean countries 
ranging from little more than $1,100 (Turkey) to 
over $8,500 (France). Even wider variations 
among the Arab League countries are accounted 
for mostly by petroleum or natural gas resources 
of Libya and Algeria with per capita incomes of 
$8,400 and $2,200 respectively compared with 
Morocco and Egypt with per capita incomes of 
$600 and $700 respectively. Israel, and to ales-
ser extent the islands of Cyprus and Malta, stand 
out as countries with essentially European stan-
dards of living. Another common feature of 
many countries in the southern and eastern 
Mediterrean areas is the extreme youth of the 
population- in Libya more than half the popula-
tion is under fifteen. 
2.3. The Mediterranean Sea itself is of vital 
economic importance to all countries in the 
Mediterranean and in the Black Sea. At any 
one time some 2,000 merchant vessels, including 
250 to 300 belonging to the Soviet Union, are 
under way in the Mediterranean. Between 300 
and 400 of these are tankers carrying up to 30 
million barrels of petroleum or petroleum pro-
ducts. All imports of petroleum into Italy and 
Greece pass through the Mediterranean as do 
50% of those of France, Spain and Germany. 
2.4. There is thus a strong mutual interest for 
countries of both alliances, and all other Medi-
terranean countries, to ensure that the freedom 
of the sea is maintained. 
2.5. There are considerable forces belonging to 
NATO countries permanently stationed in the 
Mediterranean area. In addition to those of 
Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, the 
United States maintains powerful naval and air 
forces and some army units under bilateral 
basing agreements with Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Turkey. Portugal has earmarked certain units 
as reinforcements for northern Italy in the event 
of hostilities. Forces from other NATO coun-
tries take part in NATO exercises in the Mediter-
ranean area on a sporadic basis. Belgian, Ger-
man and United Kingdom contingents form the 
land component of ACE mobile force when 
deployed in the Mediterranean, and Belgium, 
Germany and Italy contribute squadrons to the 
air component. In addition, the United King-
dom and the United States contribute a ship to 
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the naval on-call force Mediterranean when acti-
vated. 
2.6. In contrast the permanent military pre-
sence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, 
described in Chapter Ill, is modest, comprising 
the Mediterranean squadron of the Soviet fleet 
and an occasional reconnaissance aircraft. 
(b) Threats to security 
2.7. The largest potential threat to NATO 
countries in the Mediterranean region comes 
from the very large land and air forces of the 
Soviet Union and its allies in three main areas. 
Eastern Turkey has a common frontier with the 
Soviet Union, but access to the Mediterranean 
from this remote and mountaineous region with 
poor road communications would be difficult. 
Greece and Turkish Thrace have a common 
frontier with Bulgaria, but there are no Soviet 
forces stationed in Bulgaria. In addition, how-
ever, there is a significant, but not large, Soviet 
amphibious capability which could threaten the 
Turkish Straits. There are at present only four 
Soviet divisions in Hungary, the nearest Warsaw 
Pact territory to north-eastern Italy, but separa-
ted from it by non-aligned Yugoslavia which 
would provide some warning time of any 
approach to the Mediterranean in this area. This 
potential threat is described in the next chap-
ter. 
2.8. Access to the Mediterranean itself for the 
Soviet navy involves passage either through the 
Turkish Straits or Gibraltar, both of which are 
controlled by NATO countries. Access for mili-
tary aircraft to the Mediterranean, without over-
flying NATO territory, involves overflight of 
Yugoslavia- which appears to be granted- and 
a circuitous flight path down the Adriatic. 
Since Soviet military base rights in Egypt were 
revoked by that country in 1972, Soviet naval 
forces have had relatively little access to port 
facilities in the Mediterranean, and Soviet air 
forces have not been based in the Mediterranean 
area at all. 
2.9. The more immediate, but smaller-scale, 
threat to the security of allied countries in the 
Mediterranean area arises from existing or 
potential local conflicts among certain non-
aligned countries, with an inherent risk of invol-
vement of the superpowers, or from the anarchic 
behaviour of a country such as Libya. The poli-
tical stability of certain countries in the eastern 
Mediterranean and along the North African 
coast is uncertain. Any abrupt change of regime 
may lead to a change in political alignment 
favouring the Soviet Union and posing the direct 
threat of Soviet naval and air bases once again 
on the shores of the Mediterranean - although 
since its unfortunate experience in Egypt in 1972 
the Soviet Union does not appear to have sought 
very actively to reinstall its forces on Mediterra-
nean shores. 
2.1 0. Security in the Mediterranean itself there-
fore depends very much on the maintenance of 
good relations with all the non-aligned countries 
of the area and the pursuit of a negotiated settle-
ment to all actual or potential conflicts. Success 
in these aims will depend very much more on 
diplomatic and economic relations than on tradi-
tional military power. Permanent and lasting 
solutions to some of the local disputes or 
conflicts in the area may not always be in 
reach. Deficiencies can be found in the military 
readiness of the NATO forces available for use in 
the Mediterranean area. But the cohesion of the 
alliance and the pursuit of co-ordinated policies 
by the NATO and European Community coun-
tries are more important for the preservation of 
peaceful and stable conditions in an inherently 
unpredictable future than any purely military 
measures. 
Ill. Soviet Union and the Mediterranean 
(a) Possible strategic and political objectives 
of the Soviet Union 
3.1. Historically Russia for 300 years had 
fought a series of wars with Turkey but the aim 
of gaining direct access to the Mediterranean 
through the possession of Constantinople and 
control of the Turkish Straits was never ful-
filled. Relations between the two countries 
were normalised in 1925 with the signature of a 
treaty of friendship between Lenin and Kemal 
Atatiirk, at least until the signature of the non-
aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and 
the Third Reich in August 1939. Relations 
were again strained during World War II when 
Turkey, a non-belligerent, as it was entitled to do 
under the terms of the 1936 Montreux Conven-
tion, closed the Turkish Black Sea Straits to the 
passage of warships of any belligerent - which 
included the Soviet Union and the western allies. 
3.2. Although Turkey finally declared war on 
23rd February 1945, the Soviet Union on 20th 
March that year denounced the 1925 treaty of 
friendship with Turkey which was not due to 
expire until December, demanded a revision of 
the Montreux Convention, and renewed certain 
historical territorial claims concerning eastern 
Turkey. In a subsequent note the Soviet Union 
demanded revision of the Montreux Convention 
as far as the passage of warships was concerned 
so as to permit the free transit of warships of 
Black Sea powers; to prohibit the transit of war-
ships of non-Black Sea powers except in certain 
cases; the right for Black Sea powers to share 
jointly with Turkey responsibility for applying 
the transit regime; and the right for the Soviet 
Union to participate jointly with Turkey in the 
defence of the straits. Turkey at the time indi-
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cated a willingness to consider the first three pro-
posals but refused to consider Soviet participa-
tion in defence of the straits. Turkey insisted 
that the Montreux Convention could be revised 
only by agreement among the signatories. 
3.3. Soviet territorial claims 1against eastern 
Turkey were renounced only on_~30th May 1953, 
some eighteen months after Tur~ey had acceded 
to the North Atlantic Treaty. In a note recalling 
also its earlier demands for revision of the Mon-
treux Convention, the Soviet Union stated that it 
had reconsidered its position and considered that 
mutually agreeable conditions could be found to 
ensure its security. Turkey reasserted its posi-
tion that it stood by the 1936 Montreux Conven-
tion. 
3.4. After 1953 the Soviet Union, having failed 
to secure a modification of the Montreux 
Convention, sought naval and air bases else-
where in the Mediterranean. A squadron of 
submarines was based in Albania until the with-
drawal of that country from the Warsaw Pact in 
1962 when the Soviet submarines were removed 
with the exception of two which were reported to 
have been seized by Albania at the time. After 
the 1956 Suez fiasco the Soviet Union was able 
to develop close relations with ~resident Nasser 
of Egypt which enabled the S~viet Union to 
develop an important naval bas~ in Alexandria, 
and to establish military air bas~s in Egypt. In 
1972 however the new President Sadat expelled 
Soviet military personnel actina as advisers to 
the Egyptian armed forces, and fQllowing abroga-
tion of the bilateral treaty of friendship with the 
Soviet Union in March 1976, the naval and air 
bases were closed to the Soviet Union, a move 
which particularly hampered the operation of 
Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. 
3.5. Since 1976 the Soviet Union has not been 
successful in securing the use of additional major 
naval or air facilities on the shores of the Medi-
terranean. It appears likely, in fact, that in the 
light of its experience with Egypt, it has not acti-
vely sought to invest major military resources in 
another Mediterranean country, fearing the pos-
sible loss of substantial investments in the long 
term through unpredictable changes in political 
leaderships and policies of alignment in the 
countries of the area. 
(b) Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean 
3.6. In an earlier report7 the cdmmittee exam-
ined in some detail the trend ~f Soviet naval 
deployment in the Mediterranealn from the end 
of the second world war onwards. Very small in 
the 1950s the Soviet Union began to maintain a 
permanent presence of naval vessels reaching an 
average daily strength of about 20 inclusive of 
7. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st 
May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant. 
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auxiliary vessels by 1964 or 1965 rising to an 
average of about 40 by 1969 - a level which has 
remained roughly constant since then, except for 
the big build-up to a total of 100 ships, including 
73 combatants, for a brief period at the peak of 
the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Even in that year 
the average daily strength only reached 56. A 
typical presence on any day in the last 12 months 
might have been: 
Surface combatants 
Submarines 
Intelligence collectors 
Naval auxiliaries 
Miscellaneous 
(minesweepers/research, etc.) 
Total 
6 
6 
2 
25 
5 
44 
Of these not more than one or two are modem 
ships with long-range anti-ship surface-to-surface 
missile capability. The remainder of the Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron tends to be older on 
average than ships of the other Soviet fleets. 
3.7. The Soviet Mediterranean squadron is 
maintained for the most part by rotation of sur-
face ships from the Black Sea fleet, with submari-
nes transiting from the Northern and Baltic fleets 
because the Montreux Convention prohibits the 
transit of submarines from the Black Sea except 
for major repair (or on first delivery of a new 
submarine constructed outside the Black 
Sea). In the absence of major naval bases 
within the Mediterranean, the Soviet Mediterra-
nean squadron leads a relatively uncomfortable 
existence at anchorages in a few sheltered spots 
in the open sea off the coasts of various coun-
tries, but beyond the limits of the territorial 
sea. The main anchorages include the Gulf of 
Hammamet off the Tunisian coast; the Gulf of 
Sollum off Libya; an area to the east of Crete; 
and another off Lemnos Island in the North 
Aegean. Anchorages off Kithera, southern 
Greece and south of Cape Passero, off Sicily, are 
also used during exercises. Surface combatants 
spend three-quarters of their time in the open sea 
at these anchorages. A quarter of their time is 
spent under way on exercises or surveillance ope-
rations. On the other hand Soviet submarines 
when in the Mediterranean spend 90% of their 
time at sea. 
3.8. For repair and maintenance purposes the 
Soviet Union has obtained the permission of the 
Syrian Government to use the port of Latakia, 
and Tartus where both submarines and surface 
ships rotate for maintenance periods usually of 
about 30 days. There are usually 6 to 8 repair 
ships in that port. The Soviet navy uses repair 
facilities at a number of other points in the Medi-
terranean. One submarine is always undergoing 
overhaul in Tivat, Yugoslavia, for 6 months at a 
time with a Soviet repair ship always present. 
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Commercial repair facilities are also used in 
Bizerta in Tunisia and minor auxiliaries are 
usually to be found in the Greek shipyard on the 
island of Syros. Soviet naval visits to the 
Libyan ports of Tripoli and Tobruk have increa-
sed somewhat over the last 3 years; earlier in 
1986 a command ship was to be found in Tri-
poli. Annaba in Algeria has been used for 
repair work. 
3.9. It is of course open to the Soviet Union to 
make normal commercial arrangements for sup-
plies in the Mediterranean. Soviet supply ships 
regularly visit the Italian ports of Palermo, 
Naples and Genoa to take on fresh foodstuffs, 
and also to purchase various items of tools and 
hardware that are available on the open mar-
ket. On 26th January 1981 an agreement was 
signed between the Soviet Union and the Mal-
tese Government allowing the Soviet Union to 
use half of the Has Saptain underground oil sto-
rage facilities in Malta which had been built as 
part of the NATO infrastructure programme in 
the 1950s. Its total capacity was then reported 
to be 50,000 tonnes of diesel oil, 90,000 tonnes of 
other fuel oil and 40,000 tonnes of jet fuel. 
Soviet surface auxiliary vessels spend 95% of 
their time in the anchorages and ports mentio-
ned above as being normally used by the Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron. 
3.1 0. The historical level of Soviet naval forces 
in the Mediterranean is illustrated in the fol-
lowing table for the period 1964 to 1977, since 
when it can be regarded as substantially unchan-
ged: 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Historical trend of 
SoJiiet 111111al presence in the Mediterranean 
1964-77 
Year Annual Average 
ship days daily strength 
1,500 5 
2,800 8 
4,400 12 
8,100 22 
11,000 30 
15,000 41 
16,500 45 
19,000 52 
18,000 49 
20,600 56 
20,200 55 
20,000 55 
18,600 50 
17,747 48 
The Soviet presence was negligible before 1964 
and has remained constant at 46-48 since 1977. 
3.11. Under the terms ofthe Montreux Conven-
tion Turkey reports each year to the parties to 
that convention on transits of all naval vessels 
through the Turkish Straits. The following 
table shows the pattern of Soviet naval transits 
through the Turkish Straits since 1964: 
Soviet naval transits of the Turkish Straits 
1964-85 
Surface Auxiliary Year combatant Total transits transits 
1964 56 39 95 
1965 80 49 129 
1966 71 82 153 
1967 149 93 242 
1968 113 117 230 
1969 142 121 263 
1970 149 122 271 
1971 154 123 277 
1972 140 114 254 
1973 159 126 285 
1974 145 93 238 
1975 146 79 225 
1976 63 69 132 
1977 103 82 185 
1978 121 107 228 
1979 129 94 223 
1980 124 111 235 
1982 134 94 228 
1983 132 113 245 
1984 137 86 223 
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3.12. Thus, compared with the naval forces 
maintained by other NATO countries in the 
Mediterranean, the Soviet presence is modest. 
The Soviet squadron can of course be substan-
tially increased by reinforcement from the Black 
Sea fleet described in the next ~ection, but given 
the formalities of passage thrdugh the Turkish 
Straits this would take a certain time, and thus 
provide warning. Naval experts feel it unlikely 
that in the event of hostilities ~he Soviet Union 
would in fact expose major sutface naval forces 
to the risks of operations in tqe Mediterranean 
which would inevitably be con~rolled by NATO 
countries. The Black Sea fleet would be more 
likely to be used in defence of the Warsaw Pact 
southern flank. There are also important Soviet 
naval shipbuilding yards in the Black Sea, and it 
forms the main base for Soviet 1 naval units ope-
rating in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. 
3.13. Major Soviet naval vess~ls including the 
Kiev-class VTOL aircraft carriers and the heli-
copter carriers Moskva and Leningrad are repor-
ted to transit the Turkish Straits from time to 
time on their way to deployment in other ocean 
areas after transiting the Mediterranean. They 
do not appear to be deployed operationally 
within the Mediterranean. It is expected that 
the full-sized aircraft carrier now under construc-
tion in Sebastopol will not be operational until 
the early 1990s. It is however anticipated that it 
Naval vessels in the Mediterranean 
Soviet 
Union 
Carriers -
Cruisers 3 
Frigates and destroyers 8 
Sub-total - Major sutface corn-
batants 11 
Submarines 8 
Amphibious vessels 2 
Auxiliaries 27 
Total 48 
will then leave the Black Sea, declared to Turkey 
as a cruiser because the Montreux Convention 
prohibits the transit of aircraft carriers, and will 
then be deployed with the Northern or Pacific 
fleet for use in more distant oceans. 
(c) Warsaw Pact forces 
in proximity to NATO countries 
(i) The Black Sea fleet 
3.14. As least as important as the Black Sea fleet 
itself are the naval shipbuilding yards at Niko-
laiev where at the present time the first proper 
Soviet aircraft carrier is under construction. 
United Other France Spain8 NATO States 
210 
1 
14 
17 
5 
6 
11 
3910 
91 
NAT09 
2 2 
-
6 
6 1 - 8 
60 13 7 94 
68 16 7 108 
37 11 $ 61 
24 - - 30 
70 19 17 117 
199 46 32 316 
Reported to be nuclear-pro~elled, between 
65,000 and 75,000 tonnes, some 300 m overall 
and to be equipped with stea1111 catapults, this 
carrier when operational will f@r the first time 
permit the Soviet Union to operate fixed-wing 
aircraft at sea. First announcted publicly by 
Admiral Gorshkov in 1979 the carrier has been 
under construction since 1983 but is not expec-
ted to undergo sea trials before 1988. Given the 
8. Spain also has I aircraft carrier (2 jn 1986) and escorts 
at Rota, west of the Straits of Gibraltar, 
9. Total of Greece, Italy and Turkey. 
10. When only I carrier present in' Mediterranean the 
United States total of 39 falls to 33. 
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time it has taken other navies to acquire the 
necessary skills, the carrier is not expected to be 
fully operational in the oceans of the world until 
the early 1990s. It is not yet clear what aircraft 
will operate from it; there are reports that a new 
naval aircraft is being specially developed for the 
vessel. 
3.15. When operational it is expected that the 
aircraft carrier will operate with the Soviet Nor-
them or Pacific fleet, rather than in the Mediter-
ranean itself. 
3.16. The operational Black Sea fleet comprises 
first some 28 submarines (not nuclear-propelled 
- construction of nuclear-propelled submarines 
does not appear to be carried out at the Niko-
laiev Black Sea shipyards). One of the Kiev-
class aircraft carriers is normally based with the 
Black Sea fleet but operates usually beyond the 
Mediterranean. Of 37,000 tonnes displacement, 
270 m length overall, this class operates vertical 
take-off aircraft and helicopters. The smaller 
helicopter carriers Moskva and Leningrad are 
also assigned to the Black Sea fleet. The total of 
48 main surface combatants is completed with 9 
cruisers, 21 destroyers and 15 frigates. There 
are in addition 25 lighter corvette-class vessels. 
3.17. The amphibious capabilities of the Black 
Sea fleet is represented by 21 amphibious ships, 
including 5 landing ship tanks, and 5 battalions 
of naval infantry totalling 3,000 men. 
3.18. Since the committee last reported five 
years ago, the Soviet Black Sea fleet naval avia-
tion has been strengthened and now includes 100 
bombers including the Tu-22M Backfire bomber 
as well as the older Tu-16 Badger. 
(ii) Land forces 
3.19. If NATO countries on the southern flank 
sometimes feel themselves the poor relations, 
with older equipment than that on the central 
front, the same is true ofthe Warsaw Pact's sou-
them tier, Bulgaria and Hungary and Romania, 
if the latter country can still be considered as par-
ticipating militarily in the pact. Both tanks and 
aircraft in these countries' forces tend to be older 
models than in the centre. 
3.20. There are three widely separated areas of 
NATO territory to which the threat of Warsaw 
Pact land forces has to be considered. North-
eastern Italy is possibly the most remote threat, 
being separated from the nearest Warsaw Pact 
forces in Hungary by the neutral territory of 
Yugoslavia and Austria. These Warsaw Pact 
forces comprise a total of 4 Soviet divisions and 
6 Hungarian divisions, the latter at a lower state 
of readiness than those of the Soviet Union. A 
further 7 Soviet divisions at a lower state of rea-
diness in the Kiev military district, the other side 
of the Carpathians, represent a reinforcement 
capability against north-eastern Italy. The War-
92 
saw Pact forces stationed in Hungary are equip-
ped with 2,340 tanks and 1,560 artillery pieces. 
Against this Italy has 8 divisional equivalents 
with 1,250 tanks and 1,400 artillery and mortar 
pieces. Portugal provides a reinforcement bri-
gade for deployment in northern Italy. 
3.21. Against Greek and Turkish Thrace there is 
an immediate threat from the Bulgarian army 
comprising some 7 divisional equivalents at 
category 1 and 2 and a further 3 cadre divi-
sions. Romania further away provides 2 tank 
divisions and 4 motorised rifle divisions and one 
mountain division equivalent together with a 
further 4 cadre divisions. No Soviet forces are 
stationed in Bulgaria or Romania in peacetime, 
and Romania has not normally permitted the 
passage of Soviet forces for exercise pur-
poses. In the Odessa military district in the 
Soviet Union there are a further 8 motorised rifle 
divisions and 1 airborne division. Of a total of 
34 divisions the Italian 1985 white paper on 
defence estimates that just over 22 are at a high 
state of readiness with 3,680 tanks and 2,940 
artillery and mortar pieces. Against these there 
are a total of 22 Greek and Turkish divisions 
available in the area, but account has also to be 
taken of the amphibious forces of the Soviet 
Black Sea fleet listed above. 
3.22. In the area of eastern Turkey along its 
common border with the Soviet Union there are 
12 Soviet divisions deployed forward with 2,400 
tanks and 1, 700 artillery pieces. A further 8 
divisions with proportional numbers of tanks 
and artillery are available as reinforcements in 
the southern Soviet military districts. The Tur-
kish army has some 8 divisions in north-eastern 
Turkey and a further 4 in south-eastern Turkey 
protecting its other borders which could be used 
as reinforcements in the event of an attack in the 
north. 
(iii) Air forces 
3.23. The extreme mobility of air forces makes 
it misleading to count numbers of aircraft based 
in particular countries in peacetime. The Ita-
lian white paper on defence quoted above shows, 
in the whole of the southern region, some 695 
Warsaw Pact fighter bomber/ground attack air-
craft, 1,560 interceptors and 195 reconnais-
sance. Corresponding numbers for NATO are 
615, 295, and 90. The situation on the NATO 
side has somewhat improved since the commit-
tee last reported with a modernisation pro-
gramme under way in the three NATO countries 
concerned with three squadrons of Tornado air-
craft being phased in in Italy and plans for 
Greece and Turkey to acquire F-16 aircraft. 
(iv) General 
3.24. Official NATO briefings speak in general 
terms of unfavourable force ratios in the sou-
them region of 3 to 1 in north-eastern Italy, 2 
to 1 in Thrace, and 3 to 1 in eastern Turkey. 
There are however considerable United States 
air forces available for rapid reinforcement from 
their normal bases in Spain and from the United 
States, and there are defensive advantages of 
both terrain and warning time in north-eastern 
Italy and of terrain in eastern Turkey. 
IV. The NATO countries in the Mediterranean 
(a) Defence policy and armed forces 
(i) Portugal 
4.1. Although Portugal is not strictly a Medi-
terranean country it is mentioned in this report 
in part because of its commitment to a reinforce-
ment role in north-eastern Italy. The commit-
tee reported in some detail on the Portuguese 
defence effort as a whole following its visit to 
that country in October 1982 11 • 
4.2. Portugal's main contribution to collective 
NATO defence is to the Atlantic command, Por-
tugal forming part of SACLANT's area of res-
ponsibility. The important IBERLANT subor-
dinate command is assigned to a Portuguese 
admiral and is responsible for the sea area com-
prising the western Atlantic south of the Portu-
guese/Spanish frontier as far east as the approa-
ches to the Straits of Gibraltar. 
4.3. The Portuguese army has undergone 
considerable reorganisation over the last ten 
years having been reduced in size from 190,000 
to 45,740 today, organised into the equivalent of 
some 7 or 8 brigades. 
4.4. One mobile armoured brigade is ear-
marked for deployment in north-eastern Italy 
and has practised this deployment during NATO 
exercises. On one occasion Portugal has contri-
buted an artillery battery to ACE mobile force 
referred to below. 
4.5. With the second lowest per capita income 
among the NATO countries, Portugal's chief 
problem is with modernisation of equipment. 
As far as the army is concerned, this is reflected 
in its armour which still consists of some out-
dated M-48 tanks and light armoured cars. As 
in the case of Greece and Turkey, NATO com-
manders lay stress on the need for Portugal to 
receive defence assistance from other countries 
of the alliance. For the time being the United 
States, Germany and the Netherlands provide 
military aid to Portugal. The Assembly has 
noted and welcomed, in the context of a number 
of other committee reports, Portugal's applica-
tion to accede to the Brussels Treaty which has 
been under consideration by the WEU Council 
since October 1984. 
11. State of European security, Document 936, 8th 
November 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw. 
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(ii) Spain 
4.6. The committee last visited Spain in Octo-
ber 1983 and reported on that '\fisit in the frame-
work of its report the followin! year 12• 
4.7. Spain became a full party to the North 
Atlantic Treaty on 30th May 1982, but the socia-
list party then in opposition had pledged that it 
would hold a referendum on Spanish member-
ship of NATO if it came to power, as it did in 
November 1982. 
4.8. The promised referendum was held only 
on 12th March 1986, in political conditions 
rather different from those during the debate on 
Spanish accession to NA Td. The socialist 
government, and the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Gonzalez, in person, campaign~d vigorously for 
a " yes " vote on the carefully drafted question 
put to the electorate with three pre-conditions in 
the following terms: ' 
" The government regards it in the natio-
nal interest that Spain rtjmain within the 
Atlantic Alliance and considers that per-
manency of membership should be estab-
lished according to the fqllowing terms: 
1. Spain's participation in the Atlantic 
Alliance does not include its incorporation 
in the integrated military structure. 
2. The prohibition concerning the ins-
talling, stocking or introdiucing of nuclear 
weapons on Spanish territory, will be 
upheld. 
3. Gradual steps will be taken towards 
a progressive reduction of the United Sta-
tes military presence in Spain. 
Are you in favour of Spain being part of 
the Atlantic Alliance within the framework 
set out by the government? " 
4.9. The centre and right-win$ opposition led 
by Mr. Fraga, which has supported membership 
of NATO, opposed the holding of the referen-
dum on principle, and called on voters to abs-
tain. The communist party called for a " no " 
vote. 
4.1 0. The results of the refenmdum on 12th 
March were considered an outstanding victory 
for the government: 
Yes 8,987,525 52.54% 
No 6,815,173 39.83% 
Blank votes 1,119,202 6.54% 
Spoiled papers 187,219 1.09% 
Turn-out was put at: 17,109,118 (59.71%); 
abstentions: 11,542,410 (40.29%)13• 
12. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 
1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dud1ey Smith. 
13. Atlantic News, 14th March 1986. 
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4.11. The result was welcomed in particular by 
the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord earring-
ton, at a press conference on 13th March when 
he noted that it would be simpler if all NATO 
member countries enjoyed the same status in the 
organisation. He recognised however that 
NATO had lived for many years with the parti-
cular problems of the 16 sovereign independent 
countries who were members and " we accom-
modate with this". 
4.12. In a previous report14 the committee poin-
ted out the anomalies of present Spanish mem-
bership of NATO. Following ratification of 
Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in 
May 1982 negotiations had begun on the integra-
tion of Spain into the NATO military struc-
ture. The progress of the talks has not been 
made public but they were known to have run 
into difficulties over the allocation of command 
responsibilities in the Iberian area, because of 
differences of opinion between Spain and Portu-
gal which has exercised an important command 
responsibility in the Atlantic for many years. 
These negotiations were frozen with the change 
in government in Spain in November 
1984. Spain from the outset of its membership 
of the organisation has however participated 
fully in all NATO committees including in parti-
cular the Defence Planning Committee, the Mili-
tary Committee, and, as an observer, the Nuclear 
Planning Group. At the last meeting of the 
NPG on 21st March 1986, the Spanish Ambassa-
dor announced that Spain henceforth would par-
ticipate as a full member; the communique of the 
meeting no longer carried the customary reserva-
tion, " Spain attended as an observer ", of pre-
vious communiques. Spain also attends mee-
tings of Eurogroup. France, in contrast, since 
withdrawing from the integrated military struc-
ture in 1966, has not been represented on any of 
those bodies. France, on the other hand, since 
withdrawing its officers from the integrated staffs 
of the various NATO military headquarters has 
maintained military missions at these headquar-
ters and also continues to report the various sta-
tistics concerning its defence effort which NATO 
publishes each year 15• Spanish statistics are 
not yet included in the NATO figures. In 
confirming its membership of NATO, Spain 
continues its policy of not allowing nuclear wea-
pons to be stationed on its territory - a policy it 
has maintained since the accident with the Uni-
ted States aircraft in the 1960s when a nuclear 
bomb, which did not explode, burst open on 
contact with the ground causing radioactive 
contamination. The same policy with respect to 
nuclear weapons has always been pursued by 
Denmark and Norway. The consequences for 
the stationing of United States forces in Spain 
14. Document 971, op. cit. 
15. See Appendix II, denved from NATO statistics. 
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and the bilateral defence treaty are discussed in 
section 4.68 et seq. below. 
4.13. It appears to be generally recognised in 
NATO circles that in view of the terms of the 
referendum question, and while the present 
government remains in power, there will be no 
further discussion on the integration of Spanish 
forces into NATO. In the view of the commit-
tee however it would be undesirable for there to 
be any reduction in the present level of Spanish 
participation in NATO committees - which is 
mutually beneficial - and Spain should be urged 
to appoint military missions to the various 
NATO headquarters concerned which must 
include SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN as 
well as subordinate headquarters including 
EASTLANT (eo-located at Channel Command), 
IBERLANT as well as AFSOUTH and its subor-
dinate headquarters AIRSOUTH and NAY-
SOUTH. 
4.14. Since acceding to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, elements of the Spanish Mediterranean 
fleet (shown in the table in paragraph 3.12 
above) have been participating on a bilateral 
basis in naval exercises in the Mediterranean 
with various other NATO countries. Spanish 
submarines in the past have acted as hypotheti-
cal " hostile " forces in anti-submarine exercises, 
and recently Spanish surface units have par-
ticipated in such exercises for the first time. 
Without prejudging the question of permanent 
integration into the NATO military structure, it 
is felt that Spanish forces could make a useful 
military contribution to NATO's various multi-
lateral collective defence arrangements described 
in a later chapter. These could include: 
- periodical exercises with naval on-call 
force Mediterranean; 
- provision of reinforcement units for 
deployment in the Mediterranean area, 
and practising such deployments on 
exercises; 
- participation of maritime patrol aircraft 
in co-ordinated surveillance activities in 
the Mediterranean through bilateral 
arrangement with COMMARAIRMED 
in Naples (as France already does). 
4.15. The committee notes with satisfaction that 
Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
visited Spain for talks with ministers at the invi-
tation of the Spanish Government in January 
1986, and that at that time the government 
spokesman announced that Spain would apply 
for membership of the Brussels Treaty. It was 
understood that an application would be made 
once the results of the referendum were 
known. 
(iii) Gibraltar 
4.16. The British colony of Gibraltar houses a 
small naval and air headquarters which when 
activated during exercises or emergencies 
become a NATO naval command subordinate to 
NA VSOUTH in Naples -Commander Gibraltar 
Mediterranean, subordinate to Commander 
Naval Forces Mediterranean in Naples, and 
Commander Maritime Air Forces Gibraltar, 
subordinate to Commander Allied Air Forces 
Southern Europe in Naples. 
4.17. Rapporteurs ofthe committee have visited 
Gibraltar from time to time, most recently in 
March 1984, and the committee at that time 
reported in some detail on the situation on the 
rock 16• 
4.18. British forces permanently stationed in 
Gibraltar are small. They amount to one batta-
lion and some artillery the historical role of 
which is to defend the territory against any threat 
from Spain - a surely anomalous role now that 
Spain has become a democracy and is a member 
of NATO and of the European Community. 
There are normally 2 Jaguar fighter aircraft on 
rotation from the United Kingdom which can 
perform a useful reconnaissance function in 
obtaining close-up photographs of Soviet naval 
units transiting the straits. British Nimrod 
maritime reconnaissance aircraft operate out of 
Gibraltar from time to time. Britain does not 
now station naval vessels in Gibraltar perma-
nently but a guard ship - usually a frigate -
based in the United Kingdom is available at 
short notice. 
4.19. Other NATO countries including Canada, 
the Netherlands and the United States operate 
ships and aircraft out of Gibraltar during NATO 
exercises. In the event of hostilities naval ves-
sels from the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Italy would operate under the Gibraltar 
NATO command. If Spain does not join the 
integrated military structure ofNATO, Gibraltar 
will obviously continue to provide a useful base 
for a NATO naval headquarters from where 
control of the Gibraltar Straits can be exerci-
sed. 
4.20. As far as the political situation in Gibraltar 
is concerned Spain recognises British sovereignty 
over " the town and castle of Gibraltar, together 
with the port, fortifications and forts " in accor-
dance with the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht; succes-
sive Spanish governments have campaigned to 
" re-establish the territorial integrity of Spain " 
through the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sove-
reignty. After imposing a series of restrictions 
on Gibraltar the Spanish authorities closed the 
frontier in 1969. An Anglo-Spanish agreement 
was reached in Brussels on 27th November 1984 
as a result of which the frontier was reopened in 
February 1985 while reciprocity of rights for Spa-
16. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 
1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith - explanatory memo-
randum, paragraph 3.98 et seq. 
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niards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain 
was agreed, together with the establishment of 
" a negotiating process aimed at overcoming all 
the differences between them bver Gibraltar ... 
both sides accept that the issues of sovereignty 
will be discussed in that process. The British 
Government will fully maintain!its commitment 
to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar 
as set out in the preamble of the 1969 constitu-
tion ". The British commitment remains to res-
pect the wishes of Gibraltarians who in a 1967 
referendum voted by 12,138 to 44 in favour of 
retaining the link with Britain. ' 
4.21. Following the passage of ~he Spanish air-
craft carrier, Dedalo, within 1 mile of the Gibral-
tar dockyard and the launching I of 2 helicopters 
from its flight deck in the vicinity of Gibraltar 
airport on the night of 20th/21st September 
1985, Britain lodged an official protest which 
was rejected by the Spanish Government. A 
Spanish Foreign Ministry official was quoted as 
saying: "Spain only ceded the waters within the 
actual port of Gibraltar to Great Britain ... conse-
quently the remaining waters adjacent to the 
rock come under Spanish sove~ignty "17• Bri-
tain claims territorial waters up tb 3 miles or the 
median line around Gibraltar whereas Spain 
claims territorial waters up to 6 miles from its 
coast - or up to the median line with Morocco in 
the case of the Straits of Gibraltar. For some 
time Spain has maintained a proihibited area for 
aircraft stretching some 30 miles in the vicinity 
of the Straits of Gibraltar. Airspace up to 3 
nautical miles around Gibraltar is however 
excluded from this prohibited ~rea, permitting 
aircraft to operate in and out of the Gibraltar air-
field. The question of the territbrial sea is dis-
cussed in paragraph 4.74 below. 
(iv) France 
4.22. France has not been part of the integrated 
military structure of NATO since 1966 but main-
tains substantial naval and other forces in the 
Mediterranean; NATO commanders express 
confidence that these forces would be available 
to NATO in the event of hostilities. 
4.23. France maintains a perm1=ment military 
mission at the headquarters of ClNCSOUTH in 
Naples, which includes 2 liaison officers from the 
French Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterra-
nean in Toulon who are attached to the subordi-
nate NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces 
Southern Europe, also in Naples, who in turn 
maintains two NATO liaison officers at the 
French naval headquarters in Toulon. Arrange-
ments for the co-operation of French naval for-
ces with NATO forces in the event of hostilities 
are covered in detailed agreemernts negotiated 
between the NATO and French commanders-in-
chief concerned in 1972 and 197~. 
17. The Guardian, 3rd April 1986. 
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4.24. French naval forces in the Mediterranean 
are listed in the table in paragraph 3.12. They 
normally include 2 aircraft carriers carrying 
Super-Etendard nuclear capable strike aircraft 
equipped with the AN-52 nuclear bomb. Two 
of the 11 submarines are nuclear-propelled - the 
Rubis and Saphir. Part of the 27 Atlantique 
maritime patrol aircraft are based in the Mediter-
ranean. 
4.25. French naval vessels participate in NATO 
naval exercises occasionally, and more fre-
quently in joint exercises with allied navies on a 
bilateral basis. French maritime patrol aircraft 
on request from the NATO Commander Mari-
time Air Forces Mediterranean in Naples will 
participate in surveillance of Soviet naval vessels 
in the Mediterranean. The Atlantique, of 
somewhat shorter range than the Orlon recon-
naissance aircraft of some other navies, can on 
these occasions land at NATO airfields in Italy 
for refuelling before returning to its French base. 
4.26. In May and early June 1985 the French 
Mediterranean fleet with some 14 vessels inclu-
ding the 2 aircraft carriers carried out a major 
cruise in the eastern and central Mediterranean, 
with port calls in Egypt and Greece, participating 
on the way in a series of allied and national naval 
exercises. The French Commander-in-Chief 
Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral Claude Gagliardi, 
was quoted at the time as saying of the French 
fleet: "It is the military tool of an autonomous 
French policy in the Mediterranean, which was 
for a long time an American 'lake'. France is 
trying to catch up in this area vital for it, by 
demonstrating its military capability in the event 
of a crisis "18• At the conclusion of that exercise, 
one of the aircraft carriers, the Clemenceau, went 
into refit for 18 months which will include the 
fitting ofCrotale missiles in an anti-missile role. 
4.27. It is suggested that, in line with the com-
mittee's proposals concerning Spain, it would be 
useful if a French vessel were to be made avail-
able in the future for service with the naval on-
call force Mediterranean during its periodic acti-
vations. 
(v) Italy 
4.28. Italy is the major NATO participant in the 
Mediterranean area, the whole of its armed for-
ces being based on its own territory bounded 
only by the Mediterranean and the Alps in the 
north. In recent years the Italian Parliament 
has led in a process of opening up discussion of 
defence policy in Italy to parliamentary and 
public debate. This led to the publication on 
16th November 1984 (in English as well as in Ita-
lian) of the Defence White Paper 1985 presented 
by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Spadolini. 
Later than most NATO countries, Italy is also in 
18. Le Monde, 6th May 1985. 
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the process of establishing a central defence 
secretariat with the Chief of Defence Staff 
controlling overall defence policy and opera-
tions. The traditional three services in Italy had 
been too autonomous in the past. Mr. Spadolini's 
introduction to the white paper reflects both of 
these processes: 
" The time is ripe for an exchange of opi-
nions between the civilian and the military 
society in order to arrive at a common 
assessment of problems that cannot in any 
way be considered in an exclusive or sepa-
rate way or covered by an impenetrable 
technicism. This is proved by the heated 
debates which are going on in parliament 
and all over the country. Italy's defence 
policy cannot be defined in the abstract 
but it must be agreed upon by a large 
majority of the population. Therefore 
this white paper on defence is at midway 
in a complex process of analysis and reor-
ganisation started by parliament and based 
on a constant dialogue ... 
The choice made by this white paper ... con-
sists in a defence structure based on mis-
sion needs with interrelations between the 
armed forces ... 
The problem is to reach a greater integra-
tion of the forces as regards operations, 
weapons and budget without in any way 
damaging the historical heritage of expe-
riences and traditions of the individual 
services ... 
The administrative, industrial and mili-
tary structures should be better co-ordina-
ted with a consequent strengthening of the 
tasks of the Chief of Defence Staff in the 
military field and of those of the Secretary-
General for Defence, and a national arma-
ments director, in the administrative sec-
tor. " 
4.29. The Italian Ministry of Defence is seeking 
also to modernise the structure of the army by 
reducing the number of conscripts to provide a 
more efficient and more professional army and 
reducing the inefficient administrative burden of 
the territorial recruiting structure which has not 
been reorganised since the 19th century. 
4.30. The potential military threat to north-
eastern Italy from Warsaw Pact forces has been 
the basis of Italian defence planning for a long 
time, but in recent years more attention is paid 
to possible threats to the rest of the territory ari-
sing from the inherently unstable conditions in 
many Mediterranean countries. The white 
paper refers obliquely to these problems: 
" In particular some conceptual and opera-
tional certainties that had been a major 
factor in the functioning of the internatio-
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to NATO more forces than hitherto, in more 
than one case NATO has not been able to accept 
because the proposed declaration included forces 
on Lemnos. Furthermore, the present deploy-
ment of the Greek army and air force units is not 
in accordance with NATO policy. On 8th 
January 1985 a Greek Government statement 
was issued according to which: 
" The Foreign Affairs and Defence Council 
of the cabinet met today with the partici-
pation of the leadership of the armed for-
ces and approved the policy of national 
defence. The basic objective of our natio-
nal defence policy is the safeguarding of 
national independence and territorial inte-
grity of the country. " 
The announcement did not name Turkey, but in 
December 1984 the Greek Government had sta-
ted that its new defence policy would be the basis 
for deploying Greek armed forces towards Tur-
key rather than Bulgaria19• In January 1986, the 
Greek Deputy Defence Minister was reported as 
saying that Greece was to deploy a new defence 
system along its borders, in particular in the 
Aegean area, involving 600,000 men, as a 
" purely preventive " measure. The move was 
said to be supported by the opposition New 
Democracy Party20• 
4.38. The Greek forces, if fully co-operating 
with the co-ordinated NATO plans, would make 
an important contribution to defence in the sou-
thern region, but as in the case of Portugal and 
Turkey, the financial resources of the country 
alone do not permit sufficient modernisation of 
equipment. The 1,600 tanks in service include 
320 obsolete M·47 and 380 elderly M-48, toge· 
ther with 106 more modem Leopard; support 
weapons include 8 Honest John tactical missile 
launchers for which the United States retains the 
nuclear warheads. The air force is equipped 
with F-1 04 and A-7 fighter bombers as well as 
F-4 and F-5A interceptors. Greece has announ-
ced its intention of acquiring F-16s and Mirage 
2000s. Modernisation of Greek forces is sup-
ported through defence aid from the United Sta-
tes and Germany. 
4.39. The total Greek forces assigned to NATO 
amount to 13 divisions (including 1 armoured 
division, 1 mechanised division as well as 5 
armoured brigades and 2 mechanised brigades) 
with 1,050 tanks, 27 warships (the total fleet 
includes 10 submarines, 14 destroyers, 7 frigates, 
16 fast-attack craft, and an amphibious force of 
13 landing ships and a number of landing craft) 
and 310 combat aircraft. 
4.40. The problems of Greek-Turkish relations 
and United States assistance are discussed 
below. 
19. International Herald Tribune, 9th January 1985. 
20. Atlantic News, 8th January 1986. 
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(vii) Turkey 
4.41. The committee visited Turkey in October 
1985 for the first time since 1981 - a time when 
parliamentary government had been suspen-
ded. Mr. Turgut Ozal took office as Prime 
Minister in December 1983 following elections 
the previous month in which his Motherland 
Party had won a clear majority over the Nationa-
list Democracy Party which had been favoured 
by the military authorities. Only parties appro-
ved by the military authorities were allowed to 
contest the elections; 243 former deputies had 
been banned from political activity for 10 
years. Martial law was ended in Ankara and 6 
other provinces in July 1985. At present mar-
tial law remains in force in 5 provinces along the 
eastern frontier. 
4.42. Mr. Ozal's government has pursued an 
active policy to strengthen its links with Euro-
pean countries and European institutions. Mr. 
Halefoglu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has 
recently referred to Turkey's " contractual right " 
under the terms of the 1963 agreement on asso-
ciate membership of the European Community, 
to "apply for full membership in due time". 
4.43. With a defence expenditure of 4.4% of the 
GDP, Turkey's is among the highest defence 
efforts in NATO, comparing favourably with the 
larger WEU countries; with 4.6% of the active 
population in the armed forces, Turkey is second 
only to Greece among the NATO countries. In 
a country where illiteracy is still 30%, affecting 
twice as many women as men, the 20 months' 
compulsory military service has an important 
educational as well as a defence function in Tur· 
key. Great importance is attached to training; 
there is a deliberate policy of posting troops for 
service to areas of the country away from their 
home province. 
4.44. While emphasising first and foremost its 
ties with NATO and the Western European insti-
tutions including the Council of Europe and the 
European Communities with a view to eventual 
full membership of the latter, Turkey maintains 
neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and 
the Balkan countries, and would seek to improve 
economic relations with them - some electricity 
in the frontier regions is already supplied by the 
Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Relations with Bul-
garia are however strained at the present time 
because ofthe repression of the Turkish minority 
in that country. Amnesty International repor-
ted in the week of 31st March that 100 ethnic 
Turks had been killed in clashes with the Bulga-
rian police during the 1985 campaign to oblige 
the minority to change their names to Bulgarian 
ones, stop the use of Turkish, and close the mos-
ques. Turkey seeks the support of its allies as 
well as Islamic countries and the Soviet Union to 
stop Bulgarian atrocities. Turkey sees itself 
enjoying a special relationship with Islamic 
countries, especially the Arab countries. Never-
theless, a Turkish view of security has to take 
account not only of the obvious Warsaw Pact 
threat in Thrace and eastern Turkey, but of the 
level of armaments, largely supplied by the 
Soviet Union, of neighbours in the south-east. 
4.45. Iran and Iraq, neighbours of Turkey but 
not Mediterranean countries, at war with each 
other since September 1980, present a problem 
to Turkey which seeks normal relations with 
both and co-operation in dealing with the Kur-
dish minority in the frontier area of all three 
countries. From the military equipment stand-
point they are rather different. Iran, with regu-
lar forces of 305,000, has relied on its young 
revolutionary guards, reportedly 250,000, to sup-
plement its 250,000 army in its offensive against 
Iraq. It has received limited supplies of modern 
equipment from the Soviet Union since the fall 
of the Shah in early 1979. It is reputed to have 
1,000 tanks of which only 150 are relatively 
modern Soviet T-62 and T-72, 300 obsolescent 
T -54, and 500 British and American Chieftain 
and M-60 left from the Shah's regime. The air 
force now of dubious quality and training under 
the Khomeini regime is reported to have possi-
bly 80 serviceable American aircraft F-4s and 
F-14s; it has not been re-equipped by the Soviet 
Union. 
4.46. Iraq on the other hand has an army of 
475,000 in 20 divisions equipped with some 
2,900 tanks which also include some modern 
T ·62 and T • 72 and a sizable air force equipped 
with modem Soviet aircraft such as the Tu-22, 
Mi0-23 and Su-20. 
4.47. Syria has 9 divisions with much more 
modem armour including 1,300 T-62 and 1,100 
T -72 tanks. Its air force with 9 attack squa-
drons again has much modern equipment inclu-
ding 40 Su-20 and 50 MiG-23. Much of this 
equipment of Turkey's immediate neighbours 
appears superior to the bulk of that in service in 
the Turkish armed forces. Turkey is simulta-
neously in the uncomfortable position of sharing 
common frontiers with the two present bellige-
rents, Iran and Iraq. 
4.48. The Turkish army of 540,000 men is orga-
nised in 12 infantry divisions, 1 armoured divi-
sion and 2 mechanised divisions with a further 6 
armoured, 4 mechanised, and 10 infantry briga-
des plus a parachute brigade and a commando 
brigade. The bulk of the 2,900 tanks are still the 
obsolescent M-48, but 200 more modern M-48A 
and 77 Leopard I have recently been acquired. 
Support weapons include 18 Honest John tacti-
cal nuclear missile launchers for which the Uni-
ted States holds nuclear warheads. 
4.49. The Turkish land forces are organised first 
in 3 field armies. The Turkish first army with 
headquarters in Istanbul is responsible for the 
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area of the Turkish Straits where NATO brief-
ings in the past concerning the overall area of 
Greek and Turkish Thrace have suggested that 
manpower is about evenly balanced at some 
350,000 men on each side, but with a 2 to 1 
adverse ratio for NATO in tanks. The Turkish 
third army with headquarters at Erzincan has 8 
divisions responsible for the defence of the eas-
tern frontier with the Soviet Urtion where NATO 
briefings have suggested a 2 to 1 adverse ratio in 
manpower with about 152,500 men on the Tur-
kish side, and an adverse ratio of up to 7 to 1 in 
tanks of which Turkey deploys some 900 in a 
region that is not particularly favourable for 
armour. Turkish second army with headquar-
ters in Malatya has 4 divisions responsible for 
the southern border with Syria and Iraq and is, 
according to Turkish estimates, not capable of 
coping with the threat in this particular area. 
4.50. A fourth army, the Aegean army, in south-
western Turkey with its headquarters in Izmir is 
described by Turkey as comprising training 
units. It has been described bY Greek authori-
ties as a threat to Greece; they have claimed that 
it contains 140,000 men. No other authorities 
have supported that claim. Independent obser-
vers in Turkey believe that there might be some 
50,000 men, largely in training units, in the 
Aegean army. 
4.51. Since the 1974 landings, Turkey has main-
tained troops in Cyprus which at present amount 
to 17,000 men orpnised in 2 infantry divisions 
with 150 M-47 and M-48 tanks. 
4.52. The Turkish navy makes an important 
contribution to NATO both in,the Black Sea and 
in the eastern Mediterranean. Its 130 ships 
comprise 1 S destroyers, 2 escorts and 16 subma· 
rines as well as a number of fa~t patrol craft, but 
as in the case of much other Turkish equipment, 
many are obsolescent. 
4.53. The Turkish air force of 19 fighter squa-
drons and 4 transport squadrons with 8 Nike 
Hercules air defence squadrons is organised into 
the 1st and 2nd tactical air forces with headquar-
ters at Eskisehir and Diyarbaklir, responsible for 
the defence of north-western ap.d eastern Turkey 
respectively. The fighter squ~drons are equip-
ped with F-5s, F-lOOs and F-4ls. 7 of the squa-. 
drons have been equipped ~th F-104Gs sup-
plied as part of German and some Netherlands 
assistance. 
4.54. The chronic problem facing the Turkish 
armed forces is always one of modernising their 
equipment which lags one generation behind that 
of most other NATO countries, and is now infe-
rior even to some modern equipment in the Bul-
garian army. United States and German 
defence aid is promised to Turkey to assist in 
modernisation. 
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arrangements to which all the local NATO coun-
tries subscribe, the United States has bilateral 
mutual defence agreements with all the Mediter-
ranean NATO countries (except France) whereby 
the United States enjoys the use of various mili-
tary base and other facilities, while it provides 
military assistance to Portugal, Spain, Greece 
and Turkey. In addition, United States officers 
in senior positions of command - in particular 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern 
Europe (CINCSOUTH) himself- have been bet-
ter placed to generate co-operation between the 
military forces of the different NATO countries 
in the area than might officers from those coun-
tries because of certain historical rivalries. 
4.64. At the same time, certain operations 
conducted by United States forces in the Medi-
terranean, which like forces of all NATO coun-
tries operate under national command in peace-
time, have been the subject of some criticism by 
European NATO countries from time to 
time. Increasingly the host countries have insis-
ted that the military installations they make 
available to United States forces shall be used for 
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4.68. As in the case of Portugal, United States 
defence agreements with Spain 1were first conclu-
ded with a dictatorship and extended on a five-
yearly basis. Under a 1976 treaty which repla-
ced earlier agreements, most tanker aircraft (used 
for refuelling transport aircraft en route to Israel) 
were withdrawn from Spain, &nd strategic sub-
·marines were removed from Rota from 
1979. A new agreement was signed in July 
1982, a month after Spain's accession to the 
North Atlantic Treaty. For the first time this 
agreement provided that the overflight and use 
of Spanish airspace was subject to Spanish 
control; it maintained Spanish policy, since the 
accident in the 1960s which caused radioactive 
contamination, of excluding nuclear weapons 
from Spanish territory. The major bases avail-
able to the United States are the naval base at 
Rota near Cadiz and air bases! at Torrejon near 
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Madrid, Saragossa north-east of Madrid and 
Moron near Seville in the south. There is also a 
naval air base at Rota used chiefly for maritime 
surveillance. A United States petroleum pipe-
line stretches nearly 800 km from Cadiz to Sara-
gossa providing aviation and other fuel to the 
United States air bases. There are 6 major com-
munications centres at various points in Spain 
and on the Balearic islands and 2 LORAN sta-
tions. The government of Mr. Gonzalez took 
office on 1st December 1982, not long after the 
conclusion of the July agreement with the United 
States which the socialist party in opposition had 
criticised. The agreement was ratified in April 
1983 with an additional protocol providing that 
Spain's membership of NATO did not imply 
participation in the integrated military struc-
ture. As already pointed out, one of the condi-
tions put to the Spanish population in the refe-
rendum on membership of NATO held on 12th 
March 1986 was that " gradual steps will be 
taken towards the progressive reduction of Uni-
ted States military presence in Spain". The 
United States agreed in December 1985 to nego-
tiate reductions in its forces when renewal of the 
1982 agreement was discussed. At the time of 
the referendum there were press reports that the 
United States forces in Spain had been quietly 
reduced from 12,600 to 9,500, partly by replace-
ment of United States by Spanish personnel. It 
was suggested that the lower figure would 
become the official ceiling when negotiations 
were completed. 
4.69. The United States military presence in 
Italy dates in practice from World War 11 but 
was first formalised by an exchange of notes in 
January 1952 followed by an agreement signed in 
October 1954 with subsequent additions. The 
Italian Defence White Paper 1985 makes vir-
tually no reference to the presence or role of Uni-
ted States forces in Italy. There is a total of 
some 58 various installations and bases available 
to the United States in Italy, some quite small 
such as radio relay stations, and some larger 
bases. The United States army presence of 
4,000 men in Italy is the largest in any of the 
Mediterranean countries, most of it concentrated 
in the Southern European Task Force with head-
quarters in Vicenza, with a logistic base in the 
port of Livorno which both provides logistical 
support as well as nuclear fire support for the Ita-
lian army. The United States air force has 
5,800 men in Italy; the main base is at A viano in 
north-eastern Italy from which tactical squa-
drons operate on rotation from the main bases in 
Spain. Naples airfield is also available to the 
United States air force and United States naval 
aviation operates maritime surveillance aircraft 
out of Sigonella airfield near the port of Catania 
in Sicily. The United States sixth fleet is based 
in part in Naples, with its headquarters-ship 
anchored off Gaeta to the north, and also uses 
the port of Catania in Sicily. The nuclear-
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propelled attack submarines in the Mediterra-
nean are serviced at La Maddalena, an island off 
the north of Sardinia. There are 5,250 United 
States naval personnel in Italy. The United Sta-
tes operates some 15 radio communications sta-
tions located in various parts of Italy as well as 
the important intelligence-gathering centre at 
San Vito in the south-east near Brindisi. 
4. 70. Agreements on United States military faci-
lities in Greece date from a first bilateral agree-
ment of October 1953 authorising the construc-
tion of military and supporting facilities in 
Greece such as the two governments should 
agree to be necessary " for the implementation 
of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO 
plans". Following the events of 1974 there 
were long-drawn-out negotiations over a new 
agreement in which Greece sought guarantees 
that military assistance to Greece and Turkey 
would henceforth be in the ratio of 7 to 10 res-
pectively, and in which Greece sought assurances 
concerning a military balance in the Aegean, and 
the use to which United States bases would be 
put. After Mr. Papandreou's government 
came to power in 1981, a new five-year base 
agreement was signed in 1983, providing specifi-
cally that the facilities provided could not be 
used against countries friendly to Greece, inclu-
ding Libya. Despite PASOK pre-election rheto-
ric calling for the removal of United States bases 
and nuclear weapons from Greek territory, the 
bases were reprieved. The most important 
from the United States point of view is probably 
the naval base in Suda Bay, Crete, an enclosed 
deepwater natural anchorage large enough to 
take the whole of the sixth fleet. The Suda Bay 
complex includes ammunitions storage sites and 
an airfield used by the United States air force for 
staging reconnaissance missions. There is a 
second air base at Hellenikon near Athens. 
There are in addition some eight major military 
communications facilities in various parts of 
Greece and a major intelligence-gathering centre 
at Iraklion in Crete. The present bilateral base 
agreement expires in December 1988 and the 
United States has been anxious to secure assu-
rances that it will be extended beyond that 
date. Apparently during Mr. Shultz's visit to 
Athens at the end of March the subject was not 
officially raised, but the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Papandreou, was reported as saying that Greece 
was satisfied with the agreement. The base 
agreement has always been closely linked to Uni-
ted States defence aid which in fiscal year 1986 is 
reported to be some $500 million in the form of 
credits - the breakdown of United States defence 
aid to 52 countries worldwide, including 10 in 
the Mediterranean area, is shown at Appendix 
Ill. United States forces in Greece number 3,500, 
mostly air force. 
4.71. United States basing arrangements in Tur-
key were first formalised in a number of secret 
agreements after Turkey's accession to the North 
Atlantic Treaty in 1952, the most important 
being the military facilities agreement of June 
1954. A defence co-operation agreement was 
signed in 1969 which apparently codified nume-
rous earlier agreements. Although classified, 
apparently for political reasons at Turkey's 
request, the contents were publicised by Mr. 
Demirel, then Prime Minister, in February 1970 
who pointed out that activities under joint 
defence co-operation were based on Article 3 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty and would never 
exceed the limits of NATO commitments. In 
July 1975, when the United States Congress sus-
pended military assistance sales to Turkey, Tur-
key assumed full control of United States instal-
lations, leading inter alia to the suspension of 
intelligence-gathering activities at 4 sites. A 
new four-year agreement was signed in March 
1976 which provided more specifically than the 
previous agreements that " the installations shall 
not be used for, nor shall the activities serve, 
purposes other than those authorised by the 
Government of the Republic of Turkey". Un-
der the agreement the Turkish Government has 
the right to appoint 50% of the personnel enga-
ged in technical operations and related mainte-
nance services and activities in the authorised 
installations which " shall be carried out 
jointly". Difficulties with Congress prevented 
the arms embargo being lifted before 1978 
and prevented the new agreement entering into 
fore~. A similar agreement was concluded in 
March 1980 which expired in December 1985, 
remaining tacitly in force while the Turkish 
Government of Mr. Ozal has notified the United 
States that it wishes to renegotiate its terms. 
The most important United States military faci-
lities in Turkey are the strategic airfield at Incir-
lik in south-central Turkey from which United 
States squadrons can operate on rotation from 
Spain and Italy, and 4 important intelligence-
gathering facilities located in eastern Turkey, 2 
on the Black Sea coast and 1 in the Sea of Mar-
mara. In addition, there are naval facilities at 
Kargaburun in the Sea of Marmara and at Izmir, 
further airfields at Izmir and Ankara and some 
16 major communications facilities in various 
parts of Turkey. During his visit to Turkey at 
the end of March the United States Secretary of 
State failed to renegotiate the base agreement, 
which is closely linked to the question of military 
assistance and, apparently, an attempt by Turkey 
to link agreement with its textile exports to the 
United States. General Rogers, the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, is reported as esti-
mating that $1.4 billion a year is needed to 
upgrade Turkish military equipment21 • Turkey 
is reported to have requested military assistance 
from the United States of $1.2 billion a year 
whereas United States proposals for fiscal year 
21. Time, 7th April 1986. 
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1986 amounted to $714 milli9n military assist-
ance only - respecting the 7 to 10 ratio with 
Greece. As shown at Appendix Ill, assistance 
to Turkey would be about half in cheap loans 
and one-quarter in grants. United States forces 
in Turkey number 5,000 of which 3,800 are air 
force. 
4. 72. Operations by United States forces in the 
Mediterranean serve both national and NATO 
purposes. The maritime survtillance operation 
conducted largely by aircraft but also by reports 
from surface ships is a continuous activity 
throughout the year. Information on the loca-
tions and movements of Soviet naval vessels is 
in part a co-ordinated NATQ activity run by 
Commander Maritime Air Forces, a United Sta-
tes admiral based in Naples. The United States 
sixth fleet conducts NATO exercises in co-ordi-
nation with vessels of other NATO navies from 
time to time. The very large electronic intelli-
gence-gathering operation operated by the Uni-
~ed States i~ the Mediterranean area, particularly 
I~ Turkey, I.s essenti~lly a natiqnal defence func-
tiOn the fruits of which are certainly not circula-
ted on a NATO-wide basis, although one or 
two allies have access to selected United States 
intelligence data through bilateral agreements. 
Nevertheless, the general picture of Soviet mili-
tary capability and activities which is built up 
from many different sources qf raw intelligence 
data is undoubtedly of value t~ the alliance as a 
whole. • 
4. 73. However, certain military activities 
. conducted by the United States in the Mediterra-
nean area, which have not in any way been co-
ordinated with NATO, have been the cause of 
concern to NATO allies. Twq recent events are 
analysed separately here, becau~e they raise diffe-
rent issues. 
United States warships in the Black Sea 
4.74. In the week of lOth March 2 United States 
warships cruising in the Blapk Sea sailed to 
wit~in 6 miles of the ~oviet .co~st i~ the Crimean 
pemnsula. The Soviet Umonl claims a 12 mile 
. territorial sea and lodged an official protest with 
the United States over the incident. The Uni-
ted States claims that it was merely exercising the 
right of" innocent passage" .. Under the 1936 
Treaty of Montreux, naval ve1sels of non-Black 
Sea powers are entitled to pass through the Tur-
kish Straits and to cruise in th Black Sea under 
certain restrictions. Eight da}1s' notice, prefera-
bly 15, of passage through the straits must be 
given to Turkey, there must not be more than an 
aggregate total of 45,000 tonnes of non-Black Sea 
~ower naval ships in the Blacik Sea at any one 
tlme, and not more than 30,000 tonnes belonging 
to any ~ne non-Black Sea power. In practice, 
the Umted States navy exercises this right of 
non-Black Sea powers more than any other. An 
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above. The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of December 1982, now signed by 
159 nations including all NATO countries except 
Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, provides for the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea "so long as it 
is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal state". Article 19 specifi-
cally precludes " any act aimed at collecting 
information to the prejudice of the defence or 
security of the coastal state ". (The convention 
requires 60 ratifications to enter into force; so far 
only 25 mainly third world countries have rati-
fied; the United States is seeking amendments 
chiefly to the economic provisions of the 
convention. So entry into force is not an imme-
diate prospect.) The United Nations convention 
has largely codified previous usage in the matter 
of innocent passage. The spokesman for the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry, Mr. Lomeiko, on 20th 
March asserted that: " what was involved here 
was not innocent passage, but a clearly provoca-
tive passage in clear violation of the state border 
of the Soviet Union and including an attempt to 
conduct espionage ... ". It had taken place "in 
the vicinity of the Soviet coast, where there are 
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Union- had exercised a similar right to sail war-
ships near to American overseas territories, but 
not to the coast of the mainland23• 
United States warships in the Gulf of Sirte 
4.75. The United States navy had exercised its 
right to sail in the Gulf of Sirte off the Libyan 
coast on 7 occasions since 1981 24• This is a 
different issue which does not involve the right 
of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
Libya claims a territorial sea of 12 miles but in 
1973 declared a base line across the Gulf of Sirte 
at 32°30' north latitude, claiming the waters to 
the landward as" internal waters". The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea per-
mits such base lines to be drawn across bays only 
if the length of the straight line needed to enclose 
22. The Guardian, 21st March 1986. 
23. Dangerous games at sea, International Herald Tribune, 
25th March 1986. 
24. Statement by the United States Secretary of Defence, 
Mr. Weinberger. Television interview on 23rd March 1986 
quoted m Guardian, 24th March 1986. 
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force then withdrew to Sicily. 
4. 77. Later press reports from Washington25 said 
that planning for the operation began shortly 
after the terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna 
airports on 27th December 1985, and was des-
igned in part to offer opportunity for reprisal 
against Libya which the United States blamed 
for the airport attacks. The SAM-5 missile tar-
gets in Libya were ideal from the United States 
point of view as the installation of those Soviet 
missiles in late 1985 had been denounced by 
United States spokesmen as exceeding any legiti-
mate security requirement of Libya. 
4. 78. All NATO countries have of course joined 
in affirming the right of all countries to enjoy the 
freedom of the high seas, including the waters of 
the Gulf of Sirte, but the reactions of the Medi-
terranean NATO countries to the United States 
operations were reserved or critical. Typical 
was the comment by Mr. Craxi, the Italian Prime 
Minister, on 25th March, after an emergency 
cabinet meeting: 
25. International Herald Tribune, 26th March 1986. 
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(b) Collective defence arra',lgements 
under NATO ' 
4.82. Collective defence arrangements under 
NATO in the Mediterranean can be described 
under three main headings: command structure; 
joint forces; infrastructure. 
(i) NATO command structure 
4.83. In peacetime forces which are assigned to 
NATO or earmar~ed for assignment in the event 
26. Daily Telegraph, 26th March 19~6. 
27. As modified on the accession ofpreece and Turkey in 
1952. 
28. Text of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty at 
Appendix I. 
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of hostilities remain under purely national com-
mand except for certain air defence forces kept 
on permanent alert. NATO maintains a num-
ber of jointly staffed military headquarters which 
in peacetime have a planning function, including 
the right to inspect the readiness of forces ass-
igned to NATO, and practise the control of for-
ces during periodical NATO exercises. 
4.84. The NATO Commander-in-Chief for the 
whole of the Mediterranean area, immediately 
subordinate to SACEUR, is Commander-in-
Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, a United 
States admiral with headquarters in Naples 
where a number of immediately subordinate 
headquarters are also housed. Details of the 
chain of command and subordinate NATO 
headquarters are shown at Appendix IV. Refe-
rence has been made to the COMGIBMED 
headquarters in paragraph 4.16, and the prob-
lems of the Izmir headquarters and the planned 
headquarters at Larissa in Greece have been 
referred to in paragraph 4.60 above. 
4.85. Of particular importance in peacetime are 
the air defence headquarters which are perma-
nently manned and which receive information 
from the NADGE (NATO air defence ground 
environment) radar chain which, in the Mediter-
ranean area, comprises 9 radar stations in Italy, 4 
in Greece and 14 in Turkey. NATO airborne 
early warning aircraft are now operational in the 
Mediterranean, operating already out of nor-
thern Italy and Turkey, and are scheduled to be 
operational out of airfields in Greece by 
1987. This considerably improves early war-
ning in the area, especially for low-flying air-
craft. 
4.86. Surveillance by maritime reconnaissance 
aircraft from all the NATO countries in the area, 
with good French co-operation, is co-ordinated 
by Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterra-
nean also located in Naples. 
(ii) Joint forces 
4.87. While NATO forces remain under natio-
nal command in peacetime, two joint internatio-
nal forces are activated periodically in the Medi-
terranean area which serve a politically valuable 
purpose in demonstrating the practical workings 
of NATO. The naval on-call force Mediterra-
nean (NA VOCFORMED) is normally assembled 
for a month twice a year for training when it 
makes a point of making port calls in various 
Mediterranean NATO countries. It is compo-
sed of one vessel contributed by each of Italy, 
Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States; Spain has been invited to contri-
bute a vessel. When in being the force is 
controlled by Commander Naval Forces Sou-
thern Europe from Naples. As with so many 
NATO arrangements in the Mediterranean the 
Greek-Turkey dispute has partly affected the 
operation of NA VOCFORMED. 
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4.88. ACE mobile force, comprising both a land 
and an air element, is a multinational force of 
brigade group size supported by 3 or 4 squadrons 
of aircraft which can deploy on demand to the 
NATO flanks. In the Mediterranean area it is 
regularly exercised in northern Italy, in Thrace, 
and in eastern Turkey. In any period of tension 
on one of the NATO flanks, ACE mobile force, 
once the governmental decisions are taken, can 
be rapidly moved to the area concerned provi-
ding not only small but militarily useful reinfor-
cements but, politically more important, a 
demonstration of the solidarity of the alliance, 
demonstrating that any use of force by the War-
saw Pact would involve not only the flank coun-
try immediately threatened, but all other coun-
tries represented in the mobile force. 
(iii) Infrastructure 
4.89. NATO commonly-financed infrastructure 
has made an important contribution in impro-
ving the defence capabilities of the countries of 
the Mediterranean area. In the last 35 years it 
has funded the construction of airfields, now 
with hardened aircraft shelters, radar stations, 
fuel storage and communications systems. In 
the past priority has been given to the central 
region; the southern region lags badly behind as 
far as communications are concerned and the 
provision of aircraft shelters. NATO's latest 
six-year infrastructure programme was finally 
agreed by the Defence Planning Committee on 
5th December 1984 after nearly a year of difficult 
negotiations. It provides a total of 3 billion 
international accounting units ($7.85 billion) for 
the period 1985 to 1991 which will provide in 
particular for much of the outstanding facilities, 
including hardened aircraft shelters, necessary to 
receive United States air force reinforcements in 
Europe. As the United States provides 27% of 
infrastructure funds and the Federal Republic of 
Germany 26%, those two countries were prima-
rily concerned in the negotiations, but the Uni-
ted States exerted considerable pressure in an 
attempt to secure a higher expenditure ceiling. 
The programme will provide several hundred 
hardened aircraft shelters, improved communi-
cations and improvements to existing oil depots 
and pipelines. For the first time the southern 
region has been allocated more than 33% of 
expenditure, but existing deficiencies will not be 
remedied until towards the end of the pro-
gramme in the early 1990s. 
V. The non-aligned countries 
of the Mediterranean 
(a) Yugoslavia 
5.1. The pessimistic scenario occasionally put 
forward before the death of President Tito in 
1980, according to which the Soviet Union might 
on such an occasion attempt to assert the Brezh-
nev doctrine of the " socialist commonwealth " 
elaborated at the time of the invasion of Cze-
choslovakia in 1968, was not borne out. As the 
committee noted in its previous report there was 
an orderly transfer of power on President Tito's 
death to the rotating collective leadership repre-
sentative of the 6 republics and 2 autonomous 
regions provided for in the 1974 constitution 
that had been specially drawn up to prepare the 
way for the post-Tito period. There has been no 
evidence of external pressure from the Soviet 
Union to attempt to impose any particular new 
leadership or to establish closer relations. At 
the same time, the very provisions of the 1974 
constitution, designed to prevent domination of 
national politics by any one of the constituent 
parts of the country, have not made for strong 
central government. The present Prime Minis-
ter, Mr. Branko Mikulic, on taking office in 
January 1986, complained that the most able lea-
ders were not being put forward by the provinces 
to serve in the Federal Government. Much real 
power remains in the hands of the separate repu-
blics. 
5.2. Yugoslavia has severe economic problems 
at the present time, made worse by the great dis-
parities in standards of living between the diffe-
rent constituent republics. There are severe 
public order problems in the province of Kosovo 
bordering Albania, where the majority Albanian-
speaking muslim population is slowly succeeding 
in expelling the minority Serbian population 
from the province. It is claimed that most of 
the 2,000 political prisoners held in Yugoslavia 
are held in connection with disturbances in 
Kosovo. 
5.3. President Tito broke away from Stalinist 
Russia as long ago as 1948 since when Yugosla-
via has pursued an independent foreign policy, 
having played in the past an important role in 
the world non-aligned movement. Neverthe-
less, the country maintains correct relations with 
the Soviet Union and Soviet military aircraft on 
reconnaissance missions are able to overtly the 
country - the only access route to the Mediterra-
nean that is normally open to Soviet military air-
craft - and the provision of submarine repair 
facilities at Tivat has been noted above. 
5.4. Italy maintains good relations with Yugo-
slavia. From the standpoint of European secu-
rity it is certain that the neutral and non-aligned 
status of the country would provide very sub-
stantial warning time to NATO of any move-
ment by Warsaw Pact forces towards north-
eastern Italy. Italy believes that the European 
Community should play a leading role in helping 
Yugoslavia with its economic problems. 
5.5. Yugoslavia is regarded as having effective 
armed forces of 241,000 with nearly 1,000 tanks, 
mostly T-54/55, but including 100 T-74, and 
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over 400 combat aircraft which include MiG-21 
and the Yugoslav ORAO produced jointly with 
Romania using British engines. Yugoslavia 
exported $2 billion of armaments in 1985. Fol-
lowing a visit to Yugoslavia by a Rapporteur in 
1978, the committee reported 29 on Yugoslav 
plans for " all-people's defence " which would 
involve most of the population in resistance if 
the country were invaded by any country. 
(b) Albania 
5.6. For decades a completely self-isolated 
country since its break with the Soviet Union in 
the 1950s Albania had received some economic 
and military assistance from ci· na until the end 
of the Mao regime and had ac d as an occasio-
nal spokesman for that coun y before it was 
admitted to the United Na ions. After the 
admission of China, the isolation of Albania 
became complete. 
5.7. With the death of Enver Hoxha in April 
1985 there has naturally been speculation as to 
whether his successor, Mr. Ramiz Alia, would 
continue to follow Hoxha's rigid Stalinist and 
isolationist policy. There are a few tentative 
signs that this very backward underdeveloped 
country, where there are still no private cars, is 
taking a few tentative steps to establish some 
relations with European countries. It is under-
stood that the Soviet Union has attempted to 
improve its relations with the country, but with 
no sign of the Soviet approaches being reciproca-
ted. The Norwegian deputy Foreign Minister 
has recently paid a visit to the country, presuma-
bly at the invitation of Albania1 Italy, which of 
the western countries naturally· takes the lead in 
attempting to maintain frien~ly relations, has 
established a commercial airliJ!lk between Bari, 
Brindisi and Tirana. Italy, however, has a prob-
lem with a number of local f~milies that have 
taken refuge in the Italian Enjlbassy in Tirana 
against state repression and is endeavouring to 
secure safe passage for them. :From the end of 
March 1986 there will be two weekly flights by 
Swissair from Zurich to Tirana - on the initia-
tive of Albania. Some limited tourism for 40 
visitors a week has been arranged with the Uni-
ted Kingdom from October, and a larger com-
pany, Cooks Tours, is reported to be arranging 
weekend visits from 1987. 
5.8. Albanian armed forces total 40,000. The 
army of 30,000 has 100 mostly obsolete T-34, 
T-54 and T-59 tanks and an equally obsolete air 
force of 80 MiG-15, MiG-17 and MiG-19 com-
bat aircraft. 
29. Security in the Mediterranean, jDocument 776, 31st 
May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant. 
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physically separated by the cease-fire line. Pre-
viously, although a majority of the Turkish 
Cypriot population lived in the northern and 
eastern part of the island, the two communities 
had in practice been inextricably mixed with 
Turkish Cypriot agricultural communities in 
many villages throughout the island, and many 
Greek Cypriots in the north. 
5.11. The Turkish Cypriot northern part of the 
island today comprises about one-third of the 
land area. Population figures in Cyprus are in 
dispute; there has been immigration to both 
parts of the island since 1974, and the situation is 
obscured to some extent by the large number of 
both Greek and Turkish Cypriots resident in the 
United Kingdom. Turkish Cypriots accounted 
for some 18% of the total population of 632,000 
in 1973. Independent observers believe that 
about 30,000 agricultural workers from Turkish 
Anatolia were then settled in the north in 1975, 
some of whom have since returned. Some Tur-
kish Cypriots have returned to Cyprus both from 
the United Kingdom and from Australia. Eco-
nomically northern Cyprus is almost entirely 
dependent on Turkey for its trade and external 
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5.12. The Greek Cypriot two-thirds ofthe island 
had an estimated 550,000 population but there is 
understood to have been some limited immigra-
tion from Greece and favourable economic 
conditions· have attracted Cypriots from the Uni-
ted Kingdom and elsewhere. Unlike the north, 
the south has a strong economy with very little 
unemployment and has enjoyed an unpreceden-
ted building boom both of hotels and offices in 
large part because of the move of various com-
mercial interests from the Lebanon and else-
where in the Middle East. There are signs how-
ever that this growth is coming to a halt. 
5.13. The present government of the Republic 
of Cyprus, internationally recognised as such, is 
still conducted under the independence constitu-
tion of 1960 although there has been no Turkish 
Cypriot participation in government since 
1963. The de facto jurisdiction of the govern-
ment is today limited to the Greek Cypriot part 
of the island. 
5.14. At the end of December 1984, President 
Kyprianou terminated a co-operation agreement 
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Kingdom together with civilian police detach-
ments from Australia and Sweden. From a 
maximum size of 6,500 men, UNFICYP has 
now been reduced to 2,300 soldiers provided by 
the following contingents: 
Denmark 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
Sweden 
Austria 
341 
741 
515 
376 
301 
These five contingents man the buffer zone in 
that order from west to east. The Finnish and 
Irish military contingents have now been redu-
ced to a token 10 and 8 respectively, but batta-
lions from these countries could be brought back 
at any time if necessary as the Security Council 
mandate remains valid. The force is supported 
by 35 international civilian staff of the United 
Nations of 21 different nationalities and 400 
local employees. Most of the logistical support 
for the force including transport, communica-
tions and rations is supplied by the British 
contingent. The force is commanded by Major-
General Gunther G. Greindl, seconded from 
the Austrian army, who is directly responsible to 
the Secretary-General. 
5.21. In 1984 the annual operating cost of the 
United Nations force was a little over US$100 
million a year. This is met first by the countries 
contributing contingents which, under United 
Nations regulations, are not reimbursed for 
troops' pay and allowances and normal material 
costs, and which have also agreed to meet certain 
of the extra costs involved in maintaining their 
troops in Cyprus. These contributions account 
for about two-thirds of the total cost. The 
remaining third is the direct cost to the United 
Nations which is financed through voluntary 
contributions from 71 countries including Bel-
gium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom from the WEU coun-
tries, but the voluntary Special Account had a 
cumulative deficit of $127.7 million by the end 
of 1984, provisionally made up by the troop-
contributing countries. None of the Warsaw 
Pact countries contributes. Details of financial 
contributions are shown at Appendix V. 
(v) British sovereign base area 
5.22. Cyprus was under the Ottoman Empire for 
300 years from 1570 until 1878 when the Sultan 
in an agreement with Britain consented "to 
assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and 
administered by England " 30• Britain used the 
island as a military base to provide assistance to 
the Ottoman Empire against Russia. With the 
outbreak of war in 1914 and Turkey an enemy, 
Britain annexed the island which became a Bri-
30. The Cyprus Convention between Britain and the Otto-
man Emp1re signed in Constantinople on 4th June 1878. 
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tish crown colony under the Treaty of Lausanne 
in 1924. After withdrawal of British forces from 
the Suez Canal zone in the early 1950s, Cyprus 
became the headquarters of British forces in the 
Middle East and Vulcan strategic bombers were 
based there in support of the CENTO commit-
ment to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. 
5.23. Under the Treaty of Establishment signed 
by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the 
Republic of Cyprus in July 1960, as part of the 
arrangements providing for the independence of 
Cyprus, the United Kingdom was provided with 
the present two sovereign base areas totalling 253 
sq. km which do not form part of the territory 
of the Republic of Cyprus. The United King-
dom also retained the use of various other sites, 
installations and training areas including port 
areas in Limasol and Famagusta and an area in 
Nicosia airport (disused since 1974) with the 
right to use the runway. 
5.24. British forces in Cyprus have never been 
assigned to NATO. Until 1976 it housed the 
headquarters British forces Near East, but since 
1960 the numbers of forces have been considera-
bly reduced and in 1976 the title of the headquar-
ters was changed to "British forces Cyprus". 
Today there are about 2,500 men organised in 
one and a half infantry battalions, one armoured 
reconnaissance battalion and some support units 
and a Wessex helicopter squadron. Phantom 
and Lightning tactical aircraft are based at the 
Akrotiri airfield. 
S.2S. Britain maintains an important communi· 
cations and electronic intelligence-gathering faci· 
lity in Cyprus which, together with a similar ins· 
tallation in Hong Kong, provides raw material to 
the communications intelligence centre in Chel· 
tenham in the United Kingdom. Information 
derived from this source provides much of the 
basis for bilateral exchange of intelligence infor-
mation with the United States. The sovereign 
base areas provide the United Kingdom with a 
useful forward air base which can be used by air-
craft in transit to any points further east. It has 
been used in support of peace-keeping forces in 
the Lebanon and in the evacuation of residents 
from Yemen. With the knowledge of the 
Cyprus authorities, United States U-2 reconnais-
sance aircraft operate from the Akrotiri airfield 
carrying out observation duties over the demili-
tarised Sinai in a peace-keeping role. 
5.26. Cyprus also provides British army and air 
force units with ideal training areas, with the 
advantage of a Mediterranean climate. The 
sovereign base areas have played an important 
role in peace-keeping arrangements in Cyprus, 
providing logistics support to the United Nations 
peace-keeping force referred to above. 
5.27. Politically the presence of the sovereign 
base area is not an issue with the main political 
parties of either community in Cyprus. The 
Soviet Union on a number of occasions, most 
recently in 1985, in seeking to involve itself in 
the solution to the Cyprus problem has included 
proposals for the removal of all armed forces 
from the island. 
(vi) The Cyprus problem 
5.28. Since the events of 1974 there have been 
many years of abortive negotiations on a new 
constitution for Cyprus, in the course of which 
the Greek Cypriot side has come to concede the 
principle of a federal state while the Turkish 
Cypriot side as lately as November 1984 
announced territorial concessions which would 
reduce the proportion of the island to be inclu-
ded in a Turkish Cypriot federated state to 
29%. The most recent round of intercommu-
nity negotiations under the auspices of the Uni-
ted Nations Secretary-General in New York 
from 17th to 21st January 1985 broke down 
through the refusal of President Kyprianou to 
consider the Secretary-General's proposals as 
more than an agenda for negotiation whereas 
President Denktash considered them to be an 
outline agreement. 
5.29. In March 1986 the Secretary-General com-
pleted a " draft framework agreement " which, 
while not being made public, is understood to 
embody simply a listing of most agreed issues, 
and an identification of areas of disagreement. 
The main unresolved points between the two 
communities appeared to be first the timetable 
for the withdrawal of Turkish forces, with the 
Greek Cypriot side insisting on withdrawal 
before any agreement enters into force, whereas 
the Turkish Cypriot side is unlikely to agree to 
complete withdrawal until such time as the Tur-
kish Cypriot community has acquired confi-
dence in the working of any new federal sys-
tem. While the actual extent of territory to be 
included within each of the two future federated 
states is no longer a significant issue, the econo-
mic rights to be enjoyed by each community 
within the territory of the other remains to be 
settled. The Turkish Cypriot side is anxious to 
retain the homogeneity of its own community 
within the area of its own administration - a 
homogeneity that the 1974 events established for 
the first time. The Greek Cypriot side insists on 
the right of any Cypriots to engage in economic 
activities in any part of the island, which in prac-
tice, as the Greek Cypriots are the most entrepre-
neurial-minded, amounts to the right for the 
Greek Cypriots to own property and conduct 
business in the area administered by the Turkish 
Cypriot community, although without any right 
to secure electoral representation outside their 
own area. The question of any guarantees by 
external powers also remains to be settled. 
5.30. By the 21st April, the date on which the 
Secretary-General had asked for replies to his 
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draft, the press was reporting that the draft had 
been accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side, but 
that a formal reply had not been sent by the 
Greek Cypriot side. Mr. Geoxge Iacovou, the 
Greek Cypriot Foreign Minist r, is reported to 
have visited Moscow on 28th A ril to discuss the 
convening of an international conference to 
consider the four issues they considered had not 
been adequately dealt with in the Secretary-
General's draft. This move was seen in allied 
circles as an attempt to force western allied coun-
tries to seek to persuade Turk~y to persuade in 
turn Mr. Denktash to make more concessions to 
the Greek Cypriot position. The Soviet Union 
in January 1986 had renewed its proposals for an 
international conference on Cyprus which would 
seek to remove " all foreign forces " from the 
island - including by inference the British sove-
reign bases. 
5.31. It is not the purpose ofthis report to make 
any specific proposals about internal Cyprus pro-
posals. The committee nevertheless regrets the 
absence of direct contacts between the two 
Cyprus communities in the last 12 years. It will 
be difficult to resolve outstanding problems 
while intercommunity relations are limited to 
the present slender and indirect political 
contacts. 
(d) Syria 
5.32. Syria, with an army of 270,000 men and 
4,200 tanks - 2,400 of them rnodern T -62 and 
T • 72 - has the largest and m os~ modern armou-
red force in the Middle East. Its air force of SOO 
combat aircraft includes modern Soviet MiG-2S 
and Mi0-23 interceptors and SO Mi0-23 ground 
attack aircraft. It maintains some 3 armoured 
divisions with 800 battle tanks in Lebanon. Its 
navy is mainly based on 22 fast attack craft 
equipped with missiles. Isrltel claimed in 
February that the Soviet Union had supplied the 
first submarines. 
5.33. Massively supplied with modern military 
equipment by the Soviet Union, Syria neverthe-
less cannot be counted as a Soviet ally. Presi-
dent Assad, re-elected in February 1985 for a 
third 7-year term since he took
1 
office in March 
1971, and his Baath party have an overriding 
preoccupation with the restoration ofthe Palesti-
nian state and the removal of Israel from other 
occupied territories. Deeply involved in Leba-
non since it sent its forces in 1976, Syria supports 
PLO factions opposed to Yasser Arafat, and 
some of the militia forces. Wh~le within the last 
18 months President Assad has visited Moscow 
where he received assurances of continued mili-
tary and economic support, western leaders have 
also visited Damascus including President 
Mitterrand and Prime Minister Papandreou, 
both in November 1984. Almost overlooked 
among the panoply of Soviet equipment in the 

Persian Gulf. About 1,200 United States army 
personnel are stationed in Egypt. 
5.44. One consequence of the change in allian-
ces for Egypt is the impact on equipment. 
Some 1,500 Egyptian tanks are Soviet models 
which it will be increasingly difficult to maintain; 
660 M-60s have so far been supplied by the Uni-
ted States. The air force of some 430 combat 
aircraft in service has been largely re-equipped 
with French and United States aircraft since its 
losses in the Y om K.ippur conflict, but still 
retains 100 MiG interceptors. 
(h) Libya 
5.45. In its previous report the committee dealt 
at some length with Libya and the problems 
which its behaviour on the international scene 
poses not only to the western world but to its 
neighbours and nominal allies. Despite its 
conflict with Chad, the northern part of which is 
at present occupied by part of the Libyan army, 
Libya itself does not represent a serious military 
threat to the western world. Its armed forces 
are relatively small with an army of 58,000 pro-
viding perhaps the equivalent of two-and-a-half 
divisions. With its oil wealth, Libya has how-
ever purchased massive amounts of military 
equipment, mostly from the Soviet Union, but 
also from France, Italy and the United King-
dom. But of its 2,500 battle tanks and over 500 
combat aircraft, much is reported to be in sto-
rage; the limited extent of skills among the 
Libyan population has obliged Colonel Kadhafi 
to rely on foreigners for technical support of 
sophisticated equipment while the air force 
reportedly relies on Soviet, Syrian, Pakistani, 
North Korean and Palestinian pilots. 
5.46. Libya could of course provide the Soviet 
Union with important strategic bases in the 
Mediterranean as it has done in the past for wes-
tern countries. Libya is reported to have con-
structed new airfields and to be constructing a 
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Soviet Union supplied Libya with long-range 
SA-5 surface-to-air missiles which were descri-
bed by a United States State Department spokes-
man as "clearly exceeding any ·~legitimate secu-
rity interests which the Libyans may have". 
5.47. Libyan relationships with the rest of the 
Arab and muslim world vary from time to 
time. Colonel Kadhafi has b~en consistently 
hostile to his immediate neighbours, Tunisia and 
Egypt, as well as to Jordan. He has attempted 
to maintain good relations especially with Syria, 
and, surprisingly, in September 1984 signed a 
treaty of union with Morocco, jbut which does 
not appear to have had concrete results beyond 
indicating an end of Libyan support for the Poli-
sario forces opposing Morocco in the western 
Sahara. 
5.48. The problem of Libyan-sponsored terro-
rism abroad, the different interests and reactions 
of the European allies and the United States has 
been described in paragraphs 4.75 et seq. 
above. 
5.49. Libya's unprecedented wealth giving it one 
of the highest per capita incomes on the southern 
shore of the Mediterranean has I arisen for more 
than 90% from its petroleum exports. With the 
slump in the price of oil to one-third of the price 
of only a few years ago, Libya is facing an inevi-
table and severe economic crisis;J It is interested 
in closer economic links witq. the European 
Community and the majority view among Euro-
pean countries is undoubtedly in favour of lea-
ving the country through its excesses to isolate 
itself from the more moderate Alrab world, while 
maintaining a dialogue througllt countries best 
placed to communicate with Libya and seeking 
to influence its policy by econoll).ic means. The 
consequence of military actioiJl against Libya 
may for some time increase support for the coun-
try in much of the Arab world. 
(i) Malta 
new naval base beyond any possible national 5.50. Malta had been an important British naval 
requirement, and vessels of the Soviet Mediter- base from the beginning of the 19th century and 
ranean squadron have spent more time in Tri- a NATO naval headquarters for the Mediterra-
poli in the past year than hitherto. But there are nean was maintained there f{om 1952 until 
no signs of the Soviet Union establishing any 1971. Malta became independent in Septem-
significant military base of its own in the coun- ber 1964 and in 1971 when the Malta Labour 
try. Indeed, during Colonel Kadhafi's visit to Party under Mr. Mintoffwon the elections, it fol-
Moscow in October 1985 relations with the lowed a policy ofnon-alignment!which led to the 
Soviet Union were reported to have become removal of the NATO naval headquarters to 
strained. He failed to attend the Kremlin recep- Naples. The United Kingdom continued to 
tion in his honour and the forecast treaty of maintain naval and air forces on the island from 
friendship with the Soviet Union did not mate- 1972 to 1979 under a bilateral d~fence agreement 
rialise although an economic agreement was which was not subsequently r~newed, the last 
extended. General Secretary Gorbachev was British forces being withdrawn in 1979. In 1980 
reported to have strongly criticised Libyan sup- Italy concluded a bilateral agreement with Malta 
port for international terrorism including the sei- providing for economic assistance and military 
zing of the Achille Lauro liner by Palestinian guarantees for the neutrality anp non-alignment 
guerrillas. Nevertheless, in December 1985 the of Malta. In return, Malta agreed to forbid the 
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use of military bases in Malta to any country 
except Italy which would have the right to use 
them for defending Maltese neutrality. 
5.51. In December 1984 Mr. Mintoff, seeking 
renewal of economic assistance, announced that 
the treaty with Italy had not been renewed, but 
Italy pointed out that the Maltese neutrality clau-
ses of the agreement had not expired. 
5.52. Mr. Mintoff's government had seen Malta 
as a link between Europe and the North African 
countries, in particular Libya. Colonel Kadhafi 
signed a five-year " economic and security co-
operation agreement " during a visit to Malta in 
November 1984 which also provided for the 
non-establishment of military bases on Malta, 
but contained offers of Libyan assistance with 
military training and of Libyan military assis-
tance if Malta were attacked. Malta had earlier 
signed an agreement with the Soviet Union in 
October 1981 whereby the latter recognised Mal-
tese neutrality. Because of the conduct of inter-
nal policy under Mr. Mintoff which denied 
democratic rights to the opposition, relations 
with the Council of Europe and the European 
Community were strained, and the European 
Community in 1983 suspended aid because of 
human rights abuses. 
5.53. With the resignation of Mr. Mintoff, his 
former deputy Dr. Mifsud Bonnici became 
Prime Minister on 22nd December 1984. Since 
then relations with European countries and the 
Community have improved. The opposition 
Nationalist Party is again represented in the Mal-
tese Delegation to the Council of Europe. 
5.54. While Malta can provide an important 
naval and air base strategically located in the 
centre of the Mediterranean, there are plenty of 
other naval bases available to NATO forces. 
The interests of European security are therefore 
not opposed to Malta's own declared policy of 
neutrality and non-alignment. 
(j) Rest of the Maghreb 
5.55. Despite anxiety at times in the past about 
possible Soviet access to important naval bases 
in the western part of the North African coast, 
especially Bizerta in Tunisia and Mers-el-Kebir 
in Algeria, there has been no increased presence 
since the committee last reported. The Soviet 
Union continues to use commercial repair facili-
ties for naval vessels in Bizerta and Annaba in 
Algeria. 
5.56. The political future of Tunisia is perhaps 
the most unpredictable at the present time with 
the danger of a pro-Libyan government assuming 
power when President Bourguiba, perhaps the 
last French-educated ruler, eventually leaves the 
scene. 
5.57. Algeria is seen as a more stable regime 
with a not unhelpful attitude to western interests, 
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but its economy unfavourably affected by the fall 
in the price of natural gas. 
5.58. Morocco surprised western countries with 
the August 1984 declaration ofunion with Libya, 
but that appears in retrospect to have amounted 
to little more than an ending of Libyan support 
for the Polisaria guerrillas in the western Sahara 
in exchange for Moroccan non-intervention in 
Chad. Morocco appears to have stabilised the 
situation in the western Sahara by constructing a 
defensive ditch with electronic sensors. Moroc-
co's long-standing claim to the Spanish enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla were renewed in 1985 when 
Spain announced the opening of negotiations 
with the United Kingdom about the future of 
Gibraltar. 
VI. Summary and conclusions 
6.1. The security of the Atlantic Alliance is 
based on the principle of political and strategic 
unity of the NATO area and the functional inter-
dependence of the whole military apparatus. 
Therefore, the NATO southern flank should not 
be considered" peripheral". In practice, in the 
event of the flanks being lost, the central region 
itself could no longer be defended. The need to 
pay greater attention to this part of the NATO 
area is justified by: 
- the danger for the alliance of possible 
encirclement, and local sources of 
conflict; 
- defence requirements; military equip-
ment of some of the countries in the 
area is still unsufficient in some cases; 
- the economic weakness of NATO part-
ners in the area; 
- the important contribution which the 
southern flank countries make to 
defence and detente. 
The key position of NATO's southern flank is 
determined by the strategic importance of the 
Mediterranean which is crossed by heavily used 
merchant shipping lanes, which in particular 
provide the main routes for supplying Europe 
with petroleum from North Africa and the Near 
East. The central power which exercised hege-
mony in the Mediterranean area in the past has 
now disappeared and has not been replaced by a 
politico-strategic balance of force on which 
future security could be based. The distribution 
of power and the ratio of forces in general 
remains unstable and changing. 
6.2. The Soviet Union also considers itself a 
Mediterranean power and conducts a policy 
aimed at neutralising western influences, espe-
cially that of the United States, and at increasing 
its own influence. It endeavours in this way to 
exploit for its own benefit the political heteroge-
neity, the lack of geo-strategic unity and the 
regional instabilities characteristic of this 
region. 
6.3. The stationing in the Mediterranean of the 
third squadron of the Soviet Black Sea fleet has 
weakened the domination of the United States 
Sixth fleet in the region. The mission of the 
Soviet squadron is both political and mili-
tary. In political terms it seeks: 
- to demonstrate the maritime presence 
of the Soviet Union as a power factor in 
this region and to provide a military 
guarantee for Soviet policy; 
- to increase Soviet influence in the Arab 
states; 
- to present the Soviet Union as a poten-
tial protecting power; 
- to demonstrate that the Mediterranean 
should no longer be considered the 
exclusive domain of the West and that 
the Soviet Union should itself be regar-
ded as a legitimate Mediterranean 
power. 
In military terms it is designed: 
- to conduct peacetime surveillance of the 
activities of the United States Sixth 
fleet, to reduce its freedom of manoeu-
vre to prevent it from intervening in 
time of crisis and to increase the risk of 
actions against countries friendly to the 
Soviet Union; 
- in the event of a conflict to undertake a 
rapid offensive against units ofthe Sixth 
fleet. 
Admittedly the Mediterranean has not become a 
" red sea " - Moscow has achieved only a few of 
its aims in the Mediterranean area, especially as 
concerns access to support points and base 
rights. Nevertheless it has imposed itself in the 
region as an important influence. However, it 
must be remembered that the Soviet Union fleet 
in the Mediterranean encounters some difficul-
ties which limits its scope and the speed with 
which it could be reinforced (for example the res-
trictions concerning passage through the Turkish 
Straits resulting from the provisions of the Mon-
treux Convention, and the absence of proper 
bases on the Mediterranean shore). 
6.4. On the whole the politico-military situa-
tion in the Mediterranean area is characterised 
by contradictory tendencies in the western and 
eastern parts where international European 
influences are at play, as well as in the Near East 
and North African area which create an unstable 
and disturbing situation. 
6.5. Apart from the area of interest to Europe 
in order to assess the regional situation in the 
Mediterranean area, account must also be taken 
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of events in the Near and Middle East as well as 
in North Africa: 
- the still unforeseeable 1consequences of 
Egyptian policy which is tending to rap-
prochement with the Arab world; 
- the uncertain outcome1 of the war bet-
ween Iran and Iraq and the relations 
maintained by Iran with the big 
powers; 
- the Near East problem which remains 
unsolved and the tense situation still 
prevailing in the area; 
- the problem still pending of the western 
Sahara; -
- the radical policy conducted by Libya, 
based on revolutionary principles which 
constitute an unpredictable factor of 
unstability; 
- the economically oriented policy of neu-
trality conducted by Malta which in 
1981 permitted Soviet merchant vessels 
access to its protected petroleum stores 
and which in 1984 sigqed an agreement 
with Libya, the consequences of which 
are still not entirely foreseeable. 
6.6. The whole of the foregoipg shows clearly 
that the Soviet Union poses m~re than a purely 
" conventional " threat to westetn security in the 
Mediterranean area and to thd stability of the 
southern flank ofNATO. Thus, the very mixed 
southern region of NATO, from a security stand-
point, is subject at any moment to changes which 
are difficult to foresee. The political unity of 
the alliance, especially on the southern flank, is 
not assured from the standpoint of security. 
The gravity of this situation is not reduced by 
attempts to co-ordinate military plans for the 
southern flank. To this, on the periphery of the 
southern flank, is to be added the risk of conflicts 
with different possible causes and consequen-
ces. 
6.7. As far as East-West antagonisms are 
concerned, the southern flank offers the Warsaw 
Pact many more possibilities to test the political 
cohesion of the alliance and t~e danger always 
remains of a conflict in this itfportant area for 
NATO. 
I 
6.8. It is therefore in the w~stern interest to 
strengthen, through carefully judged political, 
economic and military aid, thd cohesion of the 
southern NATO countries, and :to provide politi-
cal, economic and development aid with a view 
to stabilising the periphery of NATO's southern 
flank. 
6.9. The committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation, the sub-
stantive paragraphs of which relate to the present 
explanatory memorandum as follows: 
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Draft 
Recommendation 
l(i) 
l(ii) 
1 (iii), (iv) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Explanatory 
Memorandum 
4.82-4.89. 
4.80. 
4.74-4.89. 
Chapters Ill and IV: 
paragraphs 4.5, 4.38, 
4.54. 
4.6-4.14. 
4.41-4.54. 
4.55-4.62. 
5.37-5.44. 
5.19-5.21. 
5.9-5.21,5.28-5.31. 
5.39. 
2.1-2.10. 
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VII. Opinion of the minority 
7.1. The revised report was adopted in com-
mittee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. 
7.2. The member who voted against voiced the 
following objections to the draft recommenda-
tion. In the preamble, paragraph (i) the Soviet 
Union's objectives cannot be assessed accurately; 
(iii) Afghanistan is beyond the scope of the report 
which concerns the Mediterranean; (v) terrorism 
is a worldwide phenomenon, not confined to the 
two countries cited whose involvement might 
not be proved. In the operative text, paragraph 
1 (iii) should call for any relevant disputes to be 
referred to the International Court. 
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APPENDIX I 
The North Atlantic Treaty 
Washington DC, 4th Apri/1949 
(Extracts) 
Article 5 
The parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against 
them all and consequently they agree that if such 
an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise 
of the right of individual or collective self-
defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, will assist 1he__part}'-Or__par-_ 
ties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually 
and in concert with the other parties, such action 
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures 
taken as a result thereof shall immediately be 
reported to the Security Council. Such mea-
sures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and 
security. 
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Article 6 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed 
attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack: 
(i) on the territory of any of the parties in 
Europe or North America, on the 
Algerian departments of France, on 
the territory of Turkey or on the 
islands under the jurisdiction of any of 
the parties in the North Atlantic area 
north of the Tropic of Cancer; 
(ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any 
of the parties, when in or over these 
territories or any other area in Europe 
in which occupation forces of any of 
the parties were stationed on the date 
when the treaty entered into force or 
the Mediterranean Sea or the North 
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of 
Cancer. 
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Country National currency unit 
(0) (I) 
Belgium ................... Million B. Frs. 
France (c) .................. Million F. Frs. 
Germany .................. Million DM 
Italy ................. , .... Milliard Lire 
Luxembourg ............. , . Million L. Frs. 
Netherlands ................ Million Guilders 
United Kingdom ........... Million£ Sterling 
TOTAL WEU ........ 
Canada .................... Million C. $ 
Denmark ........... , ...... Million D. Kr. 
Greece .................... Million Drachmas 
Norway ................... Million N. Kr. 
Portugal ................... Million Escudos 
Turkey .................... Millions L. 
United States .............. Million US$ 
TOTAL NON-WEU .... 
TOTAL NATO (d).,, 
Defence expenditure Defence expenditure 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1981-1985 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
GDP in purchasers' values Defence expenditure as %of 
(national currency, current prices) d (current prices- US $ million) a (current prices- US$ million) a Population {thousand) GDP in purchasers' values 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985f 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985f 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985! 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985f 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985! 
(- 5) (- 4) (- 3) (- 2) (- I) (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) ( 18) ( 19) (20) 
125,689 132,127 136,853 141,676 155,668 3,385 2,892 2,676 2,452 2,241 95,730 84,251 80,087 76,046 73,586 9,852 9,856 9,856 9,852 9,852 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.3 
129,708 148,021 165,029 176,638 186,242 23,867 22,523 21,654 20,212 19,233 572,371 542,746 516,317 489,428 472,025 54,182 54,480 54,729 54,947 55,222 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 
52,193 54,234. 56,496 57,274 59,737 23,094 22,350 22,127 20,125 18,835 683,239 659,849 653,883 613,159 576,699 59,790 59,761 59,562 59,336 59,217 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 
9,868 12,294 14,400 16,433 18,059 8,681 9,090 9,481 9,353 9,048 353,254 347,862 354,884 348,385 336,357 56,502 56,639 56,825 56,983 57,154 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 
1,715 1,893 2,104 2,234 2,317 46 41 41 39 36 3,818 3,437 3,374 3,235 3,123 366 366 366 366 366 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
11,296 11,921 12,149 12,765 12,885 4,527 4,464 4,257 3,978 3,595 141,412 138,139 132,595 123,059 115,138 14,247 14,310 14,362 14,420 14,492 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 
12,144 13,849 15,952 16,923 18,)72 24,627 24,242 24,198 22,614 22,034 513,978 483,864 455,443 424,679 409,567 56,379 56,335 56,377 56,488 56,544 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.3 5.4 
88,228 85,602 84,434 78,773 75,222 2,363,802 2,260,149 2,196,584 2,077,991 1,986,494 251,318 251,747 252,077 252,392 252,847 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 
6,289 7,655 8,086 9,320 10,2 J3 5,245 6,205 6,561 7,196 7,539 291,539 299,061 324,003 332,492 338,035 24,366 24,657 24,904 25,150 25,427 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 
I 0,301 11,669 12,574 13,045 13,' 50 1,446 1,400 1,375 1,260 1,210 57,247 56,003 56,321 54,635 53,343 5,122 5,119 5,114 5,111 5,104 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 
142,865 176,270 193,340 271,922 321, p:.2 2,578 2,639 2,195 2,412 2,379 36,941 38,140 34,813 33,466 33,509 9,730 9,790 9,848 9,910 9,989 7.0 6.9 6.3 7.2 7.1 
9,468 10,956 12,395 12,688 15,' ~I 1,650 1,698 1,699 1,555 1,690 57,091 56,277 55,064 54,736 52,772 4,100 4,116 4,130 4,141 4,153 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.2 
51,917 63,817 76,765 92,009 I 11 , ~2 844 803 693 629 635 23,928 23,365 20,668 19,310 19,624 9,970 10,030 10,099 10,170 10,231 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 
313,067 447,790 556,738 803,044 1, 198, ~5 2,815 2,755 2,469 2,190 2,422 57,666 53,032 51,147 49,858 55,144 45,757 46,780 47,804 48,720 49,792 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.4 
169,888 196,390 217,198 277,052 266, ~2 169,888 196,390 217,198 237,052 266,642 2,934,911 3,045,279 3,275,728 3,634,522 3,870,830 230,043 232,345 234,538 236,681 239,048 5.8 6.4 6.6 6.5 6.9 
184,466 211,889 232,190 252,293 282,518 3,459,322 3,571,157 3,817,743 4,179,079 4,423,257 329,088 332,837 336,437 339,883 343,744 5.3 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.4 
272,694 297,491 316,625 331,066 357,740 5,823,124 5,831,306 6,014,327 6,257,070 6,409,751 580,406 584,584 588,514 592,275 596,591 4.7 5.1 5.3 5.3 5.6 
Note a: G[ and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (I) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in 
exc ~mge rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % ofGDP in columns ( 16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion. 
For the period 1981-1985, the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Umtsper US$ 
Country Natzonal currency unit 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 b 
(0) (I) (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Belgium Million B. Frs. 37.12900 45.69!00 51.13200 57.78400 63.76700 
France Million F. Frs. 5.43460 6.57210 7.62130 8.73910 9.68360 
Germany Million DM 2.26000 2.42660 2.55330 2.84590 3.17150 
Italy Milliard Lire 1.13680 1.35250 1.51880 1.75700 1.99590 
Luxembourg Million L. Frs. 37.12900 45.69100 51.13200 57.78400 63.76700 
Netherlands Million Guilders 2.49520 2.67020 2.85410 3.20870 3.58440 
United Kingdom Million Pound Sterling 0.49312 0.57127 0.65920 0.74833 0.84289 
Canada Million C.$ 1.19890 1.23370 1.23240 1.29510 1.36130 
Denmark Million D. Kr. 7.12340 8.33240 9.14500 10.35660 11.36200 
Greece Million Drachmas 55.40800 66.80300 88.06400 112.72000 135.23000 
Norway Million N. Kr. 5.73950 6.45400 7.29640 8.16150 9.13020 
Portugal Million Escudos 61.54600 79.47300 110.78000 146.39000 175.62000 
Turkey Million Turkish Lira 111.22000 162.55000 225.46000 366.68000 494.64000 
United States Million US$ 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 
Note b: 6 n nths' average. 
Note c: Fn pe is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures for defence expenditures 
are dicative only. 
Noted: Th orresponding statistical data for Spain are not available. 
e Preliminary estimate. 
f Forecast. 
* • WEU Office of the Clerk estimates. 
Source: De uce expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(85)25. 
APPENDIX 11 
Defence expenditure per head Defence expenditure as % of total WEU (current prices- US$) a 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985! 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985f 
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
344 293 272 249 248 3.84 3.38 3.17 3.11 3.25 
440 413 396 368 348 27.05 26.31 25.65 25.66 25.57 
386 374 371 339 3!8 26.18 26.11 26.21 25.55 25.04 
154 160 167 164 158 9.84 10.62 11.23 11.87 12.03 
126 113 112 106 99 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
318 312 296 276 248 5.13 5.22 5.04 5.05 4.78 
437 430 429 400 390 27.91 28.32 28.66 28.71 29.29 
351 340 335 312 298 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
215 252 263 286 297 5.95 7.25 7.77 9.14 10.02 
282 274 269 246 237 1.64 1.64 1.63 1.60 1.61 
265 270 223 243 238 2.92 3.08 2.60 3.06 3.16 
402 412 411 375 407 1.87 1.98 2.01 1.97 2.25 
85 80 69 62 62 0.96 0.94 0.82 0.80 0.84 
62 59 52 45 49 3.19 3.22 2.92 2.78 3.22 
739 845 926 1,002 1,115 192.56 229.42 257.24 300.93 354.47 
561 637 690 742 822 209.08 247.53 275.00 320.28 375.58 
470 509 538 559 600 309.08 347.53 375.00 420.28 475.58 
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B. MANPOWER EFFORT- 1985 
Period of compulsory I Total in armed forces 2 Total armed forces 2 
military service military personnel (military and civilian) 
(months) (thousands) as percentage 
of active population 
Army Navy Air force (e) (e) 
Belgium 10 3 1Q3 10 3 108 2.7 
France 12 12 12 563 2.9 
Germany 15 4 15 4 15 4 495 2.4 
Italy 12 18 12 531 2.5 
Luxembourg voluntary 1 0.9 
Netherlands 14-16 14-17 14-17 103 2.1 
United Kingdom voluntary 335 2.0 
TOTAL WEU 2,136 2.5 
Canada voluntary 83 1.0 
Denmark 95 9 5 9 5 29 1.4 
Greece 22 26 24 206 6.2 
Norway 12 15 15 41 2.5 
Portugal 16 24 21-24 101 2.6 
Turkey 18 18 18 825 4.6 
United States voluntary 2,289 2.9 
TOTALNON-WEU 3,574 3.1 
TOTAL NATO 5,710 2.8 
Sources: 
I. IISS, Military Balance, 1985-86. 
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (85) 25 of 3rd December 1985. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
4. To be eighteen months from 1989. 
5. To be twelve months in combat arms. 
e = estimate. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
United States military assistance 
Department of Defence proposals FY 1986 
Chad ....... 
•• c. ....... ml .MCA 
8Zalre 
li!JGabon 
APPENDIX Ill 
·-o ..... 
~ Forg1ven Credots 
m Conceutonal Cr&d1ts 
~~ Tr...ury Rete Cred111 
.Fi11 
Source: United States Secretary of Defence annual report to Congress, fiscal year 1986, 4th February 1985. 
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APPENDIX IV 
NATO military command structure- Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area 
North Atlantic Council (Bn1811elt) and Defence Planning Committee 
I 
Military Committee and Intejational Military Stal! (B1'1118elt) 
I I I 
I Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, I SACLANT (Norfolk, Virginia) I 
I I 
I 
I Commander Iberian I Commander Allied Naval Atlantic Area, COMIBERLANT Forces Southern Europe, (Oeirat, Portujl&l) COMNA VSOUTR 
I 
(Napleo) 
I Itland Commander I 
Madeira o.;omm~ner Naval s:~ri~\:".!. 
SoutCm Europe (Napleo) 
I 
I Gibraltar I Mediterranean Area, GIBMED (Gibraltar) Weotem Mediterranean Area, MEDOC (formerly Toulon, now 
Key: 
exereited by 
NAVSOUTH directly) 
chain of command 
------- new commands proposed in Rogers 
plan 
----- eo-located headquarters 
I Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SACEUR (Caeteau, Belgium) 
I Commander-in-Chief Allied Foreeo Southem Europe, CINC~OUTH (Napleo, Italy) I 
I I I ------------~-----r----_-_-_-_-_-_-1 
-..L.-------, 
Commander Land ; Commander Land I 
Foreeo Soutb-Eutem I Foreee loutb-Central I 
COMLA~IijjJUTHEAST lcOMLAND~~UTHCENT~ 
Commtmder J...aud 
Forces Southern 
C~ML!!."N£'souT'H 
Commander Air l•,orcet5 
~o~~rns~u'm 
(Naples) 
i 1 
(Iamir) L __ 1_~r::~ ____ j r-----------------~~----------------~---------~ I I I I Commander 5th ATAF 
(Vicenza) 
I 
Central Mediterranean 
Area, MEDCENT (Napleo) 
I I 
I I 
I r------...1...------. ---~ 1 Commander 7th ATAF ~---Commander 6th A'PAF (bmir) 
I 
North Eutem 
Mediterranean Area, 
MEDNOREAST 
(Ankara) 
South Eaotem 
Mediterranean Area. 
MEDSOUEAST 
(formerly Malta, now 
exerciaed 
by NAVSOUTH directly) 
1 (Laritaa) 1 L-------------.J 
I 
Maritime Air 
Mediterranean, 
MARAIRMED 
(Napleo) 
DOCUMENT 1073 APPENDIX V 
APPENDIX V 
United Nations force in Cyprus 
Background information 
Finances 
UNFICYP is the only current United 
Nations peace-keeping operation financed solely 
by voluntary contributions. Funding comes 
from two sources: 
- about one-third of the costs are met by a 
special fund, the UNFICYP special 
account, to which 71 countries have 
contributed since 1964; 
- approximately two-thirds of the costs 
are absorbed voluntarily by troop-
contributing countries. 
In order to provide contingents for 
UNFICYP, the troop-contributing governments 
divert from national duty troops and other 
resources at an ongoing cost to them estimated 
by them at present at $36.2 million for each six-
month period. This figure includes (a) the 
troops' regular pay and allowances and normal 
materiel expenses for which, under existing 
arrangements, the United Nations is not 
required by the troop-contributors to reimburse 
them: these therefore constitute costs of main-
taining the force which are being financed direct-
ly by the troop-contributing governments; and 
(b) certain extra and extraordinary costs that they 
incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under 
existing arrangements, the troop-contributors 
would be entitled to claim reimbursement from 
the United Nations, but which they have to 
finance at their own expense as a further contri-
bution • to the United Nations operation in 
Cyprus. 
Including the above two elements of costs, 
the actual cost of financing the United Nations 
operation in Cyprus for the six-IDDnth period 
ending 15th December 1984 totai!J. approximate-
ly $50.4 million, estimated as follows: 
US$ 
(in 
millions) 
1. (a) Regular troops' pay and 
allowances and normlBf 
materiel costs 
(b) Certain extra and extraordi-
nary costs of the troop-
contributing governments 
that are financed directly by 
them...................... 36.2 
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2. Direct costs to the United 
Nations which the 
organisation is required to 
meet (including the extra and 
extraordinary costs of govern-
ments providing contingents 
for which they seek to be 
reimbursed), financed 
through voluntary contribu-
tions ..................... . 
Total costs ............. . 
14.2 
50.4 
Voluntary contributions from govern-
ments are required to finance the second of these 
cost elements through the medium of the special 
account. 
The special account 
The special account was established to 
"finance direct costs to the United Nations 
which the organisation is required to meet 
(including the extra and extraordinary costs of 
governments providing contingents for which 
they seek reimbursement)". In the six-month 
mandate to 15th December 1984 these costs were 
$14.2 million. 
In the period since the inception of 
UNFICYP on 27th March 1964 to 15th Decem-
ber 1984, costs under this item have been 
US$470.5 million. However, to the latter date, 
voluntary contributions to the special account 
have only totalled US$342.8 million. In 
December 1984, therefore, the account was in a 
deficit by $127.7 million, a sum which has tem-
porarily been absorbed by troop-contributing 
countries until sufficient funding becomes avail-
able through the special account. The Secre-
tary-General regularly draws the attention of 
United Nations member nations to the deficit, 
which is currently growing by about $5 to 6 mil-
lion for each six-month mandate. The Govern-
ment of the Republic of Cyprus is contributing 
the equivalent of more than US$1 million a year 
in finances and services. 
Costs absorbed by contingent-contributing coun-
tries 
Since 1964 troop-contributing countries 
have voluntarily absorbed about two-thirds of 
the costs of UNFICYP. These costs consist of 
"regular troops' pay, allowances, normal 
APPENDIX V 
materiel costs, plus certain extra and extraordi-
nary costs of the troop-contributing governments 
that are financed directly by them". In the six-
month mandate to December 1984, these costs 
were $36.2 million, made up as follows: 
Australia 
Austria 
Canada 
Denmark 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
US$ 
(in 
millions) 
0.5 
1.9 
10.7 
0.6 
3.5 
19.0 
By extrapolation it is estimated that the 
sum absorbed voluntarily by troop-contributing 
nations since 1964 is in the order of US$870 
million. In addition, as described earlier, these 
nations are also temporarily shouldering the spe-
cial account deficit which stood at US$127.7 mil-
lion in December 1984. Due to this deficit, the 
latest payment in respect of claims by troop-
contributing nations (which in some cases repre-
sent only a fraction of the actual costs incurred 
by them in maintaining their contingents) was 
made in January 1984 and met those claims only 
up to December 1977. 
Taking into consideration both the special 
account and the voluntarily absorbed amounts, 
UNFICYP has cost about US$1,400 million up 
to the end of 1984. At the present time, 
UNFICYP costs about US$100 million annu-
ally. 
Voluntary contributions 
To 15th December 1984, the voluntary 
contributors to the UNFICYP special account 
have been: 
Principal contributors 
United States 
United Kingdom 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Greece 
Norway 
Sweden 
Italy 
Switzerland 
Denmark 
Japan 
Belgium 
Austria 
Cyprus 
Australia 
Netherlands 
%of total 
46.8 
21.4 
7.1 
6.1 
2.5 
2.4 
2.3 
1.9 
1.4 
1.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
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Turkey 
Finland 
Others (see below) 
Other contributors 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Botswana 
Democratic Cambodia 
Ghana 
Guyana 
Iceland 
India 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Ivory Coast 
Jamaica 
Kuwait 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Luxembourg 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Republic of Korea 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Somalia 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United Arab Emirates 
United Republic of Camerdon 
United Republic of Tanzania 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
0.6 
0.3 
0.7 
100.00 
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Source of armaments of Middle Eastern 
and North African Mediterranean countries 
A. Apparent source of selected major equipment 
currently in service 1 
Main battle Combat Combat 
tanks aircraft ships 
Syria ...... 4200 USSR 500 USSR 30 USSR 
Lebanon .. 50 us 7 UK 3 France 
60 France 
Israel ..... 1100 UK 390 us 75 ind.* 
1 800 us 150 ind.* 
400 USSR 
250 ind.* 
Egypt ..... 1 500 USSR 140 USSR 46 USSR 
659 us 65 us 10 China 
79 France 12 ind.* 
Libya ..... 2 800 USSR 390 USSR 22 USSR 
90 France 10 France 
Tunisia ... 68 us 12 us 6 France 
2 China 
1 us 
Algeria .... 700 USSR 260 USSR 11 USSR 
Morocco .. 120 us 77 France 6 France 
1 Spain 
Source: The Military Balance 1985-86, IISS. 
APPENDIX VI 
Other supplying 
countries 
France (helicopters, 
patrol craft) 
France (helicopters) 
Spain (2 destroyers) 
UK (3 frigates, 
1 destroyer) 
UK ( 1 frigate, 
1 corvette) 
France (helicopters) 
France (light tanks) 
l. Table shows country of origin of equipment, not necessarily the supplying country, e.g. Israel has captured Soviet tanks; 
other equipment may be acquired via third countries. 
*ind. = indigenous production. 
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B. Equipment reported to be on order or under delivery in 1985 
Recipient Supplier No. Weapon Weapon Year Year No. Comments ordered designation description of order of delivery delivered 
Syria France 15 SA-342K Gazelle He!. 1984 Replacing losses in Lebanon War; to be 
armed with Hot A TMs 
(180) HOT ATM 1984 Arming 15 Gazelle helicopters 
Italy 18 AB-212ASW He!. (1986) Order pending 
6 CH-47C Chinook He!. (1986) Order pending 
12 SH-30 Sea King He!. (1986) Order pending 
Poland 3 Polnocny Class LS (1983) 1984 I 
1985 2 
USSR (35) Mi-24 Hind-D He!. (1983) (1983) (12) 
(1984) (12) 
(1985) (11) I 
.. MiG-23M Fighter/interceptor 1981 1982 (15) Incl some MiG-23BNs (ground attack ver-
sion) 
1983 (30) 
1984 (30) 
(1985) (30) 
.. MiG-25 Foxhound Fighter (1984) Unc~nfirmed 
.. MiG-27 Fighter/strike (1980) 1981 (6) 
1982 (6) 
1983 (6) 
1984 (6) 
1985 (6) 
.. MiG-29 Fighter (1984) Unctfirmed 
2 Tu-126 AEW (1981) Unc nfirmed 
(800) BMP-1 MICV 1981 1982 (lOO) 
1983 (lOO) 
1984 (100) 
1985 (100) 
(36) BTR-40PB Gaskin AAV(M) 1978 (1981) (6) 
i (1982) (6) 
(1983) (6) 
(1984) (6) 
(1985) (6) 
(200) M-1973 152 mm SPG 1981 1982 (50) Designation unconfirmed 
1983 (50) 
1984 (50) I 
1985 (50) 
(500) M-1974 122 mm SPH 1981 1982 (100) Designation unconfirmed 
1983 (100) 
1984 (100) 
1985 (100) 
.. SA-13 TELAR AAV(M) (1984) Unconfirmed 
.. T-72 MBT 1980 1981 (150) 
1982 (150) 
1983 (200) 
1984 (200) 
1985 (200) 
(250) T-74 MBT (1985) (1985) (100) UnclJnfirmed reports of deliveries of up to 
2SO 
.. ZSU-23-4 Shilka AAV 1981 (1982) (25) 
(1983) (25) 
(1984) (25) 
(1985) (25) 
(I 380) AA-2 Atoll AAM (1979) 1981 (120) Arm!ing MiG-23/25/27s 
1982 (120) 
1983 (330) 
1984 (270) 
1985 (210) 
.. AA-6 Acrid AAM (1984) (1984) (50) Unconfirmed: arming MiG-25s 
(1985) (50) 
U~onfirmed: .. AA-7 Apex AAM (1984) (1984) (50) arming MiG-21 s and 
(1985) (50) iG-23s 
.. AA-8 Aphid AAM (1984) (1984) (20) Unconfirmed: arming MiG-21s and 
(1985) (20) MiG-23s 
.. AT-4 Spigot ATM (1980) (1981) (50) Captured by Israeli forces in Lebanon 
(1982) (50) 
(1983) (lOO) 
i (1984) (100) 
(1985) (lOO) 
.. AT-5 Spandrel ATM (1984) (1984) (100) Unconfirmed 
(1985) (100) 
.. SA-13 Gopher Landmob SAM (1984) Ace to Israeli reports: to replace SA-9s 
.. SA-7 Grail Port SAM 1978 (1981) (25) 
i (1982) (25) 
(1983) (50) 
(1984) (50) 
(1985) (50) 
.. SA-8 Gecko Landmob SAM 1982 (1982) (64) Des}gnation unconfirmed: part of upgrading 
(1983) (64) o SAM network around major Syrian 
(1984) (64) ci~ies: deal incl MiG-27 fighter aircraft 
(1985) (64) i 
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Recipient Supplier No. Weapon Weapon Year Year No. Comments ordered designation description of order of delivery delivered 
Syria .. SA-9 Gaskin Landmob SAM 1978 (1981) (48) 
(continued) (1982) (48) 
(1983) (48) 
(1984) (48) 
(1985) (48) 
(12) SSN-2 Styx ShShM (1985) 1985 (12) Arming Osa-2 Class FACs 
I Natya Oass MSO (1984) 1985 I 
2 Osa-2 Oass FAC (1985) 1985 2 
Lebanon France 2 EDIC/EDA Type LS (1982) 1985 2 
Syria 18 D-74 122 mm TG (1985) (1985) (18) For Amal militia: unconfirmed 
(SO) T-54 MBT (1985) (I 985) (50) For Amal militia: ace to Phalangist reports: 
18 122 mm artillery pieces and some 
rocket launchers reportedly also received 
USA 35 M-60 A-3 MBT (1984) US LoO 1984 
Israel USA 11 F-15A Eagle Fighter 1982 Compensatory offer due to sale of extra 
equipment for Saudi F-15s: order incl 22 
fuel tanks, 6 spare engines and support : 
equipment I 
75 F-16C Fighter/strike 1983 In addition to 75 in service: total cost: $2 700 
m. of which half is grant and half is credit: 
offset purchases of F-16 components in ' 
Israel valued at $300 m.: for delivery 
1985/88 
(10) Model 209 AH-IS Hel. (1985) (1985) (10) In addition to 36 delivered earlier 
2 SA-366 He I. (1985) 1985 2 Ex-US Coast Guard: for evaluation: require-
ment for 16-20 
300 M-60-A3 MBT 1979 1981 (50) 
1982 (65) 
1983 (50) 
1984 (50) 
1985 (35) 
150 AIM-7M Sparrow AAM/SAM 1983 Arming F-15s: US LoO Jul 1983; total cost: 
$52 m. 
200 AIM-9L AAM 1983 US LoO Mar 1983 
.. RGM-84A Harpoon ShShM (1978) (1981) (20) At least 100 ordered to complement Gabriel 
(1982) (20) ShShM; AShM version for F-4 probably 
(1983) (20) also ordered 
(1984) (20) 
(1985) (20) 
Egypt China (I 10) F-7 Fighter 1980 1983 (10) Last 80 assembled in Egypt 
1984 (35) 
1985 (35) 
(2) Jianghu Class Frigate 1983 1984 I 
1985 I 
.. Luda Class Destroyer (1985) Unconfirmed 
2 Romeo Oass Submarine (1984) (1985) (2) Third pair of ex-Chinese navy submarines 
France 20 Mirage-2000 Fighter/strike 1981 (1986) (20) Ordered Dec 1981, total cost: $1000 m. 
(20) Mirage-2000 Fighter/strike (1985) Option on 16-20 more taken up 1984 but still 
under discussion: assembly in Egypt possi-
ble 
(60) ARMAT ARM 1984 (1985) (20) Arming Mirage-2000s 
.. AS-30L ASM 1983 (1985) (50) Arming Mirage-2000s 
(288) HOT ATM 1981 1984 (240) Arming 24 of 36 Gazelle helicopters ordered 
1985 (48) 1981 
.. R-440 Crotale Landmob SAM (1984) (1985) (48) Third order 
.. R-550 Magic AAM 1983 (1985) (60) Arming Mirage-2000s 
.. Super-530 AAM 1983 (1985) (60) Arming Mirage-2000s 
Netherlands 2 Alkmaar Class Minehunter (1986) Tripartite type: negotiating; total cost 
Spain 600 BMR-600 ICY 1982 
approx.: $80 m. 
1984 (250) Total cost incl 3 000 trucks and 700 coaches: 
$400 m. 
6 Cormoran Class FAC (1986) Negotiating; competing with shipyards in 
South Korea, Italy, UK and USA 
4 S-70 Oass Submarine (1986) Negotiating 
USA 6 Commuter-1900 Transport (1985) For electronic surveillance 
4 E-2C Hawkeye AEW 1983 1985 I First 2 for delivery 1985-6; total cost for 4 
(1986) (I) aircraft: $689 m.; remaining 2 for delivery 
I E-2C Hawkeye AEW 
1987 along with fifth aircraft ordered 1984 
1984 In addition to 4 on order: for delivery May 
1987; total cost incl spares: $50 m. 
34 F-16C Fighter/strike 1982 (1986) (8) Agreement in principle for a total of 150 air-
craft: total cost incl 6 F-160 trainers: $1.2 
b. 
6 F-160 Fighter/trainer 1982 (1986) (6) 
3 Gulfstream-3 Transport (1983) 1985 3 For VIP use 
48 M-109-A2 155 mm SPH (1985) In addition to 100 supplied in 1984 
472 M-113-A2 APC (1984) US LoO Mar 1984; 354 A2s, 43 M-806 
ARV s, 52 fitter vehicles and 23 ambulance 
vehicles; total value incl M-125-A2-M577-
A2s and M-548s: $157 m. 
19 M-125-A2 APC 1984 US LoO Mar 1984 
42 M-198 155 mm TH 1983 US LoO Oct 1983 
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Recipient Supplier No. Weapon Weapon Year Year No. Comments 
ordered designation description of order of delivery delivered 
Egypt 33 M-548 APC 1984 US LoO Mar 1984 
(continued) 13 M-577-A2 CPC 1984 US LoO Mar 1984 
220 M-60-A3 MBT 1982 1984 (100) In addition to 439 already on order: for deli-
1985 (120) very from 1984; deal incl 23 M-88-AI 
ARVs 
94 M-60-A3 MBT 1985 Exempted from temporary US ban on arms 
sales to Middle East imposed Jan 1985 
36 M-60-A3 MBT (1985) US LoO Dec 1985; pending congressional 
approval; in addition to 94 ordered earlier 
1985 
23 M-88-AI ARV 1982 (1984) (I I) 
(1985) (12) 
56 M-88-AI ARV 1984 Total cost: $63 m. 
424 AIM-7M Sparrow AAM/SAM (1984) 1985 (48) 
(1986) (144) To arm Skyguard air defence system; US 
LoO Feb 1984 
150 AIM-9L AAM 1983 (1984) (75) In addition to 300 delivered Apr 1983 
(1985) (75) 
72 MIM-23B Hawk Landmob SAM 1982 (1985) (36) Order incl 24 launch units in 4 btys: in addi-
(1986) (36) t10n to 12 btys ordered 1979 
(120) MIM-23B Hawk Landmob SAM (1985) Tltird order 
483 MIM-72F SAM/ShAM 1984 Total cost incl 26 towed launchers: $160 m.; 
total requirement to replace Soviet sys-
terns: about 60 launchers 
Libya Brazil (8) EMB-111 Mar patrol (1986) Negotiating 
25 EMB-121 Xingu Transport (1986) Negotiating 
(lOO) EMB-312 Tucano Trainer (1986) Negotiating for I 00-150 aircraft 
.. EE-11 Urutu APC (1986) Negotiating 
.. EE-9 Cascavel AC (1986) Negotiating 
.. EE-Tl Osorio MBT (1986) Negotiating 
Czecho- 6 Let L-410 Transport 1985 Ordered Jun 1985; in addition to 12 in ser-
slovakia vice 
Greece .. Steyr-4K 7FA APC (1986) Negotiating 
Italy 210 Palmaria 155 mm SPH 1981 1982 12 
1983 (50) 
1984 (80) 
1985 (68) 
.. Otomat-2 ShShM (1985) To arm 4 new Wadi Class corvettes 
4 Wadi Class Corvette (1985) In addition to 4 in service; to be armed with 
Otomat-2 ShShMs; named Assad Class 
Spain 4 S-70 Class Submarine (1986) Spanish otTer renewed 
USSR (15) An-26 Curl Light plane (1985) (1985) (15) Unconfirmed 
.. SA-5 Gammon SAM (1985) (1985) (30) Some systems reportedly delivered Nov 
1985 
(12) SA-N-4 ShAM 1980 1981 (3) Arming Nanuchka Class corvettes 
1983 (3) 
1984 (3) 
1985 (3) 
(48) SSN-2 Styx ShShM 1980 1981 (12) Arming Nanuchka Class corvettes 
1983 (12) 
1984 (12) 
1985 (12) 
.. SSN-2 Styx ShShM (1982) 1983 (36) Land-based version for protection of Gulf of 
1984 (36) Sirte 
1985 (36) 
4 Nanuchka Class Corvette 1980 1981 I Armed with SSN-2 Styx, ShShM and SA-N4 
1983 I SAMs 
1984 I 
1985 I 
I Natya Class MSO 1984 1985 I In addition to 6 in service 
Yugoslavia .. G-2AE Galeb Jet trainer (1983) (1984) (6) Unspecified number ordered; in addition to 
(1985) (6) some in service 
4 Koncar Class FAC 1981 Reconfirmed 1985; based on Swedish Spica 
design; armed with 4 Styx ShShMs and 76 
mm, 40 mm and 30 mm guns 
Tumsia Brazil .. EE-3 J araraca se (1984) Unconfirmed 
USA 2 C-130H Hercules Transport 1984 (1985) (2) To replace old transport aircraft 
(8) F-5E Tiger-2 Fighter 1982 (1984) (I) Order number reportedly changed from 6 
(1985) (7) 
Algeria Brazil .. EE-9 Cascavel AC (1986) Negotiating package incl Urutu APCs, trucks 
and technology transfers; total value: 
approx. $400 m. 
France (4 000) VP-2000 APC 1983 (1984) (500) 
(1985) (I 000) 
UK (16) Hawk Jet trainer/strike (1985) Reportedly ordered 
USSR .. D-30 122 mm TH (1982) (1983) (50) 
(1984) (50) 
(1985) (50) 
Yugoslavia .. G-4 Super Galeb Jet trainer (1986) Negotiating 
Morocco Argentina (20) IA-58A Pucara COIN (1985) 
Brazil 60 EE-11 Urutu APC (1985) 17 on loan from Libya for training prior to 
delivery from Brazil 
France 24 Mirage-2000 Fighter/stnke (1986) Negotiating 
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Recipient Supplier No. Weapon Weapon Year 
ordered designation description of order 
Morocco 
(continued) .. AML-90 AC (1978) 
108 AMX-lORC Recce AC 1978 
423 VAB APC 1975 
Spain 3 Lazaga Class PC/FAC (1985) 
USA I KC-130H Tanker /transport (1985) 
Source: Extracted from SIPRI "World Armaments and Disarmament 1986", Appendix 17B. 
Note to original table 
APPENDIX VI 
Year No. Comments 
of delivery delivered 
(1981) (20) 
(1982) (30) 
(1983) (30) 
(1984) (30) 
(1985) (30) 
1982 (10) Delivery started 1982 but stopped in 1984 
1983 (20) due to funding problems 
(1984) (10) 
1981 (75) Several versions; last 32 (V AB Mephisto) 
1982 (75) held up for financial reasons 
1983 (75) 
1984 (75) 
Option on 3 more 
In addition to 4 in service 
This appendix lists major weapons on order or under delivery during 1985. Certain deals close to finalisation by early 1986 are included with order year ( 1986). Deli-
veries made before 1981 for the same sales agreement have been excluded for space reasons. 
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The following conventions are used in the arms trade registers: 
. . Information not available. 
() Uncertain data or SIPRI estimate. 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
AA 
AAG 
AAM 
AAV 
AAV(M) 
AC 
Ace to 
ADV 
Adv 
AEW 
AF 
APC 
ARM 
ARV 
ASh M 
ASM 
ASSV 
ASW 
ATM 
AV 
BL 
Bty 
COIN 
CPC 
DoD 
FAC 
FY 
Grd 
Hel 
ICY 
lDS 
In cl 
Landmob 
LC 
LS 
LT 
Anti -aircraft 
Anti -aircraft gun 
Air-to-air missile 
Anti-aircraft vehicle (gun-armed) 
Anti-aircraft vehicle (missile-
armed) 
Armoured car 
According to 
Air defence version 
Advanced 
Airborne early-warning system 
Air Force 
Armoured personnel carrier 
Anti-radar missile 
Armoured recovery vehicle 
Air-to-ship missile 
Air-to-surface missile 
Assault vehicle 
Anti-submarine warfare 
Anti-tank missile 
Armoured vehicle 
Bridge-layer 
Battery 
Counter-insurgency 
Command post carrier 
Department of Defence (USA) 
Fast attack craft (missile/torpedo-
armed) 
Fiscal year 
Ground 
Helicopter 
Infantry combat vehicle 
Interdictor/strike version 
Including/includes 
Land-mobile (missile) 
Landing craft ( < 600 t displace-
ment) 
Landing ship (> 600 t displace-
ment) 
Light tank 
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LoO Letter of Offer 
MAP Military Assistance Programme 
Mar patrol Maritime patrol aircraft 
MBT 
MG 
MICV 
Mk 
MoU 
MRCA 
MRL 
MSC 
MSO 
MT 
OPV 
PC 
PDM 
Port 
RAF 
RAAF 
Recce 
SAM 
SAR 
se 
SEK 
ShAM 
ShShM 
SLBM 
SPG 
SPH 
SShM 
SSM 
SuShM 
TD 
TD(M) 
TG 
TH 
Trpt 
VIP 
Main battle tartk 
Machine-gun 
Mechanised infantry combat vehi-
cle 
Mark 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Multi-role combat aircraft 
Multiple rocket launcher 
Minesweeper, coastal 
Minesweeper, ocean 
Medium tank 
Offshore patrol vessel 
Patrol craft (gun-armed/unarmed) 
Point defence missile 
Portable 
Royal Air Force (UK) 
Royal Australian Air Force 
Reconnaissance (aircraft/vehicle) 
Surface-to-air missile 
Search and rescue 
Scout car 
Swedish crowns 
Ship-to-air missile 
Ship-to-ship missile 
Submarine-launched ballistic mis-
sile 
Self-propelled gun 
Self-propelled howitzer 
Surface-to-ship missile 
Surface-to-surface missile 
Submarine-to-ship missile 
Tank destroyer (gun-armed) 
Tank destroyer (missile-armed) 
Towed gun 
Towed howitzer 
Transport 
Very importanl person 
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Introduction 
In the first half of 1986 the Council, with 
the participation of Foreign and Defence Minis-
ters, met on 29th and 30th April in Venice under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Andreotti, the Italian 
Foreign Minister. 
In the communique issued after this min-
isterial meeting, the Ministers recalled the 
important role of WEU in the process of Euro-
pean construction. They reaffirmed their 
attachment to WEU as a forum in which the gov-
ernments concerned could address specific Euro-
pean concerns in the security field within the 
framework of their membership of the Atlantic 
Alliance. In so doing, the Ministers endorsed 
the principle set out in the Rome declaration. 
In presenting the results of the Ministerial 
Council, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
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recalled at the Assembly on 3rd June in Paris the 
role WEU should play in reinforcing European 
security, strengthening Atlantic solidarity and 
promoting the process of European integration. 
Addressing the Assembly on these various 
points, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for 
External Relations, stressed the complementary 
nature of the work done by WEU and within the 
framework of European political co-operation, a 
reality which has, moreover, been enshrined in 
the single European act. 
Mr. Andreotti expressed the satisfaction of 
the Foreign and Defence Ministers at the Venice 
discussions on questions concerning the United 
States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva and other 
important aspects of the disarmament process. 
* 
* * 
I. Activities of the Council 
The following points relate to the Coun-
cil's discussions, in particular at ministerial level 
in Venice and at the first part of the thirty-
second session of the Assembly, as well as to the 
positions expressed by the Council in its replies 
to the Assembly's recommendations and written 
questions. 
1. East-West relations and European security 
During the first half of 1986, the Council 
discussed, on several occasions, developments 
regarding East-West relations, particularly from 
the arms control and disarmament point of view. 
In Venice the Ministers recalled that the 
fundamental objective of arms control, both con-
ventional and nuclear, must be to strengthen 
security and stability at the lowest possible level 
of forces. 
(a) Negotiations between the United States 
and the USSR (nuclear forces) 
Through the Ministers in Venice, at the 
Assembly and in its reply to Recommendation 
425, the Council expressed its support for the 
efforts made by the United States in the talks 
with the Soviet Union about their nuclear weap-
ons and space. It welcomed the various ongo-
ing and close consultations among the allies and 
the American resolve to take European concerns 
fully into consideration. 
With regard to nuclear forces, WEU mem-
ber states recall the position put forward by the 
alliance at the ministerial meeting held in 
Halifax on 29th and 30th May 1986; on this occa-
sion the Ministers expressed their support for 
the United States efforts to achieve deep cuts in 
Soviet and United States nuclear forces. They 
added that in all negotiating fora in which they 
were engaged, the participating allies had pre-
sented detailed proposals directed at enhancing 
stability and security. They awaited an equally 
constructive response at the negotiating table 
from the Soviet Union and other members of the 
Warsaw Pact. Public statements alone were not 
enough. 
(b) Multilateral negotiations (conventional 
forces) 
The Council was concerned at the imbal-
ance in conventional forces throughout Europe 
in favour of the Warsaw Pact; in Venice, the 
Ministers underlined the factor of instability that 
it represents and stated that progress towards 
balanced and verifiable reductions of conven-
tional forces would represent a very significant 
contribution to the strengthening of security and 
peace in Europe. They hoped that in this field, 
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as in the nuclear field, the Soviet Union would 
translate its words into deeds at the negotiating 
table. 
They underlined their countries' continu-
ed efforts in the context of negotiations in multi-
lateral fora such as those on a comprehensive 
ban on chemical weapons in Geneva (CD) or 
those in Vienna on mutual and balanced force 
reductions (MBFR). The Ministers considered 
it necessary to intensify tht'e negotiations at the 
conference on confidence- and security-building 
measures and disarmame111t in Europe (CDE) 
taking place in Stockholm, in order that substan-
tial results could be achieved before the third 
CSCE follow-up conference in the autumn of 
1986. 
The concern of the WEU member states at 
the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe 
was shared by all the allies who, on 30th May 
1986 in Halifax, decided to set up a high-level 
task-force on conventional arms control. 
2. SDI 
SDI is a topic on which there has been an 
exchange of views between the Council and the 
Assembly principally through Recommendations 
428 and 430, Written Questions 263 and 266 and 
their respective replies. 
At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 
23rd April 1985, the Ministers agreed to achieve 
as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their 
governments to the invitation of the United 
States to participate in the research programme, 
without thereby setting as an aim the adoption of 
a common stance on SDI in view of the different 
approaches adopted by member governments 
towards their possible participation. 
The special working group set up following 
the Bonn decision has presented two interim 
reports to the Ministers, one at their meeting in 
Rome on 14th November 1985 and the other at 
their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April 
1986. 
At this last meeting, the Ministers decided 
that the work of WEU should continue to deal 
with questions of technology, principally those 
concerned with possible participation in the SDI 
research programme and the politico-strategic 
implications of possible developments in the 
field of ballistic missile defence. 
The group has therefore devoted its time 
to defining and pursuing a long-term programme 
of work covering the technological, technico-
military and politico-military aspects of the sub-
ject. 
Each meeting has also provided an oppor-
tunity for an exchange of information between 
the member governments. 
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3. Armaments co-operation 
The Council has discussed European 
armaments co-operation on several occasions. 
In order to avoid duplication with the 
competent institutions in this field, the Council 
saw the role of WEU as a complementary one 
providing political impetus to the various efforts 
undertaken in the field of armaments co-opera-
tion, including those of the Independent Euro-
pean Programme Group (IEPG). Speaking on 
2nd June to the parliamentarians, the Secretary-
General said that contacts had already been 
made with the IEPG to prevent any duplication 
and to promote a regular exchange of informa-
tion. 
Recalling the cost of research, develop-
ment and production of weapons systems, partic-
ularly those involving emerging technology, the 
Ministers in Venice welcomed the progress 
which had been made in the IEPG on 
harmonising military requirements and in 
launching co-operative research projects. They 
requested that studies be undertaken on the 
management of resources and the implications of 
rising defence costs. 
4. Enlargement 
The Council examined on several occa-
sions, and in particular at ministerial level in 
Venice, the question of enlargement. 
It considers that possible enlargement 
would involve prior completion of several stages, 
i.e. the consolidation of the reactivation process 
and the confirmation of the tasks and new struc-
tures of WEU, as well as the in-depth examina-
tion of the political conditions and legal implica-
tions of accession, in particular the applicability 
to new members of all the provisions ofthe mod-
ified Brussels Treaty and its additional proto-
cols. 
The Council has begun this twofold 
process which should be accomplished by the 
end of the transitional period on 31st December 
1987. Indeed, with the Ministers having agreed 
in Venice that preliminary contacts should be 
made with the interested countries, the Secre-
tary-General has already held talks on 26th May 
1986 in Lisbon with the Portuguese authori-
ties. 
5. Security in the Mediterranean 
Security in the Mediterranean continued 
to be one of the most sensitive aspects of the 
European dimension of common security. At 
their meeting in Venice the Ministers discussed 
the risks of destabilisation in this region. They 
paid close attention to the unstable situation pre-
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vailing in the Mediterranean area. They 
stressed the role which Western European coun-
tries could continue to play in order to reduce 
tension in the area and agreed to examine this 
point in greater depth. The countries of West-
ern Europe should continue to promote under-
standing and co-operation among countries in 
the Mediterranean area. 
6. International terrorism 
At their meeting in Venice, the Ministers 
considered the problem of international 
terrorism. They stated that terrorism consti-
tuted a serious threat to security and underlined 
the importance of early and effective action to 
implement the measures that the countries of 
Western Europe had agreed upon to combat this 
scourge. 
The Council has stated its position on this 
matter in its reply to Written Question 269, in 
which it stressed the importance of the declara-
tion of the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve on 
14th Aprill986 on international terrorism and of 
the Halifax declaration of 30th May 1986 by the 
Ministers of the alliance. In its reply to Written 
Question 268, the Council considered that not 
only those countries belonging to WEU but as 
many countries as possible should co-operate in 
the fight against terrorism and that anti-terrorist 
action was already being co-ordinated in other 
fora, in particular by the Twelve, which had 
already adopted significant measures in this 
sphere. 
7. Co-operation between European security 
and defence research institutes 
At their meeting in Venice, the Ministers 
mandated the Permanent Council to look for 
ways of strengthening co-operation between 
existing European academic and research institu-
tions in the field of security and defence. The 
contacts made confirmed the interest aroused by 
this project which forms part of the process of 
increasing public awareness of European security 
requirements. 
To this end, the Secretary-General has 
sought expert advice. In pursuing its reflection 
on the subject, the Council will, of course, take 
possible budgetary implications into account. 
11. Ministerial organs 
I. The WEU Council 
The process ofWEU reactivation has been 
reflected in the increased work rate of the Coun-
cil and the other ministerial organs. 
During the period under review, the Coun-
cil met thirteen times at permanent representa-
tive level, one meeting being attended by the 
political directors or their representatives 
(enlarged Council of 19th March 1986). 
It was assisted in its work by its working 
group which met twenty-three times. It was 
also assisted by an SDI special working group 
(five meetings) composed of experts from the 
capitals, members of the London embassies and 
the staff of the Secretariat-General. 
2. Activities of the ministerial organs in Paris 
The Assembly was informed in March, in 
a letter from the Secretary-General to President 
Caro, of the activities of the new agencies for 
security questions which, as indicated in the 
Bonn communique, were to carry out studies 
requested by the Council. In the first half of 
1986 the agencies began their work, the results of 
which will constitute internal working docu-
ments intended to contribute to the Council's 
reflection on the subjects addressed. 
In order to acquire the information neces-
sary for their activities, the agencies are estab-
lishing links with relevant international bodies 
and national administrations. Any classified 
information released to the WEU ministerial 
organs will be restricted to their exclusive use. 
3. Strengthening of the Secretariat-General in London 
The definite establishment table for the 
Secretariat-General in London, as approved by 
the Ministers on 14th November in Rome, is 
now in the process of being completed following 
recruitment of staff. In recruiting, attention was 
paid to efficiency and optimum output, on the 
one hand, and the aim of achieving the fairest 
national balance of posts, on the other. 
Ill. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
1. The various forms 
of the dialogue may be summarised as follows 
The Council has recognised the value of 
informal meetings similar to the one held on 21st 
January 1986 in Paris and on 8th April in Rome 
and is prepared to have further meetings of this 
kind, in particular before the Assembly's ses-
sions. 
The Council will present its report in two 
half-yearly parts and transmit, if appropriate, 
written information concerning certain of its 
activities. Clearly, this would have to be subject 
to the standards of confidentiality imposed on 
the Council by the very nature of its work. 
The Council's replies to the Assembly's 
recommendations and written questions would 
of course remain the normal channel for an offi-
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cial communication of the Council's standpoint 
on specific issues raised by the Assembly. 
2. The various aspects of the diahlgue between the Council 
and the Assembly in the first half of 1986 
(a) The following documents were transmit-
ted to the Assembly: 
(i) the thirty-first annual report of the 
Council on its activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1985 
communicated in implementation of 
Article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty; 
(ii) the Council's replies to Recommen-
dations 425 to 431 which the Assem-
bly had adopted during the second 
part of its thirty-first ordinary ses-
sion; 
(iii) the Council's r~plies to Written Ques-
tions 262 to 264, 266 and 268 posed 
by members of the Assembly; 
(iv) the declassified version of the report 
drawn up by the international secre-
tariat of the SAC on the prospects for 
future developments in the Japanese 
armaments industry and the possible 
repercussions for Europe. 
(b) There were several contacts between the 
Council and the Assembly bodies: 
(i) 21st January in Paris: meeting 
between the Permanent Council, 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Corti, 
Italian State Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, representing the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council, and the Pres-
idential Committee of the Assembly 
to discuss relations between the 
Council and the Assembly; 
(ii) 8th April in Rome: meeting between 
the Council, under the chairmanship 
of Mr. Andreotti~ Italian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, and the Assem-
bly Committee for Relations with the 
Council to discuss several topical 
questions and the preparation of the 
ministerial meeting in Venice; 
(iii) 30th April in Venice: presentation of 
the conclusions of the ministerial 
meeting by the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, Mr. Andreotti, to the 
President of the Assembly accompa-
nied by parliamentarians; 
(iv) 4th June in Paris: Mr. Cahen, Secre-
tary-General, was received by the 
Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations. 
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APPENDIX I 
Communique issued after the ministerial meeting 
of the Council of Western European Union 
Venice, 29th-30th April 1986 
1. Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western 
European Union met in Venice on 29th and 30th 
April 1986. They recalled the important role of 
WEU in the process of European construc-
tion. They reaffirmed their attachment to WEU 
as a forum in which the governments concerned 
can address specific European concerns in the 
security field within the framework of their 
membership of the Atlantic Alliance. These 
concerns relate both to the need for effective and 
appropriate defence capabilities and to the speci-
fic implications for security and stability in 
Europe of developments in the various arms 
control negotiations. 
2. The Ministers stressed the importance of 
the contribution to common security made by 
the member states and expressed their apprecia-
tion of the contribution which the independent 
nuclear forces of France and the United King-
dom make to deterrence. They recalled the 
indivisible nature of western security and their 
firm determination to strengthen the ties and the 
solidarity which bind them together and to the 
other members of the alliance. 
3. The Ministers reaffirmed their commit-
ment to the improvement of East-West relations 
through the promotion of contact and dialo-
gue. In this respect they recalled the impor-
tance of the CSCE process. 
I 
They emphasised that a climate of confi-
dence is important for progress in the field of 
arms control and disarmament. They noted the 
need to find solutions in all negotiating fora that 
take full account of the security interests of their 
countries. 
The Ministers recalled that the fundamen-
tal objective of arms control, both conventional 
and nuclear, must be to strengthen security and 
stability at the lowest possible level of forces. 
4. The Ministers expressed their support for 
the efforts made by the United States in the talks 
with the Soviet Union about their nuclear wea-
pons and space. They welcomed the various 
ongoing and close consultations among the allies 
and the American resolve to take European 
concerns fully into consideration. 
The expressed the hope that the Soviet 
Union would give practical effect at the negotiat-
ing table to its stated intention to reach equitable 
and verifiable arms control agreements. 
5. The Ministers stressed that the ongoing 
negotiations on United States and Soviet longer-
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range intermediate nuclear forces are of particu-
lar interest to Europe. They recalled the impor-
tance they attach to the objective of progressive 
reductions leading to the global elimination of 
this category of weapons within the framework 
of effectively verifiable agreements. In this 
context the emergence of new areas of instability 
should be prevented by adequate measures. 
6. The Ministers underlined that imbalances 
in the field of conventional forces throughout 
Europe equally constitute a factor of instabi-
lity. Progress towards balanced and verifiable 
reductions of conventional forces would thus 
represent a very significant contribution to the 
strengthening of security and peace in Europe. 
The Ministers hope that, in this field, the Soviet 
Union will translate into deeds at the negotiating 
table its recent statements. They underlined 
their countries' continued efforts in the context 
of negotiations in multilateral fora such as those 
on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in 
Geneva (CD) and on mutual and balanced force 
reductions in Vienna (MBFR). The Ministers 
considered it necessary to intensify the negotia-
tions at the conference on confidence- and secu-
rity-building measures and disarmament in 
Europe (CDE) taking place in Stockholm, in 
order that substantial results can be achieved 
before the third CSCE follow-up conference in 
the autumn of this year. 
7. The Ministers recalled the increasingly 
complex problems caused by the cost of research, 
development and production of weapons sys-
tems, particularly those involving emerging tech-
nology. They underlined the importance of 
co-operative efforts designed to help strengthen 
their defence capabilities. 
The Ministers welcomed the progress 
which had been made in the IEPG on harmonis-
ing military requirements and in launching co-
operative research projects. They particularly 
welcomed the decision taken in Madrid on 28th 
April concerning co-operation in the military 
aeronautics sector. 
The Ministers requested that studies be 
undertaken on the management of resources and 
the implications of rising defence costs. 
8. The Ministers also considered an up-to-
date report on issues relating to the SDI research 
programme provided by a working group of the 
Permanent Council. They decided that the 
work of WEU should continue to deal with ques-
tions related to participation in the SDI research 
programme and the politico-strategic implica-
APPENDIX I 
tions for Europe of possible developments in the 
field of ballistic missile defence. 
9. The Ministers exchanged views on secu-
rity in the Mediterranean and the risks of desta-
bilisation in this region. They stressed the role 
which Western European countries can continue 
to play in order to reduce tension in the area. 
They agreed to examine this point in greater 
depth. 
10. They gave special attention to the threat to 
security posed by international terrorism and 
underlined the importance of early and effective 
action to implement the measures that the coun-
tries of Western Europe have agreed upon to 
combat this scourge. 
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11. The Ministers also reviewed the progress 
made since the October 1984 meeting in Rome 
in relaunching the organisation and exchanged 
views on its future prospects. In this spirit, they 
recognised the importance of good co-ordination 
among the various institutions capable of contri-
buting to a Western European dimension of 
common security. 
12. The Ministers mandated the Permanent 
Council to make proposals, at their next meeting, 
on ways of strengthening co-operation between 
existing European academic and research institu-
tions in the field of security and defence, thus 
improving the quality of their research relevant 
to WEU. 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur arranged for the following representatives to the MBFR 
talks in Vienna to be interviewed on his behalf on 7th and 8th March 1986: 
Mr. Jozef Sestak, Deputy Head, Delegation of Czechoslovakia, and Dr. Lenka Novotna; 
H.E. Mr. J.H.L. van de Mortel, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation, and Mr. Pieter 
J an W olthers; 
Mr. Kent Brown, Adviser, US Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Michael Alexander, Ambassador, Head of the UK Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Valerian Mikhailov, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR; 
Dr. Jurgen Pohlmann, Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany; 
Mr. Krzysztof Stronczynski, member of the Polish Delegation. 
The committee as a whole adopted the first version of this report at its meeting in Venice on 29th 
April1986. It subsequently met in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia, from 16th to 20th June 1986, 
when it was addressed by or met with: 
16th June 1986 
State Department, Washington DC 
Ms. Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
Affairs; 
Mr. Charles Thomas, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Cana-
dian Affairs; 
Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military Affairs; 
Mr. Edward Rowny, Ambassador, Special Representative for Strategic Arms Negotiations. 
Congressional Research Service, Washington DC 
Mr. Stanley Sloan, Specialist in US Alliance Relations; 
Mr. Paul Gallis, Analyst in West European Affairs; 
Mr. Charles Gellner, Senior Specialist, International Affairs; 
Mr. Stuart Goldman, Analyst in Soviet Affairs; 
Mr. Steven Hildreth, Analyst in National Defence; 
Mr. Francis Miko, Specialist in International Relations; 
Ms. Charlotte Preece, Specialist in West European Affairs; 
Mr. Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Foreign Affairs Analyst; 
Ms. Jeanette Voas, Arms Control An,alyst; 
Mr. Paul Zinsmeister, Specialist in National Defence. 
Brookings Institution, Washington DC 
Mr. Joshua Epstein, Research Associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Programme. 
17th June 1986 
Department of Defence, Washington DC 
Mr. Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy; 
Dr. Winfred Joshua and Colonel Don Scott, Defence Intelligence Agency; 
Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence; 
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Mr. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control 
Policy; 
Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations 
1 
Policy; 
Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director NATO Affairs, Defence Research and Engineering; 
Mr. Robert Mullen, Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary for Trade Security Policy. 
18th June 1986 
United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services 
Mr. Samuel Stratton, Representative of New York, and members of the committee: 
! 
Democrats 
Mr. Melvin Price; 
Mr. Charles E. Bennett; 
Mr. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery; 
Mr. Earl Hutto; 
Mr. Ike Skelton; 
Mr. Thomas M. Foglietta; 
Mr. Richard Ray; 
Mr. Solomon P. Ortiz; 
Mr. Albert G. Bustamante; 
Republicans 
Mr. G. William Whitehurst; 
Mr. Robert E. Badham. 
19th June 1986 
Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia 
Admiral Lee Baggett, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and staff; 
Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dolton, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; 
Vice-Admiral Bemard Cauderer, US Navy, Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet; 
Rear-Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Deputy and Chief-of-Staff for the Commander-in-ChiefUS 
Atlantic Fleet, and staff. 
20th June 1986 
Arms Control Association, Washington DC 
Mr. Paul Wamke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association. 
It met subsequently in Geneva on 24th and 25th July 1986, when it was addressed by the follow-
ing representatives to the Conference on Disarmament: 
H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Representative of the Soviet Union; 
H.E. Mr. Robert van Schaik, Ambassador, Representative of the Netherlands; 
H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States; 
H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador, Head of the Swedish Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Dele~tion and Chairman 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Chemical Weapons Ban; 
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H.E. Dr. Henning Wegener, Ambassador, Head ofthe Delegation ofthe Federal Republic ofGer-
many; 
H.E. Mr. Mansur Ahmad, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Pakistan. 
The committee subsequently discussed and adopted the present report at its meeting at the seat of 
the Assembly, Paris, on 3rd November 1986. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, members of Congress, 
officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. In particu-
lar the Rapporteur thanks those members of the staff of the WEU agency for the study of arms control 
and disarmament who assisted in the preparation of the report. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Revised draft Recommendation 
on disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
I 
(i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report and the omis-
sion of information concerning one important meeting, but welcoming the communication of the first 
part of the report for 1986; 
(ii) Considering that the absence of agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council 
from presenting its report in time; 
(iii) Welcoming the fact that the Council remains determined to discuss and harmonise the views of 
the Seven on disarmament and the control of armaments; 
(iv) Welcoming the position adopted by the Council in its report on the whole range of arms control 
negotiations, in particular the importance Ministers attach " to respect for existing treaty obliga-
tions "; 
(v) Considering that it is more than ever essential for the Seven to seek a common position on all 
aspects ofthe control of armaments and disarmament and to maintain their own bilateral relations with 
the Soviet Union; 
(vi) Welcoming the considerable progress towards eventual agreement on treaties to reduce nuclear 
weapons and to limit space weapons made at the Reykjavik summit; 
(vii) Welcoming also the considerable improvement in confidence-building meas111res included in the 
document of the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe; 
(viii) Noting with interest the proposal in the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Paft countries of 11th 
June 1986 for reductions of land and air forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals, but 
believing that agreement on initial reductions in the MBFR framework can be reacHed immediately the 
Soviet Union accepts the necessary verification measures; 
(ix) Welcoming the steady progress of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to 
ban all chemical weapons, but believing that a comprehensive nuclear test ban should also be negoti-
ated, and welcoming therefore the continued Soviet moratorium which it believes should be recipro-
cated by the United States, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before 
the end of February of the following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by 
the Council; 
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement 
ofWEU; 
3. Urge the Seven, in their consultations on the bilateral negotiations on strate$ic and space weap-
ons, to urge both parties to pursue the considerable progress made at the Reykjavik ~ummit and to insist 
on the treaties already signed being respected, in particular SALT I, SALT 11 and th~ ABM treaty on the 
unde~standing that both parties continue laboratory research on strategic defence, 'rithout undertaking 
tests m space; 
I 
4. Until it becomes clear whether fruitful negotiations on mutual and balanced reductions offorces 
and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals are possible in the CSCE/CDE fram~work, urge govern-
ments participating in the MBFR negotiations to press for the earliest agreement otn initial reductions, 
including the right of automatic inspections and the obligation for all troops entering or leaving the 
reductions zone to pass at all times through recognised entry-exit points with permanent observers; 
5. Urge participating governments to pursue actively the improved prospects for a chemical weap-
ons ban in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, to press the Soviet Union to accept the compro-
mise proposal for challenge inspection put forward by the United Kingdom in July and, pending the 
outcome of these negotiations in 1987, not to approve as a NATO force goal the deployment of further 
chemical weapons in Europe; 
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6. (a) Urge the Soviet Union and the United States to agree to the mutual exchange of official tech-
nical teams both for the verification of a nuclear test ban when negotiated and meanwhile for the cali-
bration of the yield of nuclear tests; 
(b) Press for the ratification by the United States of the treaties on a threshold test ban and on 
peaceful nuclear explosions and for the opening of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban in the Con-
ference on Disarmament in Geneva. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. The committee adopted the first version of 
this report on 29th April by 13 votes to 0 with 7 
abstentions. The debate on the report during 
the Assembly session which opened on 3rd June 
1986 unfortunately had to be adjourned on seve-
ral occasions, partly because of the large number 
of addresses by ministers. Finally, it was 
towards the end of the session on Thursday, 5th 
June, after thirteen amendments had been 
tabled, that the Assembly voted to refer it back to 
committee. 
1.2. At the time of drafting the first report the 
Rapporteur had in his possession only Chapters 
Ill and IV of the annual report of the Council. 
The complete report did not reach the Assembly 
until after 20th May. Moreover, on 24th Octo-
ber the Council communicated to the Assembly 
the first part of its report for 1986. The Rappor-
teur has therefore taken advantage of the interve-
ning period to complete this revised report, com-
menting on the one hand on the annual report of 
the Council as a whole and taking account on the 
other hand of several major developments in the 
arms control area. 
1.3. In accordance with the terms of reference 
given to the Rapporteur for his report, the com-
mittee noted that " as the internal WEU conven-
tional arms control functions are terminated at 
the end of 1985, while three new agencies are 
created, including the agency for the study of 
arms control and disarmament questions, the 
report replying to the annual report of the Coun-
cil can conveniently be combined with a follow-
up report on disarmament which, in view of the 
impulse given by the Reagan-Gorbachev sum-
mit, will follow negotiations on the most topical 
or urgent disarmament problems, without how-
ever covering all the topics dealt with in the 
information report of 4th November (Document 
1040) or the report of 22nd November (Docu-
ment 1043) ". 
II. Activities of the Council 
2.1. The annual report of the Council for the 
year 1985, which should normally reach the 
Assembly towards the end of February, was 
dated 20th May, although Chapters Ill and IV on 
that the Council had the greatest difficulty in 
reaching agreement on a simple account of its 
own activities in 1985. The committee wel-
comes however the communication on 24th 
October of the first part of ihe Council's report 
for 1986, covering the first ~alf of the year, and 
the Council's intention an ounced therein to 
"present its report in two alf-yearly parts and 
transmit, if appropriate, written information 
concerning certain of its activities" (Chapter 
Ill, 1 ). 
2.2. Where these activities of the Council are 
concerned, the committee iS gratified to see the 
large section devoted to di~armament negotia-
tions and the fact that the Council discussed 
these negotiations at both permanent and minis-
terial level. An important passage from Chap-
ter I is worth quoting: 
" The Ministers expressed the hope that 
the negotiations betwe~n the United States 
and the Soviet Union! would make possi-
ble radical reductions in their strategic and 
medium-range nuclear armaments and 
agreements aimed at ending the arms race 
on earth and preventing an arms race in 
space. They underlined in this regard the 
importance they attached to respect for 
existing treaty obligattons. " 
This was an important statement that the com-
mittee will refer to below. 
2.3. However, the committee notes a curious 
gap in the Council's report - there is no reference 
to the important meeting o~ganised by the Ger-
man Government, which ha~ the Chairmanship-
in-Office of the Council at tqe time, of experts on 
disarmament questions from the seven minis-
tries for foreign affairs and held in Bonn on 11th 
February 1985 under the chairmanship of 
Ambassador Ruth. At the time the press 
reported that Mr. Richard Burt, then American 
Assistant Secretary of State" had sent a letter to 
·certain ministries for foreilgn affairs of WEU 
countries according to which this meeting of 
experts was thought to be ip.appropriate. 
2.4. The committee considers it important for 
the WEU countries to adopt joint positions on 
major disarmament questions. It is therefore 
regrettable that the Council. makes no reference 
to one of its most successfUl initiatives in this 
sense. 
the last activities up to 31st December 1985 of 2.5. It is not surprising that the Council was 
the former international secretariat of the Stand- unable to reach agreement on two specific points 
ing Armaments Committee and of the Agency on which the positions of the seven governments 
for the Control of Armaments reached the Office still seem to differ. These 1are Portugal's appli-
of the Clerk in March. It would in fact appear cation for membership ofWfEU made in October 
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1984 and the attempt to co-ordinate the reac-
tions of WEU countries to the United States 
invitation to take part in research for strategic 
defence purposes. 
2.6. In regard to the accession of new states to 
the Brussels Treaty, Article XI of the treaty pro-
vides that" the high contracting parties may, by 
agreement, invite any other state to accede to the 
present treaty on conditions to be agreed 
between them and the state so invited". The 
Seven seem to have been unprepared for 
Portugal's application in 1984 which in a way 
anticipated their invitation. In this connection, 
another letter from the WEU Secretary-General 
on 26th February 1986 informing the President 
of the Assembly of his visit to Spain on 28th and 
29th January reports in regard to Spain that: 
" On relations between Spain and Western 
European Union, those to whom I spoke 
confirmed Spain's interest in acceding to 
WEU. How do they view such accession? 
They are aware that accession to WEU is 
at the invitation of the WEU Council. 
They will therefore await this invitation in 
due course, i.e. after the major debate on 
the problem of security raised by the refe-
rendum on 12th March has come to a 
conclusion. " 
The Secretary-General concluded: 
"Still in my personal capacity, I con-
cluded that it was politically desirable, if a 
state wished to join WEU, for it: 
- to be a member of the Communities 
and of political co-operation; 
- to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance; 
and 
- to have a real desire to promote a Euro-
pean security dimension. " 
2. 7. The Council's report for the first part of 
1986 now makes it clear that the accession of 
Portugal will not now be considered until 1988, 
after the " transitional period " up to the end of 
1987 when the new structures of WEU resulting 
from the 1984 reactivation are to be reviewed, 
and after " the applicability to new members of 
all the provisions of the modified Brussel Treaty 
and its additional protocols " have been exam-
ined in depth. (The application of Protocols 
Nos. 11 and Ill is discussed below in paragraphs 
2.10 et seq. and 3.1 et seq.). While it is certain 
that the accession of Portugal and Spain would 
be very warmly welcomed from a purely political 
standpoint, certain WEU countries consider that 
at the same time it is essential not to isolate the 
European allied countries on the two flanks 
which are of vital strategic importance for Euro-
pean security. Should not a simultaneous invi-
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tation therefore also be made to all the allied 
European countries members of NATO to join 
WEU? 
2.8. In regard to the American invitation to 
European firms to take part in research for stra-
tegic defence purposes, the bilateral negotiations 
held by the United States with each of the Euro-
pean allied countries are making slow 
progress. Memoranda of understanding have 
been signed by the United Kingdom, Germany 
and, on 19th September, by Italy but with the 
reservation that signature did not imply that 
government's political or military support for the 
SDI 1• Exceptionally for this type of document, 
their content has not been published, which is 
arousing concern about the extent of the Ameri-
can technical know-how to which European 
industries taking part in the research would have 
access. Government reservations about the 
SDI were referred to very recently by Baroness 
Young, British Minister of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, when she addressed the 
Assembly on 3rd June 1986: 
" We shall in particular look from a Euro-
pean perspective at certain aspects of 
European participation in the SDI 
research programme, and at the politico/ 
strategic implications of SDI for Europe 
itself. Many of these questions, as 
Geoffrey Howe made clear in his speech in 
March 1985 to the Royal United Services 
Institute, are unanswerable, and will be so 
for a long time to come. And differences 
in perception and perspective between our 
member governments have already lim-
ited the possible extent of co-ordination or 
participation in the SDI research pro-
gramme." 
The many questions and reservations referred to 
by Sir Geoffrey Howe in this speech of 15th 
March 1985 were quoted in an earlier report by 
the committee 2• 
2.9. Where the future activities of the three 
new Council agencies are concerned, a letter 3 
from the Secretary-General dated 17th March 
1986 gives some information. Inter alia, it 
reports that: 
" Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-a-
vis the countries of Western Europe in 
regard to questions of the control of arma-
ments and disarmament. In the future it 
will also have to take an interest in the 
control of conventional armaments and 
the essential problem of verification. " 
I. The Times, 20th September 1986. 
2. Document 1033, WEU and the strategic defence mitia-
tive, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. van den Bergh-
explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.2. 
3. Text at Appendix I. 
Application of Protocol No. II on forces of West-
ern European Union 
2.1 0. In 1985, the Council duly carried out the 
formalities provided for in Protocol No. 11 of the 
modified Brussels Treaty to ensure that the 
forces maintained by member countries on the 
mainland of Europe did not exceed the agreed 
levels. 
2.11. In regard to the forces which the United 
Kingdom has undertaken to station on the main-
land of Europe in accordance with Article VI of 
Protocol No. 11, fixed by the Council at 55 000 
men plus a tactical air force, the committee notes 
with satisfaction that, according to the Council's 
report, in 1985 the number of British forces con-
cerned was 56 005, ofwhich 814 were redeployed 
in Northern Ireland for short tours of duty. 
These figures compare with 56 467 on the main-
land of Europe ofwhich 972 in Northern Ireland 
in 1984, according to the Council's previous 
report. The British tactical air force stationed 
on the mainland ofEurope in 1985 was the same 
as in the previous year, i.e.: 
Role Aircraft/Equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack Jaguar 1 
Tornado 4 
Offensive support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguar 1 
Air defence Phantom 2 
Rapier surface-
to-air missiles 1 
Air transport Puma 1 
Chinook 1 
Ground d_efence RAF regiment 1 
Ill. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
(a) Conventional weapons 
3.1. In its 1984 report 4, the committee exam-
ined the history of the rather incomplete applica-
tion of controls of member countries' weapons 
provided for in the Brussels Treaty as modified 
in 1954. There is no need to return to controls 
of conventional weapons - and the gaps in their 
application - since the Council, in accordance 
with several Assembly recommendations, 
decided to abolish them completely as from 1st 
January 1986. In 1985, in accordance with the 
decision of principle taken by the Council in 
·Rome in October 1984, supplemented by its 
resolution of 23rd January 1985, controls were 
awlied to only about half the conventional 
4. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty - reply to 
the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 
973, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker. 
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weapons subject to contro~under the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its Pr tocols Nos. Ill and 
IV. By pursuing documen ary controls- which 
represented most of the A'gency's work in the 
past - in 1985 and carrying out thirty-four field 
control measures in the same year, the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments duly carried out 
its duties until the last day c;>f its existence with a 
full staff. The table her~after gives a break-
down of field control mea~ures. 
3.2. The Council's decision to control in 1985 
only half the number of conventional weapons 
formerly controlled, pending the complete aboli-
tion of such controls as from 1st July 1986, 
seems curious, not to say ~berrant. 
(b) ABC wedpons 
3.3. The situation is different in regard to 
atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The 
Rome declaration adopted! by the Council on 
27th October 1984 asserted that " the commit-
ments and controls concerning ABC weapons 
would be maintained at the existing level and in 
accordance with the procedures agreed up to the 
present time ". But, as in previous years, the 
annual report of the Council for 1985 states that 
" since the situation has ren)ained the same as in 
previous years, the Agency I did not exercise any 
control in the field of atomk weapons " and the 
list of biological weapons subject to control 
accepted by the Council in 1981 having been 
renewed by the latter for 1985 " as in previous 
years ... the Agency did not exercise any control 
in the field of biological weapons". 
3.4. There remain chemic)al weapons. As for 
atomic and biological weapons, there are two 
aspects to controls of chemical weapons pro-
vided for in the Brussels Treaty: 
(i) control of any production in countries 
not having renounced the right to pro-
duce chemical w~apons; 
(ii) verification of uijdertakings made by 
the country which renounced the right 
to produce such weapons. 
3.5. As in past years, in 1985 the Council first 
renewed the list of chemicall weapons subject to 
control which it had previolllsly approved. Then, 
according to the annual rep<)rt, the questionnaire 
which the Agency sends thQ six countries which 
have not renounced the right to produce such 
chemical weapons asked: 
" ... whether production of chemical weap-
ons on their mainland territory had passed 
the experimental stage and entered the 
effective production stage. As in the past, 
all these states replied in the negative. 
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Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments- 1961-85 
Non-production 
Quantitative control measures control 
measures Total 
control 
at units (of which measures (all 
at under at at non- categories) 
depots national production Sub-total production production plants plants of chemical 
command 
weapons) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1961 29 15 12 66 7 
!!l 
63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 n.a. 60 
6 * * * * * n.a. 78 7 * * * * * n.a. 70 8 * * * * * n.a. 79 9 * * * * * (3) 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 1 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 2 * * * * * n.a. - 66 3 * * * * * n.a. - 66 4 * * * * * n.a. - 71 5 * * * * * n.a. - 72 
6 * * * * * n.a. - 71 
7 * * * * * n.a. - 70 8 * * * * * n.a. - 68 9 * * * * * n.a. - 70 
1980 * * * * * n.a. - 70 1 * * * * * n.a. - 70 2 * * * * * n.a. - 69 3 * * * * * n.a. - 72 4 * * * * * n.a. - 66 5 * * * * * n.a. - 34 
Notes a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth 
counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of 
inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures 
(old and new style - a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
n.a. : Information not available. 
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the 
Council. With regard to the variable categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the pub-
lished annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the committee. Those for 1970 to 
1985 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish 
them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without signifi-
cance. 
• Confidential information available to the committee deleted from the published report. 
In addition, the Agency asked all the mem-
ber states to declare any chemical weapons 
that they might hold. Since all the mem-
ber states replied in the negative, the 
Agency carried out no quantitative con-
trols of chemical weapons in 1985. " 
3.6. In the case of the seventh country, which 
has renounced the right to produce chemical 
weapons on its territory, the annual report states 
that: 
"The competent authorities of the country 
concerned provided the Agency with a 
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detailed, precise and complete reply to the 
request for information - aimed at facili-
tating the control of non-production of 
chemical weapons - which was sent to 
them by the Agency in accordance with the 
resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 
and with the directive received from the 
Council in 1960. In addition, the proce-
dure applied with these authorities since 
1973 was again used. " 
3. 7. In regard to field control measures, the 
Agency each year conducts agreed verification of 
non-production in plants. But reports of the 
Council prior to 1983 contained the following 
reservation: 
" As the convention for the due process of 
law 5 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the 
Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, 
as in previous years, to take the form of 
agreed control measures. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a 
few weeks' notice. Since this agreement 
has never been withheld, the 1982 pro-
gramme of control measures at privately-
owned plants was therefore drawn up with 
full confidence that it could be imple-
mented as in previous years. " 
3.8. In future, therefore, WEU's activities in 
regard to the internal control of armaments will 
be limited in fact to this procedure for control-
ling chemical weapons. The Agency for the 
Control of Armaments has not been disbanded 
altogether, but its staff has been reduced to one 
person, an expert in chemical weapons. 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
4.1. In the chapter of the annual report on the 
activities of the Standing Armaments Committee 
in 1985, it is stated that the commmittee: 
" having noted the ministerial decisions 
taken in regard to it and in regard to the 
establishment of the 'agencies for security 
questions', addressed the problem of 
co-operation in the field of armaments and 
research, and that of its own future. " 
Delegates' opinions appear to have been divided 
as to the expediency of convening the committee 
in the future. The new Agency Ill which is 
replacing the former international secretariat of 
the SAC is now working directly for the Council 
and, according to the letter of the Secretary-
General of 17th March 1986: 
" will study certain aspects of competi-
tivity in the armaments industry in 
Europe and the implications of the evolu-
tion of the world arms market, together 
with the problems of technological trans-
fers between European allies. " 
5. Convention concerning measures to be taken by mem-
ber states of Western European Union in order to enable the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control 
effectively and making provision for due process of law, in 
accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as 
modified by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 
1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but so far rati-
fied by only six countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 
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V. International negotiations 
on the control of armaments 
I 
(a) General 
5.1. The committee welcomed the fact that the 
Council decided in the Rpme declaration of 
October 1984: 
" ... to hold comprehensive discussions 
and to seek to harmqnise their views on 
the specific conditi~ns of security in 
Europe, in particular: 
- arms control and disarmament. " 
5.2. The committee, for its part, studied in 
detail last year the progress of negotiations on 
the control of armaments in four international 
forums: the bilateral negot~ations between the 
United States and the Sovi~t Union on nuclear 
and space weapons, the mutual and balanced 
force reduction negotiations in Vienna, the con-
ference on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm 
and the Geneva disarmame~t conference. 6 
5.3. At the close of the summit meeting 
between President Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev in Geneva from 19th to 21st Novem-
ber 1985, the committee was able inter alia to 
welcome "the positive fresh start to bilateral 
relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union ... and the constructive references 
to most arms control issues
1 
in the agreed state-
ment including the principle of a 50% reduction 
in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohi-
bition of chemical weapons, and the idea of an 
interim INF agreement, while noting the absence 
of specific agreements". ,The very positive 
impetus given to the negotiations was enhanced 
shortly afterwards by the long statement on dis-
armament made by General Secretary Gorba-
chev in Moscow on 15th January 1986 which 
contained six proposals, including a fifteen-year 
programme leading in three stages to the com-
plete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout 
the world before the end Qf the century and a 
three-month prolongation of the moratorium on 
nuclear tests initially declared by the Soviet 
Union as from 6th August 1985 immediately 
after it had carried out a programme of nuclear 
test explosions. 
I 
5.4. However, in spite of these two auspicious 
events, it appears that until spring meaningful 
progress in the various negotiations has been 
slight or nil. While Mr. Oorbachev's public 
statements seem promising, lthe actual proposals 
made by his delegates in the privacy of negotia-
tions have apparently not come up to expect-
6. Disarmament, information re~ort, Document 1040, 4th 
November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw; Disarmament, 
Document 1043, 22nd November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Blaauw. 
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ations. At the same time, certain western reac-
tions to the Soviet proposals seem to have taken 
a step backwards compared with some earlier 
positions. 
5.5. Since spring, however, several mainly pos-
itive events have occurred which change the 
prospects for almost all the various negotiations 
on arms control. The impromptu summit 
meeting in Reykjavik was the most recent to 
attract worldwide attention but consideration 
should also be given to the consequences of 
President Reagan's speech on 27th May about 
SALT II, the appeal of the member states of the 
Warsaw Pact of 11th June relating to the reduc-
tion of armed forces and armaments in Europe, 
certain concessions announced by the Soviet 
Union on 22nd April concerning verification in 
the context of a ban on chemical weapons and 
the new British proposals of 15th July and, 
finally, the document of the Stockholm confer-
ence adopted on 19th September relating to 
confidence-building measures. The committee 
examines these developments under the follow-
ing heads. 
(b) Billltera/ negotiations 
(i) Intermediate-range nuclear forces 
5.6. In the bilateral negotiations in Geneva 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range 
nuclear forces and space weapons, particular 
attention was paid to intermediate-range weap-
ons because of the new proposals put forward by 
Mr. Gorbachev in his statement of 15th January 
and the terms of the West's answer. Details of 
the proposals made by each side's negotiators in 
Geneva are obviously not known. But since the 
Soviet Union in particular has developed the 
habit of negotiating more publicly than in the 
past, the public is most probably aware of the 
major elements of the proposals exchanged. 
5.7. The rather spectacular language used by 
Mr. Gorbachev in his address was certainly 
intended to impress world public opinion: 
" The Soviet Union is proposing a step-by-
step and consistent process of ridding the 
earth of nuclear weapons, to be imple-
mented and completed within the next fif-
teen years, before the end of this cen-
tury." 
Nevertheless, for intermediate-range weapons, 
this address contains at least the outline of cer-
tain tangible proposals. The first stage would 
last from five to eight years: 
" The first stage will include the adoption 
and implementation of the decision on the 
complete elimination of intermediate-
range missiles ofthe USSR and the United 
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States in the European zone, both ballistic 
and cruise missiles, as a first step towards 
ridding the European continent of nuclear 
weapons. 
At the same time the United States should 
undertake not to transfer its strategic and 
medium-range missiles to other countries, 
while Britain and France should pledge 
not to build up their respective nuclear 
arms." 
During the second stage, starting in 1990 and 
spread over a period of five to seven years: 
" ... the other nuclear powers will begin to 
engage in nuclear disarmament. To begin 
with, they would pledge to freeze all their 
nuclear arms and not to have them in the 
territories of other countries. 
In this period the USSR and the United 
States will go on with the reductions 
agreed upon during the first stage and also 
carry out further measures designed to 
eliminate their medium-range nuclear 
weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear 
systems." 
Further details were given on 12th February dur-
ing an interview granted to West German televi-
sion by General Nikolai Chervov, Soviet spokes-
man on disarmament. He defined the " European 
zone " as being the area extending as far as longi-
tude 800 east, i.e. a line some 1 300 km to the east 
of the Urals, beyond which SS-20 missiles are 
out of range of Europe. SS-20 missiles west of 
that line would be destroyed: 
"We do not propose to move these SS-20 
missiles somewhere else. They will be 
destroyed under painstaking and reliable 
national and international control, includ-
ing inspections on site and on the spot. " 
5.8. The detailed Soviet proposals tabled at the 
Geneva negotiations on 16th January were com-
pleted by letters to the British and French Gov-
ernments, not represented at the negotiations. 
5.9. There were two new and positive elements 
in these Soviet proposals. British and French 
nuclear forces would no longer be taken into 
account in the negotiations but merely frozen at 
their present level. Secondly, the Soviet Union 
at that time no longer seemed to be seeking a link 
with space weapons, a ban on which was previ-
ously to have formed part of any agreement on 
other weapons systems. This point was con-
firmed publicly by Mr. Gorbachev in an inter-
view which he granted to United States Senator 
Edward Kennedy in Moscow on 6th February 
when Mr. Gorbachev said that his proposal to 
withdraw SS-20s from Europe if the Americans 
did the same with their Pershing Ils depended 
solely on the United Kingdom and France 
refraining from increasing their corresponding 
nuclear weapons and the United States not sup-
plying such weapons to other countries. 
5.10. While the United States was holding con-
sultations with its allies, particularly during Mr. 
Paul Nitze's visit to Europe in February, the 
press on 8th February reported an American 
counter-proposal approved by Mr. Reagan sub-
ject to consultations with the allies. It is 
believed this plan accepted the elimination of all 
intermediate-range American and Soviet missiles 
stationed in Europe but also insisted on a 50% 
reduction in Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia. 
However, no ceiling was said to be placed on 
British or French forces, nor were there to be 
limitations on the supply of American missiles to 
the allies. 
5.11. This time it was the European allies that 
had reservations about the first American pro-
posals, considering that the complete elimination 
of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would 
leave western forces at the mercy of the conven-
tional superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces, par-
ticularly in Central Europe. The American 
answer finally communicated to the Soviet 
Union on 23rd February returned rather to the 
" global zero-zero " position already defined in 
1981. The United States therefore proposed as 
a target the elimination of SS-20 and cruise mis-
siles in both Europe and Asia, but as a first stage 
the reduction to 140 of the SS-20 launchers in 
Europe, with a proportional reduction in Asia; 
only in the second and third stages would the 
United States agree to a reduction of its own mis-
siles parallel with Soviet reductions; short-range 
missiles were also to be taken into ac-
count. Proposals relating to British and French 
forces were rejected since the Geneva negotia-
tions are purely bilateral. French and British 
answers to Mr. Gorbachev also rejected his pro-
posal, France recalling its well-known position 
that it is in favour of all reductions in nuclear 
weapons but the arsenals of the superpowers 
must be reduced significantly before reductions 
in the relatively small French forces can be con-
sidered; in any event, priority was to be given to 
reducing conventional weapons. 
5.12. In previous reports, the committee 
recalled that the existence of British and French 
forces had in fact been taken into account 
already in the SALT I and SALT 11 bilateral 
agreements. In the first case, the Soviet unilat-
eral declaration accompanying the agreement 
stated that the Soviet Union could increase the 
number of its strategic missile launching subma-
rines in the event of the United States allies 
doing likewise. In the case of SALT 11, it has 
been known for a long time that the concession 
which allowed the Soviet Union to retain 308 
heavy ICBMs (SS-9s and SS-18s) was made in 
compensation for British and French nuclear 
forces and the deployment of American nuclear 
systems in Europe. 
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5.13. While the committee has always rejected 
any proposal to reduce !British and French 
nuclear forces at a time when the superpowers 
have thousands of nuclear }Varheads, it has nev-
ertheless drawn attention to the problems which 
would arise for the negotiat,ons on the cont:ol of 
armaments if European forces were eqmpped 
with multiple-warhead mi~siles. ~he ~rident 
missile, intended to come into service With the 
British force in the nineties, is designed to carry 
up to eight warheads. The1 possibility of a Brit-
ish force eight times its present size obviously 
raises a problem for the Sovriet Union in the cur-
rent negotiations. 
5.14. During the summer: there was a fairly 
intensive bilateral dialogue 'fith exchanges oflet-
ters between President Reagan and General Sec-
retary Gorbachev in June and July, a last answer 
to a letter from President Reagan dated 25th July 
being delivered personally by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shevardnadze, in Washing-
ton on 19th September, followed shortly after-
wards by the announcellllent of a meeting 
between the two leaders in: Reykjavik on 11th 
and 12th October. The initiative for this meet-
ing came from the Soviet Union; it w~s to b~ a 
preparatory meeting for a true summit meetmg 
and was not to lead to the signing of a final agree-
ment. 
5.15. Before the meeting, tllte press was already 
reporting new American proposals for reduc~ng 
INF in Europe to I 00 warheads on each side 
(and hence only 33 SS-20 missiles for the Soviet 
Union) and 100 warheads in the Asian part of 
the Soviet Union, which would be offset by 100 
cruise missiles based in the
1 
United States. At 
the close of the meeting, a~ which it is known 
that no agreement was reached because the 
Soviet Union insisted on a 'link with a ban on 
testing all strategic defence systems, the press 
reported a new proposal for INF missiles to ~e 
reduced to zero in both parts of Europe, but sun 
with 100 warheads in the Asi1m part of the Soviet 
Union, offset by an equal number in the United 
States. As for the Soviet ~hort-range nuclear 
missiles deployed in East Germany and Czecho-
slovakia during the years fQ].lowing the deploy-
ment of cruise missiles by NATO, their number 
would first be frozen pending negotiations on 
their reduction. 
(ii) Strategic nuclear weapons 
5.16. Referring to strategic weapons in his major 
statement of 15th January on the elimination of 
nuclear weapons before the ~nd of the century, 
Mr. Gorbachev said: 
" Stage one. Within the next five to eight 
years the USSR and the United States will 
reduce by one half the nuclear arms that 
can reach each other's territory. On the 
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remaining delivery vehicles of this kind 
each side will retain no more than 6 000 
warheads. 
It stands to reason that such a reduction is 
possible only if the USSR and the United 
States mutually renounce the develop-
ment, testing and deployment of space 
strike weapons. " 
In stage two, as from 1990 and for a period of 
five to seven years, the United States and the 
Soviet Union would have completed the 50% 
reduction in their strategic weapons; at the same 
stage, the prohibition of space strike weapons 
would have to become multilateral, with the par-
ticipation of major industrial powers. There 
would be a ban on the development of non-
nuclear weapons based on new physical princi-
ples, with a destructive power close to that of 
nuclear arms or other weapons of mass 
destruction. Finally, in stage three as from 1995 
the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons 
would be completed. Mr. Gorbachev then 
made a few comments about verification: 
"We have in mind that special procedures 
will be worked out for the destruction of 
nuclear weapons as well as the disman-
tling, re-equipment or destruction of deliv-
ery vehicles. In the process, agreement 
will be reached on the numbers of weap-
ons to be destroyed at each stage, the sites 
of their destruction and so on. 
Verification with regard to the weapons 
that are destroyed or limited would be car-
ried out both by national technical means 
and through on-site inspections. The 
USSR is ready to reach agreement on any 
other additional verification measures. " 
5.17. In his answer communicated to the Soviet 
Union on 23rd February, President Reagan 
reconfirmed the American proposal to reduce 
strategic nuclear weapons by half. In an address 
on 24th February on the eve of the opening of 
the twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet Com-
munist Party, President Reagan expressed reser-
vations about the rather publicity-seeking 
aspects of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals: 
" On the other hand, many of the specific 
details proposed in the subsequent phases 
of the Soviet 'plan' are clearly not appro-
priate for consideration at this time. In 
our view, the total elimination of nuclear 
weapons will require, at the same time, the 
correction of the conventional and other 
force imbalances, full compliance with 
existing and future treaty obligations, 
peaceful resolution of regional con-
flicts... Unfortunately, the details of the 
Soviet 'plan' do not address these equally 
vital requirements. " 
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5.18. Towards 20th May, the United States had 
to face the problem of respecting the SALT 11 
treaty when the strategic submarine Nevada 
started sea-trials with a load of 24 missiles. To 
respect the treaty limits, the United States then 
had to dismantle two old Poseidon submarines 
(with 16launchers each) or reduce the number of 
its Minuteman ICBMs. On 14th April, 52 of 
the 100 senators wrote to President Reagan ask-
ing him to take the necessary steps to respect the 
treaty. 
5.19. On 27th May 1986 President Reagan 
made a major speech on his intention to consider 
himself no longer bound by the SALT 11 treaty, 
the key passage of which reads as follows: 
" ... I have determined that, in the future, 
the United States must base decisions 
regarding its strategic force structure on 
the nature and magnitude of the threat 
posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not 
on standards contained in the SALT struc-
ture which has been undermined by Soviet 
non-compliance, and especially in a flawed 
SALT 11 treaty which was never ratified, 
would have expired if it had been ratified, 
and has been violated by the Soviet 
Union. 
Since the United States will retire and dis-
mantle two Poseidon submarines this 
summer, we will remain technically in 
observance of the terms of the SALT 11 
treaty until the United States equips its 
131 st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise mis-
sile carriage near the end of this year. 
However, given the decision that I have 
been forced to make, I intend at that time 
to continue deployment of US B-52 heavy 
bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 
131 st aircraft as an appropriate response 
without dismantling additional US sys-
tems as compensation under the terms of 
the SALT 11 treaty. Of course, since we 
will remain in technical compliance with 
the terms of the expired SALT 11 treaty for 
some months, I continue to hope that the 
Soviet Union will use this time to take the 
constructive steps necessary to alter the 
current situation. Should they do so, we 
will certainly take this into account. " 
5.20. There was much comment about this 
speech in divergent statements by various mem-
bers of the American administration and the 
public. On 19th June the United States House 
of Representatives passed by 256 votes to 145 a 
non-binding resolution calling on the President 
to " continue to adhere to the provisions of the 
SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union 
does likewise". At its meeting in Washington 
from 16th to 20th June, the committee also 
heard diverging opinions about the themes of 
this speech. As far as the actual terms of the 
speech are concerned, it is clear that the Presi-
dent did not say, as some members of his admin-
istration would have liked, that SALT 11 is dead. 
5.21. A key argument relates to possible viola-
tions of the SALT 11 treaty by the Soviet 
Union. As the committee has already under-
lined, the only case of violation of the SALT 11 
treaty specifically endorsed by the NATO coun-
tries was the introduction oftwo " new " missiles 
-the SS-X24 and SS-25 -by the Soviet Union 7 
when under the treaty it is allowed only one. It 
should be stressed that to date neither the United 
States nor the Soviet Union has violated the 
numerical ceilings imposed by SALT 11 and the 
United States is not accusing the Soviet Union of 
doing so. Although it has deployed improved 
models of strategic missiles, the Soviet Union, 
like the United States, simultaneously destroyed 
or withdrew from service other missiles so as to 
respect the ceilings. According to the defini-
tions used, the number of missiles thus destroyed 
or withdrawn by the Soviet Union is believed to 
be between 600 and 1 300, plus 14 nuclear-
propelled submarines. 
5.22. The question whether or not the SS-25 is a 
new missile within the meaning of SALT 11 (i.e. 
whether its diameter, launching weight or throw 
weight exceed those of its predecessor by more 
than 5%) is highly complex and depends inter 
alia on the components to be included in the 
expression "throw weight". If the violation is 
proved, as the NATO countries seem to believe, 
an appropriate response would be to deploy 
" new" missiles such as the Midgetman envis-
aged by the United States, but not to exceed ceil-
ings hitherto respected by both superpowers. 
5.23. Nevertheless, the 27th May speech does 
not seem to have held up bilateral negotiations 
on strategic weapons too much. At the close of 
the Reykjavik summit meeting, the press 
reported on proposals for the total elimination of 
strategic ballistic missiles within ten years, with a 
reduction of 50% during an initial five-year 
period in the number of nuclear warheads in 
each of the three categories: ICBMs, missiles on 
submarines, and the nuclear pay loads of strategic 
bombers. President Reagan in his televised 
press conference of 14th October said: 
" For the first time on the highest level we 
and the Soviets came close to an agree-
ment on real reductions of both strategic 
and intermediate-range weapons... For 
the first time we began to hammer out 
details of a 50% cut in strategic forces over 
five years ... 
7. See Document 1040, Disarmament, information report, 
4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. B1aauw - paragraphs 
4.25 to 4.27. 
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... And maybe most important, we were 
just in sight of an historic agreement on 
completely eliminati~g the threat of offen-
sive ballistic missiles by 1996. " 
The United States position <1>n eliminating strate-
gic missiles in ten years is limited to " ballistic 
missiles " - ICBMs and SLBMs - but would not 
cover cruise missiles or other weapons carried by 
bombers - a point on which the Soviet spokes-
man after the summit appeared to disagree, 
claiming that the elimination of "all strategic 
nuclear weapons " had betn discussed at the 
summit, but the United States has denied that 
this was formally propos~d, although tacitly 
accepting that the eliminat~on of "all strategic 
nuclear weapons " may have been discussed in 
conversation. 8 At Reykjavik once again the 
Soviet Union abandoned its request to offset the 
medium-range American s~stems based outside 
American territory, nor did it ask to offset Brit-
ish and French forces. Bllt again the Soviet 
Union made agreement on strategic weapons 
depend on an agreement limiting research on 
SDI systems. 
(iii) Space weapons 
5.24. In his references to space weapons in his 
address on 15th January, Mr. Gorbachev main-
tained his total opposition: "We are against 
weapons in space. " But fur the first time he 
seemed to consider the possibility of space 
research not leading to the deployment of offen-
sive weapons in space: 
"Space must remain peaceful, strike 
weapons should not be deployed there. 
Neither should they be developed. And 
let there also be a most rigorous control, 
including opening the relevant laborato-
ries for inspection. " 
5.25. If there has been a specific answer from 
the United States to this request to open labora-
tories engaged in space resealrch for inspection, it 
has not been made public. In his 24th February 
address, President Reagan merely welcomed the 
Soviet Union's acceptance 1 of the principle of 
verification: 
"We intend to pursue in specific terms at 
the negotiating table, General Secretary 
Gorbachev's public offer to resolve any 
necessary verification jssues. " 
5.26. At his press conference in Reykjavik at the 
close of the summit meeting on 12th October, 
General Secretary Gorba<thev, having first 
confirmed the Soviet concessions in regard to 
intermediate-range and strategic nuclear wea-
8. International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1986, " US 
denies Pact account", and 29th October 1986, "New US 
orders for arms talks ... ". 
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pons referred to above, reaffirmed the Soviet 
Union's request that the ABM treaty be of indefi-
nite duration and that the two parties undertake 
not to abrogate it for at least ten years. " Simulta-
neously, we suggested that all the ABM require-
ments be strictly observed within these ten years, 
that the development and testing of space wea-
pons be banned and only research and testing in 
laboratories be allowed. " Mr. Gorbachev conti-
nued: "We are aware of the commitment of the 
American administration and the President to 
SDI. Apparently, our consent to its continuation 
and to laboratory tests offers the President an 
opportunity to go through with research and 
eventually to get clear what SDI is, what it is 
about. Although it is already clear to many peo-
ple, ourselves included. " 
5.27. President Reagan did not hold a press con-
ference until 14th October on returning to Wash-
ington, when he expressed his determination to 
proceed to actual testing of SDI, and appeared to 
belittle the ABM treaty: 
" I offered to delay deployment of 
advanced strategic defence for ten years 
while both sides eliminated all ballistic 
missiles, but General Secretary Gorbachev 
said that his demand that we give up 
all but laboratory research on SDI - in 
effect kill the programme - was non-
negotiable ... 
Now the ABM treaty, which he kept refer-
ring to as if it was the Holy Grail, I asked 
him once what was so great about a treaty 
that had our governments saying to our 
people, we won't protect you from a 
nuclear attack? That's basically what the 
ABM treaty says ... 
I told him that what we were proposing 
with SDI was that once we reached the 
testin~ stage we would - well, before that, 
that nght now we were ready and willing 
to sign a treaty- a binding treaty that said 
when we reached the testing stage that 
both sides would proceed, because we told 
him frankly that we knew they were 
researching also on defence, nor was that 
ever denied. And we said we both will go 
forward with what we are doing. When 
we reach the testing stage, if it's us, we'll 
invite you to participate and see the test ... 
and I said or if you have perfected a sys-
tem that can be this kind of defence that 
we're talking about, then we share, so that 
there won't be one side having this plus 
offensive weapons, but that we eliminate 
the offensive weapons and then we make 
available to all who feel a need for it or 
want it this defence system so that safety is 
guaranteed for the future. " 
On 15th October, in approving a defence budget 
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of $292 billion for FY 1987, the US Congress 
reduced the Administration's request of$5.3 bil-
lion for SDI to only $3.5 billion. 
5.28. In contrast to President Reagan's commit-
ment to testing and, apparently, deployment of 
SDI, allied support for the United States position 
on SDI has been limited to support for 
" research", and has specifically stressed the 
importance of maintaining the ABM treaty. 
Thus Baroness Young, United Kingdom Minis-
ter of State for Foreign Affairs speaking of the 
Reykjavik summit in the House of Lords on 15th 
October said: 
" Perhaps I can confirm... as President 
Reagan has repeatedly confirmed, that 
SDI research is consistent with the present 
treaty obligations, including the ABM 
treaty. He recently reaffirmed that SDI 
will be conducted in conformity with a 
strict interpretation of the treaty. The 
Government have repeatedly made it clear 
that we regard the treaty as an important 
element in preserving international peace 
and stability and want to see it reaffirmed 
and strengthened. Any suspicion of vio-
lations should be pursued according to the 
mechanisms provided in the treaty. " 
(The reservations ofWEU governments concern-
ing SDI are referred to in paragraph 2.8 
above.) The communique of the NATO 
Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Gleneagles 
on 21st and 22nd October similarly said " We 
strongly support the United States exploration of 
space and defence systems, as is permitted by the 
ABM treaty." 
(iv) Consequences of the Reykjavik summit meet-
ing 
5.29. In the days following the summit that was 
not a summit, not only the United States but also 
the Soviet Union sent senior officials to the west-
ern capitals to inform the governments of the 
NATO countries of the positions of their respec-
tive countries. Thus, in London Mr. Viktor 
Karpov, head of the Soviet Delegation to the 
Geneva bilateral negotiations, said on 14th Octo-
ber:" We do not deny the possibility of finding a 
solution on medium-range nuclear weapons in 
Europe separately from space and nuclear offen-
sive arms. " This interpretation was formally 
d~nied in Mo~cow two days later by Mr. Karpov 
htmself who, m a statement which went back on 
his statement in London, explained that an 
agreement on INF might well be negotiated sepa-
rately but that signature would depend on an 
agreement banning the testing of anti-ballistic 
weapons in space. In Moscow on 21st October 
Mr. Gerasimov, spokesman of the Ministry fo; 
Foreign Affairs, said:" We will allow for research 
and tes~ing in the laboratory. This is a major 
concessiOn on our part but the American side 
wants to test SDI in space. As to the specific 
interpretation as to what we mean under 'labora-
tory testing', our experts do not yet agree but, 
anyway, any interpretation of testing in the labo-
ratory must exclude any testing in outer 
space." 9 
5.30. Since the initiative for the Reykjavik sum-
mit meeting came from the Soviet Union, it 
would appear that Mr. Gorbachev was seeking 
by this means to attract world attention to the 
importance the Soviet Union attached to limit-
ing the SDI programme and to show that in 
order to obtain this the Soviet Union was pre-
pared to make every concession on nuclear 
weapons. 
5.31. In their statements endorsing the United 
States position, the European allies all expressed 
the hope that the two superpowers would con-
tinue in the detailed negotiations in Geneva 
along the course laid down in Reykjavik. But 
there were reservations in Europe about the 
expediency of an agreement eliminating all 
American nuclear weapons in Europe while the 
Soviet Union retained considerable conventional 
superiority as well as several hundred so-called 
short-range missiles (but with ranges of 500 km) 
deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia 
and which would merely be frozen in the event 
of an agreement eliminating INF pending subse-
quent negotiations on their reduction. The 
main thrust of the allied position now seems to 
be to give priority to an INF agreement, and to 
persuade the Soviet Union to revert to its pre-
Reykjavik position according to which an INF 
agreement could be signed independently of any 
agreement on SDI. Thus the communique of 
the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group in Gleneagles on 21st and 22nd October 
stated: 
" Noting that the Soviet side has agreed 
last year to conclude a separate INF agree-
ment, Ministers called on the Soviet lead-
ership to reaffirm its commitments not to 
hold an INF agreement hostage to any 
other agreement. A failure to do so 
would destroy the credibility of the highest 
Soviet assurances. " 
(c) Mutual and balllnced force reductions in Europe 
(i) The western initiative of 5th December 1985 
5.32. On 5th December 1985, western partici-
pants in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna put 
forward new proposals which they said were 
intended to allow a first, albeit modest, agree-
ment to be reached quickly. To this end, they 
accepted the general framework and main provi-
9. International Herald Tribune, 22nd October 1986. 
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sions of the Warsaw Pact proposal of 14th Febru-
ary 1985, but proposed making only half the ini-
tial reductions set out in that proposal. On 30th 
January 1986, the western proposals were sup-
plemented by an outline text accompanied by a 
table of associated measures. 
5.33. The western initiative! provided for an ini-
tial cutback of 5 000 American and 11 500 Soviet 
troops in the reduction zone. It provided for a 
no-increase commitment relating to NATO, the 
Warsaw Pact and American and Soviet troops 
stationed in that zone which was to come into 
force immediately after tHe reductions. The 
agreement and its various PrOvisions were to be 
valid for a period of three ·years following the 
completion of the initial reductions. This 
period was to be used to pursue negotiations and 
prepare for further reductioms. 
5.34. Since the new proposa~s no longer insisted 
on prior agreement on levels of troops now pre-
sent in the reduction zone (the data problem), 
they were intended, in the mind of the West, to 
allow speedy progress to be lmade. It was also 
believed that acceptance, during the period of the 
agreement, of the first stage of transitional force 
ceilings relating, on the one hand, to each alli-
ance and, on the other hand, ~o the United States 
and the Soviet Union separately was also a 
favourable factor for advancing the negotia-
tions. 
5.35. Nevertheless, NATO maintained and to a 
certain extent strengthened the verification sys-
tem hitherto envisaged. 
5.36. The associated measurbs included: 
- setting up permanent entry and exit 
points with observers through which all 
personnel of land anti air forces of par-
ticipating countries would leave or enter 
the reduction zone; 1 
- notification and observation of with-
drawals; 
- notification of out-of-garrison activi-
ties; 
- exchange of observe~s on the occasion 
of such activities; 
- notification of ground force movements 
in the reduction zon~; 
- the right for each sid~ to conduct thirty 
inspections each year to verify the 
no-increase undertaking; 
- exchange of information up to battalion 
level; 
- the free use of nfitional technical 
means. 
5.37. The only position adopted in the western 
proposal on what was to happ~n to the weapons 
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of units withdrawn was to say that it was for each 
side to decide on the destination of the equip-
ment concerned. However, the proposal 
increased from 18 to 30, as compared with previ-
ous proposals, the number of annual inspections 
required, and made the provisions relating to 
out-of-garrison activities apply also to the west-
em part of Soviet territory, outside the reduction 
zone. 
(ii) Immediate Warsaw Pact reactions and its 
written answer of 20th February 1986 
5.38. The first Warsaw Pact reactions were 
rather encouraging. At a press conference in 
Moscow on 17th December 1986, Mr. 
Mikhailov, Soviet Ambassador to the MBFR 
talks, said that the western proposals were in line 
with the spirit of Geneva but were still very 
divergent. He criticised however the associated 
measures, which he considered to be deliberately 
excessive, and also the fact that the reduction fig-
ures proposed by NATO were not significant and 
the 5th December proposal did not include the 
equipment of troops withdrawn. 
5.39. Even Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15th 
January gave an encouraging impression; he said 
he was prepared for " reasonable verification " of 
troop reductions, including the establishment of 
permanent verification posts at the points of pas-
sage of troops withdrawn. 
5.40. The Warsaw Pact counter-proposal of 20th 
February 1986 entitled " draft agreement on the 
initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the 
United States of ground forces and armaments 
and on the subsequent no-increase of forces and 
armaments of the sides and associated measures 
in Central Europe " could not therefore fail to be 
very disappointing to the western allies. 
5.41. Although it accepts the principle of perma-
nent verification posts at points where troops 
enter or leave the reduction zone, this proposal is 
negative in several respects: 
- while the reductions proposed by 
NATO were not militarily significant, 
the Pact would nevertheless agree to 
similar figures: 6 500 American and 
11 500 Soviet troops, which, for the 
West, did not correspond to the dispar-
ity between American and Soviet troops 
stationed in the reduction zone; 
- the verification measures proposed were 
termed excessive and a kind oflegalised 
spying. It was unacceptable to extend 
the area of verification to cover part of 
Soviet territory as NATO had requested 
for out-of-garrison activities. 
5.42. Furthermore, the question of the destina-
tion of the weapons of troops withdrawn 
remained at the heart of the East-West contro-
versy. 
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5.43. In greater detail, the seventeen articles in 
the document, which the Warsaw Pact describes 
as intended to guide the negotiations towards a 
favourable outcome, may be summarised as fol-
lows: 
- in the course of one year, the USSR and 
the United States will withdraw behind 
their national boundaries 11 500 and 
6 500 men respectively from their 
ground forces stationed in Central 
Europe, together with their armaments 
and combat equipment; 
- information on the military units 
reduced will be exchanged prior to the 
beginning of the withdrawals; 
- the eleven direct participants in the 
negotiations will undertake not to 
increase the levels of their ground and 
air forces in the reduction zone for a 
period of three years after the comple-
tion of the Soviet-American reduc-
tions; 
- as from the same date, updated figures 
on forces remaining in the reduction 
zone will be exchanged each year; 
- when the agreement comes into force, 
three or four observation posts will be 
established on each side; 
- units and subunits of the ground forces 
of all signatories of the agreement must 
enter or leave the reduction zone via 
these posts; 
- observation posts will be manned by 
representatives of both sides; 
- military activities (movements, exer-
cises, call-up of reservists) involving 
more than 20 000 men must be notified 
beforehand; 
- in addition to the obligation not to 
inferfere with implementation of 
national technical means, requests for 
on-site verification may be made if well-
founded. As a rule, such requests 
should be granted. A refusal must be 
accompanied by a sufficiently convinc-
ing explanation; 
- a consultative commission will be estab-
lished to settle disputes which may arise 
when the agreement is implemented. 
Finally, on the basis of these proposals, the East 
offered to join in the drafting of a joint agree-
ment, in the course of which the utmost should 
be done to overcome remaining difficulties. 
(iii) Present situation 
5.44. Since the Warsaw Pact proposals of 14th 
February 1985 and the western answer of 5th 
December 1985, the negotiations seem to have 
made little progress in spite of the concessions 
made by both sides. 
5.45. The East has mainly kept to its earlier pro-
posals, i.e. withdrawal in combat or combat sup-
port units, establishment of permanent entry and 
exit points, immediate freeze of troop levels in 
the reduction zone on a collective basis and with-
out national sub-ceilings for a period of three 
years after the completion of initial withdrawals 
under the control of observers from both 
sides. The NATO countries for their part have 
agreed to abandon their data requirements and, 
as a whole, have linked their proposals with the 
plan proposed by the Warsaw Pact. There are 
still major points of disagreement, however, and 
these explain the disappointment felt on both 
sides. 
5.46. Differences between East and West have 
crystallised around verification. While the Pact 
has now agreed to the permanent presence of 
observers at entry and exit posts, during and 
after the reductions, it has not accepted western 
requirements concerning larger-scale inspections 
in the reduction zone, which, for the Pact, can 
take place only after a well-founded and justified 
request and with the prior consent of the country 
concerned. The NATO partners are calling for 
thirty inspections each year for both sides, at 
short prior notice. 
5.47. The other point at issue is the destination 
of equipment of units withdrawn. The West 
wishes to have a free hand in stockpiling such 
equipment as the country concerned sees fit, but 
the East on the contrary insists on it being 
destroyed or returned to the country of origin. 
The geographical asymmetry between the parties 
to the negotiations prevents NATO from accept-
ing this position. 
5.48. In its previous report, the committee 
pointed out with regard to the unresolved prob-
lem of equipment that "NATO could however 
accept the withdrawal, to a depot in some rear 
area in Europe to be designated, of the equip-
ment of American units to be withdrawn from 
the zone". 
5.49. Still to be settled is the fate of rotations of 
individuals relieving troops in the reduction 
zone which the Soviet Union refuses to have 
pass through the official entry and exit 
points. As for the strengths to be notified before 
their withdrawal, the West is calling for them to 
be reported down to battalion level whereas the 
East does not wish to go lower than divisional 
level. Finally, the delicate problem of notifica-
tion of exercises and possible inspections in the 
two western districts of the Soviet Union, meas-
ures which the West considers essential for the 
security of the countries on the alliance's flanks, 
has not been solved. 
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(iv) The future: from the Atlantic to the Urals? 
5.50. The foregoing explains why the thirty-
eighth session of the MBFR talks came to an end 
without any progress havi~ been made and in 
an atmosphere of disappo ntment which was 
particularly bitter since bot sides had cherished 
hopes of success. 
5.51. The Warsaw Pact criticises the West for 
the intransigence of the " legalised spying " veri-
fication system. 
5. 52. NATO for its part considers that the east-
ern countries' proposal of ~Oth February 1986 
merely reiterates the Warsaw Pact's requests of 
February 1985, fails to take seriously the ques-
tion of verification and tries to deny the reality 
and importance of geography. 
5.53. Nevertheless, by proposing far smaller 
reductions than before (half), at the same time 
increasing from eighteen to thirty the number of 
annual inspections called for, NATO has gone 
against the conventional Soviet position that any 
verification must be commensurate with the 
magnitude of the reductions involved. 
5.54. Some confusion arises over Mr. Gor-
bachev's speech in East Berlin on 18th April 
where he said: 
" The USSR propose~ substantial reduc-
tion of all component$ of land forces and 
tactical aircraft based in Europe, including 
the relevant parts of American and Cana-
dian forces deployed tlhere. 
The military units should be dissolved and 
their armaments either destroyed or put 
into storage on their national territories. 
The scope of the reductions must obvi-
ously cover the whole of Europe, from the 
Atlantic to the Urals, " 10• 
5.55. On 11th June, the theme of Mr. 
Gorbachev's speech was taiken further in the 
Budapest appeal by the Warsaw Pact member 
states to the NATO member states and all Euro-
pean countries for a programme to reduce armed 
forces and conventional wefipons in Europe u. 
As a first stage, this appeal l)roposes, in an area 
extending from the Atlantic tp the Urals, a reduc-
tion of 100 000 to 150 000 in the forces of the 
two alliances followed by ~ther reductions so 
that in the early nineties the ~and and tactical air 
forces of the two alliances wK>uld be reduced by 
25% as compared with preseht levels. Conven-
tional weapons and nuclear rttissiles with a range 
of less than 1 000 km would be included in the 
reductions; equipment withdrawn would either 
be destroyed or stockpiled on national territory. 
Verification measures are envisaged in the 
I 0. International Herald Tribune, 22nd April 1986. 
11. See Appendix 11. 
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third part of the appeal while the fourth part sta-
tes that negotiations on implementing the propo-
sals might be held either in a first stage of the 
conference on disarmament in Europe (Stock-
holm) or in a special forum with the participa-
tion of the European states, the United States 
and Canada, or in the context of the Vienna 
MBFR negotiations enlarged to include other 
European states. 
5.56. Meeting in Halifax, Canada, on 29th and 
30th May, the North Atlantic Council in ministe-
rial session issued a declaration on the control of 
conventional weapons 12 which refers inter alia to 
the setting up of a high-level working group on 
mastering conventional weapons designed to 
take advantage of the western proposals already 
presented at the Stockholm conference on disar-
mament in Europe and the Vienna MBFR nego-
tiations and to take account of Mr. Gorbachev's 
statement on 18th April. This working group is 
also studying the Budapest appeal. 
5.57. The alliance must now decide whether it 
wishes to pursue negotiations on the reduction of 
conventional forces in Europe in the framework 
of the MBFR talks or whether this aim should be 
sought in the wider framework of a second con-
ference on disarmament in Europe, the first of 
which completed its work in Stockholm on 19th 
September with the signing of a document on 
confidence- and security-building measures 
referred to below. 
5.58. While the proposals in the Budapest 
appeal seem interesting, the committee is for the 
time being sceptical about the possibility of con-
cluding an agreement on reducing conventional 
forces with adequate verification measures in a 
wider framework when, after twelve years of 
negotiations in Vienna in a more restricted 
framework, the Soviet Union has still not 
accepted the necessary verification measures. If 
the Soviet Union accepted the commitment of a 
number of annual inspections and the obligation 
for all troops entering or leaving the reduction 
zone to pass through entry and exit checkpoints, 
a first agreement could be reached in Vienna 
immediately. With the experience acquired in 
the more restricted framework, consideration 
might then be given to wider negotiations. 
(d) The conference on disarmament in Europe 
5.59. The spring session of the conference on 
disarmament in Europe being held in Stockholm 
was adjourned on 14th March. The heads of 
the United States and Soviet Delegations 
stressed that it had been possible to start work on 
drafting the final document, but that the agree-
ment so far concerned only matters of secondary 
importance. 
12. See Appendix Ill. 
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5.60. At the next session, only in August were 
major concessions made by both sides which on 
19th September finally allowed publication of 
the " Document of the Stockholm conference on 
confidence- and security-building measures and 
disarmament in Europe ... ". Comprising 104 
paragraphs with four annexes, this document is 
clearly different from the Helsinki final act of 
1975, on the one hand because "the measures 
adopted in this document are politically bind-
ing ... " (whereas application of the confidence-
building measures in the final act were always 
optional) and on the other because the 
confidence-building measures accepted in 
Stockholm: 
" will cover the whole of Europe as well as 
the adjoining sea area* 
* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is 
understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining 
Europe." 
In other words, the new area of application 
extends from the Atlantic to the Urals while the 
Helsinki measures applied in the Soviet Union 
only to a 250 km wide strip of territory along its 
western frontier. 
5.61. The Stockholm document has six sections 
and four annexes. 
Refraining from the threat or use of force 
5.62. Paragraphs 9 to 28 recall the obligation of 
participating states to refrain" from the threat or 
use of force " on which the Soviet Union 
insisted, but in exchange participating states also 
" reconfirm their commitment to the basic prin-
ciple of the sovereign equality of states and stress 
that all states have equal rights and duties within 
the framework of international law " and " the 
universal significance of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms ... " - principles dear to the 
West. 
Prior notification of certain military activities 
5.63. Paragraphs 29 to 37 govern notification of 
military activities which must be given at least 
42 days in advance ifthey involve at least 13 000 
troops or 300 tanks (or at least 3 000 troops in 
the case of amphibious or parachute exercises), 
and notification must include air forces if the 
exercise involves 200 or more sorties. Activities 
carried out without advance notice will be noti-
fied at the time the troops involved commence 
such activities. (See constraining provisions 
below.) Notification must include details of the 
principal weapons systems involved, by cate-
gory. 
Observation of certain military activities 
5.64. Paragraphs 38 to 54 contain an obligation 
to invite observers to all exercises involving 
more than 1 7 000 troops (or more than 5 000 in 
the case of amphibious or parachute exercises). It 
is generally estimated that some ten exercises by 
each military alliance will exceed this ceiling 
each year. Each state has the right to send two 
observers who may use their own maps, photo-
graphic equipment, binoculars, etc. 
Annual calendars 
5.65. Paragraphs 55 to 58 provide for the 
exchange by each state with all other states, not 
later than 15th November each year, of a calen-
dar of all exercises notifiable under the docu-
ment for the following year. 
Constraining provisions 
5.66. Paragraphs 59 to 62, enhancing the provi-
sions for prior notification, provide for notifica-
tion two years in advance of any activity involv-
ing more than 40 000 troops and an absolute ban 
on military activities involving more than 75 000 
troops which have not been notified two years in 
advance or more than 40 000 troops not notified 
one year in advance. 
Compliance and verification 
5.67. The thirty-six paragraphs numbered 63 to 
98 contain key provisions relating to verification 
rights. Each state is entitled to ask for one 
inspection per year and each state is bound to 
accept up to three requests for inspection per 
year in the case of notifiable activities being sus-
pected of having taken place without being noti-
fied in accordance with the provisions of the 
document. The inspected state has no right to 
refuse such inspections " except for areas or sen-
sitive points to which access is normally denied 
or restricted, military and other defence installa-
tions, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles 
and aircraft". In contrast, the Soviet Union 
has never accepted automatic verification obliga-
tions in the framework of the MBFR talks. 
5.68. The inspected state must answer the 
request within twenty-four hours, and the state 
requesting an inspection may send four obser-
vers who must arrive on the territory within 
thirty-six hours of the request. Inspection may 
be conducted using a land vehicle, helicopter or 
aircraft according to the wishes of the state 
requesting the inspection, but the two states 
must choose by mutual agreement which of them 
will provide the vehicles, i.e. the inspected state 
may insist on its own vehicles being used, but the 
inspectors may oversee navigation, etc. 
5.69. The request for inspection must specify 
the area within which the inspection will be con-
ducted which must not exceed that required for 
an army level military activity. The inspection 
must be terminated within forty-eight hours of 
the arrival of the inspection team. 
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Annexes 
5. 70. The four annexes relate to: 
I. the zone of application; 
II. the date of notification (15th Decem-
ber 1986 for the first year of applica-
tion); 
Ill. the right to raise any matter relating to 
confidence-buildirlg measures at the 
Vienna meeting; 
IV. the obligation not to take advantage of 
the alliances to circumvent the inspec-
tion system, i.e. a state belonging to 
one of the alliances must not exercise 
its right of inspection on the territory 
of a state belonging to the same alli-
ance in order to exhaust the quota of 
three annual inspections. 
The document comes into force on 1st January 
1987. 
5.71. Although in the negotiations the NATO 
member countries asked that notification relate 
to exercises involving more than 6 000 troops 
and confer on inspectors the right to overtly ter-
ritory in their own aircraft, the provisions of the 
Stockholm document show real improvement in 
confidence-building measures. The committee 
has reported several times on the application of 
confidence-building measures in the context of 
the Helsinki final act 13• The effectiveness of the 
new measures will be established only after sev-
eral years of application. It will certainly have 
to be seen how the Soviet Union interprets the 
expression " areas or sensitive points to which 
access is normally denied or restricted " within 
which any state is entitled to refuse inspec-
tion. The committee will not fail to follow 
application of this important document very 
closely. 
(e) Comprehensive nuclear test ban 
5.72. At the fortieth session of the United 
Nations Assembly which ended in December 
1985, very particular attention was once again 
paid to a ban on all nuclear tests. Three sepa-
rate resolutions 14 were devoted to the matter, the 
first of which urged the three depositary powers 
of the partial test ban treaty to promote, at the 
Geneva disarmament conference, the creation of 
a special committee to negotiate a treaty on a 
complete halt to nuclear test explosions. 
5.73. In his speech on 15th January, Mr. 
Gorbachev prolonged by three months, until 
13. See the committee's information report, Disarmament, 
Document 1040, 4th November 1985, Appendix IV, Rappor-
teur: Mr. Blaauw. 
14. 40/80A; 40/81; 40/88. 
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31st March 1986, the unilateral moratorium 
declared by the Soviet U?iOJ? in Augu~t 
1985. The United States mamtamed the posi-
tion held by the Reagan administration for the 
past two years according to which nuclear tests 
had become necessary to guarantee the effective-
ness of nuclear weapons in storage. For the first 
time since the Soviet moratorium was declared, 
the United States carried out a test on 22nd 
March and there have been several more 
since. At Easter Mr. Gorbachev proposed an 
emergency meeting in a European city to dis~uss 
a moratorium on nuclear tests but the Umted 
States having conducted a second test on 1Oth 
April, Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief-of-Staff of 
the Soviet armed forces, stated at a press confer-
ence in Moscow on 14th April that the Soviet 
moratorium had been terminated as from 
11th April and that Soviet tests would be 
resumed. Mr. Gorbachev has nevertheless 
maintained the moratorium for the time being. 
5.74. In the meantime, a United States spokes-
man had announced on 14th March that Mr. 
Reagan had proposed in a direct communication 
to Mr. Gorbachev that an assessment be made of 
a new seismic technique which he called Corrtex 
designed to measure the yiel? of _nuclear 
tests. For this purpose, the Soviet Umon was 
invited to send scientists to the American test 
site in Nevada in the third week of April to test 
this new system when a nuclear explosion ":as 
planned. President Reagan thus rene":ed ear~Ier 
American proposals and asked the Soviet U m on 
to hold negotiations on improving verification 
measures provided for in the treaties on nuclear 
explosions for peaceful purposes and on nuclear 
tests below a threshold of 150 kilotonnes signed 
by both countries but not ratified by the United 
States. 
5. 75. At the Geneva disarmament conference it 
has still not been possible to set up a special com-
mittee to negotiate a treaty on banning nuclear 
tests as called for in United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions and proposed in Gen~va 
by the non-aligned and Warsaw Pact countnes. 
As in previous years, the western powers have 
maintained their opposition to terms of reference 
which would allow a treaty to be negotiated, con-
sidering that the terms of reference of a special 
committee should be limited to examining prob-
lems. 
5. 76. In a letter addressed to the conference on 
20th February, General Secretary Gorbachev 
said: 
"The Soviet Union, for its part, has been 
doing all it can to help achieve this 
goal. In particular, it is agreeable to the 
strictest control over a ban on nuclear-
weapon tests, including on-site inspections 
and the use of all the latest developments 
in seismology. " 
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The Soviet Union had also announced that it 
would agree to the establishment of regional 
seismological networks on its territory to verify 
that a treaty banning nuclear tests was 
respected. 
5.77. Finally, at the disarmament conference the 
ad hoc group of experts on seismic measuring 
systems submitted a report ~n its te~hnical tests 
in 1984 in the framework of mternatwnal co-op-
eration for recording and analysing seismic phe-
nomena with a view to verifying an agreement 
banning nuclear tests. 
5. 78. The western countries' position, which is 
well known, has not changed. The United 
States has asserted several times that it intended 
to pursue a nuclear test programme designed 
above all to ensure the reliability of American 
nuclear weapons. This was a break from the 
earlier policy of pursuing trilateral negotiations 
on a complete suspension, these negotiations 
having been suspended in 1980. It is known 
that the present test programme also cove~s 
research on a possible X-ray laser for strategic 
defence systems and on new nuclear warheads 
for the Midgetman missile. The press has now 
quoted scientists at the United. States ~os 
Alamos nuclear weapons laboratones as saymg 
that new generations of nuclear weapons under 
development, understood to be part of the SDI 
programme, would require at leas~ 1 oq test 
explosions per weapon COf!?pare~ with six ~or 
earlier weapons 15• The Umted Kingdom for Its 
part continues to assert that it is prepared to 
accede to a treaty banning tests if the verification 
problem is solved. On this latter point, the 
United Kingdom and the United States seem to 
be the only countries to consider that existing 
seismic networks, particularly if supplemented 
by regional systems on the territory of _nuclear 
weapon countries, are not enough to venfy such 
a treaty. France's policy in the matter is appar-
ently not to become involved in the public 
debate. 
5. 79. The Prime Minister of China, Mr. Zhao, 
in his address of 20th March marking interna-
tional peace year, announced that China was 
henceforth renouncing tests in the atmosphere; it 
had not conducted any since 1980. At the 
Geneva disarmament conference, China has 
declared that it is prepared to play an active part 
in negotiations to draft a total test ban treaty. 
5.80. The other European allied countries repre-
sented at the disarmament conference at the 
moment are supporting United States opposition 
to the creation of a special committee in Geneva 
to draft a test ban treaty. However, in their 
public statements and in their affirmative v~tes 
on United Nations resolutions on the suspenswn 
of nuclear tests, they have shown they were in 
15. The Times, 19th April 1986. 
favour of a test ban treaty. For instance, the 
communique issued by the Federal German 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 2nd April at the 
close of Mr. Papandreou's visit to Bonn indi-
cated that there was a chance of starting negotia-
tions intended first to limit and then to stop 
nuclear tests. 
5.81. However, during the summer and autumn 
the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate with the 
United States a limitation of nuclear tests with-
out immediate total suspension being an aim, in 
the hope that the United States would agree to 
ratify the two treaties on a threshold test ban and 
on peaceful nuclear explosions signed in 1974 
and 1976. These negotiations were held in the 
framework of the bilateral talks in Geneva which 
started on 18th September. 
5.82. At the close of the Reykjavik summit 
meeting, Mr. Gorbachev made the following 
concessions in his press conference: 
" ... we proposed that ... we could examine 
at some stage ... also the question of 
thresholds, and the nuclear blast yield, and 
the number of nuclear explosions per year, 
and the fate of the 1974 and 1976 treaties, 
and would move further towards the elab-
oration of a comprehensive treaty banning 
all nuclear explosions... We do not 
demand that you introduce a moratorium. 
It is up to you. You report to your Con-
gress, to the people on how you will con-
tinue nuclear explosions or whether you 
will join our moratorium during the talks 
that we will start. But let us sit down for 
full-scale talks to work out an agreement 
on the total and final prohibition of 
nuclear explosions. In passing, we will 
also consider the questions that you men-
tion: verification, thresholds, number of 
nuclear explosions, and the 1974 and 1976 
treaties. " 
5.83. The committee referred in its previous 
report to scientific evidence that underground 
nuclear explosions could be adequately moni-
tored down to the smallest yields. As in its last 
report, the committee asks that priority be given 
to negotiating a complete nuclear test ban treaty 
and that the Soviet Union be urged most 
strongly to accept the United States' invitation to 
participate in the testing of the new verification 
system at the United States test site. 
(j) Chemical weapons 
5.84. The emphasis on the need for an agree-
ment banning chemical weapons in the summit 
communique of 21st November 1985 led to the 
belief that progress was possible in the negotia-
tions being held on this subject at the Geneva 
disarmament conference. The communique 
also announced the start of a bilateral dialogue 
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on measures to be taken to prevent the prolifera-
tion of chemical weapons as follows: 
"We are prepared for:a timely declaration 
of the location of eqterprises producing 
chemical weapons and for the cessation of 
their production, anq are ready to start 
developing procedure~ for destroying the 
relevant industrial b&se and to proceed, 
soon after the convention enters into 
force, to eliminating the stockpiles of 
chemical weapons. All these measures 
would be carried out 'under strict control 
including international on-site inspec-
tions. " 
Referring to certain interim measures, it said: 
" For example, agreement could be 
achieved on a multilateral basis not to 
transfer chemical weapons to anyone and 
not to deploy them in the territories of 
other states. " 
5.85. At the Geneva disarmament conference 
on 11th February, the United States representa-
tive, Mr. Lowitz, while his country gave priority 
:to a comprehensive treaty eliminating chemical 
weapons, said: · 
"However, the Unitep States is opposed 
to a formal treaty - as some have sug-
gested - such as one tijat would mirror the 
nuclear non-prolife1ration treaty for 
nuclear weapons. " 
At the session of the conference this spring, the 
United States also made it clear that in the 
American draft treaty banning chemical weapons 
tabled in 1984 the inspections called for would 
apply to all establishments capable of manufac-
turing chemical products, and not solely to state 
enterprises, as the wording of the draft had ini-
tially indicated. 
5.86. The special ad hoc committee, under 
United Kingdom chairmanship this year, and its 
three subgroups are continuihg their work but lit-
tle progress had been ma<le until 22nd April 
when the representative ot the Soviet Union 
introduced some significant Jilew proposals which 
in particular moved further ~awards the western 
position on some aspects of ~estruction of chem-
ical weapon facilities and v~rification: 
- destruction of cheJical weapon stocks 
would begin withiJ,- six months and be 
completed within 10 years of entry into 
force of a convention; 
- within 30 days of entry into force the 
number, capability and precise location 
of all plants capable of producing chem-
ical weapons would be declared; 
- destruction or dismantling of such pro-
duction facilities would begin within 
one year of entry into force; 
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- all production act1v1t1es would cease 
immediately on entry into force and 
measures to ensure their close-down, 
including disconnection from any non-
military chemical production facilities 
the operation of which would be 
authorised under a convention, would 
be completed within three months; 
- fairly detailed provisions were described 
for destruction of production equip-
ment, or the dismantling of equipment 
which could be used for authorised 
civilian chemical production; 
- verification measures were provided 
for: " including systematic on-site 
inspections, such as the verification of 
the accuracy of declarations, the sealing 
by inspectors of the facility to be closed, 
the periodic checking of preservation of 
seals up to the moment the seals are 
removed and the destruction or the dis-
mantling of the facility is initiated ... the 
final international verification would be 
carried out upon the full termination of 
the process of the elimination or the dis-
mantling of the entire facility". 
5.87. The detailed nature of the Soviet propos-
als, which are obviously based on the design of 
existing chemical production plants where no 
doubt legitimate civilian chemical processes are 
also carried out, makes these proposals a con-
vincing attempt at progress. The proposals do 
not however go into detail about subsequent ver-
ification measures after destruction of existing 
and declared chemical weapon production plants 
has been completed, merely asserting that " the 
convention should envisage measures ensuring 
its strict observance ... first of all the prevention 
of the use of the commercial chemical industry 
for the development and production of chemical 
weapons". Nevertheless they seem to offer a 
solid basis for active negotiation of a treaty lead-
ing to a complete and verified ban on chemical 
weapons. 
5.88. In the light of the important Soviet state-
ment, it can be seen that there is now a wide con-
sensus in the negotiations on the routine verifica-
tion system which would be applied for the 
destruction of declared stocks of chemical wea-
pons, the dismantling of production plants and 
declared installations of the legal civil chemical 
industry whose products could be used for the 
production of chemical weapons. A point still 
at issue is the concept of challenge inspections 
which would allow inspection of an undeclared 
chemical installation suspected of manufacturing 
forbidden products. Until now the Soviet 
Union has insisted on the right of any state to 
refuse requests for challenge inspections if they 
were considered abusive - if, for instance, they 
sought to inspect other secret military installa-
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tions on the pretext of so-called chemical 
production. The United States proposals con-
cerning challenge inspection, contained in the 
draft treaty it tabled in 1984, were considered too 
intrusive by the Soviet Union and also by certain 
western allied countries with large-scale chemical 
industries. 
5.89. On 15th July 1986, the United Kingdom 
tabled a document containing new proposals for 
challenge inspections 16• This text provides that 
each state party to the convention would have 
the right directly to request an inspection of 
another party. This inspection would be carried 
out impartially by members of the international 
technical secretariat that would be set up by the 
convention. They would be required to reach 
the location not later than seventy-two hours 
from the issue of a challenge. Normally, any 
state receiving a request for inspection would 
authorise the team to conduct a detailed inquiry 
in order to establish the facts. But if in excep-
tional circumstances the state considered that its 
security would be threatened by the inspection 
requested, it would have the right to propose 
alternative measures to provide sufficient infor-
mation for the matter under consideration to be 
resolved. The time-limit for this process would 
be a maximum of seven days and during that 
time the requested state would be obliged to take 
sufficient steps to enable its compliance to be 
demonstrated. 
5.90. If, following an inspection or refusal of an 
inspection, the requesting state was not satisfied 
that the requested state was respecting the con-
vention, the Executive Council set up under the 
convention would take collective measures 
which might include withdrawal of rights and 
privileges under the convention. Such meas-
ures would be without prejudice to the right of 
the other states to take unilateral action up to 
and including withdrawal from the convention -
the ultimate sanction. 
5.91. When the disarmament conference held its 
last sitting for 1986 on 29th August, neither the 
Soviet Union nor the United States had said 
whether they agreed to the terms of the British 
proposal. Nevertheless, the ad hoc committee 
on chemical weapons set up by the conference 
continued its work of drafting the actual text of 
the convention on chemical weapons. Its report 
dated 21st August 1986 contains the text of the 
articles on which agreement has been reached, 
consisting largely of the technical aspects of 
chemical product definition which would be cov-
ered by the convention, by category: supertoxic 
lethal products, other lethal chemical products 
and other harmful chemical products, and the 
restrictions applying to each product. 
16. Document CD/715, 15th July 1986. 
5.92. Sessions of the disarmament conference 
are normally suspended at the end of August to 
allow delegates to take part in debates on disar-
mament in the United Nations General Assem-
bly in New York during the autumn. They are 
resumed only in February of the following 
year. In view of the urgency of drafting the con-
vention on chemical weapons, however, this year 
it was agreed that informal consultations would 
be continued in Geneva during autumn 1986 
and that a meeting of the ad hoc committee 
would be convened in January 1987. 
5.93. In parallel with these multilateral negotia-
tions, the United States and the Soviet Union 
have, since the Geneva summit meeting, been 
holding bilateral negotiations whose results have 
not been made public. But at its meeting in 
Geneva in July, when it was addressed by repre-
sentatives of several delegations to the confer-
ence, the committee noted that the general opin-
ion was that it would be possible to conclude a 
convention in 1987 if the main stumbling-block, 
i.e. challenge verification, could be overcome. 
This agreement could thus be reached before the 
production of binary chemical weapons began in 
the United States as planned at the end of 1987. 
5.94. Once again there is reason to deplore the 
use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in 
February 1986. For the first time, the United 
Nations group of experts investigating the inci-
dent mentioned Iraq by name: " The agent used 
has mainly been mustard gas although on some 
occasions nerve gas was also employed... On 
many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical 
weapons against Iranian forces. " This shows 
the importance of a multilateral convention -
which must be a worldwide one - banning chem-
ical weapons. 
5.95. In the meantime, on 18th February the 
NATO Supreme Commander, General Rogers, 
made an important statement to the French 
Institute for International Relations in Paris 
about stocks of chemical weapons. For the first 
time since 1969, he was expecting NATO to 
approve American plans concerning the produc-
tion of chemical weapons. He outlined a plan 
providing for the transfer of chemical weapons to 
Europe in the event of crisis and after consulta-
tion with the European allies. He considered 
the stockpiling of chemical weapons should be 
approved as a force goal by the Defence Planning 
Committee at ministerial level. When voting 
funds in 1985 for the production of chemical 
weapons for the first time since 1969, the United 
States Congress had made production subject to 
the prior acceptance by the European allies of 
plans providing for the stockpiling of chemical 
weapons in Europe. 
5.96. The communique of the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee dated 22nd May refers to 
"the 1987-1992 force goals which reflect the pri-
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orities we have identified for improving conven-
tional defence " without making it clear that, for 
the United States, the force goals include produc-
tion of the new generation of so-called " binary " 
chemical weapons. Three countries - Greece, 
Norway and Denmark- appended a reservation 
concerning the text of the communique. At the 
same time the representatives of Belgium, Italy 
and the Netherlands made it known that they did 
not approve of the American decision. At all 
events, the ministerial meeting merely noted, 
without approving, a force goal affecting only the 
United States. Since then, Germany and the 
United Kingdom have indicated that the new 
chemical weapons would not be deployed in 
Europe in peacetime and that each country 
would have the right to veto their possible 
deployment on its territory in times of 
crisis. This possible deployment seems to have 
been discussed bilaterally with Germany and the 
United Kingdom and Germany has obtained a 
compensatory assurance that the stocks of Amer-
ican chemical weapons now stationed on its ter-
ritory will be withdrawn by 1990. 
5.97. The committee repeats the conclusions it 
reached in its last report, considering that chemi-
cal weapons now stockpiled in Germany were 
sufficiently effective to deter an enemy from 
using such weapons. It consequently recom-
mends that the United States be urged not to 
resume the production of chemical weapons at 
the present time and to make all necessary efforts 
to ensure real progress in 1987 in the negotiation 
of a treaty banning such weapons. While under-
lining the importance of realistic verification 
measures, the committee asks that the situation 
be re-examined at the end of 1987. In the 
meantime, it considers there is no need to 
approve the deployment of further chemical 
weapons in Europe as a NATO force goal. 
(g) Space weapons 
5.98. At the Geneva disarmament conference, 
the ad hoc committee on the prevention of an 
arms race in outer space has only just been 
reconstituted. The Soviet Union proposed to 
the conference that an international agreement 
be prepared guaranteeing the immunity of artifi-
cial earth satellites, banning the creation, testing 
and deployment of new anti~satellite systems and 
making it compulsory to destroy old ones. It 
proposed that partial measures be taken urgently 
to enhance confidence between states in space 
activities pending a solution to the problem of 
preventing an arms race in space with all that 
implies. 
VI. Conclusions 
6.1. The committee's conclusions are set forth 
m the draft recommendation, the substantive 
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paragraphs of which relate to this explanatory 
memorandum as follows: 
Recommendation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6(a) and (b) 
Explanatory 
memorandum 
1.2 and 2.1 
2.6 to 2.7 
5.6 to 5.31 and 5.98 
5.32 to 5.71 
5.84 to 5.97 
5.72 to 5.83 
VII. Opinion of the minority 
7.1. The report as a whole was adopted in com-
mittee by 8 votes to 7 without abstentions. 
7.2. The objections of the minority centred on 
the demand in paragraph 3 of the draft recom-
mendation for both parties " to pursue the con-
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siderable progress made at the Reykjavik 
summit ... ". Some members of the minority felt 
that the Reykjavik summit was a near disaster, 
from which Europe was saved only by the 
United States stand on SDI. The minority felt 
in particular that the proposal to reduce long-
range intermediate nuclear forces in range of 
Europe to zero on each side was dangerous 
because it would leave Western Europe vulnera-
ble to the large Soviet superiority in conven-
tional forces and chemical weapons as well as in 
shorter-range nuclear weapons deployed in 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany and because 
of the possible return of SS-20 missiles from the 
Asian part of the Soviet Union. The minority 
felt that in the defence of Europe the United 
States might then be left with no choice other 
than to use its strategic nuclear forces. 
7.3. The minority also voiced objections to the 
limitation of SDI to " laboratory research " in 
paragraph 3 and also had unspecified objections 
to paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation. 
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Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly 
17th March 1986 
(Extract) 
The Council has instructed me to give you 
the following information concerning the staff 
and activities of the new agencies responsible for 
security questions. 
Since 1st January, each of these agencies 
has a director: General E. Rambaldi directs the 
agency for the study of arms control and disar-
mament questions (Agency I) and the 
restructured ACA. The former head of the 
international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. 
Hintermann, is responsible for the agency for the 
development of co-operation in armaments 
(Agency Ill). Appointed by the ministers at 
their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985, 
a senior United Kingdom official, Mr. I. 
Dawson, has taken charge of the agency for the 
study of security and defence problems 
(Agency 11). 
A full table of establishment will be sent to 
you as soon as all the posts have been filled. 
As indicated in the Bonn communique, 
the role of these new agencies is to carry out the 
studies requested by the Council. 
Certain studies have already been planned, 
all or part of which will be the subject of interim 
reports which might be presented to the minis-
ters at their meeting in Venice. 
Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-a-vis 
the countries of Western Europe in regard to 
questions of the control of armaments and 
disarmament. In the future it will also have to 
take an interest in the control of conventional 
armaments and the essential problem of verifica-
tion. 
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In connection and , close co-ordination 
with the tasks of Agency I, A.gency 11 will have to 
study the assessment of the threat, and the con-
tribution of the WEU countries to the response 
to this threat, and the question of management 
resources. 
~g~D:CY Ill will study certain aspects of 
compet1t1v1ty in the armaments industry in 
Europe and the implications of the evolution of 
the world arms market, together with the prob-
lems of technological transfers between Euro-
pean allies. 
Other tasks have been planned and will 
have to be undertaken during the transitional 
period up to the end of 1987. 
All these studies constitute internal work-
ing papers for the Council iq.tended to contribute 
to its process of reflection on the subjects dealt 
with. 
In order to guarantee the availability of the 
information necessary for them, the agencies 
shall establish links with the appropriate interna-
tional bodies and with national adminis-
trations. In this respect it must be noted that 
the latter must be assured that the classified 
information they transmit to the ministerial 
organs of WEU is handled in accordance with 
their security regulations and limited to the 
exclusive use of these organs. 
The suggestion to place at the disposal of 
the ministerial organs a computerised documen-
tation centre will have to be assessed in the light 
ofbudgetary priorities and will have to be exam-
ined subsequently by the Council. 
'(signed) A. CAHEN 
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APPENDIX II 
Appeal by the Warsaw Treaty member states to the member states of NATO 
and to all European countries for a programme to reduce armed forces 
and conventional armaments in Europe 
Budapest, 10th-11th June 1986 
The Warsaw Treaty member states, being 
aware of their responsibility to their respective 
peoples and to mankind for the peace of Europe 
and the world at large and seeking a radical 
change for the better in the current complicated 
international situation, are of the view that now, 
more than ever, there is a need for taking reso-
lute action and concrete measures aimed at end-
ing the arms race, proceeding to effective disar-
mament and averting the danger of war. 
They support the programme proposed by 
the Soviet Union for the complete and compre-
hensive liquidation of nuclear and other types of 
weapons of mass destruction by the end of this 
century. They are convinced that the cessation 
of nuclear testing, the achievement of nuclear 
disarmament and the prevention of the exten-
sion of the arms race to outer space, a ban on and 
the liquidation of chemical weapons and other 
disarmament measures would be conducive to 
bringing about a more secure world for the peo-
ples of Europe and the entire globe. 
The allied states profess a complex 
approach to disarmament problems and that the 
liquidation of weapons of mass destruction be 
supported by significant cuts in armed forces and 
conventional armaments. Along with making 
Europe free of nuclear weapons, the problem of 
the reduction of armed forces and conventional 
armaments is acquiring an ever greater signifi-
cance for the present and future of the European 
continent. It is on this continent that the two 
largest groupings of armed forces equipped with 
the most up-to-date armaments face each other 
and the destructive power of some systems of 
conventional armaments is growing equal to that 
of mass-destruction weapons. The allied states 
seek to ensure that concrete nuclear disarma-
ment measures and cuts in conventional arma-
ments and armed forces are followed by appro-
priate reductions in the military spending of the 
states. 
Guided by these considerations, the 
Warsaw Treaty member states present these 
concrete proposals to all the other European sta-
tes, to the United States of America and 
Canada. These proposals constitute a signifi-
cant supplement to the programme for the elimi-
nation of weapons of mass destruction, but at the 
same time bear an independent character, and 
their realisation would substantially reduce the 
danger of war in Europe. 
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I. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states pro-
pose a substantial reduction in the land and tacti-
cal air forces of European states and in the corre-
sponding forces of the United States and Canada 
stationed in Europe. Simultaneously with con-
ventional armaments, tactical nuclear weapons 
with a range of up to 1 000 km should also be 
reduced. 
The geographical zone of reduction 
includes the whole territory of Europe, from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. 
They propose that the reduction of armed 
forces and conventional armaments in Europe be 
carried out gradually at agreed times, with the 
military balance maintained at ever lower levels 
and without jeopardising the security of any of 
the parties. In addition, parallel to the troops 
under reduction their armaments and equipment 
inclusive of nuclear means would also be dis-
mantled. 
As a first step, a one-time mutual reduc-
tion is proposed to be carried out in such a way 
that the troop strength of the countries belonging 
to the opposing military-political alliances be cut 
by 100 000-150 000 troops on each side within a 
year or two. Cuts in tactical air forces as part of 
these measures would be of great signi-
ficance. Immediately afterwards, given the wil-
lingness of the NATO countries to act likewise, 
the Warsaw Treaty member states are ready to 
carry out further significant reductions, as a 
result of which, the land forces and tactical air 
forces of both military alliances in Europe would, 
by the early 1990s, be reduced by some 25% as 
compared with present levels. Such reductions 
would affect more than half a million troops on 
each side, thus the opposing armed forces in 
Europe would be reduced by over one million 
troops. 
The allied socialist states stand for contin-
uing the process of reductions in the armed 
forces and armaments ofNATO and the Warsaw 
Treaty. Significant reductions in the armed 
forces and armaments of the two alliances would 
make it possible for all the other European coun-
tries to join this process. 
They propose that the components of 
armed forces to be reduced be demobilised in the 
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form of equivalent larger units, units and 
subunits, together with their troop arms and 
equipment. Troops would be discharged in 
accordance with established procedures in the 
given state. 
Armaments and equipment subject to 
reduction could be destroyed or stored on 
national territories in accordance with agreed 
procedures. Nuclear warheads should be 
destroyed. Certain types of military equipment 
could, subject to agreement, be transferred for 
peaceful purposes. 
Funds becoming available as a result of 
appropriate reductions in armed forces and con-
ventional armaments cannot be allocated to the 
creation of new types of weapons or to other mil-
itary purposes, they should be used for the needs 
of economic and social development. 
All the states party to an agreement on 
armed forces and armaments reduction would 
assume the commitment to keep from increasing 
their land forces and tactical strike aviation 
beyond the limits of the cut-back area. 
11. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states pro-
pose to work out such a system of reductions in 
armed forces and conventional armaments 
under which the process of reduction would 
result in a lessening of the danger of surprise 
attack and would contribute to the consolidation 
of strategic stability on the European 
continent. With this end in view, they propose 
to come to agreement at the very beginning of 
the process on a significant reduction in the tacti-
cal air forces of the two military-political alli-
ances in Europe and on lowering the level of the 
concentration of troops along the lines of contact 
between the two alliances. 
For the same purpose, supplementary 
measures would be elaborated and implemented 
which were suitable for strengthening the convic-
tion of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and 
NATO and the other states of Europe that sur-
prise offensive operations would not be launched 
against them. 
They plan to reach agreement on limiting 
the number and size of larger military exercises 
and on exchanging more detailed information 
about the size of forces and equipment regrouped 
to Europe from other regions for the period of 
military exercises, and on other measures facili-
tating the increase of mutual trust. 
The implementation of measures like the 
establishment of nuclear and chemical weapon-
free zones on the European continent, gradual 
reduction in the military activity of the two mili-
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tary alliances, the establishment of co-operation 
among their member states on questions of arms 
reduction and disarmament would facilitate the 
strengthening of confidence, the creation of more 
favourable conditions for the reduction of armed 
forces and armaments in Europe. 
Ill. 
The reduction of armed forces and con-
ventional armaments would take place accompa-
nied by reliable and effective verification 
through national technical means and interna-
tional procedures including on-site inspection. 
They propose to organise, together with 
measures of verification for, the process of reduc-
tion, the observation of the military activities of 
troops remaining after redt.fctions. 
Appropriate forms qf verification would 
be applied concerning m~sures strengthening 
mutual confidence and implemented in harmony 
with the agreements. 
For purposes of verrification the parties 
will exchange, at an agreed date, data on the total 
troop strengths of their land forces and tactical 
strike air forces stationed in the zone of reduc-
tion and separately on their components to be 
reduced and on those not affected by the 
reduction. They will exchange information 
concerning the designation of the formations to 
be dismantled, their troops' strength, location, 
and the quantity of their main types of weapons 
agreed upon. The parties would notify each 
other of the beginning and completion of the 
reduction. 
For purposes of verification, an interna-
tional consultative committee will be formed 
with the participation of representatives of 
NATO and the Warsaw treaty as well as of 
interested neutral and nop-aligned and other 
countries of Europe. ' 
On-site inspection M the reduction of 
armed forces and the destruction or stockpiling 
of armaments could be carried out, if necessary, 
with the involvement of representatives of the 
international consultative committee. For pur-
poses of such supervision posts of control, com-
posed of representatives ofthe international con-
sultative committee, would be set up at major 
railway centres, airports and harbours. 
IV. 
The present proposals for the reduction of 
armed forces and conventional armaments in 
Europe could be the subject of concrete discus-
sion in the second stage of the conference on con-
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fidence- and security-building measures and dis-
armament in Europe. 
At the same time, keeping in mind the 
pressing urgency of taking measures to lower the 
level of military confrontation in Europe, the 
Warsaw Treaty member states would consider it 
possible to proceed without delay to explore the 
proposals presented here. To this end, they 
deem it possible to convene a special forum with 
the participation of the European states as well as 
the United States and Canada. 
They are also prepared to widen the frame-
work of the Vienna negotiations on the mutual 
reduction of armed forces and armaments in 
Central Europe through the inclusion of other 
European states and the corresponding modifica-
tion of the terms of reference of those negotia-
tions. 
While expressing their readiness to make 
use of all possible channels and for mutually low-
ering the level of military confrontation on an 
all-European scale, they reaffirm their interest in 
reducing armaments and armed forces in Central 
Europe and come out once again for a successful 
conclusion of the first stage of the Stockholm 
Conference. 
V. 
In terms of the assessment of the real 
intentions of military-political groupings and 
individual states the question of military doc-
trines is no less important. The mutual suspi-
cion and distrust accumulated over many years 
must be dispelled, the two sides must be thor-
oughly acquainted with each other's problems in 
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this regard, too. For the sake of European and 
world security the military concepts and doc-
trines of military alliances must be of a defensive 
character. 
The Warsaw Treaty member states declare 
with full responsibility that they will never, 
under any circumstances, initiate military 
actions against any state, whether in Europe or in 
another region of the world, if they themselves 
are not victims of aggression. Their proposals 
stem from their consistent policy aimed at the 
elimination of the military threat, the creation of 
a stable and secure world, from the defensive 
character of their military doctrine which pre-
supposes the maintenance of armed forces at the 
lowest possible level and the reduction of mili-
tary capabilities to a level indispensable for 
defence. 
The member states of the Warsaw Treaty 
were guided by the same peaceful intentions 
when they presented their proposal for the simul-
taneous dissolution of the two military alli-
ances. 
The member states of NATO also profess 
the defensive nature of their alliance. Conse-
quently there can be no obstacle to the mutual 
and significant reduction of armed forces and 
conventional armaments in Europe. 
In presenting this appeal, the Warsaw 
Treaty member states set no preliminary condi-
tions for starting the objective discussion of the 
proposals contained therein. They are ready to 
consider, in a creative spirit, other relevant pro-
posals formulated either by the NATO member 
states, by the neutral and non-aligned or the 
other states of Europe. 
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North Atlantic Council statement on conventional arms contrDI 
Halifax, 29th-30th May 1986 
Within the alliance, we cherish the ideal 
that all the peoples of Europe, from the Atlantic 
to the Urals, should live in peace, freedom and 
security. To achieve that ideal, bold new steps 
are required in the field of conventional arms 
control. 
Our objective is the strengthening of stabi-
lity and security in the whole of Europe, through 
increased openness and the establishment of a 
verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of 
conventional forces at lower levels. 
To work urgently towards the achievement 
of this objective, we have decided to set up a 
high level task force on conventional arms 
control. 
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It will build on the western proposals at 
the CDE conference in Stockholm and at the 
MBFR negotiations in Vienna, in both of which 
participating allied countries are determined to 
achieve early agreement. 
It will take account of Mr. Gorbachev's 
statement of 18th April expressing, in particular, 
Soviet readiness to pursue conventional force 
reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals. 
An interim report will be presented to the 
Council in October, and a fihal report will be dis-
cussed at our next meeting I in December. 
Our aim is a radical improvement in East-
West relations in which mote confidence, greater 
openness, and increased security will benefit all. 
Document 1075 
Amendments 1 and 2 
1st December 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
1. In paragraph 3, line 2, of the revised draft recommendation proper, after " insist " insert 
" firmly". 
2. In paragraph 6 (b), line 1, of the revised draft recommendation proper, after" press" insert" vig-
orously". 
I. See IIth sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendment 3 
' 1st December 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Coutrcil 
AMENDMENT 3 1 
tabled by MM. Kittelmann and Berger 
3. After paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Urge on allied governments the need to ensure that negotiations on the reduction of nuclear 
forces and on the reduction of conventional forces make parallel progress, so that the NATO 
strategy of forward defence and flexible response can remain based on a range of nuclear systems 
as well as conventional arms; " 
I. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Signed: Kittelmann, Berger 
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Amendments 4, 5 and 6 
1st December 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 4, 5 and 6 1 
tabled by Mr. Wilkinson 
4. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from" the treaties" to the 
end of the paragraph and insert " the abandonment by the USSR of its demand for the termination of 
the SDI as a precondition towards progress on INF and strategic arms control agreements with the 
United States". 
5. In paragraph 5 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from" pending" to the end 
of the paragraph and add " make progress towards satisfactory, verifiable control of chemical weapons 
as a precondition towards any INF arms control agreement with the USSR ". 
6. Leave out paragraph 6 of the revised draft recommendation proper. 
1. See IIth sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendments 7, 8 and 9 
2nd December 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 7, 8 and 9 1 
tabled by Sir Anthony Grant and others 
7. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation and insert: 
" Considering that real progress can lead to agreement on treaties to reduce l!luclear weapons and 
to limit space weapons only if parallel negotiations result in a balance in conventional weapons 
and the level of forces, short-range nuclear weapons and chemical weap~ns and verification 
measures offering effective guarantees; " 
8. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from" both parties" to the 
end of the paragraph and insert: 
"the United States to pursue its negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of nuclear 
weapons taking account of the security requirements of its European partners which are ensured 
only through mutual deterrence; " 
9. In paragraph 5 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out f11om " , pending the 
outcome " to the end of the paragraph and insert: 
"to ensure that chemical weapons are maintained in Western Europe as long
1
as the Soviet Union 
has not subscribed to a treaty banning them and whose application would be duly verified; " 
I. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Signed: Gr:ant, Bennett, Ward 
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Amendment 10 
2nd December 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 10 1 
tabled by Mr. Pollidoro and others 
10. After paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Regretting the United States decision to consider the SALT 11 treaty as non-existent, " 
Signed: Pollidoro, Colajanni, Rubbi, Antoni 
l. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendments 11 and 12 
2nd December 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 11 and 12 1 
tabled by Mr. Rubbi and others 
11. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, leave out from " consid-
erable progress" to the end of the paragraph and insert" possibilities evident at the Reykjavik summit 
of eventual agreement on treaties to reduce nuclear weapons and to limit space weapons;". 
12. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, leave out " limit " and 
insert "ban". 
Signed: Rubbi, Antoni, Colajanni, Pollidoro 
I. See IIth sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendments 13 and 14 
2nd December 1986 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 13 and 14 1 
tabled by Mr. Antoni and others 
13. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, after " continued " add 
" unilateral ". 
14. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, after " strategic defence " add 
" strictly within the context of the ABM treaty". 
Signed: Antoni, Rubbi, Colajanni, Pollidoro 
I. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Amendments 15, 16, 17 and 18 
I 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Counr:il 
AMENDMENTS 15, 16, 17 and 18 1 
tabled by Mr. Palumbo 
15. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation and insert: 
" Taking note of the state of the discussion in Reykjavik which might lead in the future to 
agreement on treaties to reduce nuclear weapons and to limit space weapons;" 
16. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out " considerable progress 
made " and insert " negotiations ". 
17. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out " labbratory ". 
18. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out" without undertaking tests 
in space". 
I. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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Document 1075 2nd December 1986 
Amendments 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 1 
tabled by Mr. Valleix 
19. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, leave out "and to 
maintain their own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union". 
20. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation. 
21. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, leave out from " but 
believing " to the end of the paragraph. 
22. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out " to urge both parties to 
pursue the considerable progress made at the Reykjavik summit". 
23. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from " on the under-
standing " to the end of the paragraph. 
I. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee). 
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APPENDICES 
3rd November 1986 
I. A. United States and Soviet Union - historical levels of strategic nuclear wea-
pons I 
B. United States and Soviet Union - historical trend of total nu m bells of strate-
gic nuclear weapons 1960-1985 
11. Ratio of strategic indicators for different assumptions - 1983 
1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Kittelmann (Alternate: Lenzer) (Chairman); Mr. Cifarelli, Dr. Miller (Alternate: Brown) 
(Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amadei, de Beer, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Beregovoy, van den Bergh, Bourlges, De Decker, Dejardin, 
Edwards, Ertl, Galley (Alternate: Baumel), Gerstl, Giust, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: 
Antoni), Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes, Wirth. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
/!SS, London, 26th August 1986 
Mr. Robert Elliot, Information Officer. 
Ministry of Defence, London, 26th August 1986 
Mr. David Nicholls, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Policy and Programmes; 
Brigadier the Hon. T.P.J. Boyd-Carpenter, Director of Defence Policy; 
Miss G.L. Franklin, Head of Secretariat (Policy Studies). 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 12th September 1986 
Mr. David Ratford, Assistant Under-Secretary of State; 
Mr. John Barrass, Defence Department; 
Mr. Martin Nicholson, Research Department. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 29th September 1986 
Dr. von Plotz, Political Director for European, North American and Atlantic Alliance Affairs; 
Dr. von Kitlitz, NATO Affairs. 
Ministry of Defence, Bonn, 29th September 1986 
Colonel Pohlmann, German Army, Intelligence Division; 
Colonel Farwick, German Army, Public Information, Planning Staff; 
Captain Gunther, German Navy, Military Relations NATO/WEU; 
Lt. Col. Meyer, German Air Force, Military Relations NATO/WEU; 
Lt. Col. Keller, German Air Force, Military Policy, Eurogroup and European Affairs; 
Mr. Ysker, National Defence Staff, Economic Affairs. 
NATO, Brussels, 30th September 1986 
Maj. Gen. Christie, UK Army, Assistant Director, Plans and Policy Division, International Mili-
tary Staff; 
Rear Admiral van Idsinga, RNLN, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division; 
Colonel Malcolm Hunt, Royal Marines, Plans and Policy Division; 
Colonel Harry Sloan, UK Army, Public Information Adviser; 
Dr. Murray Feshbach, Sovietologist-in-residence, International Staff; 
Mr. Simon Lunn, Head of Plans and Policy Section, Defence Planning and Policy Division of 
International Staff; 
Mr. Jean-Claude Renaud, Director, Economic Directorate; 
Mr. Brian Field, Assistant Director, Political Affairs Division, International Staff. 
The committee as a whole met in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia, from 16th to 20th June 
1986, when it was addressed by or met with: 
16th June 1986 
State Department, Washington DC 
Ms. Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
Affairs; 
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Mr. Charles Thomas, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Cana-
dian Affairs; ! 
Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military Affairs; 
Mr. Edward Rowny, Ambassador, Special Representative for Strategic Arms Negotiations; 
Congressional Research Service, Washington DC 
Mr. Stanley Sloan, Specialist in US Alliance Relations; 
Mr. Paul Gallis, Analyst in West European Affairs; 
Mr. Charles Gellner, Senior Specialist, International Affairs; 
Mr. Stuart Goldman, Analyst in Soviet Affairs; 
Mr. Steven Hildreth, Analyst in National Defence; 
Mr. Francis Miko, Specialist in International Relations; 
Ms. Charlotte Preece, Specialist in West European Affairs; 
Mr. Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Foreign Affairs Analyst; 
Ms. Jeanette Voas, Arms Control Analyst; 
Mr. Paul Zinsmeister, Specialist in National Defence. 
Brookings Institution, Washington DC 
Mr. Joshua Epstein, Research Associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Programme. 
17th June 1986 
Department of Defence, Washington DC 
Mr. Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy; 
Dr. Winfred Joshua and Colonel Don Scott, Defence Intelligence Agency; 1 
Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence; 
Mr. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control 
Policy; 
Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations Policy; 
Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director NATO Affairs, Defence Research and Engine~ring; 
Mr. Robert Mullen, Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for Trade Security Policy. 
18th June 1986 
United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services 
Mr. Samuel Stratton, Representative of New York, and members of the committee: 
Democrats 
Mr. Melvin Price; 
Mr. Charles E. Bennett; 
Mr. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery; 
Mr. Earl Hutto; 
Mr. Ike Skelton; 
Mr. Thomas M. Foglietta; 
Mr. Richard Ray; 
Mr. Solomon P. Ortiz; 
Mr. Albert G. Bustamante; 
Republicans 
Mr. G. William Whitehurst; 
Mr. Robert E. Badham. 
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19th June 1986 
Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia 
Admiral Lee Baggett, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and staff; 
Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dolton, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; 
Vice-Admiral Bemard Cauderer, US Navy, Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet; 
Rear-Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Deputy and Chief-of-Staff for the Commander-in-Chief US 
Atlantic Fleet, and staff. 
20th June 1986 
Arms Control Association, Washington DC 
Mr. Paul Wamke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association. 
It subsequently met in the United Kingdom on 13th and 14th October 1986. 
13th October 1986 
by: 
The committee made an underway visit to HMS Ark Royal, Portsmouth, when it was addressed 
Captain J.L. Weatherall, RN, Commanding Officer; 
Commander Fraser Hutchison, Commander (Air). 
14th October 1986 
The committee met at Headquarters Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, Northwood, when it 
was addressed by: 
Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, RN, Commander-in-Chief Channel; 
Rear-Admiral R. den Boeft, RNLN, Chief of Allied Staff; 
Air-Vice Marshal Derek Hann, RAF, Chief-of-Staff Maritime Air Forces, Eastern Atlantic; 
Commander Nillesen, RNLN; 
Captain Whitfield, US Navy, representative of Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic. 
At a meeting in London that day the committee discussed a first draft of the report. 
It met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 3rd November 1986 when it adopted 
the report. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, members of Congress, 
officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on threat assessment 
The Assembly, 
(i) Reiterating the importance of public support for the necessary allied defence effort, which must be 
seen to be based on a credible comparison of the forces of a potential adversary with those of the 
alliance; 
(ii) Noting the unremitting growth in Soviet nuclear and naval forces in the last twenty-five years as 
the Soviet Union has striven to achieve parity with the United States and aware that the Soviet Union 
has retained numerical superiority in submarines and in conventional forces in the central region; 
(iii) Believing that the sometimes divergent, even contradictory, estimates of Soviet forces or equip-
ment used in some public statements by different national authorities can only detract from their credi-
bility; 
(iv) Aware that internal political disputes are preventing the further publication of the agreed NATO 
force comparisons on which consistent public statements can be based; . 
i (v) Believing that there is a clear political case for independent European sources of technical data; 
(vi) Noting that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to report further to the 
Assembly on threat assessment at the next part-session, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Impress on governments the need for defence policy to be based on a credible, objective and 
consistent assessment of the threat: 
(a) which takes account of both allied and Soviet perceptions of security requirements; 
(b) which takes account of both qualitative and numerical factors; 
(c) which compares the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies with comparable allied forces; 
2. Urge allied governments: 
(a) to draw as far as possible on the agreed NATO force comparisons in their public statements, 
so as to present a more consistent picture of the size and capabilities of Soviet forces compa-
red with those of the alliance; 
(b) to press for further improvements in the scope of the agreed force com@arisons published by 
NATO, and for the inclusion of all relevant allied forces in addition to the integrated forces 
which alone are listed at present; 1 
(c) to seek an urgent resolution ofthe petty dispute currently preventing thelpublication of a revi-
sed version of these NATO force comparisons; 
3. Give active consideration to the possible need for European technical sources of information such 
as observation satellites and electronic listening posts. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. When the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments was first set up thirty years 
ago to examine the security requirements of 
Europe and the alliance, the first problem it 
faced was the acquisition of information to pro-
vide a basis for its discussions. Perhaps coinci-
dentally, the years that followed saw growing 
interest in informed public discussion of defence 
issues and the establishment of many more inde-
pendent academic institutions devoted to 
defence studies. In addition to a number of 
national institutes, and specialised departments 
within universities, two international institutes 
were set up which have since acquired a conside-
rable reputation in their particular fields: the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies based 
in London, founded in 1958 and the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute founded 
in 1966, financed by the Swedish Govern-
ment. Since 1959, the first of these has pub-
lished each year its now substantial and authori-
tative Military Balance, and the second, since 
1968, its well-known yearbook of World Arma-
ments and Disarmament. 
1.2. Especially in the early 1980s there was a 
marked increase also in the public information 
effort devoted by certain countries to publicising 
the military capabilities of potential adversaries. 
In September 1981 the United States Depart-
ment of Defence published for the first time in 
English, and through United States Embassies in 
other languages, its illustrated brochure Soviet 
Military Power which provided considerable 
information about Soviet military forces, their 
equipment, and the Soviet defence production 
effort. The Soviet Union responded remarka-
bly promptly with two editions the following 
year of its publication Whence the threat to 
peace?, in English and French as well as the origi-
nal Russian, a skilful rejoinder to the United Sta-
tes publication, which described United States 
military capability, but also drew one or two 
comparisons with the Soviet Union's own mili-
tary capability. Later the same year the NATO 
international staff produced for the first time its 
own publication NATO and the Warsaw Pact-
force comparisons which made objective compa-
risons between the collective forces of the two 
military pacts, representing an agreed view of the 
NATO countries. These publications have 
appeared in revised form at varying intervals 
since. 
1.3. As far as the United States was concerned, 
this public relations exercise of the early 1980s 
sought to bring to the notice of a wider public, in 
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more popular, indeed dramatic form, informa-
tion much of which had been available for many 
years in official governmental publications such 
as the annual report to Congress of the United 
States Secretary of Defence, the chiefs-of-staff 
military posture statement, as well as the volu-
minous congressional hearings. But it was sup-
plemented by some newly declassified informa-
tion on Soviet weapons systems. For the Soviet 
Union, the glossy publication Whence the threat 
to peace? was an innovation in public relations -
it drew on many western sources, at least for its 
illustrations, as it duly acknowledged, but some 
of the themes were not new. 
1.4. Other notable official sources which nowa-
days provide a comparison of forces include the 
annual United Kingdom white paper, Statement 
on the Defence Estimates, and the less frequent 
white papers published by the Federal Republic 
of Germany in English and French, as well as 
German. 
1.5. Thus, the committee's information pro-
blem today is one of selection rather than acqui-
sition. In his initial discussions with officials 
the Rapporteur has become aware of the volume 
of material which merits more study than could 
be undertaken in the time available for a report 
to be submitted to the Assembly at the end of 
1986. Accordingly the committee intends to 
report more fully to the first part ofthe 1987 ses-
sion, and presents only its initial conclusions in 
the present preliminary report. 
1.6. In 1979 the committee prepared a first 
report on the balance of force, dealing with much 
the same subject as the present report 1• On that 
report, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 
336. The preamble began: 
"Aware that different political assump-
tions used in interpreting information can 
lead to widely differing assessments of 
adversary capabilities and of the balance 
of force;" 
and recommended that the Council: 
" Urge member governments: 
1. To take account of both Soviet and 
western perceptions of objectives, military 
capabilities and resulting threats, and to 
reject worst-case analysis as the only basis 
of assessment; " 
I. Document 809, 22nd May 1979, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Pawelczyk. 
1.7. The present report eschews the word 
" balance " because it implies judgment in com-
paring many unlike quantities in the asymmetri-
cal forces concerned. The purpose of the report 
is to examine some of the difficulties of force 
comparisons and to draw attention to the need in 
the alliance for objective and consistent official 
information. 
II. Intentions 
2.1. Most of the present report is concerned 
with attempts at the quantitative assessment of 
military capability, compared with which any 
attempt to guess the underlying intentions of a 
potential adversary is fraught with uncertain-
ty. Intentions can change overnight; military 
capability only slowly over five, ten or twenty 
years. The intentions of the leaders who took 
the decisions that led to the acquisition of certain 
equipment may not be those of the leaders in 
power when that equipment enters service. In-
dividual members of a collective leadership, 
whether democratic or not, will often have diffe-
rent reasons for supporting particular executive 
decisions. 
2.2. As far as the general objectives of the new 
leadership of the Soviet Union under General 
Secretary Gorbachev are concerned, the Rappor-
teur found remarkable unanimity among persons 
he interviewed in preparing this report, most of 
whom considered that the primary objective at 
home is the modernisation and strengthening of 
the Soviet economy, while externally the primary 
objective is to be seen to be able to deal with the 
United States on a basis of equality, and not to 
allow the United States to dictate to the Soviet 
Union from a position of strength. At home, 
the Soviet leadership is deeply conscious that the 
Soviet Union is a world power only on the basis 
of its defence effort, while its economy in many 
ways suffers from the shortcomings of those of 
the third world countries. Thus, the first objec-
tive of defence (and arms control) planning in 
the Soviet Union today is to achieve or retain a 
semblance of parity with the United States. 
2.3. While no responsible western authorities 
today believe that the Soviet Union is actively 
planning aggression against any NATO country, 
that does not mean that the Soviet Union will 
cease to be opportunist in its attempts around 
the world to bolster or install regimes friendly to 
the Soviet Union in third world countries, nor 
would it be wise to assume that circumstances 
may not again arise in which the Soviet Union 
will resort to the open use of force in territory 
contiguous to the Soviet Union, where it is best 
placed to apply its considerable military force, 
and as it did most recently in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 and in Afghanistan in 1978. 
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2.4. In the words of recent United Kingdom 
white papers on defence: i 
" The challenge for NATO is not simply a 
military one. Soviet leaders have never 
renounced the 'ideological struggle' and 
have used every means available to propa-
gate their own brand of Marxism, taking 
full advantage of the freedoms that exist in 
western societies to !further Soviet aims. 
These activities are designed to weaken 
the cohesion of NATO ... " 2 
and again: 
"The Soviet Union inherited the product 
of many centuries of Russian expansion; it 
is a country obsessed !with its own security 
but insensitive to the' security concerns of 
others. These traditions, and the great 
importance given to military power that 
goes with them, have been combined with 
an ideology dedicated to the ultimate vic-
tory of communism. The evidence sug-
gests that these ideo~ogical goals will be 
pursued with cautioq and discretion, but 
that opportunities will be grasped if the 
price is limited and acceptable. Given 
the present scale of NATO's defences, we 
have no reason to believe that Soviet lea-
ders have any immediate intention of 
attacking NATO countries; but we cannot 
ignore the fact that 1 those same leaders 
continue to improve the Soviet capability 
for such an attack. Moreover, the size 
and reach of the Warsaw Pact's forces 
make them a potent political weapon. If 
they were not counter-balanced by an ade-
quate military capability, they could be 
exploited to bring untelcome influence to 
bear on the domesti~l and foreign policies 
of other countries. " 3 
2.5. Outside observers have always been noto-
riously bad at assessing the intentions of poten-
tial adversaries in times of tension - bluff, inti-
midation or bent on aggression? The externally 
observable signs are the same. Two recent 
examples are the invasion M Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968, when military intelligence accura-
tely reported concentrations of Soviet and other 
Warsaw Pact forces on the frontiers of Czechos-
lovakia, but when the majority ofwestern politi-
cal assessment was that the Soviet Union at that 
time, in a period of improvilng relations with the 
West, when ratification of1 the recently signed 
non-proliferation treaty was 'pending, when there 
were prospects of a conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe, would not resort to the 
use of force against an ally as it had done in Hun-
2. Statement on the Defence Eftimates 1986, paragraph 
109. 
3. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986, paragraph 
105. 
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gary twelve years earlier. An equally valid but 
different example involving different adversaries 
was the invasion of the Falklands by Argentina 
in April 1982. Openly belligerent language had 
been used by Argentine leaders for many years, 
but always dismissed as bluff in diplomatic 
assessments. 
2.6. Thus to say merely that Soviet defence 
planning aims at maintaining parity with the 
United States does not provide any useful indi-
cation of the way the Soviet Union might 
employ its armed forces in particular circums-
tances. Despite the inherent uncertainties, the 
Rapporteur will attempt in the final report to 
assemble a range of official opinion on Soviet 
intentions by addressing the following specific 
questions to national and allied authorities: 
(a) What intentions lie, or lay, behind the 
acquisition of the present forces and 
armaments of the Soviet Union: 
(i) territorial expansion? 
(ii) global power/influence projec-
tion? 
(iii) defence of its own and Warsaw 
Pact territory? 
(b) What opportunities does the Soviet 
Union believe its military capability 
gives it today: 
(i) in Europe? 
(ii) vis-a-vis the United States? 
(iii) globally for power/influence pro-
jection? 
2.7. Meanwhile in this preliminary report 
some initial general conclusions are drawn 
concerning Soviet intentions underlying the 
acquisition of present forces and armaments. 
2.8. Separate answers must be given to this 
question in respect of different classes of for-
ces. On its northern and western European 
fronts the Soviet Union has overwhelming 
conventional superiority in such equipment as 
artillery, tanks and aggregate numbers of combat 
aircraft, although the disadvantage to NATO is 
considerably attenuated when factors such as 
quality and training are applied to the crude 
numerical ratios. In this enormous armament 
effort, which can be traced back without inter-
ruption to the end of World War 11, the Soviet 
Union is generally believed to have been motiva-
ted by its experiences then, when its western ter-
ritory was overrun nearly to the Black Sea and 
the Caspian in battles which, as the leadership 
consistently dins into the heads of the younger 
generations, cost the Soviet Union 20 million 
dead. But the numbers of men and weapons 
have been built up far beyond the levels the 
Soviet Union would require to hold its protec-
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tive glacis of satellite Warsaw Pact states against 
the numerically inferior NATO forces on the 
central and northern fronts. 
2.9. Improbable though it seems to some wes-
tern observers, it is possible that at the time these 
forces and armaments were being acquired, ele-
ments in the Soviet leadership may have belie-
ved in the possibility of an attack launched by 
NATO forces which possessed considerable stra-
tegic and tactical nuclear superiority at the time 
the decisions were taken that led to the acquisi-
tion of the existing Soviet defence forces in Eur-
ope. It is now likely, as Soviet military doctrine 
prescribes, that in these superior forces the 
Soviet military leadership believes it has the 
capability to strike offensively if hostilities broke 
out, and to penetrate NATO defences to a suffi-
cient depth to seize and destroy many airfields 
and nuclear weapons stockpiles in the more 
advanced parts of the NATO front, hoping to do 
so before a political decision was taken by 
NATO to employ tactical nuclear weapons. This 
is not to say that the Soviet military leadership 
believes it has the ability to overcome in a few 
days or weeks the far from negligible NATO for-
ces which in the event of hostilities would be 
rapidly reinforced with the considerable reserves 
of tactical aviation from the United States. 
2.1 0. As far as its strategic nuclear forces are 
concerned, Soviet intentions in acquiring them 
can be assumed to be reaction to acquisition of 
such weapons systems by the United States, as 
shown by the timescale of numbers and entry 
into service of the different weapons systems 
shown in Appendix I. While a comparison of 
United States and Soviet strategic forces shows 
considerable asymmetry in different compo-
nents, showing in particular large Soviet superio-
rity in numbers ofiCBMs, the United States has 
at all times maintained superiority, today 
modest, but at times in the past overwhelming, 
in total numbers of strategic warheads. The 
situation today remains one of rough and fragile 
parity. 
2.11. It is unlikely that the Soviet military lea-
dership sees this situation as providing it with 
any more than the means of mutual assured des-
truction to deter a United States first strike. 
2.12. As far as the Soviet naval forces are 
concerned, which since 1963 have expanded dra-
matically from an essentially coastal force capa-
ble of protecting the seaward flanks of the land 
armies, to a force today equipped with modem 
vessels capable of operating anywhere in the 
oceans, albeit as yet in small numbers, the naval 
construction programme dates very clearly to the 
Cuban missile crisis with the United States. On 
this basis, the intention again is seen as a reac-
tion to the size of the United States fleet (and 
possibly to a lesser extent to the fleets of a few 
other NATO countries), and the options with 
which the fleet certainly provided President Ken-
nedy at the time of the crisis. 
2.13. The major units of the Soviet surface fleet 
today would certainly enable the Soviet leader-
ship to provide escorts for its shipping in most 
parts of the world, and thus place the onus for 
initiating the use of force on its opponents, if 
they sought to prevent the Soviet Union delive-
ring supplies to any of its allies. But the Soviet 
surface fleet is far from being able to initiate 
general naval hostilities against the combined 
fleets of the NATO countries with any hope of 
survival, let alone success - it has as yet no air-
craft-carriers for fixed-wing aircraft in service 
while the United States maintains some fourteen 
or fifteen. The fact that the first such Soviet air-
craft-carrier is nearing completion in the Black 
Sea conforms with the view that the Soviet 
Union is striving to acquire a degree of parity 
with the United States. 
2.14. As far as submarines are concerned, how-
ever, the considerable Soviet superiority and 
heavy investment in nuclear-propelled submari-
nes must reflect an intention to disrupt allied 
shipping in the oceans in the event of hostilities 
and to interfere with the NATO reinforcement 
convoys across the Atlantic. The large Soviet 
mining capability similarly poses a threat in 
European parts if not countered with more mine 
countermeasure vessels than the alliance now 
has. 
Ill. What comparison - what viewpoint? 
3.1. Significantly different conclusions can be 
drawn from a comparison of the United States 
with the Soviet Union on the one hand or of the 
whole of NATO with the Warsaw Pact on the 
other. The fifteen NATO allies of the United 
States make a much larger contribution in man-
power, economic strength and military forces 
and equipment than do the six Warsaw Pact 
allies ofthe Soviet Union. Again the viewpoint 
will affect the countries to be taken into account 
in a force comparison. Viewed from Washing-
ton or any European country, the Soviet Union 
is the major, if not the only, potential adver-
sary. Viewed from Moscow, the Soviet Union 
with its long land and sea frontiers must take 
account of China, other neighbours, and also 
Japan as well as the NATO countries in its force 
comparisons. The Soviet Union also sees itself 
confronted by four independent nuclear weapon 
powers. 
3.2. At Appendix II are tabular comparisons of 
some main strategic indicators considered in the 
next chapter. It is seen that depending on the 
groups of potential adversaries compared, very 
different ratios of advantage or inferiority could 
be adduced. Thus, in population terms, the 
Soviet Union is larger than the United States in 
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the ratio 1 to 0.9 whereas tM Warsaw Pact as a 
whole is inferior to the whole of NATO in the 
ratio of 1 to 1.5, and when the remaining poten-
tial adversaries of the Soviet Union are added to 
the NATO total, the Warsaw Pact is inferior in 
the ratio of nearly 1 to 5. Using the same com-
parisons for GNP expressed in dollars (with the 
reservations involved in the c;onversion process) 
the Soviet Union is inferior t~ the United States 
in the ratio of 1 to 1.8; the Warsaw Pact is infe-
rior to NATO as a whole in the ratio of 1 to 2.4, 
and inferior to NATO and all other potential 
adversaries of the Soviet Union in the ratio of 1 
to 3.1. 
3.3. When the defence efforlts are compared in 
the same way, the Soviet Union has a superiority 
over the United States in the tatio of 1 to 0.5 for 
armed forces and 1 to 0.8 for defence expendi-
ture. But the same ratios for the Warsaw Pact 
as a whole to NATO show the Warsaw Pact 
equal or inferior in the ratios 1 to 1.0 and 1 to 1.1 
respectively, and inferior to all potential adversa-
ries of the Soviet Union in the ratio of 1 to 1.9 
and 1 to 1.3. ' 
3.4. These comparisons are for 1983 and are 
based solely on official United States figures 
published annually in World Military Expenditu-
res and Arms Transfers with the reservations 
inherent in the dollar assessrpents of GNP and 
defence expenditure of the various countries 
concerned, discussed in the neKt chapter. While 
Soviet perceptions of security requirements must 
be borne in mind, " equal security " cannot be 
allowed to mean force levels comparable to the 
sum of those of all possible adversaries as the 
Soviet Union has at times claimed. 
IV. What to measure? 
(Chapter in outline only, 
to be drafted for final report) 
4.1. Resources (manpower and gross domestic 
product) can be measured as ,can defence input 
(the resources devoted to de~nce) and defence 
output (numbers of men and weapons sys-
tems). Although there are difficulties in compa-
ring the essentially capitalist economies of the 
West with the centrally directed economies of 
the Warsaw Pact, especially as the official statis-
tics of the latter may be suspeft, nevertheless an 
attempt can be made to measulre these quantities 
objectively. There remain other important fac-
tors such as geography and the quality of equip-
ment which are more difficult to quantify, but 
are still important in making a comparison of 
forces. 
4.2. Again, the date of introduction or rate of 
increase of particular weapons systems is often 
significant, especially in the arms control 
context. If one side is five years later than the 
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other in introducing a particular weapons sys-
tem, it will seek to complete its planned deploy-
ment before accepting any proposals to limit 
numbers of such systems. 
4.3. The report to be submitted to the next 
part-session will discuss these various factors 
and compare the existing force levels as revealed 
in national governmental and NATO publica-
tions as well as academic sources, stressing the 
importance of the agreed NATO assessments. 
V. Sources of information 
(Chapter in outline only, 
to be drafted for final report) 
5.1. With the development of surveillance 
technology involving both satellites and ground 
or ship based radio interception, what has 
become known as " national means of verifica-
tion " in the arms control context, coupled with 
such official publications as are available, have 
become by far the most important source of 
information for measuring the military capabi-
lity of an adversary. But the raw information 
derived from technological sources remains as 
closely guarded a national secret as that derived 
from traditional espionnage. Only one or two 
countries enjoy extensive resources for acquiring 
such information; it is not distributed through-
out the alliance, but there is some selective 
exchange of information on a bilateral basis bet-
ween a few of the NATO countries. Overwhel-
mingly, the United States has privileged access to 
raw information, but some other NATO coun-
tries are in a position to make significant contri-
butions of their own. This situation raises some 
problems concerning the reliance that can be pla-
ced gn information disseminated by one country 
which other countries are unable to confirm 
independently. 
5.2. Secondly, interpretation of raw data is a 
separate process, an inexact science that can offer 
different conclusions from the same data. 
5.3. The committee has stressed on a number 
of occasions the need for the European countries 
to possess better technological resources of their 
own for collecting raw information concerning 
military capabilities of an adversary, especially 
through observation satellites, so as to be able to 
make their own interpretations of the data collec-
ted. 
VI. Chemical weapons - a specific case 
6.1. The committee could not fail to notice 
over the years the way in which official state-
ments concerning levels of some weapons sys-
tems held by the Soviet Union have lacked 
consistency, and in some cases have ranged so 
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widely that their credibility is jeopardised. The 
size of the Soviet Union's chemical weapons 
stockpile is a case in point. 
6.2. In an earlier report the committee has 
chronicled United States statements concerning 
Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons in the 
years preceding President Nixon's decision in 
November 1969 to cease any further production 
of chemical weapons. Prior to that decision, 
United States estimates of the corresponding 
Soviet stockpile had ranged from one-fifth or 
one-sixth of the total Soviet ammunition stocks, 
but such claims were abandoned after the 1969 
decision, press reports then revealing that aerial 
photographs of storage sheds in the Soviet Union 
had been wrongly interpreted as chemical wea-
pons stores. 4 In that earlier report the Rappor-
teur noted simply that " in a recent briefing in 
the United States Department of Defence, the 
Rapporteur was given to understand that the 
United States today claims simply that Soviet 
stocks of chemical weapons are 'sufficient for 
their requirements' ... ". 5 
6.3. Similarly the present Rapporteur in the 
course of the discussions he held in preparing the 
report was informed by one authority that the 
country concerned did not know the levels of 
Soviet chemical stockpiles, and accordingly did 
not make any public statement concerning those 
levels. This attitude corresponds to that of the 
United States in official statements, as in the evi-
dence given by Mr. David Abshire, United States 
Permanent Representative to NATO, to the Stra-
tegic and Theatre Nuclear Forces Subcommittee 
of the Senate Armed Forces Committee on 1Oth 
April 1986: 
" The size of the Soviet chemical weapons 
stockpile is a point on which intelligence 
experts do not agree. That disagreement, 
however, should not be allowed to over-
shadow the fact that even the most conser-
vative estimates indicate Soviet stocks are 
several times greater than the usable por-
tion of the United States inventory. " 
What the " usable portion " of the United States 
inventory is here taken to be is not known. 6 
6.4. Despite this official caution in putting a 
figure to the size of the Soviet chemical weapons 
stockpile, in recent months the committee itself 
has heard from different officials estimates 
which have ranged from 100 000 tonnes (an 
unattributable remark in closed hearing) through 
the higher levels claimed in British public state-
4. Nuclear, chemical and biological protection, report sub-
mitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments by Mr. Banks, Rapporteur, Document 838, 
29th April 1980. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 
2.50 et seq. 
5. Idem, explanatory memorandum paragraph 2.50. 
6. See paragraphs 6.8 to 6.10 below. 
ments of 300 000 tonnes of chemical weapons 7 
to the almost certainly exaggerated claim made 
by Mr. Timothy Renton, United Kingdom 
Minister of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, in his address to the public ses-
sion of the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva on 15th July 1986 according to which: 
" The Soviet Union has responded by buil-
ding up a truly massive stockpile of chemi-
cal weapons, possibly approaching in total 
all chemical weapons produced by all 
other nations ever since chemical warfare 
first began ... " 8 
6.5. Estimates of chemical weapons stockpiles 
are further complicated by the distinction that 
must be drawn between the weight of chemical 
agent and the weight of filled ammunition which 
will range from 6. 7 times (aircraft bombs) to 
20 times (artillery shells) the weight of chemical 
agent contained in them 9. The figure of 
300 000 tonnes most frequently quoted in recent 
years originally applied to filled ammunition and 
would correspond to something like 30 000 ton-
nes of contained agent, but this distinction is not 
always made, perhaps not always understood, by 
ministers in their public statements. Even offi-
cial reports, updated presumably by civil ser-
vants, reveal this confusion because British 
defence white papers, which in 1983 referred to 
Soviet " chemical weapons ... already assessed to 
be over 300 000 tonnes ... ", have since 1984 
referred to " 300 000 tonnes of nerve agent... " 10• 
This could correspond to something like 3 mil-
lion tonnes or more of filled ammunition equi-
valent. 
6.6. Of course, the Soviet Union has provided 
no public information of its own on the levels of 
chemical stockpiles, and indeed has only recently 
admitted publicly that it possessed any at all -
and then only tacitly in accepting proposals for 
destruction of its existing stockpiles in the course 
of negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. 
Unlike strategic nuclear missiles, chemical wea-
pons do not lend themselves to identification by 
observation satellite. It is therefore very diffi-
cult to assess levels of Soviet chemical weapons, 
but it appears that several different approaches 
have been used to produce the divergent figures 
of the previous paragraphs. One approach is 
through assumptions concerning the proportion 
7. See for example Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in his address 
to the Assembly on 4th December 1984, official report, page 
117. 
8. Final record of the 307th plenary meeting of the Confe-
rence on Disarmament, CD/PV 370, page 8, 15th July 1986. 
9. See for example Red God of War, Soviet Artillery and 
Rocket Forces, Chris Bellamy, Publ. Brassey's 1986, pages 
172-3. 
10. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986, Volume I, 
Annex A, paragraph 14, (Cmnd. 9763-1). Compare with 1983 
edition, paragraph 408 (Cmnd. 8951-1). 
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of chemical weapons held in the total Soviet 
ammunition stockpiles. The other approach is 
to assess assumed Soviet requirements for offen-
sive operations based on available literature on 
Soviet artillery applications which discusses 
quantities of chemical weapons which would be 
required to attack particular targets. Yet ano-
ther is to try to assess the likely production capa-
city of known chemical weapon production 
plants and then to calculate the maximum 
amount of chemical agent that could have been 
produced if the plants had b~en run at full capa-
city from the date of their construction to the 
present time. 
6. 7. Official allied statements about Soviet 
stockpiles would be more credible if they were 
more consistent; if they made some reference to 
the assumptions on which the assessment was 
based; and probably if they Were expressed as a 
possible range between a high and a low limit. 
The committee feels that ministers should resist 
the temptation to call for spectacular estimates in 
order to make a political point - it is not dispu-
ted that the Soviet Union holds stocks of chemi-
cal weapons that could be quite large; the unvar-
nished facts concerning the efTects of nerve gases 
are stark enough in themselves. 
6.8. In contrast to the speculation about Soviet 
stockpiles, the level of existing United States che-
mical weapons has not recently been publicised 
in terms of total stockpile, but over the years 
considerable information has been made public 
officially, in particular in congressional hear-
ings. The committee has . previously drawn 
attention to the academic estimate, shown in the 
table, of United States stockpiles based on such 
public information. 
6. 9. The table shows a total: of 30 880 tonnes of 
chemical agent in existence, (not counting the 
planned binary production).· If the multipliers 
referred to above concerning the amount of che-
mical agent contained respectively in artillery 
shells, aircraft bombs, etc., is applied to that 
figure an estimate of the United States stockpile 
is then 342 000 tonnes of filled ammunition 
equivalent, inclusive of the ~eight of ammuni-
tion that could be filled from the chemical agent 
in bulk storage. 
6.10. Some of this stockpile is known to be 
obsolete at the present time, not so much 
because of deterioration of the chemical agent, 
but because the weapons systems for which it 
was designed have largely bden withdrawn from 
service - this applies parti<~:ularly to 105 mm 
Howitzer rounds. Thus adjusted for obsolete 
and deteriorated ammunition shown in the 
table, and deducting all 105 mm rounds, the ope-
rationally usable United States stockpile is pro-
bably 282 000 tonnes of filled ammunition equi-
valent. 
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American chemical weapons: estimates from open sources 
Item 
GB nerve-gas munitions for in-service weapons 
Number 
held 
Tons of 
agent fill 
105 mm howitzer rounds ....................................................... . 900 000 
200 000 
13000 
750 
850 
I 300 
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds ............................................... . 
500 lb and 70 lb aircraft bombs ................................................. . 
VX nerve-gas munitions for in-service weapons 
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds ............................................... . 300 000 950 
630 2 000 lb aircraft spraytanks ..................................................... . 900 
Mustard gas munitions for m-service weapons 
4.2 in mortar rounds ........................................................... . 470000 
480000 
300 000 
I 400 
105 mm howitzer rounds ....................................................... . 700 
I 700 155 mm howitzer rounds ....................................................... . 
Munitions deteriorated beyond repair, obsoleted, or for weapons no longer in service 
115 mm rockets ................................................................ . 480 000 
320 000 
2 500 
1400 Leakers, land-mines and 155 mm gun rounds .................................... . 
Unweaponised agent held in bulk storage 
I ton drums of GB nerve gas ................................................... . 
I ton drums of VX nerve gas ................................................... . 
5 700 
2 300 
14000 
4300 
I 800 
12 600 I ton drums of mustard gas ..................................................... . 
Planned binary-munition acquisition quantities 
155 mm howitzer rounds, binary GB ............................................ . 
500 lb aircraft spraybombs, binary VX ........................................... . 
410000 
44000 
? 
I 700 
4100 
? 227 mm MLRS rocket warheads, binary GD (?) .................................. . 
Note: Of the total tonnage held of mustard and nerve gases, 93.3% IS tn the Untted States, 1.4% m West Germany, and 5.3% on Johnston Atoll in the Pact fie. The holdmgs 
in Germany constitute some 17% by agent weight of all of the avatlable nerve-gas howttzer ammunition. 
Source: Julian Perry Robinson in Sussex University ADIU report, September-October 1985. 
VII. Conclusions 
7 .1. In conclusion in this preliminary report 
the committee notes that many governmental 
and NATO publications provide a sound basis of 
force comparison, but that on some particular 
points, such as that examined in Chapter VI, sta-
tements by national authorities can be inconsis-
tent if not contradictory. The alliance needs an 
agreed consistent policy on threat assessment, 
and in particular on the public presentation of 
it. There is much information available for 
those who seek it on the levels of allied forces 
and equipment, but the inherent secrecy of the 
Soviet Union about all aspects of government, 
but more particularly about its military forces, 
means that the alliance must devote some effort 
to publicising also the levels of Soviet forces and 
equipment. NATO itself does not possess any 
intelligence sources of its own, being dependent 
solely on national inputs. 
7.2. The committee stresses the need for public 
presentation of the Soviet defence effort to be 
consistent and objective. Without concealing 
the large numerical superiority of certain Soviet 
forces, it must take account of Soviet perceptions 
both of the threat the Soviet Union believes it 
faces, and of the capabilities it believes its own 
forces to possess in the face of those of potential 
adversaries. It must take account of the histori-
cal reasons which led to the present accumula-
tion of Soviet forces and armaments. 
7.3. Although the committee does not believe 
that the Soviet Union is bent on aggression 
today, it also believes that the numerical superio-
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rity of the conventional forces of the Soviet 
Union in the Central European region is desi-
gned to give them the ability to advance into 
NATO-held territory and to seize at least key 
objectives; similarly, the numerical superiority of 
the Soviet submarine fleet must give it a signifi-
cant capability to disrupt allied shipping in the 
event of hostilities. On the other hand, the 
unremitting growth in Soviet strategic nuclear 
forces and surface naval forces, appears to result 
from Soviet reaction to historically larger wes-
tern forces. These forces are unlikely to be seen 
by the Soviet Union as giving it more than an 
ability on the one hand to deter an initial first 
strike by western nuclear forces and on the other 
to demonstrate the right of the Soviet Union to 
be present in the oceans of the world. 
7.4. Within NATO there are agreed procedures 
for presenting a reasonably objective picture of 
force comparisons between NATO and the War-
saw Pact. But a Greek-Turkish dispute invol-
ving the declaration of Greek forces on one 
Aegean island has prevented any revision of the 
NATO publication since 1984. Moreover the 
exclusion of French and Spanish forces detracts 
from the objectivity of the publication. While 
those forces are not now in the integrated mili-
tary structure of NATO, both governments 
maintain they would be available to the alliance 
in the event of Soviet aggression. Objectivity 
thus requires their inclusion in NATO force 
comparisons. 
7.5. In the preliminary draft recommendation 
the committee urges that the Assembly recom-
mend that allied governments in their public pre-
sentation of the threat should draw on the agreed 
NATO force comparisons to give a more consis-
tent presentation of the levels of Soviet forces 
compared objectively with corresponding allied 
forces, and that the political obstacles to a more 
useful and objective presentation of force com-
parisons by NATO should be removed. 
7.6. The committee finds a clear political case 
for independent European technical data sources 
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such as observation satellites and electronic liste-
ning posts, but recognises that the opinion of 
defence ministries is divided. It recommends 
therefore that the Council give active considera-
tion to this need. 
7.7. The committee intends to report further 
on the subject of the present report to the first 
part-session of the Assembly in 1987. 
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APPENDIX I 
A. United States and Soviet Union 
historical levels of strategic nuclear weapons 
1960 1961 1962 1963 
Unzted States 
ICBMs • • • • • • • • 0 • 18 63 294 424 
SLBMs 
·········· 
32 96 144 224 
Heavy bombers .. 450 550 600 630 
Total vehicles .... 500 709 I 038 1278 
Warheads: 
on ICBMs ....... 18 63 294 424 
on SLBMs ....... 32 96 144 224 
on bombers ...... I 800 2200 2 400 2 520 
Total weapons ... I 850 2 359 2 838 3168 
Sovzet Unzon 
ICBMs . . . . . . . . . . 35 50 75 100 
SLBMs 
·········· 
0 (20)* (50)* 100 
Heavy bombers .. 175 190 190 190 
Total vehicles .... 210 260 315 390 
Warheads: 
on ICBMs ....... 35 50 75 100 
on SLBMs ....... 0 (20)* (50)* 100 
on bombers ...... 175 190 190 190 
Total weapons ... 210 260 315 390 
Related events ... 
* Figures in brackets are approximate interpolations. 
Related events 
(I) SALT negotiations begin 17th November 1969 
1964 1965 1966 
834 854 904 
416 496 592 
630 630 600 
I 880 1980 2096 
834 854 904 
416 496 592 
2 520 2 520 2 400 
3 770 3 870 3 896 
200 270 300 
120 120 125 
190 190 200 
510 580 625 
200 270 300 
120 120 125 
190 190 200 
510 580 625 
(2) Initial United States deployment MIRVs on ICBMs and SLBMs 
(3) Initial United States deployment SRAM on bombers 
(4) SALT I and ABM treaty Slglled 26th May 1972 
(5) Imtial Soviet deployment MIRV on ICBMs 
(6) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on SLBMs 
(7) SALT 11 signed 18th June 1979 
(8) Initial United States deployment ALCMs on bombers 
(9) Initial Sov1et deployment ALCMs on bombers 
Sources. 
1960..1969; 1985 - various editions of IISS M1litary Balance 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1973 1975 
I 054 I 054 I 054 I 054 I 054 I 054 I 054 
656 656 656 656 656 656 656 
540 545 450 465 435 397 330 
2250 2 255 2 160 2 175 2145 2 107 2040 
I 054 I 054 I 054 I 074 I 274 I 754 2 !54 
656 656 656 800 1664 3 824 4688 
2 160 2180 I 800 I 860 I 740 2088 2 220 
3 870 3 890 3 510 3 734 4678 7 666 9062 
460 800 I 050 1427 1489 I 547 1607 
130 130 160 289 401 589 741 
210 !50 !50 145 145 145 145 
800 I 080 I 360 I 861 2035 2281 2493 
460 800 I 050 I 427 1489 I 547 I 937 
130 130 160 289 401 589 741 
210 !50 !50 145 145 145 145 
800 I 080 I 360 I 861 2035 2 281 2 823 
(I) (2) m (5) 
1977 1979 
I 054 I 054 
656 656 
316 316 
2026 2026 
2154 2 154 
5 120 5120 
2 414 2414 
9 688 9 688 
1477 1398 
970 989 
145 145 
2 592 2 532 
2407 4187 
1130 I 309 
145 145 
3 682 5641 
(6) (7) 
1970..1979 - US-Soviet Military Balance 1970..1981, John M. Collins, Umted States Congressional Research Service, October 1981 
1981-1984 - US-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985, John M. Collins, United States Congressional Research Service, March 1985 
Notes on counting rules 
APPENDIX I 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
I 052 I 049 I 040 I 030 
512 520 568 592 
316 299 241 241 
1880 I 868 I 849 I 863 
2 !52 2149 2140 2130 
4 752 4 800 5 152 5344 
3 372 3 304 3200 3 744 
10276 10253 10492 11 218 
I 398 I 398 I 398 I 398 
I 017 969 961 946 
145 145 145 173 
2 560 2 512 2 504 2 517 
5 302 5 862 6420 6 420 
I 849 I 865 1957 2122 
580 580 580 792 
7 731 8 307 8 957 9 334 
(8) (9) 
Only weapons counted in the SALT treaties are included: ICBMs; SLBMs; United States B-52 and 
Soviet Tu-95 and Mya-4 bombers. All such bombers in service are counted as carrying nuclear weapons, 
even if operationally assigned to a non-nuclear role (as 61 B-52s are), because they are counted as 
nuclear-capable for the purposes of the treaties. 
Data from the different sources are fairly consistent for numbers of missiles and their warheads. 
The numbers of nuclear weapons carried on a bomber can vary widely however, and have increased 
with the introduction of the United States SRAM and ALCM, and the Soviet equivalent. Weapon-
counting rules applied to all data for bombers are as follows: 
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1985 
I 026 
616 
241 
1883 
2126 
5 536 
3 792 
11454 
I 398 
979 
170 
2 547 
6420 
2 787 
780 
9987 
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Aircraft Total number of nuclear weapons per aircraft 
1960-1971 1972-1982 1983-1985 
B-52 (all other) • 0. 0 •••• 0 ••• 0 0 0 0. 0 0 •• 4 4 -
B-52G with SRAM ••••••• 0 0. 0 0 •• 0. 0 - 12 12 
B-52G with ALCM 0. 0 ••••••••• 0 0 •• 0 - - 20 
B-52H with SRAM - 14 I 14 0. 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 0 0 0 0. 
Tu-95 •••••• 0. 0 •••• 0 0 •••••• 0 •• 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 4 
Tu-95 (Bear H) with ALCM •••• 0 •• 0. - - 8 
Mya-4 •••• 0. 0 0 0 0. 0. 0 •••••• 0 •• 0 ••• 0. 1 4 4 
These counting rules are those used by Collins in the sources quoted, except fc.r 1983 to 1985 for 
which IISS Military Balance 1985-86 is the source for United States ALCMs. 
The effect of these rules is to overstate the numbers of nuclear weapons that could be delivered 
operationally, but they derive implicitly from the SALT treaties and provide an objective basis of com-
parison. 
Numbers of 
weapons 
B. United States and Soviet Union 
historical trend of total numbers of strategic nuclear weapons 1960-1985 
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 
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1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 8l 82 83 84 85 
Related events (1)(2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8)(9) 
Related events 
(I) SALT negotiations begm 17th November 1969 
(2) Initial Umted States deployment MIRVs on ICBMs and SLBMs 
(3) Initial United States deployment SRAM on bombers 
(4) SALT I and ABM treaty signed 26th May 1972 
(5) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on ICBMs 
(6) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on SLBMs 
(7) SALT II signed 18th June 1979 
(8) Initial United States deployment ALCMs on bombers 
(9) Initial Soviet deployment ALCMs on bombers 
(4) 
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APPENDIX II 
Ratio of strategic indicators for different assumptions - 1983 
Resources Defence effort 
Population GNP Armed forces Defence 
m. $b. thousands expenditure Sb. 
United States 
···································· 
234.5 3 298 2 222 217.2 
WEU 
··········································· 
253.7 2 357.4 2 119 92.0 
Rest of NATO 
··································· 
103.4 538.6 I 246 15.9 
Total NATO .................................... 591.6 6 194 5 587 325.1 
Other potential adversaries of USSR 
Iran 
············································· 
42.5 110.1 470 5.5 
Pakistan ......................................... 94.1 36.6 584 2.0 
China ........................................... I 020.9 401.0 4 100 34.5 
Japan 
··········································· 
119.3 I 137.8 241 11.5 
Total other potential adversaries .................. I 276.8 I 685.5 5 395 53.5 
Total NATO and other potential adversaries ....... I 868.4 7 879.5 10982 378.6 
USSR 
··········································· 
272.5 I 843.4 4400 258.0 
Rest of Warsaw Pact 
····························· 
110.9 720.6 1410 41.8 
Total Warsaw Pact 
······························· 
383.4 2 564 5 810 299.8 
Mongolia 
········································ 
1.8 1.9 38 0.2 
Total Warsaw Pact+ Mongolia 
··················· 
385.2 2 566 5 848 300.0 
Ratios: 
USSR: United States ~ ............................. 1:0.9 1:1.8 1:0.5 1:0.8 
Warsaw Pact: NATO ............................. 1:1.5 1:2.4 1:1.0 1:1.1 
Warsaw Pact + Mongolia: 
NATO + other potential adversaries 
··············· 
1:4.9 1:3.1 1:1.9 1:1.3 
Source: Absolute data from World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfen 1985, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (except defence expen<hture and 
GNP for Mongolia from IISS Military Balance 1986). 
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Amendment 1 
Threat assessment 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Antoni and others 
1st December 1986 
1. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from " aware that the 
Soviet Union " to the end of the paragraph and insert: ' 
"assuming that the Soviet Union has retained numerical superiority in submarines and in con-
ventional forces in the central region, but that it has more recently agreed to the mass destruction 
of nuclear weapons and the zero option for medium-range weapons in Europe and that it has 
withdrawn a large number of missiles and destroyed launchers in Northern Europe;" 
Signed: Antoni, Rubbi,1 Pollidoro, Gianotti 
I. See 9th sitting, 1st December 1986 (consideration of the report deferred). 
195 
Document 1076 
Amendment 2 
Threat assessment 
AMENDMENT 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
1st December 1986 
2. Redraft the beginning of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper as follows: 
"2. Urge the governments of member countries: 
(a) to draw as far possible, in their public statements on the balance of forces, on analyses 
based on objective studies such as those published by specialised institutions such as 
SIPRI and the IISS as much as those of NATO; " 
I. See 9th sitting, 1st December 1986 (consideration of the report deferred). 
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Signed: Dejardin 
Document 1076 
Amendment 3 
Threat assessment 
AMENDMENT 3 1 
tabled by MM. Hardy and Stoffelen 
lst December 1986 
3. After paragraph 2 (c) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows: 
" to ensure that the Assembly and individual member states refuse to endorse or approve of any 
disregard of the obligations contained in existing international agreements or those which are 
embodied in draft agreements which could assist in the pursuit of reduced tension; " 
I. See 9th sitting, 1st December 1986 (consideration of the report deferred). 
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Document 1077 3rd November 1986 
European helicopters for the 1990s 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 2 
by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on European helicopters for the 1990s 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur 
I. Soviet threat and battlefield experience 
11. Helicopters now in service due for replacement in the near future 
Ill. The European helicopter market and its future prospects 
IV. Co-operation in arms production 
V. Helicopter programmes now under development in Europe 
VI. Developments in United States technology for the 1990s 
VII. Future rotorcraft development and their significance for Europe 
VIII. Should the WEU nations meet their helicopter needs on an alliance basis or 
on a basis of European autonomy? 
IX. The Westland affair and its aftermath 
X. Conclusions 
I. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 with I abstention. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Wilkinson (Chairman); MM. Bassi net, Beysen (Vice-Chairmen); MM. A arts, Adriaensens, 
Bohm, Colajanni (Alternate: Gianottl), Fiandrotti, Fourre (Alternate: Prat), Garrett (Alternate: Parry), Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. 
Hengel, Lenzer, McGuire (Alternate: Sir John Osborn), Mezzapesa, Schmidt, Sinesio (Alternate: Cavaliere), Souvet, Spies van 
Bullesheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Valleix, Worrell. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are prmted in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European helicopters for the 1990s 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising the failure of West European armies to exploit fully the military potential ofthe heli-
copter, especially compared to the emphasis placed upon helicopter operations by the armies of the 
United States and the Soviet Union; 
(ii) Aware of the need to harmonise more closely operational doctrines for the utilisation of helicop-
ters in Western Europe and to meet more effectively the challenge posed by the helicopter preponder-
ance of the Warsaw Pact forces; 
(iii) Stressing the need for harmonising the requirements and re-equipment timescales for helicopters 
by NATO; 
(iv) Conscious of the commercial difficulties of helicopter manufacturers in Western Europe and the 
negligible market for civil helicopters in Europe compared to the United States; 
(v) Concerned at the relative industrial and technical advantages enjoyed by the United States heli-
copter industry owing to the economies of scale of the large military market for helicopters within the 
United States; 
(vi) Regretting that European co-operation in the helicopter field has not been more successful, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Concert a strategy for the future of the helicopter industry in the member states ofWEU based on 
transnational co-operation; 
2. Impress forcefully upon the western alliance the benefits of firepower against armour, mobility, 
surprise and flexibility of operation inherent in the helicopter; 
3. Tackle vigorously the problems of overcapacity, short production runs for military helicopters 
and poor profitability which characterise the West European helicopter industry; 
4. Secure a co-ordinated programme through the IEPG, but reporting progress to this Assembly, to 
harmonise helicopter doctrines and operational requirements with a view to ensuring the joint procure-
ment within the alliance of more helicopters, but of fewer types; 
5. Meet the industrial and technical challenge to European helicopter manufacturers posed by the 
United States, not by a policy of exclusion of American rotorcraft or investment, but by encouraging the 
governments of WEU member countries to give the European helicopter industry adequate support in 
terms of orders; 
6. Work with the Assembly to create a political will within the member states favourable to interna-
tional and especially European collaboration and against the protectionist and parochial nationalistic 
pressures in the helicopter field as in other key areas of high technology and industry of strategic impor-
tance. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. Soviet threat and battlefield experience 
1. Since the introduction of the helicopter 
into military aviation in large numbers in the 
Korean war and full exploitation in the Vietnam 
conflict, there has never been any doubt about its 
practical usefulness for many purposes. Never-
theless, for a long time Western European coun-
tries have been very slow to appreciate the 
potential of the helicopter and for far too long 
they have been reluctant to assign front-line bat-
tle missions to helicopters. Not altogether with-
out reason, they were considered too vulnerable, 
especially in the European theatre, and conse-
quently they were to be used primarily for secon-
dary missions such as transport, casualty evacua-
tion and troop supply in the battlefield 
area. The European members of NATO have 
yet to develop and deploy dedicated anti-tank 
helicopters in large numbers, even though the 
main threat they face is from the armoured divi-
sions of the Warsaw Pact. 
2. In recent years, developments in Soviet 
military doctrine and the outcome of several 
recent conflicts have forcibly made these coun-
tries change their point of view. However, it is 
a belated conversion. Both industrially and 
militarily the West Europeans have much 
ground to catch up in this field. 
Soviet military doctrine 
3. On the one hand, Soviet military doctrine, 
considering mobility as one of the key elements 
in any future major land battle, has increasingly 
been widening the variety of operations in which 
helicopters play a decisive part. Full use of heli-
copters is especially made in combating tanks, 
providing air transport capability and assisting 
with flexible fire support in the battlefield and 
beyond. The number of helicopters possessed 
by the Soviet Union has been estimated at 7 050 
of which some 760 are deployed in East Ger-
many. 
4. Consequently, Soviet helicopters have 
nearly always been armed. Nowadays, all 
Soviet helicopters can be considered to be gen-
eral purpose machines which can be used for 
troop/cargo carrying, observation, in ground-
attack modes and in anti-tank operations with-
out any change or addition to their inbuilt basic 
were able to reinforce their land forces, flying 
very low and undetected by enemy radar. Bri-
tish helicopters not only performed their classical 
anti-submarine role but also played a key role in 
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air to enable crews to operate for a short time in 
contaminated areas. 
5. The main combat helicopters currently in 
service in the Warsaw pact forces are the Mi-8 
Hip and the Mi-24 Hind in various configura-
tions. Most of them are armed with AT-2, AT-3 
and AT-6 anti-armour missiles, rockets and vari-
ous calibres of gun or cannon. Ofthese two, the 
Hind is not only an effective anti-tank weapon, 
but can also be used as a high-speed nap-of-the-
earth tank and is capable of destroying opposing 
helicopters in air-to-air combat also. 
6. The new Soviet attack helicopter Mi-28 
Havoc, currently entering limited service, is 
smaller and lighter than the Mi-24 Hind, has 
considerably improved agility and survivability 
and is specifically armed for air-to-air 
combat. This helicopter matches the United 
States army's AH-64A A~ache, which entered 
service in 1984. 
7. The Soviet Union is now testing the new 
Kamov Hokum combat helicopter with coaxial 
contrarotating main rotors whose duties include 
attack and air-to-air anti-helicopter combat. The 
West has no comparable helicopters exactly in 
this class. 
Outcome of recent conflicts 
8. Some of the most interesting early lessons 
of the military potential of helicopters were 
derived in jungle warfare in Malaya and Borneo 
as well as in other decolonisation conflicts such 
as Oman. However, in retent years helicopters 
have been engaged in conventional combat 
between regular armies during the Falklands war, 
the conflict between Syria and Israel in Lebanon 
in 1982 and the Iran-Iraq war. Although all 
these conflicts have been of a very different 
nature there is no disagree~ent that the helicop-
ter has had an important role to play, particu-
larly so in Operation Corporate in the South 
Atlantic in 1982. 
Falklands conflict 
9. In the Falklands war, helicopters proved 
to be extremely useful as a means of transporta-
tion - very often the only one. During the Brit-
ish blockade of the islands, Argentine helicopters 
were able to reinforce their land forces, flying 
very low and undetected by enemy radar. British 
helicopters not only performed their classical 
anti-submarine role but also played a key role in 
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transport mtsstons, initially for reconnaissance 
and sabotage squads which prepared landings 
and later for amphibious operations, when they 
helped troops land beyond natural obstacles 
which would have prevented such operations if 
helicopters had not been available. Owing to 
the boggy and undulating nature of the ground 
and lack of roads, helicopters were practically the 
only means of tactical and logistic transporta-
tion. Half of all the missions took place at night 
time because of the serious anti-air threat. Even 
the artillery barrage before the final assault on 
Port Stanley was made possible only by virtue of 
the helicopter-borne supply of shells. 
10. The main lessons drawn by the British 
were that helicopter crews should preferably be 
issued with equipment for night operations and 
that the aircraft should be better protected 
against portable ground-air missiles and anti-
aircraft artillery. A friend-or-foe identification 
system was considered to be very useful. The 
question of which service actually operates the 
helicopter is of less importance than availability 
and numbers. The loss of all the British Chi-
nook medium-lift helicopters except one when 
the Atlantic Conveyor transport was sunk was a 
serious blow to the campaign. 
Lebanon 
11. During the first days of the Israeli advance 
in the Bekaa valley, Syrian Gazelle helicopters 
successfully engaged Israeli armoured vehicles 
with Hot missiles. It is estimated that in these 
surprise attacks the 40 Syrian Gazelles destroyed 
between 50 and 100 armoured vehicles. Later, 
the Israeli forces were better prepared against 
this threat and destroyed some 30 Gazelles in 
air-ground attacks and with shoulder-launched 
Redeye missiles and 12. 7mm or 20mm calibre 
weapons. The Gazelle was vulnerable to a vigi-
lant enemy air defence, particularly because of its 
significant infrared signature. Furthermore the 
crew needed better armour protection. Israeli 
forces have used Tow missiles fired from heli-
copters against tanks and armoured vehicles. On 
hilly ground, however, use of the AH-1 G/S 
Huey Cobra's 20mm rotating gun proved to be 
even more effective. In this campaign logistic 
transport by helicopter and heli-borne resupply 
were very important as well. 
Iraq-Iran 
12. At the beginning of the war in 1984, both 
Iraq and Iran had a large helicopter force at their 
disposal which proved effective in destroying 
enemy tanks with Hot and Tow missiles. So 
dominant proved these helicopter-launched mis-
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siles that it was soon found that tanks could 
safely advance only at night. Again the 20mm 
rotating gun of the Cobra has proved to be a con-
siderable anti-tank weapon. Iraq's Gazelles and 
Iran's Cobras have also been engaged in air-to-air 
combat. 
Conclusions 
13. In all the conflicts mentioned, several 
types of helicopters have been employed under 
differing weather conditions and in a variety of 
terrain for a wide range of missions. 
14. The helicopter has once again confirmed 
its position as a very important if not indispensa-
ble means of personnel and logistic support 
transport. However, the vulnerability of trans-
port helicopters, in particular to ground-air mis-
siles and other anti-aircraft defence in the frontal 
zone, is significant. This vulnerability has to be 
diminished by tactical operation and technical 
means. 
15. Anti-tank helicopters, armoured with 
second-generation Hot and Tow missiles are 
very effective in the framework of a surprise 
attack, counter attack or against disorganised 
enemy units. However, once the enemy adopts 
an active response or the front stabilises, most 
existent utility helicopters with a secondary anti-
tank capability are very vulnerable and their effi-
ciency diminishes. Specialised anti-tank heli-
copters such as the AH-1 Cobra with a 
rapid-firing cannon and missiles are far superior 
to anti-tank modifications of utility helicopters 
such as the Alouette Ill, Gazelle, B0-1 05 and 
Lynx, which are not armoured, have no cannon 
and a considerable infrared signature. The spe-
cialised attack helicopter can easily thwart the 
use of anti-tank helicopters which are not equip-
ped with protection or self-defence. 
16. In the immediate future, all existing light 
scout, liaison, utility and attack helicopters 
should be equipped with self-defence weapons. 
1 7. In general, new helicopters now under 
development should be capable of operating at 
night and in poor visibility. They should be 
equipped with advanced systems for navigation, 
observation and fire control. A friend-or-foe 
identification system, armour for the most vul-
nerable parts and weaponry for self-defence are 
indispensable. Attack helicopters should be 
equipped with weapons other than anti-tank mis-
siles for attacking ground targets. It may even 
be necessary to use air-support helicopters to 
accompany anti-tank helicopters in battle. Tra-
ditional air force doctrines of air superiority are 
not fully applicable to the rotary-wing air-land 
battle. The Soviets in particular recognise the 
merits of dedicated anti-helicopter helicopters. 
II. Helicopters now in service due for 
replacement in the near future 
18. According to the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies' latest assessment (The Military 
Countnes Army 
Belgium .................... 61 Alouette 11 
Great Britain ............... 40 Scout; 
9 Alouette HC, 
155 Gazelle AH-1, 
110 Lynx AH-1, 
4 Agusta A-109 
France ..................... 187 Alouette 11 
68 Alouette Ill 
130 Puma SA-330 
162 SA-341F Gazelle 
109 SA-342M Gazelle 
Federal Republic of Germany 187 UH- ID 
148 Alouette Ill 
211 PAH-1 (B0-105P with Hot) 
96 B0-105M 
105 CH-53G 
Italy ....................... 70 AB-47G/J 
5 AB-109 
18 AB-204B 
100 AB-205A 
140 AB-206A/Al Hirundo 
14 AB-212 
24 CH-47C Chinook 
on order: 60 A-129 Mongoose 
Luxembourg ................ -
Netherlands ................ 64 Alouette Ill 
29 B0-105 
With the exception of the A-129 Mongoose com-
bat helicopter coming into service in the Italian 
army from the beginning of 1987, practically all 
helicopters now in service in WEU member 
countries no longer fully meet the requirements 
for successful operation on the contemporary 
battlefield. The majority are Alouettes, Lynxes 
and Gazelles in various configurations, while a 
considerable number of B0-1 05, AB-205 and 
206 helicopters can also be found. In fact they 
all lack one or more of the essential operational 
qualities and technical characteristics mentioned 
in the conclusions in the previous chapter. Fur-
thermore, there are differences of tradition 
within the western alliance on service responsi-
bility for the operation of helicopters. Most 
NATO nations assign all battlefield helicopters 
to the army. Canada and Norway do so to the 
air force (as do the Soviet Union and Israel). The 
United Kingdom and Greece have a split system 
with the allocation of battlefield support helicop-
ters divided between the air force and army. 
Unity of command and control of all rotorcraft 
assets is certainly advantageous, but this has to 
be set against ensuring the most cost-effective 
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Balance 1985-86), a wide variety of helicopters is 
currently in service in Western European 
countries. The following table gives the figures 
for the member states of WEU: 
Navy Air force 
3 Allouette Ill 5 Sea King 
3 HSS-1 (S58) 
104 Sea King 56 Wessex 
46 Lynx 30 Chinook 
32 Wasp 31 Puma 
41 Wessex 14 Sea King 
19 Gazelle 22 Gazelle 
5 Whirlwind 
26 Lynx 72 Alouette 
15 Super Frelon 27 Puma 
38 Alouette 15 Dauphin 
12 Sea Lynx 96 UH-ID 
22 Sea King 
30 SH-30 Sea King 20 CH-3 
53 AB-212 2 SH-30 
23 AB-204 
18 A.B-212 
20 AB-47 
- -
22 Lynx 4 Alouette 
arrangements between the services for manning, 
training and logistic support. 
19. The main categories of helicopters for 
which large production orders can be expected 
are: 
(i) battlefield helicopters for anti-armour 
warfare and air-to-air combat; 
(ii) support helicopters for transport, 
observation, recoq.naissance, casualty 
evacuation and t*oop supply in the 
battlefield area; 1 
(iii) naval helicopters ifor anti-submarine 
and anti-surface-vessel warfare, sur-
veillance and tracking, search and res-
cue and amphibious operations. 1 
I. Other important tasks which can be assigned to helicop-
ters are: airborne early warning, rapid movement of weapons 
systems about the battlefield, logistics and resupply, surveil-
lance and swift concentration of troops and firepower in out-
of-area operations. 
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Ill. The European helicopter market and its 
future prospects 
20. At the moment the helicopter industry is 
far from flourishing owing to a serious recession 
in the market for civil helicopters not compen-
sated for by extra military orders. The offshore 
section is feeling the full effect of the Gulf war, 
the fall in the price of oil and the inevitable drop 
in oil and gas exploration work. Alternative 
promising developments in the Indian Ocean 
and South China Seas have not been 
fulfilled. Onshore, the development of 
passenger-carrying helicopter traffic continues to 
stagnate because many people believe that the 
creation of public heliports, especially in densely-
populated areas, will increase noise, disturbance 
and public safety risks. Many business users do 
not yet feel the need for helicopter point-to-point 
travel, while city planners do not want to give 
away expensive real estate for landing pads in the 
city centre. 
21. In these adverse commercial circum-
stances, helicopter manufacturers have seriously 
begun to address the problem of noise and to 
make the helicopter more acceptable in the eyes 
of the public. There is still an expanding mar-
ket for emergency medical service, but the eco-
nomics of helicopter transport operations are not 
so clearly favourable as to outweigh the benefits 
of high-speed rail and motorway links in Europe 
or even conventional short-haul airliner 
services. 
22. Taking all this into account, it is obvious 
that the helicopter industry is eagerly looking for-
ward to future military orders involving some 
1 700 helicopters in Western Europe. However, 
problems of agreeing specifications, research and 
development costs, and filling spare helicopter 
man~facturing capacity now are exceedingly 
pressmg. 
Helicopter re-equipment requirements 
23. Practically all the countries mentioned 
above are engaged in programmes for replace-
ment of helicopters for their armed forces. As a 
result European helicopter manufacturers will 
undoubtedly have to adjust themselves to the 
new market situation. In view of the extremely 
high research and development costs of any pro-
gramme for an entirely new helicopter, European 
industry will have to work more 
coherently. Even though plain statistics do not 
reveal the whole truth, it might be mentioned 
that the United States company Sikorsky, a sub-
sidiary of the large United Technologies Corpo-
ration, is employing 12 400 persons and has 
more business than all the European manufac-
turers together who employ about 25 000 in all. 
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24. High development costs are forcing manu-
facturers to design helicopters around a " fam-
ily " concept and civil-military joint ventures. 
The manufacturer is then able to take certain 
existing, well proven components such as the 
dynamic units, all or most of the same avionics 
and other essential structures of the helicopter, 
and then set about optimising the ancillary struc-
tures according to role. The core of new mili-
tary helicopters, for which all or part of the 
development will in fact be wholly or partly 
funded with government money, could be 
adapted to commercial roles. Only if the Euro-
pean helicopter industry can break into the com-
mercial market, worldwide and particularly in 
the United States, will it flourish. This is a 
daunting task against United States competition. 
A more realistic objective is rationalisation 
around European and overseas military markets. 
It is not credible that Europe should retain four 
principal helicopter companies all with excess 
capacity and yielding poor results (Aerospatiale, 
Agusta, MBB and Westland)- the same number 
as the United States (Bell, Boeing Vertol, Hughes 
and Sikorsky)- and two principal engine manu-
facturers (Rolls-Royce and Turbomeca) both of 
whom are of great importance industrially in 
Europe. 
IV. Co-operation in arms production 
25. At least six Western European nations, all 
members of WEU as well as of the EEC, are on 
the verge of renewing their military helicopter 
fleet. At the moment they have some twenty 
different helicopters in service in various config-
urations of both European and United States 
origin. Some of the latter, such as the Sea King 
and Chinook, have been built under licence in 
Europe by Westland llnd Agusta respectively. 
26. Their requirements for new helicopters are 
roughly the same: light and medium-sized heli-
copters for a number of different tasks to enter 
into service between the years 1986 and 
2000. The total number required can be esti-
mated at 1 700. Potential manufacturers might 
easily find a wider market. An objective busi-
ness manager confronted with the question of 
how to fulfil these needs, starting from scratch, 
while spending his budget as cost-effectively as 
possible, would most probably answer that the 
countries involved should pool all their efforts in 
a development programme for one light attack 
helicopter and one medium-sized transport 
helicopter. All specific national variants could 
then be derivatives from these two main 
types. The ministers of defence who have to 
make the decisions do not start from scratch at 
all and they are first and foremost political 
managers. However eager they may be to spend 
their budgets cost-effectively, they operate in a 
confusing jungle of political, financial and eco-
nomic considerations and of national, regional 
and even narrower interests. They have to deal 
with many political lobbies as well as service loy-
alties and partisan industrial and national posi-
tions. 
27. The main reasons for close co-operation 
and consequently standardisation in arms pro-
duction are so well-known that it is almost plati-
tudinous to reiterate them. From the military 
point of view greater standardisation will 
enhance combat-effectiveness and interoperabi-
lity. From the financial-economic point of view 
cost savings are achieved through longer produc-
tion runs and maximised use of research and 
development funds. The guidelines should be: 
(a) competition- because it contributes to 
keen pricing and also strengthens 
industry by promoting innovation and 
enterprise; 
(b) marketability of defence products -
which benefits industry and also 
reduces costs to defence ministries 
through longer production runs; 
(c) collaboration - carries this process fur-
ther forward. It is certainly not new, 
but given special emphasis by the 
IEPG's ministerial declaration at The 
Hague in November 1984. Its value 
for money justification lies in: 
(i) longer production runs; 
(ii) sharing of development costs 
among partners; 
(iii) military advantages of standar-
disation and interoperability. 
28. In general, though with exceptions, gov-
ernments tend to leave it to industry to organise 
collaboration in the way they think most effi-
cient, within cost- and work-sharing formulae 
laid down by the participating governments. 
29. In the helicopter field European collabora-
tion has had a long and generally successful 
history. Mention should be made of the Anglo-
French programme, which began in 1967 and by 
the end of 1985 had produced over 2 500 
Gazelle, Lynx and Puma helicopters. 
30. Furthermore there is the declaration of 
principles at Ditchley Park (United Kingdom), 
signed by France, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy and the United Kingdom in 1978, 
where it is stated that these nations should work 
together to develop and produce new helicopters, 
their engines and equipment. In 1980, Italy and 
the United Kingdom set up the EH-101 project, 
a particularly interesting example because, 
although the United Kingdom and Italian 
requirements were naval, passenger and utility 
versions are also being produced to make the 
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product more marketable. The design of this 
military aircraft was deliberately adjusted with 
commercial and civil sales in mind. 
31. Nevertheless, in the ~ase of helicopter 
requirements, European ministers of defence 
attach importance to criteria of a different socio-
political nature. For various reasons they all 
seek to support their national helicopter industry 
with employment, the national balance of trade 
and technological considerat~ons very much in 
mind. · 
32. This process of identifying requirements 
and seeking collaborative solutions is by no 
means complete. Yet four principal projects, 
NH-90, PAH-2/HAP/HAC-3G, Agusta A-129 
Mk 2 (LAH or Tonal) and EH-101 have 
emerged, and it is worth examining these in 
some detail. 
V. Helicopter programmes now under 
development in Europe 
Agusta A-129 Mk 2 
33. In the early 1980s the Italian and British 
general staffs started negotiations to harmonise 
their requirements for a light attack helicopter 
for the mid-1990s. At a later stage, the Dutch 
and Spanish general staffs j<:>ined in. On 8th 
October 1986, the national armaments directors 
of Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom agreed to go ahead with a feasibility 
study for an advanced multi-role combat heli-
copter to enter into service in 1995. 
34. The main structure of the new helicopter 
will be derived from the Agusta A-129 Mon-
goose, an anti-tank helicopter' to be delivered to 
the Italian army from 1987. 
35. The participants have set up an Italian 
joint stock company, the Joint European Heli-
copter Company, based in Rome, with Agusta 
taking 38%, Westland 38%, Fokker 19% and Casa 
5% of the stock. Two merr).oranda of under-
standing have been signed, the first covering the 
overall development and manufacture of the hel-
icopter, while the second will deal specifically 
with the project feasibility and predefinition 
stage, in order to reach full development. The 
Italian Minister of Defence will let contracts on 
behalf of the partners. 
36. During the two-year feasibility and 
.predefinition phase, studies will be conducted 
into areas where further developments are 
expected. In this context a wider use of com-
posites, fly-by-wire and fly-by-light flight control 
systems, aerodynamically more efficient blades, 
instrument panels with a greater number of 
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multifunction displays and adoption of third-
generation weapon systems will be 
investigated. The new Franco-German-British 
fire-and-forget third-generation anti-tank missile 
(TRIGA T) should be the basic armament, proba-
bly with Italian participation. 
37. The United Kingdom has indicated that it 
would need some 125 of these helicopters, Italy 
about 90 and the Netherlands and Spain each 
about 70. Although the British army has agreed 
to the Italian general staff's basic philosophy in 
favour of a dedicated light attack helicopter 
(LAH) in the anti-armour role, basic decisions 
still need to be made, for example on the number 
of crew and engines. 
NH-90- NATO helicopter programme 
38. Between 1981 and 1984, studies were car-
ried out and negotiations held within NATO, the 
European aerospace industry and the defence 
ministries concerned with the aim of possible 
co-operation in the development and production 
of an 8 to 9 tonne transport and naval 
helicopter. There should be two basic versions: 
a tactical transport helicopter (TTH) and a ship-
based helicopter for the new NATO frigate pro-
gramme (NFH). The latter would not involve 
the United Kingdom. 
39. As a result of these studies and negotia-
tions, on 19th September 1985, government 
representatives from France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Italy, Britain and the Nether-
lands signed a memorandum of understanding, 
thus commissioning a consortium to develop a 
common helicopter. The requirement repre-
sents a total of 700 helicopters in the 9 tonne 
class with primary roles for the air forces, armies 
and navies such as transport, search and rescue 
service, air mobile assault and troop supply in 
the battlefield area and anti-submarine and sur-
face vessel warfare. 
40. The leading technology features of the hel-
icopter have been defined as: a four-bladed main 
rotor and four-bladed anti-torque tail rotor, 
using composite blades of advanced airfoil sec-
tions and tip plan form; twin-engined, semi-pod 
arrangement; higher harmonic control; tricycle 
undercarriage to meet crashworthiness require-
ments; a high level of composite materials in the 
fuselage and reduced delectability; flexible sys-
tem layout for mission equipment. 
41. The navy variant will offer autonomy in 
anti-submarine warfare operations and be 
designed for an all-weather, severe ship-motion 
environment. The payload capacity will meet a 
wide range of national requirements in respect of 
naval mission fits. The Italian and German 
navies in particular will need the NFH by 1993. 
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42. The armyjair force variant will offer a 
range of defensive weapons with low pilot 
workload. The urgency of procuring this aero-
plane may not be so great especially as deriva-
tives of similar categories of aircraft such as the 
Super Puma and Black Hawk could be availa-
ble. 
43. The consortium, consisting of Aero-
spatiale, Agusta, MBB, Westland and Fokker is 
actually at the feasibility predefinition study 
stage, the aim being to design an overall system 
enabling the weaponry required for different mis-
sions to be integrated as early as possible thanks 
to maximum flexibility in both the helicopter 
and the equipment. The results of the study 
were submitted to the governments at the end of 
October 1986. A project definition contract 
should commence in early 1987. 
EH-101 
44. In 1980, Agusta and Westland decided to 
combine forces on a 50-50 basis for the joint 
development, production and marketing of a 
new anti-submarine warfare helicopter, the 
EH-101 which would meet the requirements of 
the Italian and British navies. In addition to 
the naval version, commercial transport and util-
ity versions are planned from the very 
beginning. In January 1984, the British and 
Italian Governments announced the start of the 
full programme, while a formal contract for their 
naval version was signed in March 1984. The 
initial requirements are reportedly 50 for the 
Royal Navy and 38 for the Italian navy. 
45. The naval version is designed for fully 
autonomous all-weather day and night 
operations. Its primary roles will be anti-
submarine warfare, anti-ship surveillance and 
tracking, anti-surface vessel, amphibious opera-
tions and search and rescue. Other possible 
roles include airborne early warning, vertical 
loading and electronic countermeasures. 
46. The design work is aimed at providing sig-
nificant improvements in safety, availability, 
operating costs and performance. All this will 
be achieved through the use of three engines and 
higher power margins, damage tolerant airframe 
and dynamic structure, the use of composite 
materials, the latest available electronics and 
data-handling systems, greater system redun-
dancy and onboard health monitoring systems. 
47. To rationalise production costs to the full, 
an integrated programme has been designed 
under which the naval, commercial and utility 
versions of the EH-101 will be developed at the 
same time and in parallel in an interdependent 
programme. The engine choice is not yet set-
tled. The prototypes will fly with the GE T700 
powerplant. For production aircraft, the Anglo-
French RTM-322 should be available. 
48. The first of nine preproduction aircraft is 
scheduled to fly in early 1987. The commercial 
version is expected to enter service first, in 1990, 
followed shortly afterwards by the naval 
version. The EH-101 is the only new large heli-
copter under full-scale development in the 
West. Parallel work in the United States has 
been pre-empted by the existence of the Bell/ 
Boeing Vertol V-22 Osprey development pro-
gramme for a tilt rotor aircraft with very similar 
payload and much longer range. 
European HAP/PAH-2/HAC-JG 
49. By late 1975/beginning 1976 the Govern-
ments of France and the Federal Republic of 
Germany started exchanging letters about their 
joint requirements for a day-and-night capable 
anti-tank helicopter. After many years of diffi-
cult negotiations and near-failures to keep the 
project going, having fears for the future of the 
European helicopter industry, MBB and 
Aerospatiale made technical and financial pro-
posals covering the three helicopter versions now 
under development. 
50. On the basis of this proposal, the Defence 
Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and France in May 1984 signed a memorandum 
of understanding covering the development of a 
new anti-tank helicopter for service with their 
two armies in the 1990s. 
51. Prime contractor for the co-operation pro-
gramme is Eurocopter GmbH, which distributes 
the work equally between MBB and Aero-
spatiale. 
52. The co-operation programme involves a 
single basic helicopter design, from which three 
versions will be developed: 
HAP (Helicoptere d'appui et de protection) 
escort and fire support version for the 
French army, 75 required, first deliv-
ery in 1991; 
PAH-2 (Panzerabwehrhubschrauber 2nd gen-
eration), anti-tank version for the West 
German army, 212 required, first 
delivery in 1992; 
HAC-3G (Helicoptere anti-char 3rd generation), 
anti-tank version for the French army, 
140 required, first delivery in 1995. 
53. In this helicopter programme, latest tech-
nologies will be applied. Fibre composites are 
combined with aluminium alloys for the 
airframe configuration. Extremely effective 
infrared suppression is ensured through installa-
tion of two MTM-385 lR engines. The struc-
tural design of the airframe and landing gear 
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takes into account criteria such as safety, crash 
behaviour and resistance to gunfire without 
neglecting ease of repair, weight and costs. It 
will be equipped with the .most sophisticated 
visionics system to provide night and reduced-
visibility capability for the 1 pilot. It will also 
allow the gunner to identify his targets and to 
guide his weapons. · 
54. After the meeting between the French 
Defence Minister and his former counterpart last 
July, there seemed to be serious doubts about the 
feasibility of the programme. The May 1984 
memorandum is certainly no longer applicable 
and serious delays are now inevitable. There 
are still fundamental differences in operational 
doctrines and requirements between the French 
and German general staffs as well as over equip-
ment specifications which put in doubt the 
future of this project. 
55. The French National Assembly commis-
sioned a select committee report into this pro-
gramme to investigate the serious delays and cost 
overruns on this project. Efforts are being 
made to reduce the cost estimates for the pro-
gramme and final agreement is being sought on 
such questions as engine and visionics, the aim 
being to select equipment of European manufac-
ture. Nevertheless, the desire 'of the German gen-
eral staff for a more sophis~icated, heavier air-
craft for operations on the 1central front, right 
forward in the front line, will be difficult to rec-
oncile with the French requirement for a lighter 
aeroplane to destroy Warsaw Pact armour which 
has broken through the front, supported by a sep-
arate version of the same helicopter optimised 
specifically for anti-helicopter operations. 
Schedule of helicopter co-operation in Europe 
HAP/ Tonal 
NH-90 PAH-2,' EH-101 LAH-129 
HAC·3G Mk2 
France 
··········· 
X X 
Federal Republic X X 
of Germany .... 
Italy 
············· 
X X X 
Netherlands 
······ 
X X 
Spain ............ I X 
United X ! X X 
Kingdom ....... 
VI. Developments in United States technology 
for the 1990s 
56. While Europe is now working on pro-
grammes for a new generation of helicopters of a 
more or less conventional type, of which the 
most ambitious and - ironically enough - the 
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least likely to succeed is the Franco-German 
effort to develop an advanced attack helicoper, 
United States helicopter manufacturers are push-
ing ahead with completely new aircraft 
families. Work is in full progress on three dif-
ferent projects of the greatest importance; the 
LHX, a new family of light scout/attack/utility 
helicopters, the advanced vertical lift-off aircraft, 
a tilt-rotor vehicle, and the X-wing, a vertical 
take-off and landing concept, which uses a four-
blade rotor system for rotary and fixed-wing 
flight. 
LHX 
57. The United States army is generating a 
vast development programme for the LHX, its 
new family of advanced light scout/attack/utility 
helicopters, mainly to replace the different ver-
sions of the Bell UH-1, AH-1 and the A and C 
versions of the OH-58. There are very high 
capability requirements for this helicopter. The 
army wants the scout/attack version to be 
designed as a single-pilot helicopter, which 
means that significant advances will have to be 
made in automated controls to reduce the pilot's 
workload while he is performing the scout mis-
sion or fighting air-to-ground or air-to-air enga-
gements. The army attaches much importance 
to this single pilot issue estimating that it will 
reduce considerably both aircraft costs and the 
costs of attracting, training and sustaining crews 
for the aircraft. Important stress is laid on 
enhanced survivability, including reduced radar, 
infrared, visual and acoustic signatures, 
increased nuclear, biological and chemical war-
fare protection. Improved crashworthiness and 
air-to-air self-defence capabilities, greater agility 
and small size are among the other important 
requirements. 
58. Compared with previous light attack and 
utility helicopters, the LHX is expected to be 
powered by 60% smaller engines, to use 52% less 
fuel per equivalent mission, to have a 48% lower 
airframe empty weight and to provide a 45% 
improvement in payload per gross weight 
ratio. The scout/attack and utility versions 
should have a high degree of commonality in 
dynamic components such as the engines, trans-
mission and rotor system. 
59. Originally a precursor to, but later directly 
connected with the LXH programme is the 
ARTI (advanced rotorcraft technology integra-
tion) programme, launched in December 
1983. Its purpose was to examine how the tech-
nology options expected over the next few years 
could be combined to produce a rotorcraft that is 
operationally capable and supportable and at the 
same time effective in the scout/attack mission 
environment with a single crew 
member. Among issues of greatest interest 
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under consideration are the incorporation of 
automatic navigation, automatic targeting and 
digital map systems, interactive voice controls, 
senior fusion to reduce the need for individual 
interpretation of data from each sensor and the 
application of voice-activated controls. 
60. The recently-completed ARTI study has 
concluded that single-pilot operation of the 
scout/attack version of the LHX is feasible, but 
further work is needed in the areas of voice 
recognition, wide-field-of-view helmet and auto-
matic target recognition. According to the pre-
sent schedule, the army will buy at least 4 500 
LHX in various versions, the first to be delivered 
in the late 1990s. 
X- Wing 
61. Since 1984, Sikorsky, NASA and DARPA 
(defence advanced research projects agency) are 
working on the development of an X-wing verti-
cal take-off and landing aircraft which combines 
the hover efficiency of a helicopter and the high 
speed of a fixed-wing aircraft by using a rotor 
that can be stopped in flight at approximately 
230 mph for use as a wing for high-speed flight 
up to about mach 0.8. 
62. In several areas, important new technol-
ogy had to be developed for the X-wing. Since 
the X-wing does not rotate around a rotor hub in 
wing-borne flight, it cannot rely on centrifugal 
force to stiffen it. Consequently, very stiff com-
posite structures had to be developed to elimi-
nate these aeroelastic problems, while at the 
same time not exceeding an acceptable 
weight. To allow airborne conversion from 
rotor to fixed-wing flight, digital fly-by-wire sys-
tems were required. Convertible propulsion 
systems for rotor and forward flight also had to 
be developed. 
63. An X-wing/rotor system research aircraft 
(RSRA) is being tested at the moment. Powered 
rotor flights are scheduled for mid-1987. Transi-
tion from rotary to fixed-wing flight testing is 
scheduled for late 1988. Successful performance 
of the RSRA could lead to the development of an 
X-wing demonstrator by 1990. A production ver-
sion could follow in the year 2000. 
Advanced vertical lift aircraft (tilt-rotor) 
64. For some years now, NASA and the 
United States army and navy together with Bell 
Helicopter have been testing extensively the Bell 
XV -15, a twin-engine tilt-rotor vehicle, which is 
able to take off vertically like a helicopter, and 
then change to forward flight as a high-speed 
fixed-wing turboprop aircraft. The XV-15 has 
successfully shown potentially strong capabilities 
in a number of traditional helicopter roles, and 
also the additional benefits of higher speeds, 
greater range, lower noise levels and improved 
manoeuvrability. In 1983 the United States 
military services selected Bell Helicopter 
Textron and Boeing Vertol to develop a larger 
operational tilt rotor to meet their 
requirements. These requirements cover a wide 
range from combat and troop-carrying assault 
roles for the Marine Corps to replace its Boeing 
Vertol CH-46s as well as some of its heavy-lift 
Sikorsky CH-53s via combat search and rescue 
for the navy and long-range special operations 
for the air force to combat support and cargo air-
lift for the army. 
65. To give an indication of the size and per-
formance of this aircraft, it is noted that the 
Marine Corps version is required to carry 24 
combat-equipped marines at a speed of 250 
knots (463 km/h) over an operational radius of 
370 km. Altogether, the United States armed 
services will need approximately 1 050 of these 
aircraft. The first flight of the Bell-Boeing 
Vertol V-22 Osprey, as it is named now, is antici-
pated in 1988, while the first deliveries to the 
Marine Corps could begin in 1991. 
VII. Future rotorcraft development and their 
significance for Europe 
66. It is most likely that for use over relatively 
short distances (up to 200 miles) at speeds not in 
excess of 200 knots, and where roles dictate sev-
eral landings and take-offs or time in the hover 
within one sortie, the conventional helicopter 
will be retained. Certainly there will be techno-
logical improvements to blade design (such as 
those studied in BERP, British experimental 
rotor programme), controls, further use of com-
posite materials and advanced anti-torque 
devices, but the basic helicopter configuration 
will remain. 
67. However, where higher speeds over long 
distances are dominant factors, current techno-
logical developments such as the Bell-Boeing 
Vertol tilt-wing Osprey project, the Sikorsky 
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roles and employment of helicopters almost cer-
tainly would not warrant thee advantages of speed 
and distance to be set against this additional 
expense for the foreseeable future. In summary, 
service helicopters are likely to remain of a con-
ventional design rather than' an advanced hybrid 
rotorcraft. In this contex~, it is worth noting 
that the LHX, the United States army's future 
light scout, attack and utilitJy helicopter, is most 
probably to be of traditiop.al design. On the 
other hand, advanced alterhatives have not yet 
been discarded. 
VIII. Should the WEU JJations meet their 
helicopter needs on an alliance 
basis or on a basis of European autonomy? 
69. The IEPG statement issued on the occa-
sion of its revitalisation in November 1984 was 
by definition concerned with European collabo-
ration, and the 1978 declaration of principles 
was explicitly European. 
70. But collaboration in the alliance is not 
exclusively European; a number of projects are 
transatlantic: the NATO fJiigate NFR-90, Sea 
Gnat, multiple-launch rocket-system (MLRS), 
Phases I and Ill (both of which include France 
and Germany) and the Harmer GR-Mk 5. 
71. In the market sector for heavy helicopters, 
Europe has not attempted to duplicate what the 
United States has done successfully but has 
bought the Chinook (United Kingdom) or manu-
factured it under licence (Agusta in Italy). The 
Federal Republic of GermaQy manufactured the 
CH-53 under licence. Furthermore, European 
helicopters contain United States equipment. 
72. So it is not a black arid white choice. A 
sensible industrial objective must be to 
strengthen European collaboration without 
spurning the benefits which wider alliance 
involvement can bring. 
IX. The West/and affair ~nd its aftermath 
X-wing programme and the five-nation, six- 73. The Westland affair c;aused an unprece-
company European future advanced rotorcraft dented political crisis in the United Kingdom 
will markedly change the design and shape of including the resignation of 'two cabinet minis-future rotorcraft. In the main such technology 
is aimed at combining the advantages of fixed- ters, the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael 
Heseltine, and the Secretary' of State for Trade 
wing and helicopter flight into a hybrid and Industry, Leon Brittain. Now that the dust 
rotorcraft. The aim is to produce a fast (some has settled it may be useful, without venturing 
300-400 knots) rotorcraft, with long range and into the political debate, to tty to assess the pas-
endurance, whilst giving the aircraft a vertical 
take-off/landing and hover capability. In short, sible repercussions on the heFcopter industry in 
Europe as a whole. The facts may be consid-
to produce an aircraft with similar characteristics erect too well known to, repeat them in 
to the Harrier, albeit with much less speed, but at detail. Bankruptcy was impenqing for 
very much less cost. Westland owing to an impdrtant gap between 
68. Such hybrids are likely to be even more present production, primarily of Lynx and Sea 
expensive than traditional helicopters. In the King aircraft and potential orders and produc-
United Kingdom and North-West Europe the tion, primarily of EH-101 aircraft. The United 
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States Sikorsky Company and Italy's Fiat 
together took a 14.8% stake in Westland, thus 
solving its immediate financial problems. They 
may increase their stake to 29.9% if they take up 
their options in full. Although the companies 
concerned have guaranteed two million man 
hours of work, this is concerned with design and 
production work per se and is not linked to any 
particular project. 
74. Westland, like the Italian company 
Agusta, has made a success over the years of 
building Sikorsky designs under licence. It sold 
many aircraft like the Sea King in export mar-
kets. 
75. For Sikorsky, a subsidiary company to 
United Technologies, it was a logical and well-
considered step. It intended to continue its 
strategy of global expansion and to extend its 
penetration of the European market. It is espe-
cially interested in Westland's possession of spe-
cific engineering expertise in composite blades, 
rotor tip aerodynamics and avionics 
integration. Westland could also provide access 
to certain export markets, such as in the Arab 
world, South and South-East Asia where for his-
toric reasons British commercial and political 
influences are strong. 
76. Sikorsky felt that the position ofthe Euro-
pean industry in the NH-90 project was vulnera-
ble, but that this project may yet prove to be 
Europe's biggest commercial threat to its own 
Black Hawk. The world market, leaving out of 
account the United States and the Soviet Union, 
is estimated at some 1 700 to 2 000 for these 
medium-sized support helicopters. 
77. The Black Hawk as a proven design could 
be enhanced with the adoption of the new Rolls-
Royce/Turbomeca 322 engine and offer benefits 
of interoperability and standardisation within 
NATO. 
78. Until now, however, there are no signs of 
slackening in the NH-90 project, with 
Aerospatiale as the major driving force and 
Westland still a member of the five nation indus-
trial grouping whose feasibility and project defi-
nition study is due to be completed before the 
end of 1986. Nevertheless, with an improved 
Black Hawk available, the NH-90 will have to 
offer major performance benefits to be cost effec-
tive. 
79. In this situation, prospects for the Agusta-
Westland EH-101 could be good, because it cov-
ers a section of the market where virtually no 
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other products exist. W estland has predicted no 
less than 1 000 orders for both military and civil 
configurations together, which seems wildly 
over-optimistic. Sikorsky might even provide a 
foothold in the United States military market if, 
for some reason, the tilt rotor programme fails to 
meet all requirements. Through Sikorsky, 
Westland might conceivably secure a role in the 
vast LHX programme and later even try to bring 
the LHX to the attention of the British Govern-
ment for its future anti-armour and scout 
needs. Meanwhile, Westland will press ahead 
with its Italian, Dutch and Spanish partners in 
the A-129 Mk 2 LAH feasibility study, or even 
an amalgamated LAH/PAH-2 programme 
(although quite how that could be achieved is 
very much open to doubt). 
X. Conclusions 
80. Apart from the short- and medium-term 
questions raised in the preceding chapter, it is 
debatable what will happen to the European heli-
copter industry after the present production and 
development programmes. It is very difficult to 
predict the future, but the situation seems 
fluid. With the increasingly new and more 
demanding requirements of customers, military 
and civil alike, research and development costs 
will rise substantially. Manufacturers will have 
to act together, but it is doubtful whether they 
will always feel they have to keep to purely Euro-
pean co-operation. 
81. Finally, the financial figures will be a 
determining factor. No manufacturer can 
afford to remain in the red for long, even if it is 
state-owned or government-supported. Conse-
quently it is unreasonable to expect a manufac-
turer to maintain its commitment to Europe 
when an agreement outside is financially to its 
advantage. The results of the NH-90 pro-
gramme might be an important touchstone 
because virtually all the European manufacturers 
of any importance are involved, airframe and 
engine alike. If it succeeds, hopefully with a 
derivative commercial variant, it may set the 
framework for future co-operation. Only by 
pooling its resources can the European helicopter 
industry hope to keep pace with technological 
advance. Let no one deceive himself into think-
ing that it can afford to remain fragmented in a 
field where the much larger United States manu-
facturers have such advantages of scale and vast 
assured military home market. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
European helicopters for the 1990s 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Sir John Osborn 
1st December 1986 
1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add ,a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Aware that the role of the helicopter in modern warfare is influenced' by the use of anti-
helicopter missiles such as the 'Stinger' and by the use of 'anti-helicopter' helicopters, " 
2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Bearing in mind the role of the EEC in co-ordinating manufacturing capacity, including that of 
the aircraft industry and, in particular, the helicopter industry; " 
l. See 12th sitting, 3rd December 1986 (amendment 1 negatived; amendment 2 withdrawn). 
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(i) Emphasising that the explanatory memorandum to the present report is an essential factor that 
cannot be separated from the recommendation; 
(ii) Noting that the Council's replies to Recommendations 432, 433 and 435 reac;hed the Assembly in 
time to allow a true dialogue with the Council; 
(iii) Welcoming the intention expressed by the Council henceforth to report on 1 its activities twice a 
year; 
(iv) Noting that the thirty-first annual report of the Council reports on the definition of a European 
position towards the United States strategic defence initiative; 
(v) Regretting however that the report makes no mention of decisions on other important matters; 
(vi) Considering that the harmonisation of European positions on disarmament 'nd the limitation of 
armaments has assumed new importance since the Reykjavik meeting; 
(vii) Recalling that, if Europe is to speak with one voice, it is essential for all member countries of 
WEU to take part on an equal footing in defining a European position on disarmament and the limita-
tion of armaments; 
(viii) Recalling the importance of official procedure in regard to the Council's own activities and also 
exchanges between the Council and the Assembly; 
(ix) Still unaware of the action the Council has taken on its document on WEU anti public awareness; 
(x) Noting that the Council has not yet followed up its promise to communica:te to the Assembly, 
insofar as the needs of secrecy allow, the reports the new agencies submit to it; 
(xi) Considering that the Council gives no information about the role it assigns to .the Standing Arma-
ments Committee or the activities of that body; 
(xii) Noting that the Council makes no mention of any action taken on studies by the SAC, its interna-
tional secretariat or the three agencies set up in 1985; 
(xiii) Noting that the Council recognises that the WEU agencies as well as other bodies" must also take 
account of terrorism when analysing the different threats facing Europe " but that the Council itself has 
not followed up this recognition; 
(xiv) Emphasising that these failings are making the press, public opinion and the WEU countries' part-
ners in the Atlantic Alliance express ever stronger doubts about the governments' will to follow up the 
Rome declaration; 
' (xv) Recalling that any lapse by WEU in areas for which it is responsible will jeopardise the present 
and future ofWestern Europe as a whole and that no institution is able to take over 1the place the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty reserves for WEU; 
(xvi) Considering that the principle of zero growth as interpreted and practised is progressively pre-
venting the Assembly from taking part in the reactivation of WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Confirm its intention to apply in full the decisions in the Rome declaration; 
2. Say whether the composition of the Permanent Council allows it to apply these decisions and 
indicate what steps it intends to take to this end; 
3. Make official all the information it transmits to the Assembly, even if such information has previ-
ously been given in informal communications to some of its organs; 
4. Inform the Assembly about the purpose and methods of ministers of defence attending its meet-
ings at ministerial level and the results thus obtained; 
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5. Inform the Assembly about its activities at its meetings at the level of political directors; 
6. Communicate to the Assembly the conclusions it has drawn from its work on disarmament, 
account being taken of the studies submitted to it by Agency I; 
7. Integrate in WEU the working group on security in Europe set up by France, the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United Kingdom, in order to ensure the homogenous participation of all member 
countries; 
8. Explain the action it intends to take on the observation in its reply to Recommendation 435 that 
the terrorist threat forms part of the matters for which it is responsible and whose study can be assigned 
to the agencies; 
9. Ensure that the WEU agencies receive the information they need to carry out their mandates 
effectively; 
10. Inform the Assembly in detail of the tasks assigned to the SAC on the one hand and the IEPG on 
the other in the light of each group's specific characteristics; 
11. Specify in particular what conclusions the IEPG reached on the economic inquiry into the Euro-
pean armaments industries which, according to the note from the Council transmitted to the Assembly 
on 23rd February 1978 (Document 769), it was asked to prepare in 1977; 
12. Tell the Assembly how it intends to follow up the studies on the European armaments industries 
carried out by the SAC; 
13. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on the steps it has taken to strengthen "co-
operation between existing European institutes for security studies"; 
14. Explain to the Assembly how it intends to keep the press informed of each of its activities; 
15. Give a positive answer without further delay to Portugal's application to join WEU; 
16. Stop depriving the Assembly of the material means essential for the exercise and development of 
its work. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In view of the date on which the thirty-
first annual report of the Council reached the 
Assembly, the General Affairs Committee was 
unable to answer this report at the June session 
as is customary and therefore prolonged the 
mandate of your Rapporteur. 
2. It would obviously be inappropriate to 
pick a quarrel with the Council over a few weeks' 
delay in adopting its report. However, it is to 
be deplored insofar as it contradicts the Coun-
cil's statements that it is prepared to intensify its 
relations with the Assembly and even report on 
its activities twice a year. This is far from the 
case! Your Rapporteur has no need to dwell on 
the obstacles to a true dialogue between the two 
WEU organs or on the fact that only in Decem-
ber 1986 is the Assembly able to give its views on 
the activities of the Council prior to 31st Decem-
ber 1985. 
3. The present report therefore seeks merely 
to complete the one submitted to the Assembly 
in June 1986 (Document 1058), the draft recom-
mendation in which was then adopted. Since 
then, certain new information has reached the 
Assembly on the Council's activities with the 
replies to Recommendations 432, 433 and 435 
whose arrival at the Office of the Clerk on 15th 
October is likely to facilitate a half-yearly 
exchange between the Council and the 
Assembly. Furthermore, a report on the Coun-
cil's activities in the first half of 1986 (Document 
1074) reached the Office of the Clerk on 20th 
October as the Council promised and this repre-
sents a considerable improvement in its 
exchanges with the Assembly. Your Rappor-
teur has been able to take it into account. 
4. A preparatory working paper was submit-
ted to the General Affairs Committee on 15th 
October 1986 and this allowed your Rapporteur 
to take the fullest account of the opinions 
expressed at that meeting. While the views of 
committee members differed to some extent, 
particularly on the expediency of taking steps to 
enlarge WEU and on the future prospects the 
governments were effectively prepared to offer 
the organisation, your Rapporteur is nevertheless 
gratified to record a very wide consensus on 
most of the report. 
5. The documents he has since received from 
the Council have, however, led your Rapporteur 
to modify some of his views. 
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II. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly and with the public 
6. If international trdties - including, 
among many others, the Pari~ Agreements modi-
fying the Brussels Treaty - are ratified by 
national parliaments, it is to ensure that these 
treaties are not considered as the short-lived 
work of passing government~ and that legislation 
gives them a guarantee of continuity in their 
application. This essential aonsideration shows 
the full impact of Article IX of the treaty obliging 
the Council to submit an annual report to the 
WEU Assembly; it is the latter which, formed of 
politicians from the national parliaments, gives 
the whole organisation a guarantee that the 
changing concerns of the governments do not 
impinge upon the intentions pf the signatories of 
the treaty. In this connection, the fact that the 
WEU Assembly is composed of the delegations 
of the parliaments of member countries to the 
Council of Europe and not of representatives 
elected directly to the European Parliament is an 
advantage which should not 'be relinquished for 
the sake of a geometrical rather than realistic 
idea of European union, at least as long as 
defence questions remain primarily the province 
of states, even if it is consider~d that the future of 
WEU is to take its place in this union, when the 
time is ripe, alongside the European Communi-
ties. 
7. The Council constantly evokes the ever-
increasing number of meetings between repre-
sentatives of the Council and the Assembly: par-
ticipation of ministers and the Secretary-General 
in sessions, joint meetings with the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments and the 
General Affairs Committee, meetings between 
the Council of Ministers - and also, since 1985, 
the Permanent Council - and the Presidential 
Committee, meetings between the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council and the President of the 
Assembly and meetings of the Committee for 
Relations with the Council. 
8. The Assembly of course welcomes these 
various contacts with the Council, but it cannot 
overlook certain drawbacks and, above all, their 
unofficial nature. 
9. (i) The presence of ministers at Assembly 
sessions and their pronouncements, in particular 
those of the Chairman-in-Office and the Secre-
tary-General, and their answers to questions put 
by parliamentarians correspond perfectly to the 
Assembly's needs because the former speak with 
the necessary authority on behalf of their govern-
' 
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ments while the latter two are empowered to 
speak on behalf of the Council and their words 
are recorded and included in the proceedings of 
sessions. It is for them to assume this responsi-
bility, particularly when answering questions, 
and they have always done so. In several cases, 
however, it has been noted either that the Coun-
cil took no effective follow-up action on their 
remarks, which was tantamount to contradicting 
them - this has happened several times since 
October 1984, inter alia for the communication 
of information about the Council's activities, dis-
armament and the creation of a European insti-
tute for defence research - or that chairmen-in-
office were ultra-conscientious about their 
responsibility to the Council and took refuge 
behind vague utterances to avoid giving precise 
answers to questions put by parliamentarians. 
In short, both the ministers and the Secretary-
General are constantly faced with the difficulty 
of having to speak on behalf of a Council whose 
views are not well known to them. In the next 
chapter, your Rapporteur will examine what he 
believes are the reasons for this. 
10. (ii) Meetings between organs of the 
Assembly and the Council, whatever their form, 
suffer, on the one hand, from the fact that it is 
difficult for a parliamentary assembly to delegate 
its powers to anyone and, on the other, from the 
fact that the informal character the Council 
wishes these meetings to have - particularly joint 
meetings for which the Council itself proposed 
official procedure which it has never wanted to 
apply - prevents minutes being taken and the 
dialogue, however interesting, being really bind-
ing on the Council. Efforts by the Assembly, 
and first and foremost by its President, who has 
endeavoured to prepare memoranda, to have 
them examined by the Presidential Committee 
and to distribute them to members of the Assem-
bly so that the Assembly's point of view may be 
clearly expressed at such meetings, have never 
received any real response from the Council, 
even when these memoranda reached it well 
before its meetings. 
11. The Council could alleviate these difficul-
ties if it adopted a different policy towards public 
opinion and the media. It is obvious that prior 
to 1984 it had to be discreet because of the part 
tion on a matter of such importance? 
Drowning such a political fact in an administra-
tive report, published tardily and by the Assem-
bly, brings grist to the feeling that the press is 
expressing with growing frequency that the 
Seven have in fact abandoned the intentions they 
voiced in the Rome declaration. It is a renunci-
ation of the principal aim of the reactivation of 
WEU: to arouse a spirit of defence among the 
nations of Western Europe which seemed to be 
dying away with the pacifist demonstrations 
which followed NA TO's twofold decision of 
December 1979. 
12. Did the Council not decide to set up a 
press service in the Secretariat-General? What 
steps have been taken to implement this 
decision? Is it merely, as the Secretary-General 
said, the difficulty of finding a suitable official 
that is holding it up? There is no doubt that the 
sparseness of the information it gives about its 
activities gives credit to all those who doubted its 
intentions to follow up the Rome declaration 
and even the text on WEU and public awareness 
appended to the thirty-first annual report in 
which the following conclusion is to be found: 
"Success in achieving the objectives of the 
Rome declaration will depend on many 
factors, a major one of which will be the 
stimulation of public interest in WEU and 
the generation of greater public awareness 
of policies which WEU members 
follow. Maintenance of the higher politi-
cal profile of WEU will enable the 
organisation to play a part in helping the 
cause of European security and transatlan-
tic unity." 
13. Why did the Council have to repeat such 
an obvious fact eighteen months after the Rome 
declaration? Above all, why has it done nothing 
to carry out this excellent intention? The text in 
question is full of practical suggestions for 
informing the public about all the activities of 
WEU. None of them has yet been followed 
up. The press articles to which the Secretary-
General refers, and of which he was often the sig-
natory, certainly help to make the public aware 
of WEU, but they are not properly speaking 
information about what it is actually doing. 
played by armaments controls in its activ- 14. The Council must not claim that the 
ities. But this is no longer so and it is hard to Assembly is unfavourably prejudiced against it, 
imagine why the Council persists in communi- pursuing pointless quarrels, moved by narrow 
eating nothing to the press except on the occa- political ulterior motives or aiming to occupy 
sion of ministerial meetings. Thus, the princi- more than its due share of the stage and over-
pies it adopted on the SDI are set out only in the shadowing the Council: all that is needed is a 
thirty-first annual report. Would it not have been glance at the many references in the international 
preferable for their adoption to be the subject of press to the activities of the WEU Council to 
a communique which would have been an event, note that for months not one observer outside 
attracted general attention and shown at one and the organisation has expressed the slightest belief 
the same time that the reactivation of WEU was in the reactivation of WEU, assuming that the 
really tangible and that Europe was capable of newspapers still consent to devote a few lines to 
expressing at least the principles of a joint posi- the organisation's activities. Moreover, all the 
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parliamentarians know full well that there can be 
no real parliamentary life without an executive 
and that the Assembly itself is nothing and can 
~xpect no hearing from public opinion without a 
dialogue with the Council. 
15. If an inventory were made of the informa-
tion the Council should give the Assembly - in 
several cases, it has definitely committed itself to 
doing so - and where it has been silent, it would 
read as follows: 
16. (i) Everything relating to meetings of the 
Council at the level of political directors of the 
ministries for foreign affairs. Have they been 
limited to meetings of the Permanent Council 
enlarged to include these directors, as the Secre-
tary-General said? Have there been no meet-
ings specifically of political directors in the con-
text of WEU? Is it once again their informal 
nature that has led the Council to say nothing 
about them? 
17. (ii) Everything relating to disarmament 
and the limitation of armaments. Those who 
have had to speak on behalf of the Council on 
this matter have merely been evasive or denied 
the evidence, which is that following an 
approach by the United States to the WEU mem-
ber countries the Council in fact gave up discuss-
ing this matter just when, following Mr. 
Gorbachev's proposals on 15th January 1986, it 
was becoming a key element of international 
relations. Your Rapporteur awaits with interest 
the Council's delayed answer to Written Ques-
tion 270. If the Council is effectively examining 
these questions, particularly on the basis of 
reports submitted to it by Agency 11, your 
Rapporteur expects above all that the Council 
will inform the Assembly of the relevant conclu-
sions it reaches, as it did in the case of the SDI. 
18. It is in fact typical that the paragraphs of 
the thirty-first annual report of the Council on 
East-West relations, most of which are about dis-
armament, consist only of extracts from the 
address by the Chairman-in-Office of the Coun-
cil to the Assembly and of summaries of replies 
to Assembly recommendations. They reveal 
nothing about the action of the WEU Council 
itself during a period in which the question of 
disarmament has been highly topical and when it 
would have been essential for Europe to make its 
views known. In this connection, the report on 
the Council's activities in the first half of 1986 is 
no more satisfactory since it says nothing about a 
possible joint European position. 
19. (iii) Although the Council has said that it 
is prepared to inform the Assembly of the reports 
prepared by the three new agencies provided 
there are no special reasons for not doing so, it 
has so far done absolutely nothing in this 
sense. But in this case it is a well-known fact 
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that the reports were transmitted to the Council 
several months ago. 
20. (iv) Everything relating to action taken on 
these reports, as well as on earlier studies by the 
Standing Armaments Committee on European 
armaments industries. Has it to be concluded 
that neither these reports nor the studies were 
intended to be followed up?' Your Rapporteur 
reserves the right to return to this matter in his 
remarks about the agencies. 
21. The annual report refers to a study which 
the Council is said to be preparing on the effec-
tiveness of proposals to improve procedure for 
answering the Assembly. Tl)e Assembly knows 
nothing about these proposals although there 
seems to be no reason wh)! it should not be 
informed of them before any decision is 
taken. Yet it has to note that in recent years the 
Council has been taking more and more time to 
reply to recommendations and written questions, 
that all the rules on the subject, particularly the 
one allowing the Council one month to answer 
written questions, are less and less respected by 
the Council and that the content of replies has 
steadily dwindled. All this tends to make the 
relationship between the Council and the Assem-
bly look more like aimless chatter than a real 
exchange of views and helps to cast increasingly 
explicit doubt in the minds <i>f observers of the 
activities of WEU about the will of the Council 
and the real bearing of what ministers say to the 
Assembly. 
22. The Assembly has often given its views on 
its relations with the Council. Except perhaps 
for budgetary matters, these present no particular 
problem. They depend ma~nly on what the 
Council is and does. Yet in the last two years it 
has appeared only too often, that the Council 
viewed these relations merely as a means of 
calming the Assembly each tinte it expressed dis-
content at the Council's sho{tcomings but the 
latter has never really sought to give the Assem-
bly satisfaction by following uJI> its recommenda-
tions. 
23. But the Council cannot ~ontinue to act in 
such a way for very long since iin the Rome decla-
ration it set itself a programme and a timetable 
for implementing its aims. Speeches by minis-
ters do little to conceal - and soon will not con-
ceal at all - the shortcomings of the Council, 
which is in the process of losing all credit. The 
Assembly cannot hope to retain the credit hith-
erto accorded to it if it cannot ensure that real 
substance is given to the reactivation of WEU. 
This has now become truly urgent if we are to 
avoid any future initiative relating to WEU being 
discredited in advance, because one cannot claim 
indefinitely to be wanting to give new life to an 
organisation which, in fact, is still not very effi-
cient. 
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Ill. The political activities of the Council 
24. The first question is whether the Council 
had any real political activity in 1985. Close 
scrutiny of the thirty-first annual report of the 
Council allows a positive answer to be given to 
one point, i.e. "space and related activities", but 
only one. This is in fact the only chapter of the 
annual report to show action by the Council 
leading to relatively detailed political conclu-
sions committing all the governments and defin-
ing joint concerns and aims. 
25. It should be recalled that the then 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. 
Andreotti, undertook to ensure that the Assem-
bly was informed, in an appropriate manner, of 
the terms of the document drawn up by the 
working group responsible for studying the mat-
ter and adopted by the Council of Ministers. 
The inclusion ofthis chapter in the annual report 
of the Council is therefore merely a delayed fol-
low-up of this promise and it may be wondered 
whether the Council was not thus brought face to 
face with the need to meet the Assembly's wishes 
and whether it is not in point of fact an attempt 
to honour the word of the minister at least cost, 
i.e. with a minimum of substance and above all a 
minimum of publicity. 
26. However, the chapter as such gives impor-
tant information not only about the extent of the 
consensus among the Seven on the SDI - and it 
went quite a long way - but also about the proce-
dure which allowed a consensus to be reached: 
meetings of government experts and adoption of 
their conclusions at ministerial level. This 
means that the Permanent Council had little to 
do with the preparation of this text. This is 
probably to be welcomed, since it is unlikely that 
that body would have been able to work out such 
a positive agreement on the principles of the 
seven member countries' policies, judging by the 
total absence of political initiative by the Perma-
nent Council to which the thirty-first annual 
report of the Council once again testifies. 
27. Finally, the new half-yearly report 
describes the guidelines the Council intends to 
follow as a result of the work of its group on the 
SDI: technological questions and the politico-
strategic implications of developments started 
off by the SDI. The question is to what extent it 
intends to include disarmament-related matters 
in these studies in view of the fact that the SDI 
seems to be at the centre of American-Soviet dis-
armament negotiations. 
28. All the other chapters of the annual report 
merely repeat texts already communicated to the 
Assembly. They show only the Council's 
administrative activity and no real political 
action. 
of a deliberate will on the part of the govern-
ments to abandon the aims they drew up in 
Rome less than two years ago? Is it due to one 
or other government blocking decisions which 
the others would have been prepared to take? Is 
the reason the composition of the Permanent 
Council which is no longer effectively empow-
ered to take political initiatives? The fact that a 
working group of representatives specially 
appointed by the ministries was able to work out 
an altogether acceptable joint position on such a 
delicate matter as the SDI indicates that the last 
of these explanations is not irrelevant, even if 
not the only one. 
30. If this is the case, we should therefore 
wonder whether it is possible to reactivate WEU 
in the context of the institutions set up in 
1954. The Assembly has asked several times 
whether the ambassadors in London were best 
placed to give WEU the political impetus it 
needs. Quoting the Rome declaration, the 
thirty-first annual report confirms that this is 
indeed the Council's vocation. The composi-
tion of the Permanent Council, intended to man-
age a system mainly concerned with armaments 
control, seems to give it little chance of fulfilling 
this vocation. Should it be maintained? 
31. It may therefore be wondered whether the 
Council has adequately defined the role WEU 
should play and whether it has not been con-
cerned more with structures than with 
activities. Account being taken of what is done 
in NATO or in twelve-power political consulta-
tions, your Rapporteur feels these activities 
should be exercised in a number of directions: 
32. (i) Consideration of the evolution of 
American strategic concepts - which are not lim-
ited to the SDI - and their implications for 
Europe's security so as to: 
(a) strengthen Europe's position in the 
alliance; 
(b) determine in which areas European 
initiatives are necessary, in particular 
in regard to modern armaments, so 
that Europe may retain its political 
role in the world and a technological 
and industrial capability adapted to its 
security requirements. 
33. (ii) Study of the threats to Europe. 
These obviously include the threat represented 
by the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces and 
the operations of member countries of that pact 
and also those which may originate elsewhere, 
for instance in the Mediterranean area. Agency 
II has been instructed to study the threat. Such 
a study has no meaning unless the Council draws 
29. One may thus wonder about the real rea- consequences from it, which, to the best of the 
sons for this absence of initiative. Is it because Assembly's knowledge, it has never done. 
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34. (iii) The Assembly has also drawn the 
Council's attention to the threat of international 
terrorism to European society. Insofar as it 
seems increasingly that military means will be 
needed to counter terrorism, WEU can no longer 
turn a blind eye to this question although it is 
desirable that other aspects be examined in wider 
forums, as Mr. Andreotti said at the joint meet-
ings in Venice in April 1986. The fact that the 
question of terrorism has to be tackled in 1987 in 
the framework of the WEU Public Administra-
tion Committee shows that WEU cannot be left 
outside. The question is whether the ministers 
will continue to ignore it at their Luxembourg 
meeting in November 1986. Your Rapporteur 
is gratified that in its reply to Recommendation 
435 the Council endorsed the point of view 
expressed by the Assembly on the role which 
should be played by Agency 11 in this 
connection. But he would like to know how the 
Council has effectively followed up this 
endorsement. The disagreement which 
emerged among the Twelve in October 1986 
over measures to be taken against Syria, proved 
to bear considerable responsibility in the 
organisation of an operation which might have 
been very serious had it succeeded, shows that 
concerted action cannot be expected of the gov-
ernments without serious preparation. Is this 
not specifically the task of the agencies? 
35. (iv) Nor, as far as the Assembly knows, 
has the study of disarmament and arms limita-
tion questions, entrusted to Agency I, led to prac-
tical conclusions being drawn by the 
Council. The Assembly undoubtedly shares the 
views set out in the half-yearly report on conven-
tional disarmament, but it considers that a col-
lective expression of the European point of view 
in these matters should not encounter funda-
mental difficulties but would strengthen the 
account taken of the preoccupations expressed 
by the Council. 
36. (v) Examination of threats to international 
peace emanating from areas outside the North 
Atlantic Treaty area. Many recent events have 
shown that more searching consultations on the 
matter are essential because, increasingly, it is 
instability in these areas that might lead to major 
hostilities which Europe will not be able to 
escape. 
37. (vi) The search for political impetus which 
the Council can give to European armaments 
co-operation. The Council has been proclaim-
ing that this is its aim ever since the Rome decla-
ration, and in particular in the Bonn 
communique. What has it done to attain it? 
38. It is obviously the presence of ministers of 
defence at Council meetings that should allow 
impetus to be given to the bodies responsible for 
making concrete contributions. The annual 
report is not very explicit about the participation 
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of these ministers, although since 1985 they have 
also been meeting in the IEJ?G, which seems to 
indicate that the latter is also destined to give 
political impetus. 
39. The informal nature of the IEPG means 
that it is not a decision-takiJilg body and that is 
what should distinguish it from the WEU 
Council. However, one may wonder why the 
ministers labelled "informal" one of their two 
annual meetings in 1985 and 1986. Was the 
purpose not once again to eyade decisions and 
responsibilities? This also . diminishes WEU 
and glosses over that which dlistinguishes it from 
the IEPG. It is remarkable ,that in its reply to 
Recommendation 432 the Council states that its 
"objective is to help maintain the political impe-
tus for the work of the IEPG" and does not even 
mention the Standing Armaments Committee. 
Does this mean it no longer sees it as a living 
body? In that case, it should say what action it 
intends to take on its 1955 decision setting up the 
SAC. 
40. It is essential for the Council to explain to 
the Assembly and to the public what role it 
assigns to WEU, the IEPG and the CNAD 
respectively in regard to armaments co-operation 
and what is the impact of tlie participation of 
ministers of defence in WEU Council 
meetings. The half-yearly report is far from giv-
ing the Assembly the full satisfaction it is entitled 
to expect in this matter. 
41. (vii) Examination of the possibility of 
enlarging WEU to the member countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance and of the European Commu-
nities which have so requested. The Council 
has asked the Assembly to ensure links between 
WEU and the parliaments of those countries. 
The Assembly has endeavoured to do so, and not 
unsuccessfully, but it has always held that while 
its initiatives could precede those of the Council 
they would be significant only provided they did 
not give the Council a pretext to avoid giving its 
views. If this were the case, it would find itself 
in a particularly delicate position vis-a-vis its 
partners. There are signs that this matter too is 
becoming urgent. 
42. During its visit to Denmark in October 
1986, as during its visit to Norway in February, 
the committee noted that these countries were 
anxious to be kept informed about WEU's 
activities. The Assembly for its part has taken 
all the steps necessary to allow parliamentary 
observers from European member countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance so wishing to take part in 
sessions and even in meetings of some of its 
committees. But it is not its role to inform the 
governments of these countries of the activities 
of the WEU Council and it is essential for the 
Council itself to provide this information. 
43. Having been unable to visit Spain, the 
committee has no first-hand information about 
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that country's views following the referendum in 
June 1986 the results of which should bring it 
closer to WEU. But it must be recalled that the 
Assembly voted in favour of Portuga~'s applica-
tion for membership and has shown Its support 
by inviting the Portuguese Delegat~on to the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to 
take part in all its activities as observers. 
According to the reply to Written Question 265, 
only on 26th May 1986 did the Council have p~e­
liminary contacts with the Portuguese authontles 
following Portugal's application for membership 
on 27th October 1984. For the other possible 
candidate countries, such contacts are still at the 
planning stage. 
44. The committee's discussion on this subject 
showed that while some members considered the 
revitalisation of WEU should be given priority, 
in time, over enlargement, others on the contrary 
considered that acceptance of enlargement was a 
touchstone for testing the governments' will to 
reactivate WEU. If it came to the test, an indi-
cation is to be found in the answer to Written 
Question 265: the Council will do nothing before 
December 1987. The half-yearly report takes 
up this point. Yet unless the Council has 
changed its mind it meant 31st Dece~be~ 1987 
to be the time-limit only for the orgamsatwn of 
the agencies. Is this matter so important that it 
must have decisive repercussions on the enlarge-
ment of WEU? Is it not rather a pretext for 
postponing decisions which ~h?uld not be .v_ery 
difficult to take ifthere is a mmimum ofpohtical 
will among the governments? 
45. None of these proposals is new: they have 
all already been the subject of Assembly recom-
mendations on many occasions. Indeed, the 
underlying principle is defined in the modified 
Brussels Treaty and the Council reiterated or 
stipulated the principles in the Rome declaratio~ 
and in subsequent texts or statements. So far, It 
has taken no effective action on them. 
46. Some committee members expressed the 
opinion that the ministerial meeting to be held in 
Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986 
will be something of a last chance to reactivate 
WEU. Should the meeting be unproductive in 
spite of the efforts of the Luxembourg Govern-
ment and the specific proposals of the Assembly, 
the governments' only remaining l?ea~s of 
action would be to promote co-operatiOn m the 
framework of the Twelve. However, the obsta-
cles to introducing defence questions into this 
framework make one wonder whether Europe 
would not find it easier at present to express 
itself in another framework. 
IV. The functioning of WEU 
4 7. The new structures of the ministerial 
organs of WEU should obviou~l_Y be e_xami~ed 
from the standpoint of the political onentatwn 
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of the Council. However, a few preliminary 
remarks are called for before starting this chap-
ter: 
48. (i) The procedure adopte~ by the Council 
for abolishing limits on conventiOnal armaments 
having been to delete the lists appended to the 
protocols the tasks of the Agency for the Control 
of Arma~ents were reduced to very little, but the 
agency was maintained. It is .gratifying that the 
thirty-first annual report contmues to report on 
its activities, as stipulated by the treaty. 
49. (ii) In the same way, the 1955 decision s~t­
ting up the SAC is still in force an~ altho~gh Its 
international secretariat was termmated It was 
simultaneously transferred to the new Agency 
Ill which did not mean a major change in the 
activities of WEU. However, the SAC has 
apparently not been convened in 1986, wh.ic.h is 
absolutely contrary to the 1955 decis~o~. 
Putting Written Question 271 to the Council m 
July 1986, our colleague Mr: van ~e~ Wer!f 
rightly insisted on the Council explammg this 
matter. No reply to this question has yet been 
received by the Assembly. It is clear that a de 
facto abolition of the activities ofthe SAC would 
make it pointless to transfer the activities of its 
international secretariat to Agency Ill. How 
does the Council explain the concomitance 
between this transfer and the de facto suspension 
of SAC meetings? How does it intend to respect 
the SAC's obligation to submit a half-yearly 
report on its activities when there have been 
none in 1986? 
50. (iii) The structures of WEU must be 
reconsidered after the end of 1987 so that an 
assessment may be made of their performance, 
which means that the new agencies should be 
judged on the results ?f their wo_rk. But the 
Council seems to be domg everythmg to ensure 
that results are slender and that the newly-
created agencies are therefore destined to be 
condemned. There is every indication that the 
Council has merely taken note of the reports the 
agencies have submitted to it without making the 
slightest political use of them. 
51. One may therefore wonder whether th~ 
creation of these agencies met a real Co~ncil 
requirement or whether it was not ~ather a~med 
at concealing the abolition of the mt~rnatwnal 
secretariat of the SAC and the reductiOn of the 
ACA to practically naught. The Council's iner-
tia makes the new agencies hardly credible. The 
information the Assembly has received does not 
allow it to form an opinion on the documents the 
agencies have submitted to the Council, but it 
can nevertheless note that: 
52. (a) The agencies are guaranteed no mean-
ingful source of information from the govern-
ments or larger international organisations better 
placed than WEU to keep the agencies informed, 
such as NATO. They therefore have to venture 
on to the thin ice of creating for themselves pro-
cedure for acceding to such sources of 
information. Information obtained in this con-
nection indicates that this is a difficult long-term 
task. Precedents give grounds for wondering 
about the kind of information that even the 
IEPG, of which all the WEU countries are mem-
bers, is prepared to transmit to Agency Ill. 
53. (b) The agencies have no means of pro-
cessing the information they are able to obtain, 
and in particular have no computer of adequate 
capacity. They are therefore reduced to using 
makeshift methods of examining the documenta-
tion they obtain for preparing the studies which 
should provide material for the Council's 
work. 
54. (c) The Council merely notes the studies 
submitted to it but has so far done nothing to 
draw political conclusions from them. 
55. In the circumstances, if an objective opin-
ion had to be expressed on the work of the agen-
cies, it would probably be that the agencies pro-
duce perfectly useless studies on the basis of 
mediocre information processed by archaic 
methods. Were two years needed to show 
this? Was it not possible in 1985 to foresee that, 
however carefully the agencies carried out the 
tasks assigned to them, such premises would lead 
to their being condemned at the end of the two 
years they were allowed to prove their 
worth? Was the 1987 time-limit anything other 
than a false pretence camouflaging the decision 
taken at the outset to put a rapid end to the exis-
tence of the agencies the Council was creating? 
56. The memorandum by the President of the 
Assembly, adopted by the Presidential Commit-
tee on 15th September 1986 and sent immedi-
ately to the Council, set out the Assembly's posi-
tion regarding the agencies as follows: 
"While there is no doubt that the 
Secretariat-General, as a consequence of 
the Rome declaration, has extended its 
field of action considerably, it is not so 
clear that the new agencies have so far had 
to play a role corresponding to WEU's 
operational requirements as envisaged in 
the Rome declaration. The creation of 
such agencies implied that WEU effec-
tively exercised certain responsibilities 
and also that the Council left them a free 
enough hand to allow them to take mean-
ingful action in the areas assigned to them. 
(a) For the reports to be really useful, the 
task of reporting at short notice on the var-
ious subjects assigned to them by the 
Council implies certain requirements 
which do not yet seem to be fully met. 
1. The Council must first develop definite 
tasks before asking the agencies for 
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assistance. The reports submitted to it 
should be considered and effectively 
followed up in the ton text of its normal 
work. 
2. The agencies must be required to follow 
continuously the matters they have to 
study so as to build up the necessary 
documentation and competence to be 
able to work to good avail. They must 
have the means necessary for acquiring 
information in member countries and 
international organisations and for 
processing it. In particular, NATO 
and the IEPG should be instructed to 
give them all necessary support. 
3. The Council must inform the Assembly 
and public opinion of the content of 
these reports without delay, subject 
only to the restrictions imposed by clas-
sified defence information (Recom-
mendation 432). 
(b) The necessary continuity of the agen-
cies' action means that, in addition to their 
task of keeping the Council informed, they 
must have permanent ~asks in the context 
of WEU's general vocation (Recommen-
dation 432). 
1. Agency I for disarmament questions 
should be instructed to assist the dele-
gations of all member countries in dis-
armament negotiations in which they 
take part, particularly in the United 
Nations and the CSCE. It should take 
part in preparing directives for the 
negotiations and should follow official 
and unofficial negotiation sessions in 
order to be able to play an effective 
role. This means the agency giving 
member countries every guarantee that 
the secrecy of infoqnation communi-
cated to it is respected and that the 
basis of any co-opetation between the 
agencies and the Assembly must be 
clear enough to ens~re that the latter 
cannot be suspected of leaks. 
2. Agency 11 for defence questions should 
be instructed to co-ordinate work 
undertaken in the various member 
countries to keep public opinion 
informed of defence problems with a 
view to making it better aware of their 
European dimension. The Assembly 
has often stressed the interest of this 
task which corresponds to views 
endorsed by the Seven in the Rome 
declaration. While giving favourable 
answers to Assembly recommenda-
tions, the Council has so far done noth-
ing to follow them up (Recommenda-
tions 429 and 432). 
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3. Agency Ill for the development of 
armaments co-operation differs from 
the others in that its research role is a 
secondary one. It is responsible for 
following the progress of European 
armaments co-operation. Where nec-
essary, it has to follow and analyse 
work conducted elsewhere on the com-
parison of equipment requirements and 
relevant specifications and on the pre-
sent situation. Finally, it has to study 
the armaments sector of industries in 
member countries. For this purpose, 
it should first continue the work under-
taken by the international secretariat of 
the SAC and ensure that governments 
follow up their conclusions, which has 
not so far been the case, some of these 
studies, particularly the one on legal 
obstacles to co-operation, involving leg-
islative decisions. Just as, generally 
speaking, American legislation reserves 
the United States army's procurement 
for the country's own industries, princi-
ples should similarly be defined for 
European preference without any 
protectionist policy. Agency Ill 
should also be given the permanent 
task of studying all matters raised by 
the transfer between allies of 
armaments-related technology. 
Finally, the 1955 text setting up the 
SAC should be re-examined to ensure 
that that body's new terms of reference 
take account of the vocation of the 
IEPG and of the fact that WEU has a 
political vocation: preparation of the 
European union." 
57. Since your Rapporteur fully endorses the 
opinion of the Presidential Committee on this 
matter, he has little to add to this text, other than 
to say that he has learned, once again through the 
reply to Recommendation 432, that the Council 
has taken preliminary steps to implement para-
graph (b) 2 above by promoting co-operation 
between European study and research 
institutes. Finally, the half-yearly report refers 
to this matter but the terms used leave room for 
doubt about the intentions of the Council which 
apparently makes no distinction between 
research work and study, although they are quite 
different when it is a matter of security and 
defence. After the inquiry instigated by Mr. 
Genscher into the possibility of setting up a 
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research institute for such matters had reached 
negative results, the Assembly proposed giving a 
European dimension to the activities of the study 
institutes by organising regular international 
training courses. The Council's statements are 
too vague to ascertain what action it intends to 
take on this recommendation. 
V. Conclusions 
58. The thirty-first annual report of the Coun-
cil is not likely to calm but, on the contrary, to 
revive the misgivings your Rapporteur expressed 
in his previous report. However, he hopes the 
coming weeks will throw more light on the 
Council's true intentions, inter alia through the 
answers to Written Questions 270 and 271 and 
the report on the activities of the Council in the 
first half of 1986. He regrets that the dates fixed 
for the session did not allow him to wait until 
after the ministerial meeting to be held in 
Luxembourg on 14th November before submit-
ting his report to the committee for adoption. 
He reserves the right to add the necessary finish-
ing touches when he presents it during the ses-
sion. 
59. Conversely, the first reading of the present 
document by the General Affairs Committee 
showed that committee members were increas-
ingly doubtful about the governments' intention 
to follow up the Rome declaration. A recent 
debate in the European Parliament on the poten-
tialities of the single European act have again just 
shown the narrow limits within which any 
defence activities by the Twelve will always be 
confined. If WEU were to fail in its area of 
responsibility it would be a failure for Europe in 
a vital area. The stalemate at the Reykjavik 
summit meeting should, 'more than ever, encour-
age European governments to face up to the seri-
ousness of this situation. 
60. Finally, the report on the Council's activi-
ties in the first half of 1986 gives no information 
about the activities of the Council's subsidiary 
organs: the ACA and the SAC. The reduced 
activity of the ACA certainly does not justify the 
Council reporting on it twice a year, but the 
Assembly has to recall that it is a statutory obli-
gation for the Council to report on it 
annually. As for the SAC, there are ample 
grounds for wondering how the Council intends 
to apply its 1955 resolution. This is a point on 
which the Council's explanations are awaited. 
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Amendment 1 
Political activities of the Council -
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Bianco 
2nd December 1986 
1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council to 
be held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, the joint views of the Council ob the implications of 
the Reykjavik meeting; " 
Signed: Bianco 
I. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (amendment agreed to). 
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Developments in the Soviet Union and East- West relations 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Close, Rapporteur 
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1. Adopted in committee by 10 votes to I with 3 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Berrier (Chairman); MM. Close, Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Baumel, Sir Frede-
ric Bennett, MM. Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Herfkens, Mr. Hill (Alternate: Murphy), Mrs. 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are pnnted in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on developments in the Soviet Union and East- West relations 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that for forty years the Soviet Union has constantly pursued a degree of military 
deployment not justified by the requirements of its security; 
(ii) Considering that, in spite of the Helsinki final act, the measures taken in the qame of detente have 
led to no true alleviation of the internal dictatorship in the USSR nor to an improvement in the situa-
tion in the peoples' democracies; 
(iii) Noting that the size ofthe amounts the Soviet Union allocates to defence is one of the fundamen-
tal reasons for the persistence of economic difficulties and that any true transformation in the Soviet 
Union requires a reduction in its military effort; 
(iv) Considering that the new Soviet authorities seem aware of the need to make this reduction; 
(v) Considering in particular that the progress the latter have made in informing the Soviet and 
foreign public in 1986 may be the start of an important new turn in Soviet internal policy and in that 
country's external relations; 
(vi) Considering that the determination shown by the Soviet Government to improve the standard of 
living of the population should lead it to seek agreements allowing it to reduce its military expenditure; 
(vii) Noting in fact that since 15th January 1986 the highest Soviet authorities have presented many 
proposals which could allow meaningful negotiations to be started on the limitation of armaments; 
(viii) Welcoming in particular the results obtained at the Stockholm conference on the verification of 
confidence-building measures; 
(ix) Regretting however that the speeches of Soviet leaders have not always resulted in effective 
concessions in international negotiations; 
(x) Regretting that the Reykjavik meeting did not allow the bases for these negotiations to be fixed, 
but trusting that it nevertheless allowed a substantial rapprochement of views likely to lead, in the near 
future, to agreement between the United States and Soviet Union on the goal oftrue'negotiations which 
would take account of the strategy now in force and of which deterrence is the keystone at every level; 
(xi) Recalling that western security is ensured by a relative balance in forces - which should be 
brought to the lowest possible level - in all areas and that at the present time this balance has not been 
achieved in Europe in the conventional field and particularly in that of chemical weapons where the 
Soviet Union has a near monopoly in Europe; · 
(xii) Considering it is essential for the countries of Western Europe to harmonise their views on ques-
tions concerning the limitation of armaments and to make them known to their American partners; 
(xiii) Considering that the WEU Council has a decisive role to play in this matter and gratified that it 
has instructed one of the new agencies to study Soviet proposals; 
(xiv) Considering that the requirements of European security must also guide relations of all kinds bet-
ween the West and the Soviet Union, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Develop as a matter of urgency its consultations and work with a view to defining European posi-
tions on disarmament and the limitation of armaments as it has done for the strategic defence initiative; 
2. Convey these positions to the United States before negotiations on the limitation of armaments 
are started; 
3. Proceed in like manner to study the Soviet Union's attempts to transfer to the countries of the 
third world the struggle it calls "anti-imperialist"; 
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4. Seek an agreement between all the western countries to avoid undue competition continuing to 
allow the Soviet Union to have the West contribute, even indirectly, to the development of its military 
effort; 
5. Ask the member countries to increase their effort to ensure a balance of conventional forces in 
Europe in order to facilitate an agreement on the reduction of the number of Euromissiles without jeo-
pardising the security of Europe as it now is by the deployment of Soviet short-range Euromissiles, 
including SS-21s, SS-23s and SS-24s; 
6. Make every effort to ensure that the current negotiations in Geneva result without delay in an 
agreement on a verified worldwide ban on chemical weapons. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Close, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Throughout the ages, man has wondered 
about the role played in the evolution of history 
and the ensuing irreversible trends by those 
whom Grousset called figureheads and whose 
influence Jakob Burckhardt tried to define in his 
chapter entitled " Die Historische Grosse " 1• 
2. This is precisely the fundamental question 
your Rapporteur put to himself when he started 
to tackle East-West relations as they are now in 
the light of the coming to supreme power of a 
new leader, Mr. Gorbachev. 
3. Could he be the providential instrument of 
destiny and radically influence the future of the 
planet through the sole impact of his personality, 
or will he merely continue a long-term strategy 
aimed at ensuring the primacy of communist 
ideology by profoundly changing methods, but 
without diverging one iota from the Soviet 
Union's fundamental objectives? 
4. After a long period during which Soviet 
policy seems to have followed, rather unimagina-
tively, a fairly steady course, using proven 
methods and pursuing not very mysterious aims, 
although relevant information seeped out spar-
ingly, the arrival of Mr. Gorbachev at the head of 
the Soviet Union together with a new, or at least 
younger, team of leaders compared with their 
predecessors marks a distinct change. The West 
now has to determine what this new course 
is. It is clearly a matter of style, particularly in 
regard to information. There is also a change in 
the volume of activity and the number of initia-
tives. Your Rapporteur has therefore tried to 
draw up an inventory of proposals put forward 
by Soviet leaders since the beginning of 
1986. The list is long but probably not complete. 
To what extent does the policy inaugurated by 
Mr. Gorbachev go beyond the activity relayed by 
the media and imply a revision of medium- and 
long-term goals? What is just tactics and what 
is political strategy in the new Soviet proclama-
tions? What role does revolutionary ideology 
still play in the reasoning of the leaders? These 
questions are inevitably being raised in the 
West. It is not easy to know and even less easy 
to deduce what policy should be followed in face 
of this evolution. 
5. It was therefore normal for the Assembly, 
which has been constantly concerned with the 
I. In which he says true greatness is a mystery. Some-
times the decisive element is above all one of personality and 
sometimes rather the work left behind; often too, judgment 
cannot prevail in face of stronger prejudice. J. Burckhardt: 
Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen. 
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trend of East-West relations, to take up this ques-
tion again today. However. welcome this may 
be to your Rapporteur, he well realises the uncer-
tainty of the conclusions he has managed to draw 
from considerations based on an enormous mass 
of various publications from 
1
which it is not pos-
sible to bring out a very coherent interpretation 
of recent events. 
6. Another major obstacle stemmed from the 
acceleration of events which forced your Rappor-
teur to revise almost daily '1- report which was 
intended to be objective, exhaustive and topi-
cal. The Reykjavik meeting on 11th and 12th 
October 1986, the hopes placed in it and the 
ensuing disillusion are but one example among 
others. 
7. Before pondering on developments in the 
Soviet Union, one basic assumption should pro-
bably be borne in mind, as well as the fundamen-
tal aims of a superpower which also considers 
itself to be the bastion of Marxist-Leninist ideo-
logy. The assumption has never been called in 
question: it is the final triumph of communism 
on a world scale. The duality of the Soviet 
Union, at one and the same time possessor of the 
supreme weapon and doctrinal driving force, 
sometimes leads to conflicting situations. In-
deed, it is necessary to guarantee security and 
promote expansion. Direct and indirect stra-
tegy, the latter very often by •• proxy", comple-
ment each other and interpenetrate each other 
with remarkable continuity on the basis of a 
variety of means ranging fro~ military power in 
its purest form to economic, political and psy-
chological aspects with a vrew, while always 
being prepared to defend the ,sanctuary, to pur-
suing territorial or ideologi9al expansionism. 
The battle of ideas and the conquest of minds, 
with the assistance of structurall themes and peer-
less organisation, are among i~s preferred means 
of achieving the final aim. To ensure the suc-
cess of these strategies, it is essential to separate 
Europe from the United States, that Europe 
which Alain Mine said shone like a dead star 
and, unless it became aware of its strong and 
weak points it would in the long run become the 
lung of Moscow, but in a near-protectorate situa-
tion. Such an evolution would be fostered by 
the asymmetry of geostrategic •positions. 
8. Although it may not be possible to assess 
the true impact of Soviet initiatives, two factors 
perhaps demonstrate their sincerity: on the one 
hand, known facts about the internal situation 
and the direction in which Mr. Gorbachev is gui-
ding his economic and sociolQgical policy and, 
on the other hand, the conviction that the leaders 
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of such a vast, developed and inflexible country 
as the Soviet Union cannot suddenly take deci-
sions which would imply radical conversions. 
This means that at the very best it is only the 
start of a trend which will probably be very slow 
and might be revised by the very persons who 
seem most determined to bring it to fruition. 
One way or another, it is therefore in our interest 
to be cautious in our approach to the new Soviet 
proclamations. 
9. In view of the above, the report will there-
fore be divided into three principal sections: 
10. I. The Soviet Union's internal situation 
will cover economic problems, a fundamental 
factor in understanding the whole, and internal 
problems, including the constraining weight 
which the demographic increase in non-
Russians, above all in the Asian republics, will 
eventually bring to bear. 
11. //. Soviet external policy will review suc-
cessively: 
- the growth in Soviet strength at every 
level of armaments; 
- external policy inside and outside 
Europe as it results from a worldwide 
strategy and the most recent initiatives 
taken in this area. 
12. ///. Western Europe's position. Western 
Europe is still incapable of speaking with a single 
voice. It is interested in and highly concerned 
by the dialogue between the two great powers. Its 
uncertainty - not to say confusion - results from 
the precariousness of its position in defence and 
security matters and from the still minor role it 
plays in settling major problems at world level. 
13. Has East-West co-operation in civil mat-
ters been beneficial for Europe? Is it adult 
enough to define a security policy which takes 
account of its own interests, while fitting into the 
framework of the Atlantic Alliance? 
14. These are the principal questions that we 
shall have to raise although without exhausting 
this vast and complex subject on which our 
future destiny depends and of which East-West 
relations are the cornerstone. 
15. If it is not present in this great worldwide 
debate, Europe will be condemned to remain a 
non-person. Finally, to use well-known words: 
as long as we have not built the United States of 
Europe, we shall remain the Europe of the Uni-
ted States. 
I. The Soviet Union's internal situation 
16. From the fall of Khrushchev in 1964 up to 
the death of Chernenko on 11th March 1985, 
there was very little change in the Soviet Union, 
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either because its principal leaders, particularly 
Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Chernenko, had been 
chosen by the group which decided Soviet policy 
because they did not in fact threaten the estab-
lished situation, as Khrushchev had done, or 
because the only General Secretary of the Com-
munist Party who seems to have tried, on 1Oth 
November 1982, to introduce certain reforms in 
the country's leadership, Mr. Andropov, was 
soon struck by an illness from which he died 
after fifteen months in office, without having had 
the time to achieve major reforms. 
17. The appointment of Mr. Gorbachev to 
lead the Soviet Union certainly showed a desire, 
or at least resignation, of the same group to open 
the way to a number of changes which had in fact 
been necessary for a long time. Mr. Gorba-
chev's age and personality bear witness to this. 
Moreover, the death ofMikhail Suslov, who had 
clearly played a dominating role in the last 
twenty years by refusing to deviate from a very 
conservative ideological course, probably weake-
ned the position of those who were opposed to 
change. It is quite likely, however, that the new 
General Secretary of the Bolshevik Communist 
Party, in the dealings leading up to his appoint-
ment, had to agree to certain limits, at least for 
the time being, to his freedom of action. The 
memory of how Mr. Khrushchev was rebuffed 
must also encourage him to be cautious. More-
over, when he was responsible for ideological 
questions during Mr. Chernenko's term as Gen-
eral Secretary of the party, Mr. Gorbachev was 
extremely conservative in ideological matters 
and it is difficult to say how far he still adheres to 
the positions he then held. 
18. It is therefore already possible to discern a 
new style of government and some rejuvenation 
among the country's leaders and their methods, 
but it is not yet possible to be sure how the new 
team of leaders sees the future of the Soviet 
Union and its relations with the rest of the world 
and how far it intends to conduct the reforms 
undertaken. Are they purely formal changes, 
designed to give a more modern appearance to 
the administration of the Soviet Union, or are 
they the start of deeper changes which, if success-
ful and if the new leaders remain in power, 
would be able to transform international rela-
tions fundamentally in the next ten years? It is 
too soon to say. 
19. It would therefore be extremely dangerous 
for the West to count on a radical change in the 
nature of East-West relations and to allow any 
weakening of its positions in Europe and the 
world. Conversely, it might perhaps to a certain 
extent encourage a trend in the Soviet Union 
towards placing international peace on sounder 
bases than at present. 
20. Thus it is not on the basis of the real or 
presumed intentions of the new Soviet leaders 
that an idea should be formed of what a Euro-
pean policy might be but on the facts of the situa-
tion in the Soviet Union insofar as they can be 
determined and on their implications in foreign 
and defence policy matters. Naturally, for ideo-
logical considerations the action of Soviet leaders 
might not conform to what objective analysis 
might show to be required by the situation. How-
ever, it seems that whatever part ideological 
concerns may have played in Mr. Gorbachev's 
past, since the death of Mr. Suslov on 25th 
January 1982 they have no longer played such an 
important role in the determination of Soviet 
policy. The new generation of leaders seems 
infinitely more aware than the previous one of 
the weight of realities and it is perhaps not 
unduly daring to think that the latter will even-
tually take precedence over ideological conside-
rations among Soviet leaders. 
(i) Economic problems 
21. Since the failure of Mr. Khrushchev's 
attempt to develop all sectors of the Soviet eco-
nomy in order to shift competition between the 
communist and capitalist worlds from the threat 
of armed conflict to competition in economic 
efficiency and social welfare, the Soviet leaders 
had reverted to the old Stalinist options which 
gave absolute priority to investment for defence 
purposes at the expense of investment which, 
directly or indirectly, could have allowed 
consumption to rise. 
22. The impact of this choice was conside-
rable. From a purely economic standpoint, it 
led to much wastage of natural and human 
resources in the Soviet Union, delayed progress 
in all civil technology and maintained a shortage 
of many consumer goods, with all that implied: 
rationing and black market. Socially, it kept the 
standard of living of most of the population 
fairly low with the result that it was - and still is 
- necessary to do the utmost to close the country 
off from outside influences and even from inde-
pendent information about the true situation in 
the Soviet Union and in capitalist countries so 
that Soviet public opinion cannot make compa-
risons which would be unflattering for the way 
the country is managed. There is a close link 
between economic choices and political dicta-
torship. 
23. It seems that changes in the leadership of 
the Soviet Union in the last three years, while 
not representing a radical upheaval in the aims 
the country has set itself, nevertheless imply an 
infinitely more realistic analysis of the problems 
than in the past. 
24. The Soviet Union seems to have become 
aware of the permanent nature of a number of 
problems which it had thought it could solve by 
voluntarist state action. 
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(a) In spite of heavy jnvestment to allow 
new land to be cultivated, agriculture, 
apart from occasional improvements, 
has been an ever-present problem 
since the second world war, with grave 
agricultural deficit$, a disastrous level 
of income from labour and mediocre 
use of the soil resulting in the need to 
import large quantities of foodstuffs, 
including grain. 
(b) The inadequacy of industries produ-
cing consumer goo4s, their poor equip-
ment and their low productivity are an 
increasing burden on the Soviet eco-
nomy and society. ' 
25. It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the 
military effort in financial terms since Soviet sta-
tistics and even the budget are not presented in a 
manner which allows a comparison to be made 
with western countries. It is impossible to 
ascertain the proportion of the Soviet GNP ear-
marked for defence although most economists 
have, for a long time, been <renouncing the bur-
den of military expenditure which is far too 
heavy for the Soviet economy in which many 
sectors have been stagnating or even regressing 
for many years. Furthermore, the prospects of 
using new technology for defehce purposes which 
have emerged in the last decade have brought the 
Soviet Union to grips with tile need to increase 
its defence budget even more so as not to lag 
behind the United States and the western coun-
tries and it has consequently had to give up the 
idea of more productive invQstment. 
26. To the permanent difficulties facing the 
Soviet economy, a further mne has been added 
since 1985, i.e. the fall in the price of natural gas 
and oil. These two product~ represent 60% of 
Soviet exports outside the communist bloc. The 
price of oil, which was about $27.5 per barrel in 
the third quarter of 1985, fell ~o between $10 and 
12 per barrel in July 1986 and the price of gas 
changed in parallel. At the same time, the dol-
lar, which is quoted for oil prices, was devalued 
in terms of the currencies ofWestern Europe, the 
region which provides most of Soviet imports 
from outside the communist [bloc. Finally, the 
market for oil products was saturated, which 
made a quantitative increase. of Soviet exports 
difficult. In fact, oil production, like coal and 
electricity, in the first half of 1986 was far lower 
than estimates in the plan and even actual pro-
duction in 1984 (616 million tonnes but only 595 
million in 1985). This threefold phenomenon 
led to a serious trade imbalance in the Soviet 
Union and made it more difficult to pursue eco-
nomic development for which the import of 
durable goods remained essential. The Soviet 
balance of trade with the industrialised western 
countries, which had been positive until 1984, 
registered a deficit of $2 500 million in 1985 and 
this situation worsened at the beginning of 1986. 
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27. The new General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party tried to face up to all these 
problems when he presented the five-year plan 
for the period 1986-90 to the twenty-seventh 
party congress in February and March 
1986. The main aim Mr. Gorbachev assigned 
to this plan, according to his speech in Khaba-
rovsk in August 1986, is a restructuration of 
Soviet society with both social and economic 
implications. In itself, the priority given to the 
reorganisation of living conditions is already an 
innovation and requires a major increase in the 
growth rate: 22.1% in five years and 4.1% in 
1986, whereas the increase was only 2.6% in 1984 
and 2.9% in 1985. Industrial production should 
rise by 25% thanks to an equivalent increase in 
productivity. 
28. If we are to believe the explanatory memo-
randum to the plan presented by Mr. Nikolai 
Ryzhkov, Prime Minister, on 18th June 1986, 
the emphasis is on the renewal of industrial 
equipment. Today, 29% of machines used are 
of international standard. This figure should 
rise to 80 or 85% in 1990. By 1990, computer 
output should be multiplied by 2.4. Civil 
nuclear power, which represents 10% of today's 
energy output, should provide 20% in 
1990. This aim remains unchanged in spite of 
the Chernobyl disaster, and the nuclear pro-
gramme should follow the course set out in the 
plan. 
29. To achieve these results, Mr. Gorbachev 
proposed a number of reforms: thus, he attacked 
the excessive centralisation of the economy and 
proposed studying the possibility of passing 
some economic powers to the authorities of the 
main regions which in those matters may be des-
tined to replace the republics which were too 
unequal in terms of area, population and 
wealth. The purpose is not to call in question 
the state management system but merely to rec-
tify some of its weaknesses. To the same end, 
he expressed his intention of making firms more 
independent, for instance by making them inde-
pendent for their accountancy, and developing 
the idea of profit-sharing within certain limits: 
people must not be paid to do nothing so the 
creation of superfluous jobs must be avoided. 
He even envisaged the privatisation of certain 
economic sectors, particularly that of services. 
The General Secretary also proposed to foster 
links between research and production. 
30. In agriculture, the plan provides for the 
production of 250 to 255 million tons of grain 
and 21 million tons of meat in 1990 instead of 
182 million tons of grain and 16.2 million tons of 
meat in 1985. To this end, two series of measu-
res are to be taken. First, there is to be a struc-
tural reorganisation of the agricultural and food 
complex. The six ministries concerned and a 
state committee are grouped in a single agro-
industria1 state committee, the Gosagroprom. 
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The aim of this measure is to put an end to 
ministerial supervision. Second, there is to be 
more material encouragement to stimulate pro-
ductivity. Agricultural concerns are urged to do 
better than the plan thanks to various kinds of 
bonus. The income of those in charge of kolk-
hozes and sovkhozes will depend on turnover. 
The best agricultual workers will be paid bonuses 
up to twice their basic salaries. 
31. In a speech in Vladivostok in August 1986, 
Mr. Gorbachev said it was necessary to work out 
a special economic development programme for 
the Soviet Far East. The region should no lon-
ger be considered just a source of raw materials; 
it should process them on the spot instead of sen-
ding them west. 
32. Finally, an agreement concluded with the 
United Kingdom in July 1986 on the reimburse-
ment of pre-1917 Russian loans should allow the 
Soviet Union to have access to the London 
financial market. This is probably a first step 
towards a policy designed to give the Soviet eco-
nomy access to the Euromarket and financing for 
investments, which are sorely needed since the 
fall in oil prices in the first half of 1986 limited 
its possibilities of obtaining foreign currency. 
33. This step should probably be linked with a 
request by the Soviet Union to take part in the 
activities of GATT at that organisation's minis-
terial conference in Punta del Este on 15th Sep-
tember 1986. Although since 1983 the Soviet 
Union had been showing interest in that organi-
sation, its new approach evokes the possibility of 
accession to GATT and indicates its intention to 
make changes in foreign trade procedure and 
management methods of Soviet firms to make 
this possible. This step may also reveal or 
confirm a real intention on the part ofthe Soviet 
Union, in order to remedy weaknesses in its eco-
nomy, to adopt a more open attitude to interna-
tional trade and certain forms of competition 
which the country renounced in 1924. The evo-
lution of the Soviet Union towards an economy 
more open to the international market is, how-
ever, not yet sufficiently clear or significant for 
the members of GATT to consider that they 
could accept this proposal without reservation. 
34. Finally, since spring 1986, several plans 
for setting up mixed economy projects in the 
Soviet Union associating Soviet and capitalist 
firms have been the subject of negotiations or 
contracts. It is clear that such associations, if 
they succeed, are likely to have considerable 
repercussions on the basic principles of the 
Soviet economy and at the same time inject new 
life into it. 
35. Clearly the new Soviet leaders have asses-
sed the serious problems which have in fact exis-
ted for a long time but which their predecessors 
preferred to ignore. The question is whether 
they will be sufficiently realistic, clear-sighted 
and tenacious to rectify the situation, since this 
would obviously require far-reaching changes in 
Soviet internal and external policy. There are 
signs that they are considering making these 
reforms. 
(ii) Internal problems 
36. The trend of Soviet internal policy is far 
more a test of the will of the new team of leaders 
to carry out reforms than decisions relating 
to defence, disarmament, foreign policy or the 
economy because it involves forces which it is 
not easy to juggle with in the short term. A five-
year plan can be modified, proposals for negotia-
tions can be abandoned and military invest-
ments can be concealed. But it is far more 
difficult and dangerous to go back on public 
undertakings or measures relating to the day-to-
day life of people, their well-being and their free-
dom. These undertakings and measures hence 
prejudge the continuity of Soviet policy as a 
whole. 
37. Conversely, in a country where the condi-
tions of the struggle for power are kept as secret 
as in the Soviet Union, it is difficult to discern 
what is at stake in the struggle, the parties invol-
ved and the forces they represent in a society in 
which the true tendencies of public opinion can 
hardly be expressed. It is therefore a matter of 
interpreting signs which are sometimes not very 
explicit. 
38. It is evident that Soviet society has been 
deeply marked by the fact that an authoritarian 
regime has remained in power for several deca-
des, determined to impose its policy without 
taking account of the reactions of the people, to 
prevent public opinion being expressed, to 
control information and to use terror as much as 
conviction to this end. It was impossible to 
redirect the economy validly and lastingly 
without at the same time attempting to correct a 
number of problems within society which were 
evident a long time ago but which seem to have 
grown considerably in the past decade. 
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privileges they enjoyed led to corruption exten-
ding to a large part of the administration and 
managerial staff throughout the economy. 
41. (iii) While in principle the Soviet econo-
mic system ensures full employment, the conti-
nual denunciation of idleness and a study of 
published vacancies and applications for 
employment lead to the conclusion that in spite 
of poor labour productivity many Soviet citizens 
of working age are unable to find employment. 
42. (iv) The feeling of frustration felt by 
society as a whole in face of this social conserva-
tism led to the extension of serious scourges: 
alcoholism, which had caused havoc in Russia 
for a very long time, spread still further, and 
drug-taking which had on the contrary been 
almost unknown emerged and is now a matter of 
concern for the authorities, as are the signs of 
revolt denounced by the Soviets for a long time 
under the name of hooliganism. 
43. (v) Excessive centralisation led to uncon-
trolled growth of the large cities where there are 
housing, transport and supply problems which 
the administration cannot manage to control. 
For instance, Moscow is now believed to have 
8 700 000 inhabitants, whereas the plan anticipa-
ted a rise to only 7 600 000 in 1990, and 60 km of 
underground railway line planned for 1986 are 
not yet built, according to the head of the party 
organisation in Moscow in an 'interview with Mr. 
Amalric published in Le Monde on 16th July 
1986. 
44. (vi) Many observers refer to the persis-
tence of racist feelings against the Jewish mino-
rity, few in number since the second world war, 
and the Moslem elements of the population, on 
the contrary, very numerous, close to 75 mil-
lion. Due to a high birth rate, the Moslem 
population is increasing rapidly, whereas the 
birth rate of the European population has fallen 
in recent decades and is now at a very low rate 
equivalent to that of the Western European 
nations. This is a particularly serious problem 
since the revival of Islamic fundamentalism in 
the Middle East now appears to be making itself 
39. (i) Lack of economic motivation led to felt among Soviet Moslems among whom Isla-
poor labour productivity, a lack of dynamism in mic secret sects and societies are believed to be 
firms and serious weaknesses in their manage- making great strides, in spite of a ban on them 
ment, as underlined in the Soviet reports on res- and an increasing number of!repressive measu-
ponsibility for the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in res. In a book which has left its mark, L'Empire 
April 1986. eclate, Helene Carrere d'Encausse, the Soviet 
expert, showed the magnitude of the problem 
40. (ii) Maintaining the same people in politi- which already existed and wh~ch is liable in the 
cal and economic positions of power for too long near future to become even more difficult to 
and the absence of sanctions against leaders who solve, i.e. the cohabitation in the Soviet Union of 
failed to give satisfaction had led to posts of res- peoples with different languages, cultures, reli-
ponsibility remaining perpetually in the hands of gions and ethnic particularities. In particular, 
a social elite which had become conservative and the Afghan war seems to have accentuated Mos-
opposed to change known as the nomenkla- lem opposition which refuses both communist 
tura. Their misuse of public property and the ideology and Slav domination. 
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45. (vii) The development of many opposition 
movements representing very varied trends is no 
longer in any doubt. Some are linked with 
national claims, particularly in the Baltic provin-
ces, in spite of the measures taken to settle a Rus-
sian population in these areas and to disperse 
many of the former inhabitants of the three Bal-
tic countries throughout Soviet territory. Others 
are of a religious nature, not only Moslems, and 
are outside the official orthodox church, too well 
controlled by the state. The sects seem to have 
made considerable progress in spite of persecu-
tion. Yet others are more clearly political, whe-
ther supporters of a return to the old regime, 
democrats, reformist socialists or anarchists, or 
even quite simply groups of young people who 
seek greater freedom and take western protest 
movements as a model. Although the Soviet 
press made no mention of them until very 
recently, it is known that there have been terro-
rist attacks in the Soviet Union. 
46. The Guardian of 22nd July 1986 pub-
lished an interesting article summarising a seven-
teen-page manifesto issued in Leningrad by the 
Movement for Socialist Renewal in November 
1985, which seems to emanate from liberal sec-
tions of the Soviet administration and calls for 
far more radical reforms than those announced 
or embarked upon by Mr. Gorbachev, particu-
larly in the sense of freedom of information and 
political discussion, including television. One 
may wonder whether the distribution of this 
document was not intended precisely as provoca-
tion by the opponents of the General Secretary of 
the party in order to show that his reformist 
intentions were endangering the bases of the 
regime, or whether it really did emanate from a 
group of civil servants who found Mr. Gorba-
chev's initiatives insufficient. 
47. Admittedly, Mr. Gorbachev's proclaimed 
intentions of fighting alcoholism, drug-taking, 
idleness and criminality seem to have been 
warmly welcomed by Soviet leaders, but less so 
regarding his intention to wage all-out war on 
corruption and "undue acquisition of 
wealth ". The General Secretary announced in 
Kuybyshev on 7th April 1986 that laws were 
going to be promulgated against those who 
acquired undue wealth. On 28th May, Pravda 
published on its first page a resolution by the 
Central Committee and a decree by the Soviet 
Supreme increasing penalties for all economic 
crimes. These measures were in fact aimed 
mainly at the spread of the black market and 
moonlighting experienced in the Soviet Union in 
the last decade and sought to strengthen state 
controls over the entire economy. One may 
wonder to what extent they will be effective and 
above all whether they do not run counter to the 
wish for economic liberalisation expressed else-
where. 
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48. At the same time as he announced his 
wish to strengthen discipline at work, Mr. Gor-
bachev said he intended to fight corruption at 
every level. This fight affects both workers and 
members of the nomenklatura. Thus, after the 
Chernobyl disaster, a search was made for those 
responsible. Their punishment was announced 
to the public and persons relatively high in the 
administrative hierarchy were concerned. 
49. Thus, the social policy started by Mr. Gor-
bachev and leaders supporting him, such as Mr. 
Eltsin, head of the party in Moscow, and Mr. 
Ryzhkov, head of the government, seems to have 
reached the nomenklatura. An opposition 
seems to be forming round certain persons such 
as Mr. Ligachev, who effectively occupies second 
place in the regime and is secretary to the party 
organisation, whom foreign observers think 
represents bureaucracy clinging to its security 
and privileges. 
50. There have been signs of a political strug-
gle. Following the twenty-seventh party 
congress, many members of managing bodies in 
the party, Soviet Supreme and government were 
replaced. There was something of an accelera-
ted changeover in party officials (eight of the ele-
ven members of the secretariat have been repla-
ced since 1981, 40% of the members of the 
Central Committee, 50% of party leaders in the 
republics and regions and almost 70% of minis-
ters). The Rector of the Institute for Internatio-
nal Relations (MGIMO), a diplomatic school 
which was one of the bastions of the nomenkla-
tura, was removed, according to Pravda of 23rd 
July 1986. A reshuffle in the military high com-
mand, which began in September 1984 with the 
departure of the chief of general staff, Marshal 
Ogarkov, continued in 1986 with the replace-
ment of General Luchev at the head of the group 
of Soviet armed forces in Germany, the Soviet 
forces' most important command. 
51. It is perhaps in the sector of culture and 
the media that measures already taken have been 
the most significant because they are likely to 
lead to far-reaching changes in society's attitude 
towards political problems to the extent that any 
return to former practices will be difficult. Thus, 
the congress of Soviet film workers managed to 
have more candidates than posts available in the 
elections to its board. The results were distinc-
tive because they led to the elimination of most 
of the former members and allowed new leaders 
to emerge in the film world, now promoted to 
official recognition. At the congress of the wri-
ters' union, the same procedure obliged most of 
the former leaders to make way for new ones. It 
is clear that such a revolution in the sensitive 
area of culture could not occur without the agree-
ment of the Kremlin, which has thus tolerated 
the formation of a sizeable breach in an area in 
which the political authorities had hitherto been 
in full control. 
52. In the case of the press, Mr. Gorbachev 
said in a speech to the plenum of the Central 
Committee on 1Oth March 1985 that the transpa-
rency of information must be enhanced and its 
truth guaranteed. There is every reason to 
think that this speech has already been given tan-
gible effect. For instance, in May 1986 Pravda 
criticised Soviet television, accusing it of using 
too many read-out texts, not enough pictures and 
too many prearranged, polished-up interviews. 
In regard to its foreign news, Pravda considered 
that information about the capitalist world was 
monotonous, that preference was given to mee-
tings, demonstrations and protest marches. 
There was rarely any reference to scientific and 
technical achievements. Television seems to 
have understood the message because on 6th 
August 1986, for the first time, Soviet television 
showed a parliamentary debate in the Soviet 
Supreme during which the Minister for the Coal 
Industry was asked to answer questions by mem-
bers criticising his ministry, and this programme 
was shown two weeks after the session was held, 
which by Soviet standards is quite quick. 
53. However, it was in the case of five disas-
ters which occurred in spring and summer 1986 
that there was the most noticeable progress in 
speed and honesty of information, compared 
with earlier practice of concealing such accidents 
as completely and for as long as possible, to 
minimise their extent and to gloss over state res-
ponsibility for them. These were the explosion 
at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the 
Ukraine on 26th April 1986, the earthquake 
which devastated Soviet Moldavia on 30th 
August, the sinking of the liner Admiral Nakhi-
mov in the night of 31st August to 1st Septem-
ber, the hijacking of an aircraft on a Soviet 
domestic flight on 24th September by two Soviet 
nationals which caused six victims and the total 
loss of a Yankee class nuclear submarine off Ber-
muda on 6th October 1986. 
54. It was admittedly only on 6th May, i.e. ten 
days later, that an official press conference was 
given on the Chernobyl accident, and after it had 
been announced by the western press. 
55. But as from 6th May there was a reversal 
of traditional policy relating to information. The 
effort deployed by the Soviet media in regard to 
an unforeseen event which was rather disagree-
able for the authorities was unprecedented for 
tens of years. In two months, dozens of articles 
and accounts have been published in Moscow 
and the provinces. The television has reported 
on the spot. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
bureaucratic habits and sluggishness have not 
disappeared and it is significant to note that 
negative phenomena are referred to in the Mos-
cow press rather than in the provincial press, 
which is visibly still very sensitive to pressure 
from local authorities or less aware of the liberal 
measures taken by the Kremlin. 
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56. However, for ten days after the accident 
the authorities were relatively mute. The first 
communique from the government on 28th 
April was censored for the people concerned 
since two phrases announcing that there were 
victims and that a government commission was 
to be set up did not appear in the Ukraine Prav-
da. Only on 5th May was a series of protective 
health measures announced to the people of 
Kiev. But subsequently the transparency called 
for by Mr. Gorbachev was far better respected. 
Thus, during Mr. Mitterrand~s visit to Moscow, 
Mr. Gorbachev recognised that the situation 
round Chernobyl was disastrous and that first 
aid had been a matter of dtramatic improvisa-
tion. In the following days, various informa-
tion given by the Soviet press, radio and televi-
sion progressively revealed that the danger of 
nuclear radiation had been seriously underesti-
mated by the local authorities. Only on 27th 
April was a start made with evacuating the peo-
ple. Administrative partitions were such that 
villages in Biolorussia, as close to the power sta-
tion as those in the Ukraine, were not evacuated 
until six days later because ofthe administrative 
boundaries between the two republics. 
57. The second major innovation after the 
accident in Chernobyl was the announcement 
that a number of people had been dismissed. It 
was announced that action had been taken 
against high-level members of the hierarchy as 
well as workers. The director and head engineer 
of the power station were dismissed for irrespon-
sibility and incompetence, as 'well as the Chair-
man of the State Committee for Security in the 
Nuclear Industry and the first deputy Ministers 
of Energy and Electrification and of Mechanical 
Construction. The Minister of Energy and Elec-
trification was severely reprimanded. 
58. If, according to the inquiry of the Political 
Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party, the 
disaster was due to a human error, the conse-
quences were drawn: it was nealised that there 
was effectively a lack of disGipline which Mr. 
Gorbachev had already denounced in other cir-
cumstances, for certain members of the staff had 
abandoned their posts at the time of the accident. 
In fact, it was just as if Chernobyl had provided 
an opportunity for Mr. Gorbachev to illustrate 
the speech he had been making for some 
time. It was also an opportunity of showing his 
determination to fight lack of discipline and 
carelessness and to ensure the transparency of 
information. However, one may wonder whe-
ther the Soviets announced the accident at Cher-
nobyl because they had no alternative in view of 
information from western countries or whether 
the new Soviet information policy merely 
conformed with a decision to ~romote a change 
in society. 
59. While Mr. Gorbachev made use of Cher-
nobyl at home, he also made use of it internatio-
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nally by proposing to strengthen co-operation to 
handle nuclear accidents on the one hand and to 
prevent the premeditated destruction of nuclear 
power stations by conventional weapons on the 
other, which was one of his arguments in calling 
for disarmament. This led the Soviet Govern-
ment to provide detailed analyses during the 
summer of the causes of the accident and assess-
ments of its consequences which foreign obser-
vers sometimes found unduly alarming, particu-
larly about the probable number of cases of 
cancer caused by the accident. One may also 
note the purposeful use of Chernobyl to streng-
then the great fear of all things nuclear among 
Western European public opinion and to give 
new strength to pacifist movements. 
60. The speed with which the Soviet media 
gave the news of the natural disaster in Moldavia 
- which it is true did not involve government 
responsibility - and then the accident in the 
Black Sea - following which the Minister for the 
Merchant Navy, Mr. Gujenko, was forced to 
retire on 27th September - and finally the hijack-
ing shows that the practice which started with the 
Chernobyl affair has been continued, which is a 
real revolution if it is recalled that hitherto most 
facts of this kind - including a nuclear accident 
and a serious fire in the Moscow underground 
and several hijackings - were completely concea-
led from Soviet and international public opi-
nion. 
61. Thus, facts which are hard to deny testify 
to a significant evolution in the priorities set by 
the Soviet authorities, the revival of a routine, 
unprofitable economy taking precedence over 
the development of the defence effort, and the 
search for new living conditions for the people 
eclipsing the fight against capitalism. Recogni-
tion of certain freedoms, concern for less selec-
tive information and the replacement of many 
officials allow it to be hoped that this trend will 
be continued. 
62. But there must be no misunderstan-
ding. The ideology governing the Soviet Union 
since 191 7 has in no way been called in question 
by Mr. Gorbachev and his team. The Soviet 
leaders have in no way renounced the conquest 
against capitalism, those of Mr. Gorbachev so far 
leave only very limited room for detente in inter-
national relations. 
63. Moreover, it seems certain that Mr. Gor-
bachev has not overcome all opposition and that 
his foreign and internal policies are encountering 
obstacles in the Soviet Union itself. Thus, the 
dubious arrest of the American journalist Nicho-
las Daniloff, accused of spying and infringing 
customs regulations, on 1st September 1986 and 
his being held in a state of arrest for a month in 
spite of American protests were considered by 
certain western analysts to be an attempt by 
KGB leaders to prevent the holding of a Soviet-
American summit meeting which had been plan-
ned for the last months of 1986, thus jeopardi-
sing the policy of detente, essential for the 
achievement of Mr. Gorbachev's economic and 
social programme. 
64. It is therefore impossible to deduce from 
an analysis of this programme what Soviet 
foreign policy will be in future years. Mr. Gor-
bachev has at least linked his personal authority 
sufficiently with the reforms it involves to be 
able to credit him with a real will to achieve 
them, i.e. to assume their implications in terms 
of external and defence policy. 
II. Soviet external policy 
65. Mr. Brezhnev and his successors left Mr. 
Gorbachev an external situation which, although 
not as bad as the situation inside the Soviet 
Union, nevertheless kept the country involved in 
matters the outcome of which was, to say the 
least, uncertain in view of the implications for 
internal matters. 
(i) Armaments 
66. The Soviet Union had to take delicate 
decisions at short notice in armaments ques-
tions. 
of the world by communism, although they no 67. (a) Admittedly, de facto respect by both 
longer seem to think that this conquest requires a parties of the numerical ceilings fixed by the 
direct military confrontation between the two SALT II agreements for intercontinental missi-
great powers. It is the methods used from Sta- les, although these agreements have not been 
lin to Chernenko that are subject to revision, not ratified by the United States Congress, allowed 
the final goal. The past of Mr. Gorbachev, the Soviet Union to have more strategic ballistic 
quite recently responsible for ideological matters missiles than the Americans. But MIRVing and 
in the party's Central Committee, leaves little the deployment of air-to-surface cruise missiles 
doubt on this point. It is in the tactical field on bombers still leaves the United States slight 
that the changes now visible are to be found, not superiority in the number of nuclear 
in revolutionary strategy. Just as Mr. Khrush- warheads. The initial deployment of MXs as 
chev's attempts to relaunch the Soviet economy from the end of 1986 and the possibility of adap-
with liberal reforms in no way detracted from the ting the second series of 50 MX missiles to 
domination exercised over the people's democra- mobile launchers, probably in 1989, will to some 
cies or the use of indirect strategy in the fight extent improve the American position. 
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68. (b) President Reagan's announcement in 
March 1983 of a major investment programme 
for research into ways of ensuring the defence of 
American territory against Soviet ballistic missi-
les forced the Soviet Union either to intensify its 
research programme, which would then become 
very costly, or, at less cost, to increase the num-
ber of warheads deployed on its strategic nuclear 
weapons. President Reagan stood very firm 
against Soviet attempts to make him block the 
SDI programme in exchange for minor sacrifices 
in the limitation of nuclear weapons. He was 
prepared to agree to the opening of negotiations 
on new weapons only if the Soviet Union at the 
same time negotiated a significant limitation of 
nuclear and conventional weapons. 
69. (c) The increase in Soviet nuclear power 
thanks to the deployment of SS-20 missiles with 
three nuclear warheads in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia forced the United States to deploy 
Pershing 11 and cruise missiles in Western 
Europe, with the result that the Soviet lead in 
continental-range weapons was undermined. 
70. Soviet attempts to take advantage of paci-
fist agitation in certain Western European coun-
tries at that time or even to stir it up in order to 
prevent these missiles being deployed had failed 
even before 1984 and the NATO twofold deci-
sion of December 1979 was implemented. 
71. (d) In tactical nuclear weapons, develop-
ment of the neutron bomb by the United States 
was likely to give the West a lead once it was 
decided to deploy it and above all to eliminate 
the Soviet lead in conventional arms. 
72. (e) The Soviet Union has always blocked 
the negotiations on the mutual and balanced 
reduction of conventional forces in Europe, in 
particular by opposing any valid form of inspec-
tion, thus allowing it to retain an overwhelming 
conventional superiority over the forces 
deployed by NATO. In the event of hostilities, 
this superiority would make NATO face a diffi-
cult choice between total, almost immediate 
defeat and recourse to nuclear escalation. The 
SDI, intended to give the United States a far 
freer hand if faced with such a choice by shelte-
ring American territory from Soviet missiles, 
could deprive the Soviet Union of most of the 
advantage of being able to conquer Western 
Europe very quickly. 
73. {f) The remarkably fast expansion of 
Soviet naval power revived the fear of Soviet 
imperialism in several regions of the world, par-
ticularly the Far East, where Japan has started to 
build up a considerable defence capability. 
Soviet positions in that area are liable to be wea-
kened if Japan joins the worldwide arms race. 
74. The Soviet Union was thus faced with a 
choice between a further major financial effort to 
catch up with the technological benefits the SDI 
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would give the United States in the next few 
years or significant concessions with a view to 
reaching agreements limitina armaments at all 
levels. 
(ii) External policy 
75. (a) As long as the western deterrent sys-
tem retains its effectiveness,· the Soviet Union 
will probably not give priority to action in 
Europe, which would involve too many risks. It 
will be content to ensure its considerable supe-
riority in conventional forces which not only 
gives it a guarantee against any conventional 
western reaction but also allows it to exert fairly 
strong pressure on the countries of the West. 
Thus it will be able to pursue' without risk a far 
more active policy outside EuJ1ope either through 
direct expansion, as in Afghanistan, or by more 
indirect action, particularly in Africa and Latin 
America with the support of its naval presen-
ce. The main aim will be to weaken the 
influence of the West and threaten its supplies of 
natural resources and lines of communication by 
outflanking them from the south. For this pur-
pose, it often makes use of so-called liberation 
movements which exist in Africa and Latin 
America - and now above all in Central America 
- and when intervention seems necessary it pre-
fers to leave such action to its .. allies " - such as 
Cuba - so as not to become involved in a possi-
ble setback. ' 
76. At the same time, exploiting differences 
emerging between Europe and the United States, 
either about defence and disarmament matters 
concerning the security of the North Atlantic 
Treaty area or on the occasion of conflicts out-
side that area, which are on the increase, it is 
waging an intensive propaganda campaign 
throughout the world with the principal aim of 
uncoupling Europe from the United States. 
While this psychological action !has not yet achie-
ved major results, it is leavi~g traces and the 
effects must not be minimised. 
' 77. (b) The advantages of the Soviet Union's 
continued domination over the Eastern Euro-
pean countries are obviously not negligible. It 
can plan to ensure its defence several hundreds 
of kilometres from its own territory which is thus 
sheltered from any conventional surprise attack. 
It benefits considerably from its' trade with those 
countries, which are forced to. buy its oil and 
industrial products whatever the cost and to sup-
ply it with low-cost agricultural produce and raw 
materials. However, this systematic exploita-
tion is not to the credit of the regimes supported 
by the Soviet Union and fans the flames of revolt 
which are unpleasant when they find political 
expression, as in Poland, and dangerous in the 
event of a serious conflict with the West since the 
Soviet Union cannot be sure of the reactions of 
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the forces of its allies and the populations of the 
territories where its troops would be deployed. 
78. (c) Relations between the Soviet Union 
and the People's Republic of China, very bad 
since 1960, have not improved because China 
made the evacuation of Cambodia by Vietnam 
and of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and a 
reduction in Soviet military and nuclear deploy-
ment in Central Asia prior conditions for the 
normalisation of relations between the two coun-
tries. 
79. (d) In Europe, the Soviet Union has stead-
ily tried to consolidate the situation established 
after the second world war by moving its fron-
tiers westward and by establishing friendly regi-
mes in the territories occupied by the Red Army 
in 1945. For many years, it proposed an all-
European conference which became the confe-
rence on security and co-operation in Europe 
and met for the first time in Helsinki in 
1973. To obtain recognition of the Eastern 
European regimes and frontiers, together with its 
proteges, it had to agree to enter into a number of 
commitments relating to exchanges of all kinds 
and public and individual freedoms. However, 
application of the Helsinki final act ran up 
against considerable difficulties because rejection 
of the regimes imposed and perhaps also of cer-
tain frontiers by the populations concerned, 
including several sections of the Soviet people, 
made it impossible to allow much freedom. In 
these conditions, the process started in Helsinki 
has not made as much progress as many had 
hoped, except perhaps in confidence-building 
measures, although it has allowed relations bet-
ween the two German states to be developed to 
some extent and a few liberal measures to be 
taken in the people's democracies. Detente in 
Europe has reached a point beyond which it can 
hardly go without endangering Soviet domina-
tion. 
80. (e) Soviet diplomacy, which was effective 
as long as the purpose was to encourage third-
world countries to rebel against western colonisa-
tion or American power, was unable to make the 
links thus created permanent, except perhaps in 
Cuba. President Sadat's dismissal of Soviet 
advisers called in by his predecessor, Nasser, was 
a turning point in the history of Soviet-Arab rela-
tions. Since then, the Soviet Union has found 
only fickle allies in the Near and Middle East. 
It had to take military action to support a mili-
tary putsch in South Yemen in 1985 in order to 
replace one allied regime by another. Its assis-
tance has not allowed Iraq to beat Iran after six 
years of war. On the contrary, the Iranians 
seem to have improved their positions and 
strengthened the cohesion of their people while 
in the Soviet Union itself there are signs of sym-
pathy for them among the Moslem population. 
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81. (f) The Soviet Union is seriously handi-
capped by the situation in Afghanistan, where, 
for the last seven years, it has been involved in a 
deadlocked war in support of a government that 
is rejected by most of the population. Every 
success in the field is quickly countered by the 
local resistance movement. This war is an obs-
tacle to friendly relations between the Soviet 
Union and Moslem countries; it is forced to 
deploy more than a hundred thousand men and 
vast quantities of equipment in Afghanistan, it 
suffers considerable losses, and finds itself in the 
disagreeable position of a great power which can-
not halt a poorly-armed guerrilla movement. 
Even in the Soviet Union, it has caused reactions 
whose extent it is difficult to assess, particularly 
in areas near the Afghan frontier. The invasion 
of Afghanistan has isolated the Soviet Union to 
some extent, led to a few, admittedly very limi-
ted, sanctions being taken by the western coun-
tries but, above all, it has created a situation in 
which it is difficult for the Soviet Union to with-
draw without serious loss of prestige, although 
events show little promise of decisive victory for 
the Soviet cause. 
82. (g) These various circumstances have 
induced the Soviet Union to adopt a more cau-
tious attitude to international matters than in the 
past. This caution is obviously most noticeable 
in the Near and Middle East: Iraq's main sup-
plier of arms, the Soviet Union has been careful 
not to adopt a clearly anti-Iranian position. It 
has avoided being compromised by its other cus-
tomers, Libya and Syria, by supporting terrorist 
organisations and taking a definite stand in 
Lebanese affairs. The United States' determi-
nation not to allow the Soviet Union to inter-
vene in that region seems to have had a suffi-
ciently deterrent effect. Even its support for 
certain regimes or opposition movements in 
Africa and Latin America has been kept to a 
level which avoided a clash between the two 
great powers. 
83. There is no doubt that Mr. Gorbachev 
intends to rectify this situation, on the one hand 
because he cannot make Soviet public opinion 
accept a disputed internal policy if his external 
policy is also subject to keen criticism and, on 
the other, because the maintenance of tension 
might limit his scope for action in economic and 
social questions. He has therefore had to make 
everyone understand that his diplomacy is based 
on new foundations. 
84. He showed this first by changing all the 
leaders of the Soviet diplomatic service and the 
officials of the foreign affairs department 
(MID). Thus, Mr. Gromyko, who had run this 
department for many years, was replaced by Mr. 
Shevardnadze. Under Mr. Gorbachev, this 
ministry has changed more than any other 
branch of the government: six new deputy minis-
ters, two new first deputy ministers and many 
changes in the department and at the head of the 
principal embassies. Moreover, whereas when 
he was head of this ministry Mr. Gromyko took 
sovereign decisions on everything, a feature of 
the present period is the return of foreign affairs 
to control by the party, Politburo and General 
Secretary. Mr. Dobrynin, new party secretary 
and head of its international department, ensures 
maintenance of this control. Mr. Shevardnadze 
implements Mr. Gorbachev's directives. It has 
been seen that a large number of experts on 
America have joined the MID and relations with 
the United States are given greater prominence 
than in the past. 
85. A new department responsible for arma-
ments negotiations has also been set up in this 
ministry. It is believed that the Ministry of 
Defence, hitherto the only judge in the matter, 
has thus been deprived of many of its tasks in 
this area. 
86. In June 1986, Mr. Dobrynin wrote an arti-
cle in the review Kommunist which apparently 
defined the principles of the new Soviet foreign 
policy. First, there was to be a global diploma-
tic approach which must take account of all the 
fundamental aspects of world policy: military, 
political, economic and humanitarian. The 
newest element is the humanitarian aspect in 
which Mr. Dobrynin visibly includes the human 
rights problem. Mr. Gorbachev stressed this 
point during the visit by Mr. Mitterrand, Presi-
dent of the French Republic, to Moscow. Mr. 
Dobrynin also stressed that the role of the mili-
tary factor in international relations had chan-
ged. On 6th March 1986, Mr. Gorbachev said 
security was increasingly a political task which 
could be accomplished only by political means. 
It was time to place relations between states on a 
sounder basis than armaments. While under 
Brezhnev the Soviet Union's security was based 
above all on the balance of military forces, 
although the importance of maintaining the mili-
tary balance is still emphasised, that is the limit 
and it seems to be taking second place to the sur-
vival of all mankind in the face of modern wea-
pons. Mr. Dobrynin wrote that international 
relations must be tackled not on the basis of a 
narrow understanding of the interests which 
oppose the two sides but on joint interests and 
aspirations. 
87. These new ideas on the balance of forces 
seem to have been followed up in the many pro-
posals made by Mr. Gorbachev on disarmament 
since the beginning of 1986. But they are not 
confined to this area and a number of statements 
have been made and measures taken to reorient 
Soviet external policy. 
88. In a speech in Vladivostok on 28th July 
1986, Mr. Gorbachev traced the broad lines of a 
new policy in Asia and the Pacific. He announ-
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ced the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from 
Afghanistan before the end of 1986: one armou-
red regiment, two mechanised infantry regiments 
and three air force regiments~ i.e. a total of 6 to 
8 000 men. This number is not very great since 
the Soviet Union is believed to have about 
120 000 men in Afghanistan. It is more an indi-
cation of intentions than a real reduction in the 
Soviet presence. It is quite qlear, however, that 
Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan cannot 
be effected by progressive withdrawals of forces. 
It requires political measures such as the esta-
blishment of a government acceptable to at least 
part of the opposition and it is not certain that 
Mr. Gorbachev can go so far I in his concessions 
at present, always assuming that he intends to do 
so. 
89. But the full meaning Of this sign can be 
seen if set in the context of tln.e other intentions 
voiced in the Vladivostok speech. It is first a 
question of allowing a rapprochement between 
the Soviet Union and China. The withdrawal 
of Soviet forces from Afghanistan is one of three 
conditions laid down by China for normalising 
its relations with the Soviet Union. In the same 
speech Mr. Gorbachev announced a unilateral 
reduction of 7 5 000 Soviet ttoops stationed in 
Mongolia, which is far more significant and 
meets China's second condition. Finally, a 
Soviet First Deputy Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, Mr. Arkhipov, visited Beijing in 
August, probably to give details of these propo-
sals, and another First Deputy Chairman, Mr. 
Talyzin, followed him on 8th September to dis-
cuss economic matters but probably also the 
main issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the occu-
pation of Cambodia by the Vietnamese army. 
The Cambodian affair seemed: insoluble until at 
the beginning of September Deng Xiaoping said 
in an interview granted to the American CBS 
television channel that he was prepared to visit 
Moscow to meet Mr. Gorbachev if the latter 
brought pressure to bear on Vietnam to with-
draw its troops from Cambodia, meaning that 
China was no longer making their actual with-
drawal a condition for normalising Sino-Soviet 
relations. It is clear that to re-establish these 
relations would be a considerable success for Mr. 
Gorbachev and enhance Soviet influence in the 
Far East and the personal authority of the Gen-
eral Secretary of the party. 
90. But his purpose is apparently not to revert 
to the pre-1960 situation, wl)ich the Chinese 
would not in any case want, bilt rather to allow 
the Soviet Union to take a new place on the wes-
tern shore of the Pacific. His, speech in Vladi-
vostok and the new Soviet manner of speaking 
testify to this. Efforts to improve relations bet-
ween the Soviet Union and Japan, North Korea 
and even the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations, now recognised by the Soviet Union, 
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have opened the door to the proposals made by 
Mr. Gorbachev in Vladivostok, i.e.: 
(i) for the Soviet Union to take part in 
the conference on economic co-opera-
tion in the Pacific to be held in Van-
couver in November 1986; 
(ii) to hold a conference on security and 
co-operation in the Pacific; 
(iii) to close the military bases of the two 
great powers on foreign territories 
(mainly the Soviet base in Cam Ranh 
in Vietnam and American bases in 
the Philippines); 
(iv) to hold a conference in Hiroshima on 
the denuclearisation of the Pacific; 
(v) to hold negotiations on the limitation 
of naval forces in the Pacific. 
91. These various proposals show that it is 
intended to recover political and economic 
influence in Eastern Asia and the Pacific which 
the Soviet Union had progressively lost since its 
break with China. But they in no way preclude 
an effort to play a military role in the region, too. 
92. Thus, there has been a steady build-up in 
the Soviet Pacific fleet in recent years. It is now 
believed to have about ninety major warships; it 
has considerable nuclear capability and two of 
three Soviet Kiev-class aircraft-carriers are assi-
gned to it. In addition to Soviet ports, it has the 
former American base at Cam Ranh in Vietnam, 
whose berthing capacity has been trebled. It is 
reported to have 25 surface craft, 5 attack subma-
rines and 38 aircraft there at present which could 
threaten the entire South-East Pacific. Further-
more, land, air, naval and nuclear forces in the 
Soviet Far East have been increased very consi-
derably since they are now believed to include 80 
long-range Backfire bombers with a cruise missile-
launching capability and 165 SS-20 missiles with 
three nuclear warheads each. In summer 1986, 
the fleet conducted the most important naval 
exercises ever carried out by the Soviet Union on 
its eastern shores. 
93. Although the naval superiority of the Uni-
ted States and its allies seems assured in case of 
war thanks to the presence of the Seventh Fleet 
in the Far East and above all the Third Fleet in 
the Western Pacific, American leaders are distur-
bed at the build-up of Soviet strength in that 
ocean. The Soviet Union is already exercising 
some political influence on the Pacific powers: 
whereas the Soviet Union is strengthening its 
links with its Vietnamese ally, has signed an 
agreement granting it port facilities at Kiribati 
(Gilbert Islands) and is negotiating another with 
Vanuatu (New Hebrides), some of the United 
States' allies, such as New Zealand, are proving 
reticent, particularly about the presence of 
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nuclear-propelled ships in their waters, and the 
new President of the Philippines, Mrs. Aquino, 
has indicated that she will perhaps not renew the 
agreement allowing the United States to main-
tain bases in her country when it expires in 
1991. In present circumstances, the loss of 
these two bases would be a disaster for the Ame-
rican presence in a large part of the Pacific. 
94. The guidelines presented by Mr. Gorba-
chev in Vladivostok cannot be interpreted 
without taking account of this military deploy-
ment. For the Soviet Union, it is obviously a 
matter of establishing itself in an area where 
recent economic developments show that it will 
play a vital role in the next few decades and 
where the situation is less stable than in Europe, 
which allows political and military action to be 
conducted which the Soviet leaders consider to 
be more fruitful. 
95. Although Mr. Gorbachev has not defined 
his overall intentions for the Near and Middle 
East, as he did for the Far East in Vladivostok, 
there are signs that after a long period of dor-
mancy following the break between the Soviet 
Union and Anwar el Sadat's Egypt, Mr. Gorba-
chev is also thinking of playing a greater role in 
that area although no final decisions on how to 
do so have yet been taken. However, observers 
have noted that: 
(i) talks have been opened with Israel for 
re-establishing consular relations bet-
ween the two countries. This is 
significant because relations were bro-
ken off in 1967 and the existence in 
the Soviet Union of several hundreds 
of thousands of candidates for emi-
gration to Israel gives a special tint to 
these relations; 
(ii) the message of sympathy addressed to 
Libya after the American bombing of 
Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 in 
fact carried a veiled warning that 
Libya would be promised no support 
if it continued to encourage terrorist 
activities; 
(iii) Soviet military assistance to Iraq is 
probably mainly aimed at containing 
the Islamic revolution propagated by 
Khomeini's Iran. It thus brings the 
Soviet Union, which, moreover, is 
supporting its Syrian ally - itself 
fairly favourably inclined towards 
Iran - closer to the large majority of 
Arab governments which also fear an 
Iranian victory; 
(iv) the great discretion shown by the 
Soviet Union in recent months about 
the Lebanese problem and its public 
disavowal of outrages committed in 
the West by terrorist groups from 
Lebanon are no doubt intended to 
show that the Soviet Union is keeping 
a free hand in the Middle East and is 
seeking to restore peace in the 
region. 
96. Thus, after having endorsed the cause of 
the most destabilising fractions in the region for 
some twenty years, the Soviet Union is now 
taking on a far more moderate and peaceful atti-
tude, ~robably w~th the intention of resuming the 
place 1t lost, takmg part in any negotiations to 
restore peace and preventing the United States 
from playing a preponderant role. 
97. It is in Africa that Soviet policy has had 
the most obvious success in the last decade. 
Whereas during the preceding period it had tried 
to replace the western countries and exercise 
?irect e~ono~ic, political and military influence 
m certam Afncan countries such as Guinea and 
Mali, it suffered serious setbacks because it was 
unable to define, or in any event apply, a policy 
adapted to African requirements. It therefore 
subsequently resorted to other methods, particu-
larly after the unrest following the decolonisation 
of the Po~uguese empire. Admittedly, it still 
sends Soviet " advisers " to certain countries 
such as Angola and Mozambique, but in small 
number~. Th~ Cubans, themselves armed by 
the Sovtet Umon, sent armed forces which now 
form the main support for the Government of 
Angola, which is apparently not accepted by the 
great majority of the people. Nevertheless, 
Ango~a. served as a base for operations against 
Nam1b1a and Zaire. Moreover the Soviet 
Union has established friendly rela'tions with the 
Government of Mozambique with the result that 
South Africa is now surrounded by states under 
Soviet i~flu~nce which encourage, arm and assist 
subversiOn m South Africa and provide refuge 
for the organisations propagating unrest in the 
country. The. policy of segregation pursued by 
the South Afncan Government makes African 
public op~nion particularly sensitive to propa-
ganda agamst that state, which controls sea and 
air lanes essential for the West. It is also clear 
that the development of subversion in South 
Africa and unrest along its frontiers do not make 
it easy for that country to adopt an internal 
policy showing greater recognition of human 
rights. 
98. Similarly, the collapse of the Abyssinian 
empire and the agitation which developed in 
neighbouring countries allowed Cuban forces to 
be sent to Ethiopia and led to an interminable 
civil war in some of its provinces. This too is a 
vital region for international communications 
through the Strait of Bab al Man dab and the sou~ 
them exit from the Red Sea through which most 
Gulf oil passes on its way to Europe. The 
Soviet Union already controls South Yemen on 
the eastern shore of the strait and the activities of 
its allies are a threat to the western shore. 
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99: Support for the regime in Nicaragua stem-
mmg from a recent revolu~ion and Soviet and 
above all Cuban assistance to subversive move-
ments in neighbouring countries and other Latin 
American countries are probably aimed less at 
controlling lines of communication than at crea-
ting a maximum number of difficulties for the 
United States in the region, spreading a feeling 
that the latter is the oppressor of free peoples and 
finally weakening American positions in the 
world. 
100. It is however in relations with the West 
and with the United States that Mr. Gorbachev 
has shown most clearly that he wishes to change 
the aims of Soviet diplomac~ and achieve tangi-
ble results. The principal decisions, particularly 
those which led to the opening of the Geneva 
negotiations on the limitation of armaments 
. ' 
were certamly taken at the end of the period 
when Mr. Brezhnev led the St>viet Union. How-
ever, they have been reaffirmed and explained 
particularly clearly in recent months. It may 
naturally be wondered whether they are not 
merely intended to leave Soviet diplomacy and 
armed forces a freer hand in Asia, to consolidate 
advantages already acquired, whether they are 
sheer propaganda or, in the last resort, do they 
really seek to make world p~ace more stable. 
101. On 15th January 1986, on the eve of the 
opening of the twenty-seventh party congress 
and on the resumption of the Geneva negotia-
tions on the limitation of armaments, Mr. Gor-
bachev made a statement on behalf of the Soviet 
party and government which contained a far-
reaching nuclear disarmament plan. It was a 
three-stage plan to be compJeted at the turn of 
the century: 
102. (i) In the immediate future: 
(a) the two great powers would put an end 
to all nuclear tests and call on the 
other powers to do likewise. The 
Soviet Union for its part would pro-
long by three months its unilateral 
moratorium which was to have ended 
on 31st December 1985; 
(b) within the next five to eight years, the 
two great powers wpuld reduce by half 
the nuclear arms capable of reaching 
each other's territory; 
(c) they would renounce the development, 
testing and deployment of space strike 
weapons; 
(d) they would limit the number of their 
nuclear warheads to 6 000; 
(e) they would remove all intermediate-
range missiles from the European thea-
tre; 
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(f) they would undertake not to deliver 
intermediate-range missiles to other 
powers; 
(g) the United Kingdom and France 
would pledge not to build up their res-
pective nuclear weapons. 
103. (ii) As from 1990, all the nuclear powers 
would pledge to freeze all their nuclear weapons, 
stop all tests and destroy tactical nuclear wea-
pons. All the industrial powers should sub-
scribe to the ban on space strike weapons and 
renounce the production of weapons of mass 
destruction based on new principles of physics. 
104. (iii) The third stage would begin at the 
latest in 1995: all nuclear weapons would have to 
be destroyed by the end of 1999, while a univer-
sal agreement would guarantee that nuclear wea-
pons would never return. 
105. The destruction and limitation of arma-
ments would be effected by national technical 
means and with on-site inspections. 
106. Mr. Gorbachev also proposed terminating 
the production and stockpiling of chemical wea-
pons under international on-site inspections, a 
reduction in conventional weapons and the level 
of armed forces with reasonable verification in 
the framework of the MBFR talks in Vienna, the 
development of confidence-building measures at 
the Stockholm conference and the progressive 
lowering of the levels with effect from which 
manoeuvres should be notified. 
107. This statement formed the basis of a long 
series of diplomatic approaches to NATO coun-
tries, speeches, additional proposals and answers 
to western objections or counter-proposals ema-
nating from very varied Soviet authorities. They 
allowed the resumption of all negotiations on 
disarmament or the limitation of armaments 
which had been flagging, sometimes, like the 
MBFR talks, for many years. 
108. However, it very quickly became apparent 
to the western negotiators that the proposals 
confirmed by their opposite numbers in necessa-
rily secret negotiations differed considerably 
from public statements by Soviet leaders. 
Without these statements being openly called in 
question, many of the promised concessions did 
not reach the negotiating table. The Soviet lea-
ders for their part continually accused the United 
States of refusing to take any effective disarma-
ment measures in view of the fact that it was not 
interested in statements which would not lead to 
proposals for agreements including absolutely 
reliable verification measures. 
109. These American reservations led the 
Soviet leaders on several occasions to give more 
details and add to certain points in Mr. Gorba-
chev's statement. Soviet proposals made after 
the statement on 15th January 1986 include: 
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110. (a) During a visit to Moscow on 28th 
January of a delegation from the Italian Commu-
nist Party led by Mr. Natta, Mr. Gorbachev 
reverted to the old Soviet proposal for creating 
nuclear-free zones in Western and Eastern 
Europe. 
111. (b) Mr. Boris Rauschenbach, Soviet aca-
demician, stated on 29th January that the Soviet 
Union would be prepared to introduce the stric-
test verifications and open up the laboratories 
concerned for inspection for everything relating 
to the military use of space. 
112. (c) In answer to western proposals at the 
MBFR negotiations, on 6th February the Soviet 
Union agreed to an initial reduction of 11 500 
men for the Soviet Union compared with 6 500 
for the United States, as well as the establish-
ment of checkpoints at the entrance to and exit 
from the area in which forces would be limited, 
although they refused to allow the area of verifi-
cation to be extended to Soviet territory. 
113. (d) In his report to the twenty-seventh 
party congress on 24th February, Mr. Gorbachev 
reverted to earlier Soviet proposals, including: 
- renunciation by the nuclear powers of 
any kind of warfare; 
- a strictly controlled reduction in the 
level of states' military potentials to a 
reasonable level; 
- the termination of military blocs, star-
ting with an undertaking not to enlarge 
them or to form new groups; 
- a proportional and balanced reduction 
in military budgets. 
114. (e) Receiving Mr. Chadli Bendjedid, Pre-
sident of the Algerian Republic, on 28th March 
immediately after the bombing of Tripoli by the 
American air force, Mr. Gorbachev extended to 
the Mediterranean a number of proposals he had 
made in relation to Central Europe, i.e.: 
- extension to that area of concerted 
confidence-building measures; 
- the reduction of armed forces; 
- the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear 
weapons; 
- a ban on the deployment of nuclear 
weapons in non-nuclear Mediterranean 
countries; 
- maintenance of the undertaking not to 
use such weapons against any country 
which refused to accept such deploy-
ment; 
- the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet 
and American ships, with no immediate 
restriction. 
115. (f) Finally, several times since the begin-
ning of 1986 Mr. Gorbachev has recalled the 
importance he attaches to holding a summit 
meeting with President Reagan. One of its 
main aims was obviously to revive the negotia-
tions on disarmament. The meeting between 
Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik in 
October might have helped. Its failure will pro-
bably lead to the more important meeting which 
was to have been held in the United States before 
the end of the year being postponed. This sum-
mit meeting has been called in question twice, 
following the bombing of Tripoli in March and 
the arrest by Soviet police of the American jour-
nalist Daniloff in September, but each time both 
the Soviet Union and the United States have 
sought compromise ways of allowing it to be 
held. 
116. The obvious question is which of these 
many proposals constitute serious bases for 
negotiations and which are propaganda to make 
public opinion attribute to the United States and 
its allies responsibility for any delays or the 
breakdown of talks. Western negotiators in 
Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm have noted inter 
alia that the words of their Soviet or Warsaw 
Pact opposite numbers differed considerably 
from those of Mr. Gorbachev. From the 
moment it was a matter of spelling out the nature 
of verifications and inspections, effective Soviet 
concessions fell far short of what might have 
been expected from the words of the General 
Secretary of the party during summer 1986. 
117. It is clear that effective, rigorous verifica-
tion is the cornerstone of any disarmament 
agreement. Nuclear tests can be detected from 
remote seismic observatories with little sacrifice 
of state sovereignty. The same is not true for 
missile deployment which requires very accurate 
air reconnaissance by inspectors enjoying the full 
confidence of all concerned. Verification of 
conventional force deployment raises even more 
tricky problems since it requires inspectors to be 
stationed permanently on the territory subject to 
a limitation agreement. Finally, any agreement 
banning the production of certain weapons, par-
ticularly chemical weapons, means inspectors 
must have full freedom of movement and be able 
to enter factories. In the latter two cases, in any 
event, the proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev 
during the summer still seem inadequate. How-
ever, it is clear that these proposals are merely 
overtures for future negotiations and hence call 
for further concessions or greater details. In any 
case, it is to be noted that in September 1986 the 
Stockholm negotiations on confidence-building 
measures conducted in the framework of the 
CSCE reached a compromise on the question of 
verification which was acceptable to both 
sides. 
118. If, moreover, Mr. Gorbachev's proposals 
are considered as a whole, it is evident that they 
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are mainly designed to slow down, if not halt, the 
American SDI programme. This seems to 
concord perfectly with the logic of Soviet inte-
rests and it is clear that the Soviet authorities are 
prepared to make major concessions in order to 
achieve this result. Henceforth it is for the 
West - and first the Americans - to say what 
price, in disarmament terms, they intend to 
charge for relinquishing the considerable strate-
gic advantage they might derive from developing 
the SDI programme. As 1for the Europeans, 
they must be clear about their security require-
ments and explain them to their allies so that 
progress towards the controlled limitation of 
armaments will not lead to a situation which is 
dangerous for Europe's sec~rity. 
119. Admittedly, on 21st September the first 
stage of the Stockholm conference on confidence-
building measures closed with the adoption of a 
final document including renunciation of the 
threat or use of force in relations between signa-
tory states, the notification of military exercises, 
the transfer and movement of troops, an annual 
exchange of plans for milita!ly activities, sending 
invitations to observers to I attend manoeuvres 
and limiting military activity on the continent 
with a system of verification being replaced by 
on-site inspections. But this was a minor mat-
ter. 
120. The meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. 
Gorbachev in Reykjavik from 7th to 9th October 
on the contrary appeared to jbe a failure because 
the two participants were unable to adopt a joint 
text. Undue importance should perhaps not be 
attached to this improvised and thus ill-prepared 
summit meeting intended to prepare the way for 
more detailed talks between the American and 
Soviet leaders which were to be held at the end of 
the year but which will probably be delayed by 
the Reykjavik setback. 
121. On the whole, the failure at Reykjavik 
seems due to Soviet insistence on a close link 
between nuclear disarmament and a halt to the 
strategic defence initiative. The Soviet Union 
proposed abolishing, in two: five-year stages, all 
the nuclear armaments of tlie two great powers 
and prolonging for ten years the ABM treaty and 
the nuclear test ban. What the Soviet Union in 
fact wanted to obtain, in exchange for conces-
sions in other areas, was the abandonment of the 
strategic defence initiative while the United Sta-
tes considered there could be no question of 
doing this before nuclear disarmament had been 
achieved. 
122. Moreover, the Soviet proposals for nuclear 
disarmament raise a number of questions that 
Europe must examine very closely. In fact, 
Europe would have every reason to fear the 
signing of agreements limited to what President 
Reagan once called the zero option, which the 
Soviet Union now seems to be endorsing. This 
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would mean the total removal, from Europe at 
least, of SS-20 missiles on the one hand and of 
Pershing II and cruise missiles on the other. Cer-
tain facts must not be forgotten: 
123. (i) In order to be satisfactory, total remo-
val should apply to the whole of Soviet territory 
because it would be easy for Soviet forces to 
bring Euromissiles redeployed in Asia back to 
Europe at short notice, while the United States 
would take too long to redeploy in Europe wea-
pons stockpiled in America. Hence, there must 
be total, controlled destruction of all these wea-
pons, including those in East Asia. 
124. (ii) Secondly, the recent deployment of 
shorter-range Soviet SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 mis-
siles no longer allows the West to draw a parallel 
only between SS-20s and Pershing II and cruise 
missiles, but an attempt must be made to reach 
agreement covering all these weapons. In 1986, 
the zero option can no longer be what it was in 
1979. Mr. Gorbachev's proposals, which sepa-
rate the case of the SS-20s from that of shorter-
range nuclear weapons, could not be accepted by 
the West as they stand. It is true that on this 
point Mr. Gorbachev seemed prepared to make 
major concessions, i.e. to freeze immediately the 
deployment of short-range nuclear weapons and 
to negotiate their reduction. 
125. (iii) It seems increasingly clear that the 
disappearance of nuclear weapons from Western 
Europe would leave our continent defenceless in 
face of a Soviet military aggression using only 
conventional forces, very superior in number 
and armaments to those of NATO. It is preci-
sely a conventional attack or the use of pressure 
based on the threat to use conventional weapons, 
that the American presence in Europe and the 
Atlantic Alliance are designed to avoid. An 
agreement relating solely to medium- or short-
range nuclear weapons would thus seriously 
affect European security by creating a situation 
in which Europe's security was uncoupled from 
that of the United States. 
126. (iv) Mr. Gorbachev was able to offer him-
self the luxury of taking up the very words Mr. 
Reagan used in March 1983 to announce the SDI 
to the world to propose the eventual elimination 
of nuclear weapons. But we must not be taken 
in by this tactical skill: whereas the United States 
President referred to elimination only in a 
context which, thanks to the SDI, would ensure 
the security of the United States and conse-
quently the fullest possible deterrence from 
which Europe would have benefited, what Mr. 
Gorbachev offered was the abolition of deter-
rence in favour of the conventional superiority 
exercised by the Soviet Union in Europe. 
127. (v) Generalised nuclear disarmament as 
advocated by Mr. Gorbachev is certainly an aim 
for Europe. But its first effect would be to 
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reduce to naught the principal element of the 
policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic 
Alliance for almost forty years. It would there-
fore require a guarantee relating to the level of 
forces and conventional weapons and a major 
effort by Western Europe to obtain a credible 
conventional force. Has it the will to make this 
effort? 
128. In the circumstances, Reykjavik should 
probably be considered as a step towards the 
long-planned summit meeting at which disarma-
ment problems will at last be tackled realistically, 
i.e. the maintenance or restoration at the lowest 
possible level of a balance of security on both 
sides. There is no doubt that the Reykjavik 
meeting allowed some narrowing of views in 
nuclear disarmament matters. The two great 
powers must now reach agreement on the overall 
conditions for joint security in the event of a 
drastic reduction, or even the abolition of all or 
certain categories of nuclear weapons. This 
matter is of vital importance for Europe and its 
silence since 15th January about Mr. Gorba-
chev's proposals has helped to make it a simple 
pawn in a game where its security is at stake. 
Ill. Western Europe's position 
129. The WEU Council is assessing the possible 
consequences for Europe of developing the SDI 
and, in its thirty-first annual report, it reports on 
the principles it has defined on this question. 
130. Conversely, the Council has been incapa-
ble of informing the Assembly of what it has 
done to define a European point of view on 
disarmament-related matters. When it visited 
Washington in June 1985, the committee was 
informed that the United States authorities did 
not wish WEU to express its views on the subject 
and that Mr. Richard Burt, an Under-Secretary 
of State, had conveyed this to the governments 
concerned. Remarks by members of the Coun-
cil on their reaction to this approach were cryp-
tic, indicating that the Council has done little in 
the area apart from instructing the agency for the 
study of arms control and disarmament ques-
tions to study Soviet tactics and analyse Soviet 
proposals on the matter. The Assembly has no 
idea at all of the action the Council has taken or 
intends to take on this work which should be 
communicated to it insofar as it does not have to 
remain confidential for security reasons. In 
view of the subject, this seems hardly proba-
ble. 
131. But the impact of a new Soviet policy on 
Western European security is not confined to 
matters relating to the SDI and disarmament. 
Your Rapporteur has referred to certain aspects 
of this policy outside the North Atlantic Treaty 
area, particularly in the Mediterranean and the 
Pacific, which quite clearly concern international 
peace and Europe's security in accordance with 
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Yet the Council hardly seems to have examined 
them in recent years whereas it has continued to 
deal regularly with East-West relations in Euro-
pe. Even here, the Assembly is not kept well-
enough informed to be able to assess the depth or 
extent of the exchanges of views which have been 
held. At most it may be deduced that no collec-
tive guideline has been laid down and it is to be 
feared that the ministers have remained fairly 
close to the diplomatic surface of the situation. 
(i) European security and Mr. Gorbachev's 
disarmament proposals 
132. The breadth of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals 
is encouraging for Europe because it proves that 
Soviet leaders have grasped the fact that security 
is a whole. Admittedly, Soviet diatribe against 
nuclear weapons and the emphasis on arms limi-
tation or nuclear disarmament measures, and 
above all on halting nuclear tests - the true 
Soviet leitmotiv - may imply that this is the 
point they intend to emphasise, as well as the 
abandonment of the SDI, probably their major 
aim. But it must also be recalled that the sensi-
tiveness of a section of European public opinion 
in recent years about anything nuclear provided 
fertile ground for propaganda by the Soviet 
Union which could thus promote its direct disar-
mament interests and attempt to weaken western 
cohesion. 
133. As matters now stand, it is evident that 
Europe cannot accept the idea of disarmament 
applying to nuclear weapons alone. This is an 
area in which parity between the two great 
powers has almost been reached whereas for 
conventional weapons the overwhelming supe-
riority of the Soviet Union and its allies in the 
European theatre might encourage them to act 
dangerously from the moment they no longer 
have to fear nuclear retaliation from the West. It 
should not be forgotten that western defence 
policy is aimed solely at keeping the peace and 
that this is ensured by a worldwide deterrent sys-
tem within which both conventional and nuclear 
weapons play a role. The presence of American 
forces on the European continent and of the Bri-
tish Army of the Rhine and the French First 
Army in the Federal Republic guarantees that 
the nuclear forces of these three countries would 
be used in the event of an outside aggressor atta-
cking Western Europe, even if only conventional 
forces were used. 
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relative parity in the conventional field. Hence, 
before accepting firm steps towards nuclear 
disarmament, they must either obtain, through 
negotiations, permanent, controlled parity with 
the Soviet Union, or make the necessary finan-
cial and technological efforts to raise their 
conventional strength to that of the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet Union is well aware ofthese 
requirements and has stated that it is prepared to 
take them partly into account in the MBFR 
talks. However, so far the conventional force 
reductions they propose haVe not been signifi-
cant enough to form a basis for valid negotia-
tions holding promise of real progress towards 
nuclear disarmament. It should be added that 
the problem ofbringing in ~nited States reinfor-
cements to Europe in the event of a serious crisis 
is still very difficult to solve because of the threat 
to allied maritime transport of Soviet navy ship-
ping deployed in the North Atlantic. This 
means that there will be no r~al balance of forces 
if MBFR apply only to Central Europe where the 
Soviet Union is able to bring in reinforcements 
at short notice. 
135. The problem raised by chemical weapons 
should also be stressed. Unless an agreement is 
reached in the near future on the radical, verified 
renunciation of all chemical weapons by both 
sides, the Soviet Union migllt, within two years, 
have a near monopoly in this area in view of the 
United States decision to withdraw its chemical 
weapons from Europe. In the event of hostili-
ties in which the Soviet Union used or threat-
ened to use chemical weapons, it would take a 
long time and be difficult to redeploy in Europe 
those which had been withdrawn. Chemical 
deterrence, achieved throu~ the presence of 
American weapons, will therefore no longer 
apply and European countries might start produ-
cing such weapons, as the French Government 
has just been authorised to do by parliament. 
136. As long as there is no1 satisfactory agree-
ment on the reduction of conventional forces, 
the main problem for Europe will continue to be 
the maintenance, or rather restoration, of a 
conventional defence capability which it now 
lacks. Efforts by certain European members of 
the Atlantic Alliance to reinforce their conven-
tional forces are not enough and, in the event of 
a purely conventional war, w~stern defences - as 
your Rapporteur has shown el$ewhere - would be 
able to ward off for only a very brief period an 
offensive in which the Soviet Union and its allies 
mobilised their full potential. In other words, 
the best means of avoiding nuclear escalation in 
hostilities in Europe and of holding successful 
negotiations on a balanced limitation of forces is 
134. Thus the European members of the Atlan- not to anticipate the possible outcome of nego-
tic Alliance cannot be satisfied with the priority tiations but to restore a balance from which equi-
the Soviet Union accords to the nuclear aspect of valent reductions might be envisaged by both 
disarmament. They could not subscribe to sides. Only on the basis of a real balance of 
serious nuclear disarmament proposals without conventional forces can large-scale reductions be 
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made in nuclear weapons without endangering 
Europe's security. 
137. If, as seems evident, the forthcoming meet-
ing between President Reagan and Mr. Gorba-
chev still gives priority to the limitation of 
nuclear weapons, it is urgent for Europe to 
remind the United States President of this aspect 
of the situation, and it is regrettable that WEU 
was not used for defining a European position on 
the matter. This meeting should induce Europe 
to call for equality in security which would imply 
the establishment of a clear link between nuclear 
and conventional disarmament. 
138. Moreover, Europe cannot ignore the fact 
that its security, like that of the United States, is 
not ensured only along the Elbe and that freezing 
the conventional and nuclear balance in Europe 
would be dangerous if it were to allow a further 
expansion of Soviet military strength in Asia, the 
Pacific or the Mediterranean. This is due to the 
ability of the Soviet Union- but not the United 
States - to move its land and air forces quickly 
from one front to another, to the vital impor-
tance of the Pacific and the Mediterranean for 
the West and to Europe's position which would 
not allow it to escape a clash between the two 
great powers even if it originated in another part 
of the world. 
139. This is tantamount to saying that Euro-
pean security is not a regional matter but is lin-
ked to the establishment of a world balance. This 
is why all measures to limit forces or armaments 
on the European continent or to create denuclea-
rised zones in Europe, far from consolidating 
peace, are liable to make it more uncertain if 
they are not part of efforts to organise world 
peace. This is precisely what the signatories of 
the Paris Agreements had in mind when, in 
1954, they set up the WEU Council to be respon-
sible for dealing with all threats to international 
peace wherever they may arise, and it is regretta-
ble that the Council has always been so restric-
tive about applying Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Thus, the Council should pay 
heed to Mr. Gorbachev's proposal to extend to 
the Mediterranean the disarmament measures 
which he was proposing for Europe and define a 
European position on the matter. 
140. Mr. Gorbachev's other main goal is 
obviously to halt the American SDI programme 
or, in any event, to divide the western allies on 
the matter by accusing the United States of 
opposing any serious disarmament negotiations 
through their obstinacy on this point. The 
moratorium on Soviet nuclear tests, accompa-
nied by incessant appeals for priority to be given 
to an agreement on a generalised end to such 
tests, seems to be aimed mainly at inducing the 
United States to give up research in the context 
of the SDI since this inevitably includes experi-
ments requiring nuclear tests. Soviet propa-
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ganda on the subject might be further boosted by 
the fact that the American authorities, in order to 
obtain the approval of Congress for the sums 
needed for work on the SDI, spoke of the abso-
lute security this programme might one day give 
the American continent, which hardly seems to 
correspond to foreseeable facts, but which could 
be disturbing for European public opinion in the 
knowledge that its security is guaranteed by the 
solidarity between the destinies of Europe and of 
the United States. 
141. There is little doubt that the SDI has 
already had one result, which is to make the 
Soviet Union seek effective disarmament and for 
this purpose to suggest giving up some of the 
advantages it enjoys at the present juncture in 
order not to embark upon a further stage in the 
armaments race where it might get out of its 
depth for economic and technological reasons. It 
seems hardly thinkable for the United States to 
abandon the SDI research programme, nor 
would this be likely to facilitate the success of 
future negotiations. 
142. Conversely, Europe cannot overlook the 
fact that until now its security has depended on 
the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons by 
the Atlantic Alliance and that if foreseeable pro-
gress with the SDI lead.s to American strategic 
nuclear weapons being better protected this 
should not noticeably affect the priority given to 
offensive weapons. It should therefore not play 
into the hands of the Soviet Union by opposing 
the American programme, which would be in 
vain moreover, but examine the consequences its 
results may have for European security. In this 
connection, the attitude adopted by the WEU 
Council, as defined in its thirty-first annual 
report, corresponds perfectly to WEU's voca-
tion. While accepting that the deployment of 
new defence systems may be the subject of nego-
tiations in the context of the worldwide search to 
limit armaments, neither Europe nor the United 
States can accept Mr. Gorbachev's proposals that 
the total abandonment of the SDI, including cur-
rent research, should be a kind of prior condition 
for disarmament negotiations. 
143. Europe must not consider Mr. Gorba-
chev's appeals for disarmament as just propa-
ganda manreuvres to isolate the United States 
from its European allies and the non-aligned 
countries and to crown the Soviet Union with 
glory for having a monopoly of action in favour 
of peace and disarmament. Nor must it close 
its eyes to this aspect of the Soviet approach. 
On the contrary, it must maintain and streng-
then its co-operation with the United States. 
This is more than ever essential for its security 
now that disarmament negotiations will proba-
bly be starting up again, the aim being to avoid 
the outcome of these negotiations being detri-
mental to Europe's security. With this in 
mind, there seems no reason for the WEU Coun-
cil not to hold consultations on all the problems 
raised by Mr. Gorbachev's proposals, as it did on 
the SDI. By instructing one of its agencies to 
study Soviet disarmament proposals, the Coun-
cil has shown some inclination to do so. As far 
as the Assembly knows, this is as far as it has 
gone. 
(ii) East- West civil co-operation 
144. Since the days Khrushchev presided over 
the destiny of the Soviet Union, it has been 
trying to develop co-operation with the West in 
many areas, particularly the economic area. At 
that time, its main aim was probably to obtain at 
least de facto recognition of the regimes and 
frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe. To a 
large extent, it has succeeded with the final act of 
the Helsinki conference. It is therefore for other 
reasons that this process has been pursued relent-
lessly ever since. 
145. It is also obvious that truly economic rea-
sons have played a major role in the trend of 
Soviet policy: obtaining credit, acquiring advan-
ced technology and finding outlets for Soviet 
exports have played a part. Mr. Gorbachev 
added further reasons, particularly the wish to 
take advantage of certain aspects of a market 
economy to make Soviet firms more dynamic. 
146. Western European countries have often 
been tempted to give priority to this aspect of 
detente, either because they saw it as a means of 
furthering their own interests or because they 
considered they would be better able to draw clo-
ser to the populations of the Soviet Union and its 
allies by increasing relations of all kinds. These 
are reasons which guided most countries' diplo-
macy in Helsinki and subsequently, in particular 
when work started on the great Siberian gas pipe-
line to enable many European countries to 
import Soviet gas. 
14 7. This policy encountered certain setbacks, 
however. First, neither Helsinki nor contracts 
with the East brought the slightest change in the 
deployment and modernisation of Soviet for-
ces. There was no reduction in military expen-
diture. They did not slow down the rapid deve-
lopment of Soviet naval strength or prevent the 
Soviet Union from deploying its SS-20s and then 
its SS-2ls, SS-22s and SS-23s targeted on Western 
Europe. Nor did they prevent the deployment 
of anti-missile defence systems on Soviet terri-
tory. There is no reason to think that the deci-
sions just taken at the Stockholm conference on 
the notification and international supervision of 
manoeuvres will do much to change this situa-
tion, although agreements on inspections may 
create useful precedents for more significant 
agreements. 
245 
DOCUMENT 1079 
148. Conversely, Western Europe now has to 
purchase Soviet gas and oif at a time when it 
would be more advantageous to buy on the inter-
national market because of the fall in energy pri-
ces. It is in competition with the United States 
for the supply, at a loss, of the agricultural pro-
duce the Soviet Union needs. In other words, 
from this form of detente it has been able to 
derive neither the economic nor the military 
benefits it might have expected. As for the 
concessions in terms of freedom made by the 
Soviet Union and its allies in Helsinki, they have 
in fact hardly been applied, as proved by the 
situation in Poland and the fate of Soviet dissi-
dents. 
149. There is no doubt that the new course Mr. 
Gorbachev intends the Soviet economy to follow 
is already directing it towards the development 
of East-West economic relations and this will be 
increasingly so. It will no l<J>nger be possible for 
the West to delude itself as in 1973. Only inso-
far as it is possible to conclude balanced, control-
led disarmament negotiations will Europe and 
the United States be able to consider that the 
development of trade with the East will not pri-
marily serve Soviet armaments policy, as has 
been the case in the last ten years. 
IV. Conclusions 
150. A link can be discerned between Mr. Gor-
bachev's economic, social alnd domestic policy 
initiatives and his disarmament proposals since 
it seems essential to put a brake on military 
expenditure if the other aims are to be attained. 
It may therefore understanqably seem to be in 
the interests of the West to encourage all these 
aims by making the Soviet Union's policy of eco-
nomic overtures easier and adopting a concilia-
tory attitude towards disarrrtament. 
151. However, it is not cer1lain that all the pro-
claimed aims are actually being pursued. The 
successes and failures of economic and social 
policy and action by those in favour of liberalisa-
tion or the restoration of bureaucracy may lead 
to a change of tactics in both domestic policy and 
foreign, defence and disarmament policy. The 
crisis triggered off by the arrest of an American 
journalist, Mr. Daniloff, by Soviet police in Sep-
tember 1986 showed, if proof were needed, that 
there are still forces in the Soviet Union determi-
ned to impede dialogue with the United Sta-
tes. The West cannot allow its security to 
depend on such hazards or olh. the possible length 
ofMr. Gorbachev's political life. Admittedly, it 
has no interest, by being radically uncompromi-
sing, in making it more difficult for him to apply 
a new policy which it can b111t hope will be suc-
cessful, but it cannot ignore the fact that, if fully 
successful, this would mean the triumph of the 
Soviet cause in the world. 
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152. Your Rapporteur believes this means that 
the West must assess Mr. Gorbachev's proposals 
on their own merits, i.e. in terms of the guaran-
tees they offer for its security and Europe, which 
does not play a direct part in the most important 
negotiations, cannot determine its defence policy 
in the light of speeches by the General Secretary 
of the Soviet Communist Party. Yet it cannot 
turn a deaf ear to what he says. His words must 
be studied carefully so that Europe can give its 
American ally its views on economic matters, for 
which it is the responsibility· of the Twelve to 
define a European policy, and on security, 
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defence and disarmament matters where it is for 
the WEU Council to try to harmonise the views 
of the Seven for their weight to be brought to 
bear in bilateral relations with the United States 
and in the various NATO bodies. The Reykja-
vik summit meeting and its impact on world 
public opinion provided a unique opportunity of 
showing that the revitalisation of WEU is not 
meaningless and that it would be unacceptable 
for the European point of view to remain a dead 
letter just when nuclear deterrence seems to be 
called in question, thus jeopardising the security 
of W estem Europe. 
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Parliamentary and public relations 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations2 
by Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur 
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VII. Conclusions 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Lady Jilt Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca, Enders (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Cavaliere (Alter-
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Draft Resolution 
on parliamentary and public relations 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the frequent mention of the reactivation ofWEU in debates in some member parlia-
ments; 
(ii) Convinced, however, that still more parliamentarians should take an active part in such debates 
in all member parliaments; 
(iii) Welcoming the United Kingdom Government's initiative in presenting a written report to parlia-
ment on the activities of the Council of WEU and its ministerial organs, 
INVITES national delegations 
1. To seize every opportunity to discuss the role of Western European Union in parliamentary and 
public debates on security and defence matters; 
2. To urge the other governments of member countries to follow the example of those of Germany 
and the United Kingdom and produce regular written reports to parliament on the activities ofWEU; 
3. To approach their national parliaments and governments to ensure that they acknowledge the due 
central and priority role of the Assembly, which is the most direct expression of the political and demo-
cratic will of member countries; 
4. To continue impressing upon the governments of member countries the need to allocate to the 
Assembly the financial and technical means essential for the effective pursuit of its public relations 
activities. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
l. The purpose of the present report is to 
inform the Assembly about action taken in par-
liaments on recommendations adopted by the 
WEU Assembly and about the committee's 
activities in the period between June and 
December 1986. Furthermore, the report will 
examine the public relations activities of the 
Council and the WEU member govern-
ments. Finally, it will consider means of 
improving parliamentary action and relations 
with the public in member countries. 
11. Action taken in parliaments 
on recommendations 
adopted by the WEU Assembly 
2. At its meeting in Paris on 4th June 1986 
during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary 
session of the Assembly, the committee, in accor-
dance with Rule 42,3 (a) , selected the following 
recommendations for debate in national parlia-
ments: 
- 432 on the reactivation of WEU - its 
tasks, structure and place in Europe, 
and 
- 435 on security and terrorism - the 
implications for Europe of crises in 
other parts of the world. 
The texts of these recommendations were trans-
mitted as usual with a letter from the President 
of the Assembly dated lOth June 1986 to the 
presidents of member parliaments expressing the 
hope that they would be of interest and provide 
subject matter for speeches or questions to min-
isters. 
3. In a letter addressed to committee mem-
bers, Lady Jill Knight, Chairman of the commit-
tee, sent a number of draft questions relating to 
the subjects covered in the selected recommen-
dations asking them to send her, through the 
intermediary of the secretariat, the text of the 
questions they actually put, the dates on which 
they were put and the text of the answers 
obtained. 
4. As proposed in the report on parliaments, 
public opinion and defence, adopted, by the 
Assembly on 3rd June 1986, the Chairman sent 
copies of these letters together with the model 
questions also to the rapporteurs of the two 
selected recommendations as well as to the chair-
men of delegations, and commented as fol-
lows: 
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"In order to enhance the Assembly's 
efforts to bring its work to the attention of 
national parliaments and urge them to fol-
low it up, and recalling Resolution 71 on 
parliaments, public opinion and defence 
and Resolution 72 on the promotion of 
parliamentary and public interest in WEU 
matters, the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations considers it impor-
tant that the rapporteurs of recommenda-
tions adopted and the chairmen of 
national delegations participate to a 
greater extent in parliamentary follow-up 
action. 
I therefore enclose a c~py of my letter of 
today's date to the members of the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions together with a number of draft ques-
tions relating to the subjects covered by 
the recommendations selected for debate 
in parliaments. 
I would be grateful if you would use your 
influence and take every opportunity of 
encouraging your colleagues on the delega-
tion to put questions in your parliament 
on the relevant Assembly recommenda-
tions." 
5. This initiative was followed up in the Bun-
destag in October 1986 when Mrs. Fischer, MM. 
Zierer, Reddemann, Unland and Bohm put ten 
questions to the Federal Government. 
6. Apart from an initiative by Mr. Dejardin 
in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, it is 
not yet clear whether successful action was taken 
in other member parliaments too since parlia-
mentary activities were reduded during the sum-
mer period and the dates fqr resuming parlia-
mentary activities after the summer recess differ 
somewhat from country to country. But it 
should be recalled that there are specific reasons 
for putting questions to governments on Assem-
bly recommendations at a given time. It is also 
most important for members and national dele-
gations to improve the communication of infor-
mation about their activities in national parlia-
ments to the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations through the intermediary of the 
Office of the Clerk. At the moment only the 
Italian Delegation does this regularly. 
7. Since the problem of terrorism continues 
to be a matter of major concern in all member 
countries it is still appropriate to use the relevant 
recommendation for interventions in parlia-
ments. Some important ip.terventions have 
been made already. In a discussion on terrorist 
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problems during a meeting of ~he Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the French National Assembly on 
17th April 1986, Mr. Caro, President of the 
Assembly of WEU, recalled Articles V and VIII 
ofthe modified Brussels Treaty. He then asked 
to what extent and as from when the French 
Government considered a terrorist act to be a 
threat to peace in view of the very special natu~e 
of that type of act. He asked whether these arti-
cles were inapplicable in view of the fact that 
there had just been an aggression ag~iD:st Italy. 
Resuming the debate, the French Mmister for 
Foreign Affairs made no special reference to 
these questions. 
8. In a debate on crime prevention in the 
House of Commons on 8th May 1986, Mr. 
Murphy spoke about the initiative for inter-
national co-operation which had been put for-
ward by the Assembly of WEU for ~ European 
group to co-ordinate the fight agamst terror-
ism. 
9. In a debate on foreign affairs in the House 
of Commons on 18th June 1986, Sir Anthony 
Grant made a comprehensive statement about 
the activities and developments of Western 
European Union. Turning to questions of ter-
rorism, he said: 
"The President of WEU, Mr. Caro, of 
France, proposed a powerful in~tiative for 
WEU to help in the battle agamst terror-
ism. 
In the Assembly of WEU we spend hours 
debating this subject, condemning it, 
regretting it and deploring it, ~ut nothing 
happens in the way of practlca~ results. 
President Caro produced helpful Ideas for 
the seven nations to co-ordinate their 
actions against this beastly modern 
scourge, but once again buckets of col.d 
water were immediately poured on his 
idea by the Ministers. They said that 
they preferred to deal through the EEC, 
despite the fact that the EE<; ha~ sho~n 
remarkably little enterpnse m this 
respect." 
10. Conversely, on 20th June 1986 a question 
was put by Mr. Pepermans in the Belgian Cham-
ber of Representatives on anti-terrorist co-opera-
tion in which he made reference only to co-oper-
ation within the European Communities and the 
Council of Europe. 
11. In a debate in the Bundestag on 16th April 
1986 concerning international terrorism, the 
German Chancellor underlined in a government 
statement that the Europe of the Twelve was able 
to contribute considerably to the battle against 
terrorism. He added that Europe had not 
always used its possibilities in this respect ~n the 
past. In the ensuing discussion the questloD: of 
involvement of the European Commumty, 
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NATO and the Interparliamentary Union was 
debated several times but the role of WEU in 
this respect was not mentioned. 
12. In the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies 
on 29th May 1986, a motion on the strengthen-
ing of European and Atlantic co-operation in the 
fight against international terrorism was debated 
and voted upon. In this motion the govern-
ment was encouraged to finalise the INGEPOL 
project in regard to national legislation and rec-
ommendations of the Council of Europe and was 
asked to continue its consideration and to pro-
pose measures in order to ~trengthen Europ~an 
and Atlantic co-operation m the fight agamst 
international terrorism. There was no reference 
to WEU in that motion. 
13. On Recommendation 432 on the reac-
tivation of WEU -its tasks, structure and place 
in Europe, Mr. Masciadri put a written questi~n 
to the Italian Government on 31st July 1986 m 
which he took up much of the recom-
mendation. No answer has yet been received 
from the Italian Government. 
14. Mr. Masciadri also put questions on Rec-
ommendations 433, 434, 436 and 437. Answers 
have not yet been received. 
15. In the Belgian Chamber of Representa-
tives on 2nd October 1986, Mr. Dejardin put two 
questions related to Recommendation 432 to the 
Minister for External Relations. Answers have 
not yet been received. 
16. In a meeting of the Defence and Armed 
Forces Committee of the French National 
Assembly on 15th May 1986, Mrs. Edwige A vise, 
who is not a member of the WEU Assembly, 
asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs, after 
recalling France's initiative to reactivate Western 
European Union in 1984, about the govern-
ment's intentions in regard to the role it wished 
that institution to play. 
17. Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, French Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, answered that r~a.c­
tivation of WEU offered Europeans the possibil-
ity of discussing among themselves fundamental 
matters such as East-West relations, and matters 
relating to co-operation on armaments were also 
discussed there. 
18. In the French National Assembly o~ 16th 
June 1986, Mr. Stirbois put a written questiOn on 
the absence of French ministers at the last ses-
sion of the WEU Assembly. 
19. On 28th July 1986, Mr. Jean-Bernard Rai-
mond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, transmitted 
the following answer: 
"The government attaches great impor-
tance to the work of Western European 
Union and was represented by two of its 
ministers, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and the Minister of Ddence, at the recent 
meeting in Venice in Af)ril. In regard to 
the annual sessions of the WEU Assembly, 
it should be specified that they are held in 
two parts, one in spring and the other in 
autumn. At the spring meeting, only the 
government of the country having the 
chairmanship-in-office of the WEU Coun-
cil represents the .'atter ar,~d addresses the 
Assembly in its i'ame, It was in this 
capacity alone that the French Minister 
for External Relations addressed the 
Assembly exceptiona1ly in June 1983. 
Conversely, it is customary for the French 
Government to delegate one of its mem-
bers to address the Assembly at the second 
part of the latter's anm~al session in 
December." 
20. In his speech in the Ho.1s~> vf Cc~mons 
on 18th June 1986 mentioneo abov.. Sir 
Anthony Grant referred to parts 0:~ Recomrrt~!l­
dation 432. He regretted that in his nine year., 
in WEU he could not recall a Bn tish Defence 
Minister coming to address the Assembly. He 
went on: 
" Defence is a fundamental subject. Other 
nations manage to field their top Defence 
Ministers. Why do we not do as well? " 
21. Turning to the problem of enlargement, he 
said: 
" I should have thought it was obvious 
that the inclusion of Portugal, which is 
keen to join and is a member of NATO, 
and later that of Spain, would enhance the 
interests ofWEU. It was most creditable 
of the Spanish people, so wisely led by the 
moderate labour government, to decide 
quite firmly that they wish to remain in 
NATO. In addition, Denmark, Norway 
and even Turkey, if they so wished, could 
make a contribution to WEU. 
Such an enlargement is opposed by Minis-
ters on the astonishing ground that in 
some way the political will of the Seven 
might be jeopardised by the accession of 
new candidates. What nonsense. What 
great political will does WEU exercise now 
that would be disturbed by the presence of 
our oldest ally, Portugal? All that will be 
disturbed is the comfortable lethargy of 
the Council of Ministers. 
Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign Minis-
ter, described what, in his view, were the 
three main obstacles to the enlargement or 
revitalisation of WEU, all of which were 
completely inexplicable. The first was: 
'the instinctive feelings of national and 
cultural identity that had to be over-
come'. What does that mean? The sec-
ond obstacle was: 'The post-war political 
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consensus in many European countries 
was in danger of breaking down'. How 
will that be made worse by other nations 
joining WEU? Thirdly, he said: 'Matters 
relating to security have to be dealt with in 
a discreet way and should not be shouted 
from the rooftops.' We all know that 
from our own parliaments. At least he 
went on to say: 'WEU could make a signif-
icant contribution to! the cause of Euro-
pean unity, especially as its expertise 
encompasses the vital field of defence 
policy.' So it can. 
Ministers ofWEU, and that includes ours, 
must show a great deal more drive and 
determination to make this organisation 
work in the interests <1>f the defence of the 
West. I have no doubt about the commit-
ment of my right hon. and learned friends 
to the European cause or to the defence of 
our nation and of the West. However, I 
should like my hon. friend the Minister of 
State to give an absolute assurance that the 
government wholly sqpport WEU and its 
revitalisation and will do all that they can 
to encourage the lethargic other Ministers 
in WEU to secure its advancement as rap-
idly as possible. " 
22. In a statement on 19th June 1986, Mr. 
Renton, Minister for Overseas Development, 
referring to the remarks by 1Sir Anthony Grant, 
said: 
" As hon. members on both sides of the 
House acknowledge, Europe must pull its 
weight in East-West affairs generally and 
in the western defence effort in particular. 
WEU helps in that prpcess. The govern-
ment took a leacFng part in the 
reactivation of WEU and we regard it as a 
significant forum for European political 
contribution to security. We have 
endeavoured consistently to ensure that 
Foreign and Defence Ministers attend 
WEU meetings and Assembly sessions. " 
23. Answering a written question put by Sir 
Anthony Grant on 3rd June 1986 on the policy 
of the British Government towards enlargement 
of Western European Union, Mr. Eggar, Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, said: 
" At their meeting in Venice on 29th-30th 
April, WEU Ministers!agreed that the new 
institutional arrangements approved at the 
Council meeting in Bonn in April 1985 
should be allowed to run until the end of 
1987, when a review of the structure and 
operation of the organisation will take 
place. At that time member governments 
will be able to assess the achievements of 
WEU's reactivation and the way ahead. 
We support"this approach." 
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24. During a debate in the Belgian Senate on 
8th July 1986 on the bill adjusting the budget of 
the Ministry of Defence for the financial year 
1985, Mr. Dehousse asked the government about 
reactivation of Western European Union. Mr. 
de Donnea, Minister of Defence and Minister of 
the Brussels Region, answered that he had put 
forward the idea in the Council of WEU that this 
organisation should have a special interest in the 
problems of peace and security in Africa and par-
ticularly in the southern Sahara. WEU should 
think about what a Euro-African alliance might 
be in matters of peace and security. 
25. Furthermore, the Minister emphasised 
that WEU was being reactivated and that its Sec-
retary-General was imparting considerable 
momentum. At the same time this institution 
was also working out its true tasks. The prob-
lem was to avoid duplication of work between 
WEU, the IEPG and Eurogroup. 
26. In a debate in the Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives on 16th July 1986, WED's role 
in Euro-African relations was discussed with the 
participation of Mr. Vanvelthoven and Mr. De 
Decker. Both Mr. Tindemans, Minister for 
External Relations, and Mr. de Donnea, Minister 
of Defence and of the Brussels Region, spoke in 
the debate. 
27. On 24th July 1986 the bill concerning the 
approval of the single European act was dis-
cussed and voted on in the Belgian Senate. Dur-
ing the debate, Mr. Close underlined the impor-
tance of improving co-operation between the 
Assembly ofWEU, the European Parliament and 
the North Atlantic Assembly. He also 
expressed the wish that Belgium play a crucial 
role in supporting the idea of creating a Euro-
pean research institute. In the same debate, Mr. 
Pecriaux asked about the government's position 
towards WEU in the framework of the request to 
ratify the single European act. 
28. In a government statement, Mr. Tin-
demans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, 
said there was no doubt that member countries 
of WEU had to decide in the near future about 
Greens asking the government to call for the 
reintroduction of the arms control provisions of 
WEU was discussed and rejected. In the 
debate, Mr. Gansel underlined the importance of 
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty which 
implies a functioning NATO. 
Ill. Activities of the committee 
30. The previous paragraphs show intense 
activity by members of the Assembly in several 
national parliaments in order to follow up 
Assembly recommendations and to propagate 
knowledge of its work. Nevertheless it seems 
that in every parliament only a few and almost 
always the same members are really active in this 
respect. Your Rapporteur has information 
about special initiatives by committee members, 
for instance by Mr. Antretter, Mrs. Fischer and 
Mr. Dejardin, who put several questions which 
will be quoted below. Conversely it is encour-
aging that in some countries even parliamentari-
ans who are not members of the Assembly show 
a special interest in WEU matters. 
31. Since it is the special duty of the Commit-
tee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to 
make arrangements for bringing to the attention 
of parliaments the work of the Assembly and 
inviting them to follow up this work, committee 
members first should feel bound to set a good 
example by putting questions or intervening in 
other ways. 
32. The committee's intention to increase vis-
its to member parliaments in order to enhance 
contacts and information between parliaments 
failed because of the Assembly's difficult finan-
cial situation. Consequently the Presidential 
Committee asked the committee to postpone 
until the autumn its information meeting 
planned to be held in London in May. This 
information meeting was held at the House of 
Commons on 17th November 1986 with the par-
ticipation of the Secretary-General of WEU. 
IV. Parliamentary 
ana public relations activities 
of the Council and member governments 
candidatures for membership. He confirmed 
the importance of better co-ordination between 
the three assemblies. He said consideration 
might be given to the Assembly of Western Euro-
pean Union playing the role of committee for 
security questions of the European Parliament, 33. In the previous report on the promotion of 
for instance, presuming that a parliamentary parliamentary and public interest in WEU mat-
group could specialise in security ques- ters, the committee suggested that the annual 
tions. One could also envisage the European report of the Council contain a special section 
Parliament requesting reports from the Assembly dealing with public relations. It is therefore to 
of WEU or from the North Atlantic Assem- be welcomed that the thirty-first annual report of 
bly. But these were only thoughts. Definite the Council to the Assembly on the Council's 
conclusions had not yet been reached. activities for the period 1st January to 31st 
December 1985 contains, in part one, a para-
29. On 5th June 1986, a special debate was graph on WEU and public awareness. In this 
held in the Bundestag when a motion by the very short paragraph the Council said: 
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" On several occasions, and notably in its 
reply to Recommendation 411, the Coun-
cil stressed the need to ensure that Euro-
pean opinion was informed as completely 
as possible about the threats to our conti-
nent and about the security and defence 
policy adopted by the member countries 
and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these 
threats." 
34. Unfortunately, the annual report says 
nothing about the Council's special activities 
with a view to achieving these aims. But taking 
into account that a special unit for public rela-
tions is to be created within the Secretariat-
General in London, it was hoped that the next 
annual report would contain more substantial 
information in this respect. Unfortunately this 
does not appear to be the case. 
35. With regard to the information activities 
of member governments, Mr. Antretter put a 
question to the German Government on 6th 
June 1986 asking what concrete steps it had 
undertaken in order to improve information 
communicated to the public in the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the activities of the 
Council and on those of the other ministerial 
organs of WEU. 
36. In his answer, Mr. Mollemann, Minister of 
State in the Foreign Office, stressed that the Fed-
eral Government was the only government 
among the seven WEU member countries to pro-
vide regular half-yearly reports since 1967 on the 
activities of WEU. Secondly, he referred to the 
creation of a public relations unit in the Secre-
tariat-General in London which had started work 
on 1st January 1986. The Federal Government 
consequently expected the public to be better 
informed about the activities of the Council and 
of the other ministerial organs of WEU. Finally, 
the minister stressed that the Federal Govern-
ment would continue to provide information in 
an appropriate manner, for instance by press 
statements and speeches about WEU and the 
activities of its ministerial organs. 
37. Thanks to the initiatives of Mr. Murphy 
and Mr. Roy Hughes in the House of Commons, 
the Government of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many is no longer the only WEU member gov-
ernment to provide information about WEU 
activities at national level. When Mr. Roy 
Hughes, on 15th July 1986, asked the Secretary 
of State for Defence what new defence initiatives 
he was proposing within the ambit of Western 
European Union, Mr. Younger, United King-
dom Secretary of State for Defence, answered: 
" A report on the work of WEU was placed 
in the library at the end of May. The 
United Kingdom has played a full part in 
the development of a programme of work 
for WEU and, for example, supports the 
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areas of study described in the com-
munique of the meeting at ministerial 
level in Venice on 29th-30th April. A 
copy of this communique is also in the 
library." 
38. In implementing a decision made known 
in answer to an earlier question put by Mr. Mur-
phy, the United Kingdom Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office drew up an interesting report 
on the activities of Wes'l;Crn European Union 
dated 21st May 1986. This was a most welcome 
new initiative and it is to be hoped that it will 
become a permanent feature. Your Rapporteur 
particularly asks his British colleagues to make 
use of this report in order to carry further their 
dialogue on WEU matters with Her Majesty's 
Government. Similarly he asks his other 
Assembly colleagues to urge their governments 
to follow this example. 
39. The subject has already been raised in 
Belgium. In the Belgian Chamber of Represen-
tatives on 2nd October 1986, Mr. Dejardin put 
the following questions to the Minister for Exter-
nal Relations: 
40. 
" Information given to the public on the 
role and duties of WEU and its political 
activities is obviously insufficient. 
However, this European institution, the 
only one with security and defence respon-
sibilities, should play an ever more deci-
sive role in the process of European inte-
gration and the development of European 
convictions among the people. 
It is obviously for the governments of the 
seven member countries of Western Euro-
pean Union, and its parliamentary Assem-
bly, to make public opinion aware of this 
fact. 
How does the government inform the pub-
lic about the role, duties and activities of 
WEU in the framework of the alliance and 
its importance in the government's secu-
rity policy? 
How much does the government spend 
each year on giving the public such infor-
mation?" 
He received the following answer: 
As the honourable member so pertinently 
remarks, it is for the governments of the 
seven member countries of Western Euro-
pean Union but also - and perhaps even 
more directly - its Assembly to have the 
privileged task of conveying to public 
opinion the importance of the work of 
WEU. 
Arrangements have been made by mem-
bers of the Council to ensure that their 
press attaches keep in regular touch with 
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journalists to inform them on the spot or 
in the capitals of the results of discussions 
at WEU ministerial meetings and of the 
work of the organisation. 
The same is true for ministerial addresses 
to the Assembly, the texts of which are 
transmitted to the media. 
The energetic and noteworthy efforts of 
the Secretary-General of WEU should also 
be recalled. The secretariat has a press 
unit responsible for propag<tting all useful 
information about reactivation. 
Furthermore, the Permanent Council is at 
the moment considering means of associ-
ating those responsible for European 
research institutes with the attempt to 
make public opinion aware of the terms of 
European security. It is studying the pos-
sibilities of organising in each member 
state, including Belgium, WED-sponsored 
seminars open to journalists, experts and 
representative sectors of public opinion to 
study these matters. 
Neither the Minister for External Rela-
tions nor the Minister of Defence ever 
fails, when speaking in public, to empha-
sise the importance, place and role of 
WEU in Belgium's external relations and 
security policy. 
At colloquies in which they are invited to 
participate, officials in my department 
more particularly responsible for security 
questions describe the activities of WEU. 
When the occasion arises and with my 
authorisation, they co-operate in the draft-
ing of articles on WEU in specialised 
reviews or more general publications. 
Booklets and information documents on 
Belgium's external policy never fail to 
stress the role and vocation of WEU and 
developments which have taken place or 
are expected in the context of the reac-
tivation of that organisation. " 
41. It is also worthy of note that the German 
Government reports annually on the situation 
regarding disarmament and the control of arma-
ments as well as on the military balance in a 
written document to the Bundestag which pub-
lishes it as an official Bundestag document. 
The last report, published on 25th June 1986, 
contains for the first time several references to 
the activities of Western European Union with 
regard to disarmament and the control of arma-
ments, and it can be used by our German col-
leagues as a sound basis for putting questions on 
these matters. 
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V. Means of improving action 
in national parliaments 
42. In August 1986 the French Revue de 
Defense nationale published a summary about 
WEU and especially the results of the thirty-
second ordinary session of its Assembly. In the 
article reference was made to several subjects 
discussed there such as terrorism, security, 
regional conflicts and the situation in the Medi-
terranean. But the author came to the conclu-
sion that with modern means of communication 
and crisis management governments could react 
so promptly that democratic parliamentary 
supervision could not be exercised until it was 
too late. 
43. Without wishing to comment on this arti-
cle, your Rapporteur draws attention to the fact 
that action taken in pailiaments on recommen-
dations adopted by the WEU Assembly can be 
successful only if it is carried out promptly in all 
member parliaments. To this end, an effective 
system of interparliamentary information and 
communication must be established. 
44. All WEU member parliaments with the 
exception of Luxembourg have permanent 
telexes. So have the· Council of Europe and the 
European Parliament, but not the Assembly of 
Western European Union. Without such facili-
ties quick co-ordination of parliamentary fol-
low-up action will still be difficult and the com-
munication of information to the Committee for 
Parliamentary and Public Relations about parlia-
mentary activities in member countries remains 
limited. 
45. In the Council's reply to Recommendation 
433, it pointed out that: 
"Recognising the importance of effective 
communication between the various 
organs of WEU, the Council is currently 
studying the possibilities for improving 
the present practices; a number of sugges-
tions may be contemplated, including that 
put forward by the Assembly for the instal-
lation of a telex, or the use of facsimile 
equipment or even the installation of a 
system which could be based on the ones 
used by other bodies such as European 
political co-operation. 
The final choice would of course depend 
on requirements, the versatility of the 
equipment and the budgetary implica-
tions. The installation of new equipment 
should therefore be examined by the 
appropriate bodies in this light, and in the 
context ofbudgetary considerations on the 
whole." 
But for the time being the Assembly of Western 
European Union remains the only European 
assembly working without these important tech-
nical means. 
46. Many member parliaments have com-
puter-controlled documentation systems, but the 
Assembly of WEU has no such system. Since, 
with the small staff in the Office of the Clerk it is 
very difficult to select from the vast number of 
documents being sent by member parliaments 
the relevant texts which might be of special inter-
est for the Assembly of Western European 
Union, the secretariats of national delegations 
should be asked to provide their help in this 
work using the computer systems of their parlia-
ments. 
47. Another problem is that there are difficul-
ties in providing without delay the representa-
tives in all member countries with all the neces-
sary documentation and texts which might be 
helpful for action in parliament and also for pub-
lic information. In almost every member· par-
liament written reports from the Assembly dele-
gations are published but in very different 
ways. These reports mostly take account first 
and foremost of the interventions of the delega-
tion members. 
48. The only document provided under the 
responsibility of the Assembly and intended to 
be used in all member countries is the orange 
booklet entitled " Texts adopted and brief 
account of the session", published by the Assem-
bly twice a year since November 1965 after every 
ordinary part-session. This document is pub-
lished in the five languages of the WEU member 
countries. 
49. The publication of this booklet is very 
important since it is the only regular information 
provided about the activities of the Assembly 
that is available in the languages of all member 
countries. Various factors, however, detract 
from its usefulness in practice. 
50. First, the document takes too long to 
publish. The printed texts in French and Eng-
lish are available only several weeks after the 
close of the session. The translation into the 
other official languages of member countries 
takes even longer because the Office of the 
Clerk's translation service has to work with a 
very small staff. As a result the Italian, German 
and Netherlands versions of the document can 
be sent to these countries often only some 
months after the close of the session. For 
instance, when the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations held its information meet-
ing in Bonn on 20th February 1986, a German 
version of the document with the texts adopted 
and the brief account of the December session 
was still not available, almost three months later. 
51. Every effort should be made to accelerate 
the publication of these texts. 
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52. Again, in its present form the booklet has 
another disadvantage. Its presentation does not 
stimulate the interest of a reader in the 
Assembly's activities. At present, the results of 
every ordinary part-session are presented in the 
following way: First, the text of recommenda-
tions adopted during the ~ession are given in 
numerical order. Then conks a brief account of 
the session in which the, different speeches, 
reports and debates are summarised. There fol-
lows a list of speakers and a list of Assembly doc-
uments prepared for the relevant session. 
53. For a reader not familiar with WEU mat-
ters it is rather difficult to derive from this very 
formal and dry manner of presentation an idea 
about the Assembly's work and objectives. More-
over, the booklet does not include certain impor-
tant information. 
54. Your Rapporteur therefore wishes to sub-
mit a few proposals and suggestions to improve 
the usefulness of this document: 
(i) Every issue should start with a very 
brief introduction describing the ori-
gins· and aims ofWEU and its Assem-
bly. -It inigltt be worded as follows: 
"Western European Union is a defen-
sive alliance founided by the modified 
Brussels Treaty 'signed at Paris on 
23rd October 1954. The member 
states are· Belgium, France, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. 
The Assembly of Western European 
Union, the inter-parliamentary orga-
nisation ofWestem European Union, 
is composed of representatives of the 
Brussels Treaty powers to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. The seat of the Assembly is 
at Paris. Each year the Assembly 
holds an ordinary session divided 
into two parts. 
This booklet includes the text of all 
recommendation$ adopted during the 
session held in ... " 
(ii) So far the booklet has not included 
the text of any replies of the Council 
to Assembly J!ecommendations. 
According to estlablished procedure, 
the Council transmits these texts to 
the Clerk of the Assembly who sends 
them immediately to the representa-
tives in English and French. They 
are also reproduced in Volumes I and 
Ill of the Assembly proceedings. But 
these volumes contain many other 
documents. Decades ago, the 
Assembly published the texts of 
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recommendations and the replies of 
the Council in a separate document 
entitled " Collected texts adopted and 
replies of the Council". But these 
special publications were issued only 
once a year and had 1;10 great practical 
use for actual politkal work. In 
1974, this publication- was aban-
doned. 
It would be useful.· and could be 
done without any great difficulty, if 
the booklet could also ·contain the 
Council's replies to recommendations 
adopted at the previous session. · The 
advantage would be that these -texts 
would be available in all lang-uages JJf 
member couotries. · 
(iii) The booklet should also contain a 
short calendar or timetable of future 
events and meetings ia order to con-
vey information apout activities of 
the Assembly and its comntjttees in 
between sessions. Apart frqr:n the 
press reJ.eases distributed only. in eng~ ' 
lish and French to a limited number 
-of journalists, a.n4· consequently· not 
available in all capitals of the member 
countries, there is so far no regular 
and topical information about forth-
coming Assembly activities. 
55. Finally, it would be worth considering 
whether the booklet, p~blished at present twice a 
year, should not appear at le.~st every three 
months. If there are not insurmountable finan-
cial objections this could allow the Ass.embly to. 
provide more regular infortn;ition on its activi-
ties and those of its <:ommittees. 
VI. Means of improving relations witli thep11blic 
56. During the debate at the last ordinary ses-
sion ofthe Assembly on Mrs. Fischer's report on 
the promotion of parliamentary and public inter-
est in WEU matters, Mr. Tummers emphasised 
that WEU should not only inform the public 
about its work but also le~m from the public. 
He asked that closer links be established with the 
public in order to achieve an active exchange of 
views with the public. 
57. Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges underlined sev-
eral times the importance of studying the ways in 
which WEU is treated in school textbooks used 
in the different member countries. 
past President of the Atlantic Treaty Association 
(AT A), published under the title " The AT A and 
a new approach to NATO information " in the 
April1986 issue of the NATO Review, is worthy 
of study because it deals with many problems 
facing WEU in a very similar way. 
59. In 1954, an Atlantic Treaty Association 
was created as an international non-govern-
mental organisation composed by the national 
member associations existing in all NATO mem-
ber countries on a voluntary private basis with 
the following purpose: 
- to educate and inform the public about 
the aims and goals of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation; 
- to conduct research on the various tasks 
and activities related to that organis-
ation; 
- to promote the solidarity of the peoples 
of the North Atlantic area; 
- to develop permanent relations and 
co-operation between its national mem-
ber committees or associations. 
60. The AT A is an umbrella organisation with 
its headquarters in Paris whose purpose is to 
co-ordinate and stimulate the work of national 
Atlantic committees in each of the member 
couotries. It created special programmes such 
as the Atl&otic Education Committee and the 
Atlantic Association of Young Political Lea-
ders. The former, for example, has been con-
cerned with the way NATO is treated in school 
textbooks. 
61. In the abovementioned article, Mr. Cor-
terier explains that almost all the national Atlan-
tic committees host seminars and conferences 
and devote a great deal of their attention to edu-
cational institutions. Thus, the Netherlands 
Allantic Committee co-operates closely with the 
two national teachers' organisations, resulting in 
joint conferences and projects. The British 
Atlantic Committee has formed two subcommit-
tees for its work in this area. The first deals 
with pupils aged eleven to nineteen and concen-
trates on briefings at NATO in Brussels or at mil-
itary headquarters in the United Kingdom for 
headmasters or heads of school departments. 
The second subcommittee concentrates on aca-
demic staff from universities and polytechnics as 
well as interested members of the student body 
through departments and non-political unions 
and societies. 
62. In line with increased concern about later 
generations, a pilot seminar for teachers of his-
tory is being considered by AT A to compare 
western values with those of the Soviet Union. 
58. Sometimes it might. be useful to learn from 
the activities and experience~> of similar interna-
tional organisations in the area of public rela-
tions, for instance from thost: ofNATO. In this 
connection an interesting arti<;le by Mr. Cor- 63. It is obvious that the conferences of these 
terier, member of the ·Bundestag and immediate Atlantic committees are successful in attracting 
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important political personalities. For instance, 
in May 1985, Mr. Kissinger addressed the Neth-
erlands Atlantic Committee at a symposium on 
the future of the defence of Europe. At a meet-
ing of the General Assembly of the Atlantic 
Treaty Association held in the Federal Republic 
of Germany on 17th September 1986 speakers 
were Chancellor Kohl, Lord Carrington and 
General Rogers. 
64. It seems that there is no comparable forum .. 
for discussing the problems of a European 
defence dimension with the public. Of course 
many national and international movements 
have been created in order to spread the idea of 
European unity in public opinion. The ~uro­
pean movement, for instance, founded in Paris · 
in 1947; is a non-governmental organisation with 
national councils in most of the Western Euro-
pean countries. Its aim is to inform and lead 
public opinion, to study the political, economic 
and technical probletns of European union or 
integration and to suggest how they can be 
solved; to promote a sense ofEuropeanism and a 
common loyalty to Europe; to mobilise public 
opinion behind the policy of unity or integration 
and provide a medium through which supporters 
of this cause can make their influeace felt. 
65. But these private organisations are not 
especially familiar with European security and 
defence issues. It was therefore important that 
the President of the Maison de I 'Europe in Paris . 
and the President of the European Movement 
invited the Secretary-General of Western Euro-
pean Union to speak on Western European 
Union in its European and Atlantic dimensi6n at 
a conference organised on 5th May 1986. In 
order to enlarge the forums in which European 
security and defence problems might be dis-
cussed with the public, parliamentarians should 
support all efforts to introduce these subjects 
into existing private associations or to create new 
associations or foundations dealing especially 
with Europoean defence problems. 
66. Last but not least, your Rapporteur is con-
vinced that political groups and political parties 
could do more to intensify information and dis-
cussions on European security matters in mem-
ber countries. Some major political parties, for 
instance in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
but also in other countries, have created politkal 
foundations with considerable funds which regu-
larly organise seminars and conferences. In . 
establishing the working programmes of these 
foundations questions of European security and 
defence and the role of Western European Union 
should not be forgotten. 
257 
DOCUMENT 1080 
VII. Conclu1ions 
67. It is obvious that the problems of WEU's 
reactivation and its functions in security and 
defence questions, as well as subjects covered in 
Assembly recommendations, played a considera-
ble role in the parliamentariy debates in several 
member countries throughout the last six 
months. But the intensity of these debates var-
ied from. country to country. Your Rapporteur 
has no informatien about such debates in the 
Netherlands, where parliament had to be recon-
stituted after the general election. 
68. Nevertheless, without presuming to have 
filii information about debates in parliaments, 
your Rapporteur has the impression that only a 
few and often the same members are really active 
for WEU in their parliaments. The present 
repott can refer to parliamentary action by fif-
teen representatives. This is not very encourag-
ing taking into account that the WEU Assembly 
is composed ofeighty-nine representatives plus 
an equal number of substitutes. 
69. The Corill'liittee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations appeals to all members to let it 
know more about their activities. The national 
delegations, and particularly the secretaries who 
attend meetings of the committee, are invited to 
·provide the committee, thro~gh the Office of the 
Clerk, with early information about defence and 
security debates in their parliaments. 
70. For the first time, on 21st May 1986, the 
United Kingdom Government produced a writ-
ten report to parliament on the activities of the 
Council of WEU and its ministerial organs. 
This initiative is to be warmly welcomed and 
will hopefully becOme permanent practice. Con-
v6t.sely, the first part of the thirty-second annual 
report of the Council to the Assembly says noth-
ing about its activities in informing the public. 
71. The publication of the orange booklet with 
the texts adopted and the brief account of the 
session should be accelerated. Its contents and 
· presentation should be improved. 
· 72. In order to enlarge the forums in which 
European ~curity and deferce problems might 
be explained and discussed with the public, 
members of the Assembly should endeavour to 
interest appropriate private associations in these 
matters or instigate the creation of associations 
dealing especially with European defence prob-
·lems. 
Document 1081 
Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union 
INFORMATION REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 2 
by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur 
This report has been circulated separately as a booklet. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Order 
on the outline of a new b()(Jkiet on 
Western European Union 
17th November 1986 
(i) Noting the report on the outline of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations; 
(ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians 
and the public in member countries, 
INSTRUCTS its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
1. To ensure that a booklet based on the text submitted is published as soon as possible in the five 
languages of the WEU member countries; 
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is regularly brought up to date. 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Lady Jill Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca, Enders (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Cavaliere (Alternate: 
Gtust), De Bondt, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Goerens, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Mercier, Dr. Miller (Alternate: Co!eman). MM. 
Noerens, Seitlinger (Alternate: de Chambrun), Tummers (Alternate: Eysink), Mrs. van der WerfTerpstra. 
N. B. The names of those taking part in the vote are prznted tn italics. 
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 432 to 437 
RECOMMENDATION 432 1 
on the reactivation of WEU -
its tasks, structure and place in Europe 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting the interest in the reactivation ofWEU shown by several European member countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance; 
(ii) Stressing that the interest in the activities ofWEU shown by many European member countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance is closely linked with the effectiveness of the Council's political activities; 
(iii) Considering that abolition of the lists of armaments subject to control and the new direction given 
to WEU following the Rome declaration will allow consideration to be given to enlarging WEU once it 
has been given definite terms of reference; 
(iv) Recalling Portugal's application for membership of WEU and welcoming the results of the refe-
rendum held in Spain on 12th March 1986; 
(v) Considering that the delay in transmitting the thirty-first annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly makes it impossible to adopt an answer to that report in time for the first part of the thirty-
second session of the Assembly; 
I 
(vi) Welcoming the efforts made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Secretary-General 
to develop a dialogue with the Assembly; 
(vii) Recalling that information which cannot be given officially to all members of the Assembly can-
not be counted as part of this dialogue; 
(viii) Noting that many texts which the Council promised the Assembly have not been sent and that the 
Assembly is therefore not kept properly informed of the activities of the Permanent Council, the wor-
king groups and the agencies; 
(ix) Regretting that the permanent tasks assigned to the agencies are inadequate and vague; 
(x) Considering that in these circumstances the Assembly's tasks of supervision, criticism and cen-
sure of the Council remain fundamental, which means that the Assembly must remain completely inde-
pendent of the Council, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Keep the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance informed of and associated with its 
activities insofar as the modified Brussels Treaty allows this, particularly in regard to co-operation in 
armaments matters, in the hope that it will be possible to achieve greater rationalisation and overall har-
monisation in this area; 
2. Study the consequences of the possible accession of Spain and Portugal tb WEU so as to take 
favourable action without delay on Portugal's application and to propose that Spain accede to the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty; 
3. Ensure that the Assembly is kept regularly informed of all the Council's activities at a frequency 
and in time to allow a fruitful dialogue between the two organs of WEU; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
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4. Present the information which it itself, its Chairman-in-Office or the Secretary-General give the 
Assembly in such a way that it may be transmitted to all members of the Assembly; 
5. Within reasonable time-limits, allow the Assembly to benefit from the studies conducted by the 
agencies and working groups after expurgating those parts which are classified secret; 
6. Ensure that, in addition to the conjunctural studies requested by the Council, the agencies have 
pemurnent tasks with due independence of action for implementing them; 
7. Inter alia, instruct Agency 11 to organise a European institute for advanced defence studies, whose 
tasks will have been defined by the Council, in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Recommendation 429. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 432 
1. The Council stated after its meeting in Rome on 27th October 1984 that ~ better utilisation of 
WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an·improvement in the 
common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its mem-
bers. In the field of arms co-operation, WEU's objective is to help maintain the political impetus for 
the work of the IEPG and to contribute substantively in support of it wherever possible. The IEPG, 
-·which comprises all the European member states ofNATO, is the main forum through which European 
oollaboration in the field of armaments is organised. The aim of such collaboration is the creation of a 
Jenuine two-way street and better defence at lower cost through the rationalisation and harmonisation 
of European defence industries, and the creation of more competitive European defence industries and 
the creation of a more competitive European defence/industrial base. 
2. On the question of enlargement, the Council's position at present remains as stated in its reply to 
Written Question 265, which was sent to the Assembly on 30th July 1986. 
3. The Council is convinced that a fruitful dialogue with the Assembly involving a regular exchange 
of information and a better co-ordination of objectives and work programmes is an essential prerequi-
site for the proper functioning ofWEU. To speed up the flow of information, the Council is to present 
its report in two six-monthly parts and will provide, if appropriate, written information on certain of its 
activities, with due regard of course for the rules of confidentiality to which it is subject. 
4. The Council would like to point out that the tasks it assigns to the agencies are of two types, 
namely ad hoc studies on the one hand and monitoring studies and periodic reports on the other. 
At their meeting in Rome in November 1985, the Ministers of WEU approved a number of tasks 
for the three agencies. These agencies were set up to provide specific technicallcontributions to the 
work of the Council to enable it, as the competent political organ ofWEU, to make analyses and draw 
conclusions. All these studies will therefore be internal working documents for the Council for its 
reflection on the subjects addressed. 
5. The Council is convinced that a commitment to reflection, research and training in the field of 
strategic studies is very important for the future of European security. Ministers at Venice instructed 
the Permanent Council to make proposals on ways of strengthening co-operation between existing Euro-
pean institutes for security studies. To this end, the Secretary-General has sought expert advice. In 
pursuing its reflection on this subject, the Council will of course take budgetary implications into 
account. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th October 1986. 
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RECOMMENDATION 433 1 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 
1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Considering that: 
(a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial 
organs ofWEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration; 
(b) each of these budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explana-
tory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a 
document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and trans-
mitted to the Council; 
(c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned docu-
ments and of the others produced durj.ng the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a 
regular basis; 
(d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extraor-
dinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the evo-
lution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero growth 
criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments; 
(e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the 
sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of 
the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in 
October 1984 to have the Assembly " play a growing role "; 
(f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial 
organs increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to 
provide a better guarantee of its autonomy and independence; 
(g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body 
should be given responsibility for this task; 
(iii) Regretting that: 
(a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget ofthe Paris agencies whereas the Assem-
bly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been rejected; 
(b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a 
telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services ofWEU as well as by parliamentarians; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has adop-
ted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL: 
1. Examine the possibility of: 
(a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different 
documents; 
(b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories 
of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolu-
tion of these budgets; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admi-
nistration (Document 1054). 
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2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its budge-
tary decisions; 
3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure for approving Assembly 
budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and independence; 
4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3 posts which are given 
top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986; 
5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an independent body for the 
administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with the other co-ordinated organisa-
tions; 
6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay down a general rule on 
the subject applicable to all WEU staff; 
7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it being understood that the 
telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and 
cost-sharing to be agreed among them; 
8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs of WEU to achieve future cost-
saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private industry to investi-
gate this matter and make recommendations. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 433 
1. (a) The form in which the budget of the ministerial organs is presented is the outcome of careful 
study by the Budget and Organisation Committee. It has been reviewed and amended during the past 
two years. The intention is to submit to governments in one document all the information necessary to 
form a judgment. This same document, once approved by the Council, is made available to the 
Assembly. 
Because of the evolving process of reform, the documentary aspect has been, exceptionally, more 
complex. A number of documents were necessary as adjustments were made to take account in parti-
cular of staff changes. Equally, certain aspects of the budgets involved classified material which could 
not be made generally available. 
(b) A subdivision into ordinary and extraordinary expenditure and income has been considered 
in previous years several times by the Budget and Organisation Committee. It was concluded however 
that such a presentation would not be satisfactory in the case of the WEU budget where so clear a dis-
tinction between these categories of expenditure cannot be made. Governments have preferred to 
maintain the present system on the assumption that a substantial and detailed explanation for each item 
of expenditure is given in Part II of the budget. 
2. The Council will ensure that documents relating to budgetary decisions affecting all parts of the 
organisation or matters of budgetary policy will be transmitted to the Office of the Clerk where no pro-
blems of confidentiality or security classification are involved. 
3. The Council at present applies the procedures established under the Financial Regulations and 
the agreements reached previously between the Council and the Assembly, by which the Council is 
required to examine and express an opinion on the Assembly's budget before it can be finally adop-
ted. The question of amending this procedure has been raised in the past. There has frequently been 
formal and informal consultation at joint meetings and in the course of contacts between representatives 
of the Presidential Committee, the President of the Council and the Secretary-General. 
As the Council stated in paragraph 6 of its reply to Recommendation 429, it has noted the Assem-
bly's wish for greater autonomy. However, it would be difficult to meet this wish because of different 
budget control procedures in member countries. Nevertheless, the Council has approved some simpli-
fications - along the lines desired by the Assembly - in the way the ministerial organs' budget is presen-
ted, which the Assembly might find appropriate for its own budget. 
4. The creation of two new B3 grade posts must be seen in the light of detailed job requirements, not 
only in the context of the Assembly itself, but also in the wider context ofWEU as a whole and the over-
all budgetary limits required by governments. 
5. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions would involve the co--
operation of other international organisations and would have to take account of complex legal and 
managerial considerations. It is a matter which the Council will pursue having due regard to the evol-
ving situation regarding pensions. 
6. The general principle of dual grading is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved 
position in the establishment table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to 
recruit staff who are judged to possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous 
experience. 
Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and beyond the 
approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment. 
7. Recognising the importance of effective communication between the various organs ofWEU, the 
Council is currently studying the possibilities for improving the present practices; a number of sugges-
tions may be contemplated, including that put forward by the Assembly for the installation of a telex, or 
the use of facsimile equipment or even the installation of a system which could be based on the ones 
used by other bodies such as European political co-operation. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th October 1986. 
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The final choice would of course depend on requirements, the versatility of the equipment and 
the budgetary implications. The installation of new equipment should therefore be examined by the 
appropriate bodies in this light, and in the context of budgetary considerations on the whole. 
8. The approach to the use of a private consultant should not be piecemeal, particularly in view of 
the cost of consultancy. In the Council's opinion, a management consultant would be cost-effective 
only in the context of a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of the whole ~nstitutional structure 
of WEU and in view of the budgetary constraints arising from the application o~ the principle of zero 
growth. 
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on Canadian-European co-operation in high technology 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming Canada's participation in NATO, OECD, ESA and other international organisations 
and conferences together with WEU member countries; 
(ii) Considering Canada's achievements in the scientific, technological and aerospace sectors such as 
V-STOL aircraft, the Canadarm, the Candu nuclear reactor, energy from conventional and non-
conventional sources, polar ocean research and communication techniques; 
(iii) Considering that Canada is an associated member of ESA and that a new agreement will have to 
be signed in 1988; 
(iv) Considering Canada's wish to develop further its high technology industries and also its close 
industrial and political relations with several Western European countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member states: 
1. To study the possibilities of Canada participating in projects of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group and other high technology European ventures provided there is reciprocity and that 
Canada likewise adopts a most-favoured attitude to European research, development and produc-
tion; 
2. To promote closer collaboration with Canada in the European Space Agency by: 
(a) extending its associate membership from five to ten years; 
(b) widening the range of programmes in which Canada should participate to include new appli-
cation programmes such as ERS-II and TDRSS and also scientific programmes; 
(c) asking the Canadian authorities to use European hardware such as Ariane in joint ventvres; 
(d) inviting the Canadian space authorities to participate in European manned space programmes 
such as Hermes and Hotol; 
3. To consider favourably connections of Canadian firms and research institutions with Eureka 
projects; 
4. To approach the Canadian authorities for the promotion of European hardware in the internatio-
nal organisations in which they participate. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordmary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 1053). 
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1. The Council recognises the vital role played by Canada within the western community by virtue 
of its geostrategic situation and its political commitment. The Atlantic dimension of defence equip-
ment co-operation is, of course, covered by the NATO Conference ofNational Armaments Directors. 
As regards possible participation by Canada in the IEPG's projects, the Colllncil recalls that the 
IEPG is, as its name suggests, a grouping of European member countries which seeks to strengthen the 
alliance through improved armaments co-operation. In October 1984, the IEPG's Chairman visited 
Canada. It was agreed that close ties between Canada and the Independent European Programme 
Group would be of mutual interest. Such ties should be encouraged whenever possible. 
2. The European Space Agency (ESA) concluded a co-operation agreement with Canada in 1978; this 
agreement will expire in 1988 but is open to extension, renewal or amendment by mutual agreement. 
Canada contributes to the general ESA budget and to two programmes, Olympus (ll!trge communication 
satellites) and ERS-1 (earth resources remote-sensing satellite). The Canadian agency, Telesat, is pro-
posing to use Ariane to launch an Anik E satellite in the 1990s. Canada is currently studying the possi-
bility of participation in the Hermes project. A continuation of the present co-operation and an invol-
vement in new projects is to be expected. 
3. At the ministerial conference on 30th June 1986 in London, the ministers agreed not to increase 
for the time being the number of countries participating in the Eureka programme. The ministers 
noted, however, that participation in Eureka projects by enterprises or institutes frqm third countries is 
not excluded. Governments do not invite participants; only the companies. Interested Canadian 
enterprises or research institutes are therefore free to contact project partners from Eureka countries 
with regard to their participation in specific projects. In accordance with the flexible character of the 
Eureka concept, the final decision on project participation will be taken by the project partners. 
4. The Council is convinced that the strengthening of links between Canada and the Western Euro-
pean countries can only be to their mutual benefit. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 27th October 1986. 
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the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty is an essential basis for European 
co-operation in external policy matters; 
(ii) Considering that in certain areas no western organisation is able to replace the WEU Council for 
the application of this article of the treaty; 
(iii) Deploring the fact that the seven governments have not yet made use ofthe WEU Council to exa-
mine matters which constitute a threat to international peace and stability; 
(iv) Recalling however its Recommendation 396 concerning the alliance machinery for dealing with 
developments beyond the NATO area, and reiterating its belief" that in the case of such developments 
which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance the ready assis-
tance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond 
the area"; 
(v) Recalling that the Rome declaration confirmed the WEU Council's vocation to play an active 
part in the application of Article VIII; 
(vi) Recalling that relations between certain member countries and countries outside Europe call for 
continuous exchanges of views between the WEU countries; 
(vii) Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to international 
peace and security; 
(viii) Considering that the recrudescence of international terrorism is also a serious threat to internatio-
nal peace and security and may seriously unsettle western society if effective countermeasures are not 
taken; 
(ix) Welcoming the fact that international society has started to take up the challenge of terrorism, but 
regretting the absence of any significant agreement about the means to be used to this end and deploring 
the consequences ofthis division, considering how essential it is to agree on the measures to be taken; 
(x) Regretting that no effective co-ordinated measures, whether preventive or repressive, have been 
taken against terrorist actions before the United States action against Libya, but recalling that the mem-
bers of the Assembly give preference to political and diplomatic channels for solving the problem of 
international terrorism, while not precluding any other appropriate measures if it proves impossible to 
succeed by negotiation; 
(xi) Welcoming as a modest step forward the intentions announced by the Twelve on 27th January, 
and 14th and 22nd April1986 and the firm diplomatic and juridical measures agreed at the Tokyo sum-
mit on 5th May 1986; 
(xii) Considering that only the co-ordination of measures taken by the states in question can meet the 
situation created by international terrorism; 
(xiii) Recalling that this co-ordination is all the more necessary after the launching by Libya of two mis-
siles towards the island ofLampedusa, which constituted a true act of war against a member country of 
WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1.1. Effectively apply Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty as it planned when adopting para-
graph 8 of the Rome declaration in October 1984 and, in particular, meet each time crises outside the 
North Atlantic Treaty area require it to do so and whenever consultations among the Twelve seem unli-
kely to meet the situation; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (7th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Docu-
ment 1057). 
268 
2. Follow attentively developments in the war between Iraq and Iran and: 
(a) promote the return to a fair, lasting peace; 
(b) strongly denounce any violation of the laws of war by either side; 
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(c) concert action by member countries to prevent any extension of the war and to ensure the 
safety of navigation in the Gulf; 
3. Confirm that the development of international terrorism brings into play the application of Arti-
cle VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in this context: 
(a) promote and participate effectively in international consultations to counter terrorist action; 
(b) apply systematically the decisions set out in the twelve-power declaration of 27th January, 
and 14th and 22nd April 1986; 
(c) draw up a charter specifying the principles which its signatories would undertake to follow in 
the event of terrorist action; 
(d) co-ordinate the preventive and repressive measures which member countries are obliged to 
take because of the development of terrorist operations; 
(e) concert the action taken by member countries so as to deter effectively any country from 
affording assistance or encouragement to organisations practising terrorism; 
{f) seek an agreement between member countries that their courts will not refuse extradition 
applications for convicted terrorists on the grounds that the act (or acts) of terrorism was car-
ried out from political motives. 
11. For these purposes, the Assembly endorses the call for action its President a4dressed to the Coun-
cil and recommends that the Council instruct the appropriate WEU agencies to re,ort without delay on 
the various aspects of the threat international terrorism constitutes for the western defence system, indi-
viduals and public freedoms and define the measures which member countries should take to counter 
terrorism effectively. 
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1. Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty stipulates that, at the request of any of 
the member states, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with 
regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, 
or a danger to economic stability. As stated in the Rome declaration of October 1984, the member 
states of WEU may consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. The 
ministerial meetings and the regular meetings of the WEU Council at Permanent Representative level 
provide the Council with an opportunity for discussing questions of this nature. 
2. The Council is aware of the potentially serious consequences of the Iran/Iraq conflict for the secu-
rity of the entire region. This war could indeed create an even greater polarisation among the countries 
concerned which would not only further complicate the search for a peace settlement but could also 
have serious repercussions more widely. 
The Council is extremely concerned at the violations of the rules of war which have occurred 
during this conflict and which have led to additional suffering, thus further diminishing the chances of a 
peaceful settlement. However, the Council supports the efforts being made, particularly by the United 
Nations, the non-aligned states and the Islamic Conference, to find a solution, as well as the demarches 
of the Twelve in this respect. 
3. The Council reiterates that, at their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th Aprill986, the Ministers 
underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of 
Western Europe had agreed upon to combat the scourge of international terrorism. It also points to the 
establishment by the Twelve, at their meeting in Brussels on 27th January 1986, of a permanent working 
group on terrorism questions and the decision taken at that meeting not to export arms or any other 
military equipment to countries which were clearly implicated in the support of terrorism. It welcomes 
the measures announced at the Tokyo summit on 5th and 6th May 1986 covering, inter alia, restrictions 
on the diplomatic missions of states which engage in terrorist activities, improved extradition procedu-
res and the closest possible bilateral and multilateral co-operation between police and security organisa-
tions. This willingness for greater international co-operation to eliminate terrorism was also evident in 
the Halifax declaration of 30th May 1986 by the North Atlantic Council. 
The Council firmly supports the efforts by the Council of Europe, by NATO and by the Twelve, 
particularly - as regards the latter - within the framework of political co-operation and the Trevi group. 
In this context, the Council would recall the emergency meeting of European Community interior 
and justice ministers on 25th September 1986 in London, at which further counter-terrorism measures 
were agreed. As regards the problem of extraditing persons convicted of acts of terrorism, the Council 
would refer to the European convention on the suppression of terrorism, signed in Strasbourg on 27th 
January 1977. The purpose of this convention is to overcome the difficulties that may arise in the case 
of extradition and mutual legal assistance with respect to persons charged with or convicted of acts of 
terrorism. 
4. The Council takes the view that the WEU agencies, particularly the agency for the study of secu-
rity and defence questions, must also take account of terrorism when analysing the different threats 
facing Europe. In so doing, any duplication of what is already being done in other fora should be avoi-
ded. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th October 1986. 
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(i) Aware that by the 1990s information technology might become the largest manufacturing activity 
in the West; 
(ii) Considering that Western Europe's industrial success in this technology will brobably depend on 
the promotion of a European civil and military computer market; 
(iii) Aware of the report on the armaments sector of industry in the member coun~ries prepared by the 
WEU Standing Armaments Committee and the Council's answer on 20th March 1986 to Written Ques-
tion 262 put by Mr. Lenzer on the activities of that committee complementary to those of the Indepen-
dent European Programme Group; 
(iv) Disappointed by the Council's answer on the lack of practical steps to be taken to enhance the 
competitiveness of the European defence industry in general and of information technology in particu-
~r , 
' 
(v) Considering Europe's important role in space and its activities in space transportation, satellites 
and scientific matters such as the Giotto programme; 
(vi) Considering that the importance of this role demands an independent European effort within the 
framework of certain activities such as those relating to the space station but also requires effective 
co-operation with the United States; 
(vii) Considering the need for co-operation between NASA and Arianespace on worldwide launch 
price policies; · 
(viii) Considering that the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments should play a 
well-defined intermediary role in co-operation on weapons development projects such as the European 
fighter aircraft; 
(ix) Noting with concern differences in policies of member countries with regard to armament exports 
to non-member countries, especially those in conflict areas and even those which support international 
terrorism, which may seriously obstruct progress towards improved defence co-operation; 
(x) Deploring the Council's lack of political will in not preparing its thirty-first lannual report on its 
activities which cannot now be taken into account in preparing the present report, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Instruct Agency Ill, i.e. the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, to initiate 
studies on: 
(a) the establishment of a European civil and military computer market; 
(b) the possibilities of creating networks of supercomputers in Europe for civil as well as military 
purposes; 
2. Define, in co-operative weapons development projects such as the European fighter aircraft, a 
useful co-ordinating role for the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, with particu-
lar regard to European military industrial matters, taking into account the activities of the NATO 
Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Independent European Programme Group; 
3. Provide the Assembly with full details of this role in the thirty-second amb.ual report. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (7th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fourre on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions (Document 1055). 
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1. The Council agrees with the Assembly on the importance of information technology for Europe's 
future industrial position in the world. Information technology plays a crucial role in modern defence 
systems particularly in the field of command, control and communications (C 3). As far as co-opera-
tion between armed forces is concerned, and as the Council indicated in its reply to Recommendation 
419, data-processing systems should be interoperable, the prerequisite being the early harmonisation of 
national operational requirements in the relevant bodies. Some member countries of WEU have in 
fact already favoured the interoperability of data-processing systems in the armed forces by selecting the 
common computer language known as ADA. 
It is certain that European industry will not be able to compete in world markets unless it is in the 
forefront of progress in information technology. For this to happen, Europeans will have to create a 
structured and highly efficient European market for computers which is capable of meeting the challen-
ges from outside. 
The Council has noted the Assembly's interest in the activities of the agencies. 
It has examined the tasks that are to be assigned to the agencies and considers that the current 
priorities as defined by the Council are such that it is not possible at present to charge Agency Ill with a 
study on the establishment of a European civil and military computer market, or with a study of the 
possibilities of creating a supercomputer network. 
2. The Council draws attention to the wide-ranging activities of the IEPG and the CNAD (Confe-
rence of the National Armaments Directors) regarding the joint development of armaments production. 
Agency Ill should maintain contact with these groups in order to be able to draw on their analyses 
and conclusions in its own studies, and to avoid unnecessarily duplicating their work. The agency will 
thus contribute to the role recognised for WEU by the ministers, namely, to provide political impetus to 
bodies concerned with arms co-operation such as the IEPG and the CNAD. 
3. The Council will, in its future reports to the Assembly, continue to provide information as appro-
priate on the activities of Agency Ill. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th November 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th November 1986. 
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The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of a number of projects in the NATO and IEPG frameworks involvi:pg the application of 
the most recent technology to weapons and defence equipment, arising in particular from the United 
States emerging technology proposal, and SACEUR's follow-on forces attack concept; 
(ii) Considering that in many cases NATO countries could advantageously introduce modern techno-
logy more rapidly into conventional weapons systems to help offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority 
in tanks, guns, and aircraft; 
(iii) Believing that the European allies must examine all such proposals carefully, and that the intro-
duction of modern technology into defence equipment must satisfy the criteria of this recommenda-
tion; 
(iv) Calling for the possible arms control implications ofthe introduction of emerging technology into 
conventional weapons systems to be more closely studied, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ensure that current proposals for the introduction of emerging technology into conventional wea-
pons systems or for the follow-on forces attack concept meet the following criteria: 
(a) they should fit the conceptual framework being developed by the NATO Military Committee, 
and take account of North Atlantic Council recommendations bearing in mind the need for 
deterrence to maintain peace and security both in Europe and in the world; 
(b) they should be cost-effective and affordable within the limits of national defence budgets; 
(c) they should emphasise again the need for standardisation and co-operatiOn at European level 
which is also a precondition of co-operation between the European allies and the United 
States; 
(d) they should lead to a balanced and just transatlantic sharing and transfer of technology, 
research and production, and improve interoperability; 
(e) they should be capable ofbeing taken into account in current and future arms control negotia-
tions; 
2. Report annually to the Assembly on the progress being made on the list of priority projects selec-
ted by the IEPG; 
3. Instruct the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annually to 
the Assembly on the arms control implications of the foregoing proposals. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (8th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 1052). 
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1. The member countries of the integrated military structure of the alliance have sought to adapt 
their long-term defence planning in view of the changing nature of the threat and of new technological 
potentialities. Thus, the NATO Defence Planning Committee, meeting on 9th November 1984, appro-
ved the follow-on forces attack (FOFA) long-term planning guideline which is designed to enhance 
NA TO's long-standing conventional capability to strike against the second echelons of an aggressor. 
The Defence Planning Committee, at its meeting on 3rd and 4th December 1985, took note of the 
conceptual military framework and in this context also stressed the importance of emerging technologies 
for long-term defence planning. 
2. The introduction of new weapon systems incorporating sophisticated technology entails additio-
nal cost. This does not necessarily mean an automatic increase in the overall costs of defence provided 
that a qualitative improvement in the weapon systems makes a quantitative reduction possible. The 
criterion of financial feasibility is a key factor in the choices made by the governments concerned; they 
also take steps to ensure that other components of defence are not weakened by the introduction of new 
conventional technologies. 
3. In the area of new technologies, the setting up of co-operative programmes from the outset is the 
best way of helping to ensure that projects are carried out on financially acceptable bases and under 
conditions that guarantee maximum operational effectiveness. 
4. As the Council stated in its reply to Recommendation 414, it would like to see the establishment 
of a balanced two-way street in arms procurement between the United States and Europe. 
5. The introduction of new conventional weapon systems corresponds to operational criteria and 
technological developments which the alliance could not disregard without jeopardising its security and 
deterrence credibility. 
It remains the aim ofthe alliance to provide increased security and stability, if possible at a lower 
lev~l of forces. 
The allied countries concerned will take account of technological developments in formulating 
their policies in conventional arms control negotiations. 
6. With regard to the exchange of information and the concertation of activities described in its 
reply to Written Question 262, the Council is willing to inform the Assembly ofWEU activities with res-
pect to the enhancement of the competitiveness of the European defence industry. As stated in its 
·reply to Recommendation 414, the Council cannot provide detailed information on current or planned 
activities of the IEPG as this information involves a number of non-WEU members. 
7. As part of its examination of the arms control efforts being made at various levels and in various 
fora, the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions should also bear in mind the 
effects of the introduction of new conventional technologies on these efforts. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th November 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 13th November 1986. 
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I. Introduction 
1. The Presidential Committee, composed in 
such a way as to represent the various Assembly 
bodies and political tendencies, is responsible for 
expressing agreement on the fundamental lines 
of conduct which must ensure the political cohe-
sion of the Assembly. By adopting positions on 
topical matters, it takes account of the evolution 
of the international situation and thus guarantees 
continuity in the political dialogue between the 
Council and the Assembly. In recent months, 
this task has been of particular importance 
because of the meeting between Mr. Reagan and 
Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik and the thaw in the 
armaments control negotiations. 
2. In the context of its budgetary and admi-
nistrative responsibilities, the Presidential Com-
mittee also has maintained, vis-a-vis the Coun-
cil, its defence of the financial arrangements 
necessary for the Assembly to accomplish its task 
and has worked out a number of measures desi-
gned to allow the Assembly to have better 
control over its voting procedure and the mana-
gement of its budget. 
3. The Presidential Committee, the Assem-
bly's steering body, has thus fulfilled its duty to 
ensure the continuity of the Assembly's action 
between sessions at both political and adminis-
trative level. 
II. The Assembly's relations with the Council 
contacts. Meeting the wish expressed by the 
Presidential Committee, the Luxembourg Minis-
ters for Foreign Affairs and Defence welcomed in 
turn the President of the Assembly on 17th July, 
the Committee for Relations with the Council 
(enlarged Bureau) on 16th October and the Presi-
dential Committee on 14th November at the 
close of the informal meeting of the Council of 
Ministers. Still in the same spirit, the presi-
dency of the Council will for the first time be 
represented throughout the forthcoming session 
by a member of the Luxembourg Government. 
5. Thus, following the decision taken in 
Rome to reactivate WEU1 a new standard of 
relations is being developed between the govern-
mental and parliamentary bodies ofthe organisa-
tion. 
6. The Assembly is tryihg to establish a true 
dialogue with the Council1 So that they may 
carry out their mandate, PFtrliamentarians wish 
to be heard as well as infornlled. Their ambition 
is less to criticise than to epcourage. Informed 
by the President of the Assembly of the readiness 
of the presidency of the Council, the Presidential 
Committee decided to afford it its full support by 
informing the Council of the value the Assembly 
attaches to Europe makin~ its voice heard in 
East-West negotiations since the Reykjavik mee-
ting. This is indeed the condition on which it 
will be possible to answer the questions raised by 
this meeting and to ensure that Europe's security 
interests are taken into account. 
7. In the same spirit, the Presidential Com-
4. The Presidential Committee is gratified to mittee, anxious to inform the Council before its 
have found the presidency of the Council most ministerial meeting in Novrember of the Assem-
co-operative. There have been very regular bly's position on the matters it was to discuss, 
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adopted, after a detailed discussion, a memoran-
dum submitted to it by the President of the 
Assembly. This text, transmitted to both the 
Council and the Assembly, provided important 
points for discussion at the ministerial meeting 
held in Luxembourg on 3rd and 4th November. 
Having received general approbation, it will 
form a basis for discussion with a view to deci-
sions which will have to be taken by the Council 
at the ministerial meeting on 29th and 30th April 
1987. 
8. It is not for the Rapporteur of the Presi-
dential Committee to analyse the results of the 
informal meeting of ministers for foreign affairs 
and defence held in Luxembourg on 13th and 
14th November. It will be the task of commit-
tee rapporteurs and members of the Assembly to 
draw conclusions from the information received 
from the presidency of the Council, to express an 
opinion on the amount of work accomplished 
and to assess how much ground still has to be 
covered before the establishment of true Euro-
pean co-ordination on security matters, thus 
asserting Europe's views in the international 
forums in which problems relating to its own 
security are discussed. 
9. I merely wish to express my personal satis-
faction that, without having yet adopted final 
positions on the serious problems of the day, the 
Council has defined principles and made plans 
which should give it the wherewithal to discuss 
security matters, thus allowing WEU, in parallel 
with twelve-power political co-operation, to esta-
blish in a smaller framework co-operation on 
security matters which could be extended to 
other members of the Communities signatories 
of the North Atlantic Treaty when the process of 
reactivating WEU is completed next year. 
10. It would thus appear that the convergence 
of views between the presidency of the Council 
and that of the Assembly has allowed the dia-
logue between the governmental and parliamen-
tary bodies of WEU to be extended with a view 
to strengthening the reactivation of the organisa-
tion. This convergence was shown inter alia in 
the proposal by the President of the Assembly for 
creating a European political area by co-ordina-
ting twelve-power political co-operation and the 
work of the Seven. A common will has emer-
ged which culminated in the decision of principle 
taken by the Council in Luxembourg to give a 
European security policy committee formed of 
the political directors of the ministries for foreign 
affairs, and possibly representatives of ministries 
of defence, the task of voicing Europe's views in 
security matters. 
11. Furthermore, the presidency-in-office has 
stated that it agrees with the President of the 
Assembly in emphasising that the dialogue bet-
ween Europe and the United States is essen-
tial. WEU should be an instrument of this dia-
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logue. The Assembly, like the Council, will 
endeavour to show the United States that work 
accomplished in WEU, by giving Europeans a 
chance of speaking with a single voice, is in the 
overall interest of the alliance and of the United 
States itself. 
12. The Presidential Committee has said how 
much value it attaches to the enlargement of 
WEU. The Council for its part apparently 
wishes to re-examine this matter at the close of 
the reactivation process. The Presidential 
Committee hopes that the tasks of WEU and of 
the bodies which will have to carry them out will 
be clearly defined in the course of next year and 
that consequently a positive decision will not be 
postponed indefinitely. 
13. Finally, while it has been agreed that terro-
rism could not be countered by seven-power 
action, a clear, definite decision should be taken 
on the framework in which Europe must tackle 
this serious problem. 
14. In short, the Presidential Committee 
considers that the Council, instead of passing its 
tasks over to other bodies, should itself fulfil its 
mandate under the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Indeed, it is the only body in a position to define 
Europe's security interests. Following the 
Luxembourg meeting, there would seem to be 
every hope of this. 
15. It is all the more important for the Assem-
bly to be able to play its role in a reactivated 
WEU. 
Ill. Administrative action 
16. In the management of the Assembly's 
work, the Presidential Committee's first concern 
was to ensure that the Assembly has the where-
withal to take part in reactivation without being 
hampered by the inadequate means at its dispo-
sal. 
17. In agreement with the Committee on Bud-
getary Affairs and Administration, the Presiden-
tial Committee first wished to rectify the preca-
rious conditions in which the Office of the Clerk 
of the Assembly is working by including three 
new posts in the draft budget, two of which being 
for the administrative service. Provision was 
also made for obtaining sufficient funds to allow 
the implementation of the programme of mee-
tings and visits planned by the committees and 
approved by the Presidential Committee in the 
light of the agenda of the session. 
18. Unfortunately, the Presidential Commit-
tee has had to note that the experts meeting in 
London in the framework of the WEU Budget 
and Organisation Committee were above all see-
king to reduce the estimates in the Assembly's 
budget without taking into account the specific 
requirements of parliamentary work. Thus, in 
view of the increasingly heavy burden of pen-
sions with the retirement of officials recruited 
when the Office of the Clerk was set up, the 
reductions requested do not produce zero growth 
but a reduction in real terms in the amounts 
available to the Assembly for pursuing its 
action. The experts were probably not unani-
mous, but as is the rule in such cases the com-
mittee aligned itself on the most restrictive posi-
tions. 
19. After detailed consideration of the posi-
tions adopted by the experts, the Presidential 
Committee felt the conclusions they had reached 
were unacceptable to the Assembly and that 
there could thus be no question of negotiating 
with the Council on the basis of a draft budget 
resulting from application of the budget reduc-
tions proposed in London. Expressing the una-
nimous position of the Presidential Committee, 
the President of the Assembly wrote to the Chair-
man of the Council to invite the Council not to 
follow the excessively negative approach of the 
Budget and Organisation Committee's recom-
mendations but to adopt a position in confor-
mity with the Assembly's wish to exercise its 
duties in the framework of a strict budget, but 
unhampered by an effective reduction in the 
financial resources at its disposal and by staff 
shortages. 
20. The Council having postponed the mee-
ting at which it was to give its opinion on the 
Assembly's budget, its position is not yet known 
at the time of writing this report. The Presiden-
tial Committee hopes that with the support of 
the presidency-in-office of the Council, in which 
it renews the expression of its confidence, the 
modest budget it has prepared for 1987 will 
obtain the final approval of the Council. 
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21. The Presidential Committee has also 
endeavoured to improve the conditions in which 
the Assembly works. 
22. Anxious to allow substitutes to attend 
debates, even if they have n<l>t signed the register 
of attendance, and to ensure that votes by sitting 
and standing are in order, it decided to propose 
that on a trial basis at the part-session starting on 
1st December the Assembly introduce the use of 
voting cards. They will be handed to members 
signing the register of attend,ance and will confer 
the right to take part in all votes by sitting and 
standing during the relevant sitting. Clearly, 
votes by roll-call, which are inherently unambi-
guous, will not require the use of voting cards. 
But, as specified in the note sent to all members 
of the Assembly, all participants in a vote by sit-
ting and standing will have to show that they 
have the voting card they have been given which 
is proof that the provisions <1>f Rule 24 governing 
the exercise of the powers of representatives and 
substitutes have indeed been applied. 
23. Anxious for everything relating to its own 
activities to be as clear and stringent as possible, 
the Presidential Committee 'considered it desira-
ble for the credits available to political groups to 
be included in the audit pr<llcedures applying to 
other sub-heads of the budget, it being under-
stood that there must be full respect for the inde-
pendence of action by political groups. For this, 
too, there is an information note for all members 
of the Assembly. 
24. All in all, the Presidential Committee has 
endeavoured to provide the Assembly with the 
political and technical means of fulfilling its 
task. It is now for the Assembly to contribute, 
in agreement with the Council, to the expansion 
of the dialogue between the two parts of the orga-
nisation during the present session and, in so 
doing, to the strengthening of Europe's voice in 
the concert of nations. 
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APPENDIX I 
Methods of voting 
The Presidential Committee recalls that 
during a sitting the exercise of powers by repre-
sentatives or their substitutes is linked with their 
signing the register of attendance. It considers 
nevertheless that all members of the Assembly 
should be allowed to attend debates, even if they 
have renounced the right to vote by instructing 
one of their colleagues to sign the register of 
attendance in their stead. They might otherwise 
be denied a right which is granted to parliamen-
tary observers. 
The Presidential Committee also notes 
that it is extremely difficult for the presidency 
and sittings service to ensure that only parlia-
mentarians who have duly signed the register of 
attendance take part in votes. 
Consequently, after consulting the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, the 
Presidential Committee considered there should 
be flexibility in allowing parliamentarians who 
do not have the possibility of signing the register 
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of attendance to attend a debate in the chamber 
and, second, strict application of the rules when 
the Assembly has to take a decision or vote on a 
text. It therefore wishes to implement on a trial 
basis at the next part-session, which is to start on 
1st December 1986, the following provisions: 
The Office of the Clerk will be responsible 
for handing a voting card, at the moment of 
signing the register of attendance, to each repre-
sentative, or the substitute replacing him at a 
given sitting. Voting cards will be approxima-
tely the size of a post card and the colour will be 
changed for each sitting. 
Only members of the Assembly able to 
show their voting cards will be entitled to take 
part in votes by sitting and standing. 
Votes by roll-call will still be conducted by 
calling out the names of representatives or their 
substitutes who have signed the register of atten-
dance. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Auditing funds granted to political groups 
1. Since 1960 Assembly budgets have inclu-
ded a sub-head for the expenses of political 
groups. In 1986, the amount was F 300 000, 
shared between the four existing political groups 
in accordance with provisions in force since 1965 
(cf. document A/WEU/CP (64) PV 4), as fol-
lows: 
- a fixed subsidy of F 18 700 per group 
(making a total ofF 74 800); 
- the remaining amount (F 225 200) being 
shared in proportion to the number of 
members in each group. 
2. There has so far been no check on the way 
these sums are used. However, at its meeting 
on 3rd November 1986 the Presidential Com-
mittee considered it necessary to introduce pro-
cedure for verifying the use of sums granted to 
political groups. (This has been done in the 
Council of Europe since 1983.) After verbal 
and written consultation, it approved the follo-
wing regulations proposed by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration: 
(a) the chairman and treasurer of each 
group shall guarantee control of the 
use of the funds; 
(b) in each political group, two auditors 
appointed by the group from among its 
members will verify that the entries in 
the accounts have been properly 
made; 
(c) each year the political groups will issue 
a report on the use of the funds during 
the previous financial year in accor-
dance with the model balance sheet 
appended hereto; 
(d) before the end of March, this report 
shall be sent to the Office of the Clerk 
which will append it to the Assembly's 
accounts for submission first to the 
Assembly's auditor (Article 13 of the 
Financial Regulations) and then to the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Article 15 of the 
Financial Regulations); 
(e) no payment shall be made to a group 
until the accounts for the previous year 
have been received by the Office of the 
Clerk of the Assembly. 
Balance sheet to be furnished by Assembly political groups 
on the use made of Assembly of Western European Union allocations 
Assets 
1. Surplus at 31st December 19 .. 
(bank accounts, cash) 
2. Interest 
3. Appropriations granted by the 
Assembly of WEU for 19 .. 
Signatures of the treasurer and two auditors of 
the group: 
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Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff 
(salaries, insurance) ! 
2. Administrative expenses 
(postage, telephone, office supplies) 
3. Seminars and meeti~gs 
4. Travel and subsiste*e 
(members and secre~arial stafl) 
• I 5. InterpretatiOn costs · 
6. Representational exJ)enses 
(receptions, dinners) 
7. Sundry expenses 
11. Surplus at 31st Decem~er 19 .. 
(bank accounts, cash) 
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Written Questions 265, 267 to 273 and replies of the Council 
to Written Questions 265 and 267 to 272 
QUESTION 265 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. De Decker, Ferrari Aggradi, 
Kittelmann, Stoffelen and Vecchietti 
on 8th April 1986 
To ask the Council of Ministers what pro-
gress has been achieved in responding positively 
to paragraph 8 of Recommendation 429 in 
regard to enlargement ofWEU and when can the 
Assembly hope to expect a definitive reaction 
with most immediate regard to the application of 
Portugal which has already been submitted as 
long ago as 19th October 1984. 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 30th July 1986 
1. The Council considers that the interest 
expressed by certain states in becoming members 
ofWEU is an encouragement to the efforts which 
have been undertaken to reactivate the 
organisation. 
2. However, possible enlargement of WEU 
would involve the prior completion of several 
stages: 
- the reactivation process should be con-
solidated and the tasks and new struc-
tures of WEU confirmed. This will 
only be accomplished by the end of the 
transitional period on 31st December 
1987; 
- the Council should also examine in 
depth the political conditions and legal 
implications of accession, in particular 
the applicability to new members of all 
the provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and its additional protocols. 
The Council has begun this process. 
3. At the ministerial meeting in Venice on 
29th and 30th April, it was agreed that prelim-
inary contacts would be made with interested 
countries. In this context, the Secretary-
General held talks on 26th May in Lisbon with 
the Portuguese authorities. 
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QUESTION 267 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, 
Sir Anthony Grant, Lady Jill Knight, 
MM. Murphy, Schulte, Sir Dudley Smith, 
MM. Stoffelen and van der Werff 
on 30th April1986 
Has the Council under consideration on a 
continuing basis all aspects of present arms 
control and disarmament negotiations; and in 
particular has it agreed positions on: 
(a) the MBFR negotiations in Vienna; 
(b) the discussions in the conference on 
disarmament in Geneva on: 
(i) a comprehensive, verifiable nuclear 
test ban; 
(ii) a chemical weapons ban? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 26th November 1986 
The Council confirms its interest, as 
already indicated in its reply to Recommen-
dation 425, in the ongoing negotiations on arms 
control and disarmament. 
The Seven, aware of the difficulties of the 
East-West dialogue, wish to see this dialogue 
make progress towards the goal of disarmament 
and arms control. They support the efforts 
made by the United States with whom they regu-
larly have close consultations. 
Concerning conventional forces, they wish 
to see the East-West dialogue lead to the 
strengthening of stability and security in the 
whole of Europe, through increased openness 
and the establishment of a verifiable, compre-
hensive and stable balance at lower levels. 
Those nations of the Seven participating at 
the mutual and balanced force reduction talks 
(MBFR) in Vienna continue to promote the 
western proposal of December 1985. This 
sought to break a long-standing deadlock on data 
by offering to postpone agreement on force levels 
until after reductions had taken place. As far as 
future development of policy is concerned, the 
Council draws the Assembly's attention to the 
Halifax statement of 30th May where the coun-
tries of the alliance decided to set up a high-level 
task force on conventional arms control. This 
task force is building on the western policies that 
have been pursued at the CDE in Stockholm and 
at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna and is 
taking account of the document agreed at the 
CDE on 21st September 1986, as well as the 
recent eastern conventional arms control pro-
posals. 
Although the question of a comprehensive 
nuclear test ban is on the agenda of the disar-
mament conference, it has not been possible to 
achieve a consensus there on how this question 
could be tackled. 
Concurrently with these discussions, the 
group of scientific experts mandated to examine 
international co-operation measures with a view 
to the detection and identification of seismic 
movements has continued its work on the 
various international co-operation measures 
which could, if necessary, be applied to the veri-
fication of a comprehensive ban on nuclear 
testing. 
The Seven are also committed to the 
urgent conclusion of a comprehensive and veri-
fiable worldwide ban on the development, pro-
duction, possession and use of chemical 
weapons. They fully support the negotiations to 
that end at the conference on disarmament in 
Geneva and welcome the many contributions 
made by delegations from member countries of 
WEU. They are looking for a constructive 
Soviet response on the key verification issues, 
especially on challenge inspection. 
QUESTION 268 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, 
Sir Anthony Grant, Lady Jill Knight, 
MM. Murphy, Schulte, Sir Dudley Smith, 
MM. Stoffelen and van der Werff 
on 30th Apri/1986 
Since the fundamental raison d'etre of 
WEU's existence as expressed in the modified 
Brussels Treaty is to maintain the defence and 
security of Western Europe, what collaborative 
action can the Council of Ministers and other 
relevant organs of WEU institute and support to 
take positive steps to establish joint machinery 
to combat government-sponsored and govern-
ment-supported terrorism inside and outside 
Western Europe? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 19th June 1986 
At their meeting in Venice on 29th and 
30th April, foreign and defence ministers of 
WEU exchanged views on the threat to security 
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posed by international terrorism and underlined 
the importance of early and effective action to 
implement the measures that the countries of 
Western Europe had agreed upon to combat this 
scourge. 
QUESTION 269 
put by Mr. van der Werff 
on 30th Apri11986 
Like everyone, the General Affairs Com-
mittee has dealt extensively with terrorism, won-
dering whether it might be preferable, when 
necessary, to counter it in the framework of 
WEU rather than in that of the Twelve. 
Furthermore, such activity would improve 
WEU's position whose reactivation, since the 
Rome declaration, I feel has been marking 
time. 
The new form of terrorism, clearly aimed 
at our societies, seems to be coming from Libya 
and also from Syria and even Algeria and it is 
impossible for the terrorists themselves not to 
have the full support ofthe governments of some 
at least of these countries,. particularly Colonel 
Kadhafi. · 
Preventive and repressive measures must 
of course be taken without delay, but that is not 
all: we must above all see how to encourage 
forces against the practice of terrorism in the 
Arab countries. We should also ascertain how 
to deter the Soviet Union from affording large-
scale assistance to the governments of these 
countries and perhaps also examine how it might 
be possible to oppose such support. 
1. Does the Council intend to start such 
political activities? If WEU decides not to do 
so, will it really be done among the Twelve or in 
NATO? 
2. Who will take the imtiative? 
3. Who will be responsible and how and 
when will the Assembly be 'informed of progress 
achieved, if any? 
4. Does the WEU Cou~il intend to examine 
the decisions taken in Toleyo to fight terrorism 
and ensure that they are afplied in Europe? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 30th July 1986 
The Council hopes that the statement by 
ministers at the last session of the Assembly will 
have reassured the honourable parliamentarian 
about the progress of the revival of WEU. 
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The WEU member countries are greatly 
preoccupied by the development of international 
terrorism. As stated in the Council's reply to 
Written Question 268, they take the view that 
this question is already being tackled in other 
fora, where significant measures have been 
agreed. 
The Council points to the Halifax 
statement of 30th May 1986, in which the min-
isters of the alliance resolved to work together to 
eradicate the scourge of terrorism, and urged 
closer international co-operation in this effort. 
The Council also draws attention to the 
declaration made in The Hague on 14th April 
1986 by the foreign ministers of the Twelve on 
international terrorism and the crisis in the 
Mediterranean, paragraphs 9 and 10 of which 
refer specifically to the contacts which the 
Twelve may have with those states concerned. 
QUESTION 270 
put by Mr. van den Sanden 
on 30th June 1986 
Answering a question put by Dr. Miller on 
4th June 1986 on the Council's silence about the 
meeting of disarmament experts held in Bonn on 
11th February 1985, the Chairman-in-Office said 
it was because the meeting " was in a sense con-
sidered informal". Can the fact that a meeting 
- which the Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
had announced to the Assembly in December 
1984 - was thus considered informal be 
attributed to an intervention by American 
diplomacy with a view to dissuading WEU from 
handling disarmament matters, as suggested by a 
statement by a member of the WEU secretariat 
reported in the New York City Tribune of 6th 
June 1986? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 26th November 1986 
The proceedings of the Council of WEU 
and of other meetings held under its auspices are 
not made public because of their confidential 
nature. The meeting held in Bonn on 11th Feb-
ruary 1985 falls within this category. Therefore, 
the Council is not in a position to give further 
information. 
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QUESTION 271 
put by Mr. van der Werff 
on 15th July 1986 
According to paragraph 9 of the 
communique issued at the close of the minis-
terial meeting held in Bonn in April 1985, the 
Permanent Council was instructed to present 
proposals with a view to promoting European 
co-operation in armaments matters. 
At the same meeting, in addition to cre-
ating a specialised agency (Agency Ill) in WEU, 
the ministers decided to maintain the activities 
of the Standing Armaments Committee and to 
convene it henceforth at an appropriate level. 
Paragraph 7 of the communique issued in 
Venice on 27th Aprill986 shows that the min-
isters' interest in this matter has not dimin-
ished. 
To ask the Council: 
1. Whether it has managed to define the spe-
cific role of WEU and of its agency in relation to 
that of the various interallied bodies responsible 
for examining such co-operation, promoting it 
and, more rarely, implementing it? Can it 
define its doctrine in the matter? 
2. Whether the mandate it gave the SAC in 
its decision of 7th May 1955 has to be 
changed? 
3. Whether the SAC submitted a report to 
the Council on its activities at the end of the first 
half of 1986 in accordance with paragraph 11 of 
the 1955 decision? 
4. Whether the SAC will be convened during 
the second half of this year? At what level? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 17th November 1986 
In the Rome declaration of October 1984, 
the ministers stated that WEU should play an 
active role in providing political impetus to 
armaments co-operation by supporting all co-
operative efforts, including those of the IEPG 
and the CNAD. 
The Council has been reflecting on ways of 
translating this decision into concrete 
actions. All partners agree that this exercise is 
proving difficult because of the need to avoid 
overlapping the activities of WEU with those of 
the IEPG and the CNAD. This has already 
been indicated in the answer to Written Question 
262. However, this effort will be continued. 
In the meantime, bearing in mind the abo-
vementioned role, the Council has decided to 
undertake a process of reflection on ways of 
enhancing collaboration between the SAC and 
Agency Ill, so that the Committee can help to 
identify areas of research relevant to WEU -
approval of which would be the responsibility of 
the Council - and to outline, when necessary, the 
national positions of the Seven in this field. 
This process of reflection must be set in 
the current context of the transitional period and 
it will be only at the end of this period, i.e. 31st 
December 1987, that any final conclusions can 
be drawn. 
The SAC will meet in the not too distant 
future. Each member state has nominated its 
representative in accordance with its own criteria 
bearing in mind the decision taken at the minis-
terial meeting in Bonn in April 1985 that the 
SAC should meet at the appropriate level. 
Furthermore, the Council would inform 
the honourable member that it took note of the 
half-yearly report of the SAC for the period 1st 
December 1985 to 31st May 1986, which was 
submitted to it in accordance with Article 11 of 
the decision of 7th May 1955. 
QUESTION 272 
put by Mr. Antoni, Sir Frederic Bennett, 
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, Goerens, 
Lady Jill Knight, MM. Pecriaux, Schulte, 
Sir Dudley Smith, 
MM. Soell and Wilkinson 
on 3rd November 1986 
Considering that Portugal is already a 
valued member state of NATO and the 
European Economic Community, as well as 
being a country which has clearly demonstrated 
its active interest in all western defence arenas, 
what obstacles still stand in the way of accep-
tance of its formal application made on 27th 
October 1984 to join WEU? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 1st December 1986 
At their meeting in Luxembourg on 13th 
and 14th November 1986, ministers confirmed 
that the WEU reactivation process should be 
completed before a position on the question of 
enlargement could be adopted. The Council's 
view has not changed from that stated in its reply 
to Written Question 265. 
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QUESTION 273 
put by Mr. Close 
on 26th November 1986 
In the discussions :between President 
Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev: in Reykjavik, con-
sideration was given to elimipating intermediate-
range missiles (cruise and Pershing 11 missiles on 
one side, SS-20s on the other), with the exception 
of a hundred SS-20s based in the Asian part of 
the Soviet Union and a hundred missiles of an 
equivalent type based in the United States. 
This preagreement said nothing about the 
SS-21 s, SS-22s and SS-23s deployed by the 
Soviet Union in the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia. 
Can the Council answer the following 
questions: 
1. Since the SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s 
remain in place and the hundred SS-20s 
deployed in Asia are mobile and can be brought 
back to Europe at very short notice, what is left 
of deterrence at European level and the coupling 
between the United States and Europe so widely 
evoked to justify undeniably the deployment of 
Euromissiles in five European countries? 
2. Even if these agreements take no tangible 
form in view of the impossibility of agreeing on 
the question of the strategic defence initiative, it 
can be seen that the Soviet Union is conducting a 
vast psychological offensive to bring European 
and American points of view into conflict, which 
is their major strategic goal. 
What is Europe's answer to this point in 
NATO and above all in Western European 
Union? 
3. Why did the Council not define a joint 
European position taking account of the require-
ments of a strategy based on nuclear deterrence 
and the security of Europe before the Reykjavik 
talks started? 
4. In what I consider to qe the unlikely event 
of a five- and ten-year timetable leading to the 
total elimination of nuclear weapons, can it rea-
sonably be expected that the !United States space 
system would be set up and qperational in such a 
short lapse of time? If not, does the Council not 
consider that Europe would be in the position of 
a hostage in view of the considerable Soviet 
superiority in conventional forces and chemical 
weapons? 
5. In view of the lessons to be learned from 
the "truncated summit meeting", does the 
Council not consider that the strengthening of 
the European pillar of the alliance in WEU 
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should be effected urgently in a spirit of political 
and military co-operation which is lacking at 
present? What steps does it intend to take to 
bring about this strengthening? 
6. Is it not therefore essential to conduct a 
vast information campaign among public 
opinion and to make it aware of the conditions 
necessary for guaranteeing Europe's security and 
warding off the risks of a third world war? Is 
the Council prepared to grant the Assembly the 
means necessary for taking part in this infor-
mation campaign? Is it determined to take part 
in the campaign itself and by what means? 
* 
* * 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
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